Spear guidelines for IDPs

UNDP Sri Lanka Support to Mine Action Programme in Sri Lanka Project
Impact and Performance Assessment, June 2006
DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION 2/51
Table of Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................................3
I. Executive Summary and Recommendations.............................................................4
I.I Findings and Recommendations ...........................................................................................5
I.II Background and Rationale for the Evaluation ....................................................................7
1. Project Design...............................................................................................................7
1.1 Support Project...............................................................................................................7
1.2 Assumptions...................................................................................................................9
1.3 Compatibility of Objectives.........................................................................................11
1.4 Lack of Strategic and Risk Management Plan.............................................................13
2. Project Implementation.............................................................................................15
2.1 Cooperation and Coordination.....................................................................................15
2.2 Quality and Appropriateness of Structures..................................................................15
2.3 Capacity Building ........................................................................................................16
3. Sustainability..............................................................................................................22
4. Revised Project Strategy ...........................................................................................25
5. Analysis for UNDP Project Involvement until 2008 ...............................................26
5.1 SWOT Analysis ...........................................................................................................26
5.2 Analysis of Technical Assistance ................................................................................27
6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................30
7. Appendices......................................................................................................................31
A. Evaluation Methodology.....................................................................................................31
B. Interviews and Meetings .....................................................................................................32
C. Documents...........................................................................................................................34
D. Field Visits ..........................................................................................................................37
E. Revised Results Framework................................................................................................43
F. Revised Logframes ..............................................................................................................44
G. Terms of Reference.............................................................................................................47

Acronyms and Abbreviations
AMAO Area Mine Action Office
DDG Danish Demining Group
DEX Direct Execution by the UNDP of a project
DMAO District Mine Action Office
EC European Commission
EOD Explosive Ordnance Division
FSD Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GoSL Government of Sri Lanka
GA Government Agent
HDU Humanitarian Demining Unit
HSZ High Security Zone, area closed by Army for use
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MAG Mines Advisory Group
MAP Mine Action Project, of the UNDP
MMIPE Melinda Maragoda Institute for People‟s Empowerment
MRE Mine Risk Education
NEX National Execution of a UNDP project
NBD Nation Building and Development Ministry
NGO Non-Government Organization
NMAO National Mine Action Office
NPA Norwegian People‟s Aid
NSCMA National Steering Committee on Mine Action
PCIS Post-Clearance Impact Survey
QA Quality Assurance monitoring process
RMAO Regional Mine Action Office
RONCO American commercial demining company, training SLA members
SLA Sri Lankan Army
SLNSMA Sri Lanka National Standards for Mine Action
TA Technical Adviser
TIA Task Impact Assessment
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children‟s Emergency Find
UXO Unexploded Ordnance

I. Executive Summary and Recommendations
After more than two decades of conflict, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed a ceasefire agreement in 2002 which led to
hope of peace, stability, reconstruction and development. Humanitarian demining plays a
critical role in the first phase of the rehabilitation effort, as donors and development agencies
require a certificate of clearance before agreeing to commence work on sectoral projects.
Just as the laying of mines forewarns of conflict, demining can be the confirmation of a peace
process that will enable all sides in the conflict to create an equitable future. The UNDP
initiated this Project in support of the Government‟s Programme for Mine Action, in the hope
that it would return to productive use land currently suspected as contaminated by mines and
UXO, and further the overall development aims of Sri Lanka.
As this evaluation took place, the ceasefire agreement faced numerous violations which
raised the spectre of a return to renewed conflict. Demining activities were sporadically
disrupted in the North and East due to strike days and random attacks which led development
agencies to reassess their field presence. As some demining sites border high security zones,
ongoing clearance depends upon stability in the area.
Moreover, donors are concerned that increased conflict both between the Sri Lankan Army
(SLA) and the LTTE and amongst Tamil factions could lead to further laying of mines along
the defensive lines that divide these groups. Reports of the laying of new mines could not be
confirmed during our visit. Should that occur it is likely that international assistance for mine
clearance would cease, as it did during other phases of renewed conflict.1
Nonetheless, we gathered evidence of the value of UNDP‟s capacity building project and
identified ways in which it could continue to develop national and local capacity in a revised
format. As the Government Programme has extended until 2008 its target for creating a North
and East free from the effect of mines, UNDP could also continue its activities until then.
Indeed, it has undertaken to oversee a Technical Survey that will extend its current
commitment until the end of 2006 for at least a year.
However, as the primary aim of this support project was to build the capacity of the Ministry
of Nation Building and Development through a National Steering Committee on Mine Action
(NSCMA) and a National Mine Action Office (NMAO) to plan and manage mine clearance
activities and provide standards and controls for doing so, much remains to be done. In
particular, UNDP technical assistance has been focused in the North. The same support
services need to be developed in the East and within a Mine Action Office in the Ministry.
To develop a comprehensive approach, a joint view needs to be developed with the Ministry
regarding the authority and required expertise of the UNDP Technical Advisers.
In addition, the absence of a strategic plan that defines a precise and shared vision of how the
Programme will continue the monitoring activities of the Project when it finishes means that
even the UNDP Country Office is unsure of how roles are responsibilities should be
delineated.
If UNDP is to continue providing capacity building support to the Mine Action Programme,
it must have a more consistent and productive operating environment with the Ministry and a
strategic plan, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities between NSCMA, an established
National Mine Action Office, the UNDP Mine Action Project (MAP), and the UNDP
Country Office. This is the only way for the Project to create a sustainable level of mine
action capacity throughout all of the affected regions.
1
During those times, demining was continued by the SLA and HDU.

I.I Findings and Recommendations
Roles and responsibilities
The UNDP has succeeded in establishing this technical support project for capacity building
of the Mine Action Programme of the Ministry of Nation Building and Development, and in
supporting the establishment of NSCMA and National Standards. Its original scope foresaw
providing technical support to develop mine clearance capacity throughout the mine-affected
areas of the North and East. Due to different views on the scope of the capacity building role
of the UNDP and its Technical Advisers there currently is little Project field presence in east
of Vavuniya.
According to the National Standards for Mine Action in Sri Lanka, the Government should
have its own National Mine Action Office. The UNDP assisted in this role in the absence of a
National office. But as the UNDP prepares to finish its capacity building work and phase out
the Mine Action Project, the Government needs to set up and staff its own National MAO,
within the Ministry and coordinating with NSCMA in order to continue oversight and
coordination of mine clearance activities.
This is a DEX project and donors of the UNDP MAP insisted they would not fund these
activities directly through the Ministry. Donors have reiterated that they support funding
through the UNDP project because it assures neutrality in execution in a conflict region and
better access to all parties in the field. Furthermore, the UNDP‟s monitoring and reporting
process meets their needs. We foresee this project remaining DEX until it ceases, at which
point the Ministry and NSCMA would take on decision-making for all of the mine action
field offices.
Given the revised final target date of the National Mine Action Strategy, UNDP technical
support through this Project will not extend beyond 2008, and so the UNDP would like to
assure that the successes of the Mine Action office in Jaffna can be duplicated in offices in
Kilinochchi, Vavuniya and Trincomalee. It is only through this uniform coverage that the
Project has the chance of creating sustainable capacity for regional Mine Action offices. The
UNDP Chief Technical Adviser to the Project, in consultation with the Government, should
be authorized to set up and staff field offices in an adequate manner, with capacity building
activities and staff training within his purview.
To streamline day to day operations of Project activities, the UNDP Country Office, Project
Office, the Secretary and Adviser to NSCMA and the new director of the National Mine
Action Office should itemize and agree to the role and authority given to the Chief Technical
Adviser of the UNDP Project, which is under DEX execution. This Memorandum of
Agreement should spell in detail what each party undertakes to do and how the parties will
resolve future differences over activities. While it is important for the NSCMA to provide
general direction to the Project as a support mechanism to Sri Lanka‟s National Mine Action
Programme, the day to day management of operations should be left to UNDP, so that it
fulfills its obligations. Donors want to be sure that UNDP is unhindered in executing the
projects they have funded.
Strategic planning and staffing
 Not only does UNDP need a strategic plan for this Project, outlining the details and
processes of its last two years of support, the Ministry also needs one, so that NSCMA
and the National Mine Action Office can take over the activities of the Mine Action
Project, and assure ongoing quality assurance monitoring and database management. The
main issue to be planned is the transfer of skills and competencies from the UNDP
Project to a national Mine Action Office. The Ministry may then want to draft a strategic

plan of what demining needs remain (after the Technical Survey clarifies the issue) and
what resources are necessary to accomplish that task.
 The success of the UNDP Support Project rests with the technical advisers (TA) it has
provided and their ability to monitor the needs of mine clearance projects in the field. In
addition, the UN affiliation enables international TAs to provide a critical protection role
for local staff and international demining agencies as they work in a conflict region and
cross defensive lines.
 The TAs have developed district mine action offices (DMAO) and trained local staff in
quality assurance (QA) methodology, the accreditation process, monitoring of Mine Risk
Education (MRE), conducting Post-Clearance Impact Surveys (PCIS), and setting up the
IMSMA database. Loss of qualified personnel with extensive knowledge of the project
and the field would undermine UNDP‟s ability to fulfill its project aims by 2008
 As this project depends on the technical knowledge and experience developed in its field
staff, expansion of staff in order to provide thorough coverage in the North and East and
retention of current staff should be the first consideration as the UNDP extends its
Project. Local staff should be given contracts of at least one year in order to offer them
some basic job security and prevent high staff turnover and the loss of institutional
knowledge.
 Should UNDP extend this Project for two more years, a strategic plan must consider
what additional local staff should be recruited and trained now in order to leave behind
sustainable mine action QA and monitoring units to cover the North and East. Current
staffing is at a minimum level. In addition, the NMAO may ask UNDP to assist in
training their new staff. The Colombo office needs increased staffing to coordinate the
last main tasks of the Project: drafting a strategic plan, overseeing the Technical Survey,
and preparing to handover responsibilities to a National Mine Action office.
Mine Action Services
 The Mine Action Project Services of quality assurance, post-clearance impact surveys
and accreditation need to be refined to assure maximum utility. Mine clearance agencies
that fail the accreditation process should be suspended from mine clearance until they
pass. The review/appeals process should be formalized. MRE could go through the
accreditation process, even if informally.
 The IMSMA reporting system could be maintained after the UNDP Project finishes,
perhaps in the Survey Department, should the Ministry of NBD not be in a position to
house the database. The Ministry now has its own reporting system, which has inherent
inconsistencies according to NGOs who are represented in the statistics. The Ministry is
not using IMSMA in part due to the complexity of extracting information by untrained
users. The UNDP Mine Action Project needs to review the options and include the
IMSMA database in its strategic plan for handing over the project. However, to enhance
the effectiveness of ongoing capacity building in Mine Action coordination in Sri Lanka,
a single, definitive data pool should be the source of mine action information in the
country.
 Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance programmes are coordinated through
UNICEF. Quality assurance monitoring indicated some gaps in these programmes.
Coordination should be made with UNICEF to assess current needs and review how the
community will sustain these activities.
 Landmine Ban Advocacy in support of the Government of Sri Lanka signing the Ottawa
Convention and the LTTE signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment remains a goal

of this Mine Action Project. Donors did indicate a reluctance to contribute more funding
for mine clearance in Sri Lanka until these documents are signed, which may limit
resources available for continued UNDP involvement.
I.II Background and Rationale for the Evaluation
In an effort to support post-conflict reconstruction UNDP in 2002 undertook to support the
Ministry of Nation Building and Development‟s Mine Action Programme,2
promoting a safer
environment for the people of the conflict affected areas; the revitalization of land for IDP
resettlement; and to increase economic development that would provide sustainable
livelihoods. This was to be achieved through the establishment of national capacity to plan,
manage, coordinate and execute mine action and related activities, and thus contribute to a
positive mine action environment in Sri Lanka.
UN Mine Action comprises five complementary groups of activities: Mine Risk Education,
Humanitarian Mine Clearance, Survivor Assistance, Stockpile Destruction and Advocacy.
Within the UN system, the UNDP assumed the responsibility for addressing the
socioeconomic consequences of landmines, developing countries‟ institutional capacities and
supporting integrated and sustainable programmes for mine action. The UNDP approaches
the landmine problem from a long-term development perspective and creates conditions for a
return to normal economic activity, reconstruction and development.
The UNDP Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka project‟s primary purpose is to assist the
country to develop the capacities and skills required to manage its mine action programme
with minimal external support, and to ensure a high standard through quality control.
As the 2006 project phase nears it close, the UNDP seeks to assess its impact on the national
Programme and whether it had met its objectives. As a result of this evaluation, UNDP will
decide whether its continued partnership with the Ministry of Nation Building and
Development (NBD) in demining is productive, and identify where it needs revision in order
to meet the Ministry‟s revised target date of 2008 for a country free of the effects of mines.
1. Project Design
1.1 Support Project
The “Support to Mine Action Programme” (MAP) is a directly executed (DEX) project of
UNDP that was initiated in 2002 but began in its current form in August 2003. The Project
was designed as a coordination mechanism to directly support the National Mine Action
Programme in Sri Lanka under the leadership of the National Steering Committee for Mine
Action (NSCMA), and to set up support in the field for mine clearance. It was intended to
contribute to increased livelihood opportunities in affected communities and aimed to support
significant progress towards Sri Lanka‟s stated goal of making the country free from the
effect of mines and UXO by the end of 2006.
2
Then called the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

According to the foundation document3
, results would be achieved through the following
activities:
 Capacity building. Strengthen the national capacity to plan, manage and execute
humanitarian mine action activities.
 Support to mine action operations. Provide support to mine action implementing agencies
to conduct mine action activities.
 Support to resource mobilization and advocacy. Continue and improve a partnership and
resource mobilization strategy to support coordination of the implementation of the Sri
Lankan Mine Action Programme and for mine action operations.
The main primary results to be achieved by the UNDP Mine Action Project were:
1) To further strengthen and develop management and technical capacity of Sri Lanka
through the established National Steering Committee for Mine Action to coordinate mine
action activities
2) To improve the safety of the mine affected communities by reducing the landmine threat
through supporting the implementation of an integrated programme including the use of
Quality Management practices
3) To meet the needs of the mine and UXO incident survivors and to develop strategies for
their socio-economic reintegration
The project aimed to build the capacity of the Ministry and of district offices in several
aspects. The first was to have a central coordinating body, NSCMA, which would oversee the
policy and coordination of all activities related to mine action and track the tasking and
clearance activities of each demining agency in the field. The UNDP field offices would then
deal with developing the local skills to monitor demining activities and assure that agencies
were operating according to the national standards and that documentation of their work was
entered into the national database.
In fact, the UNDP Mine Action Office has carried out some functions of the National Mine
Action Office (MAOSL). The National Mine Action Standards explain the division of
responsibilities:
“The NSCMA is responsible for ensuring the conditions which enable the effective
management of national mine action projects. The NSCMA is ultimately responsible for
policy oversight and coordination, advice and direction on operation including National Sri
Lankan Mine Action Standards, Quality Assurance, Mine Risk Education and Victims
assistance
The NSCMA is responsible for establishing and maintaining national standards, regulations
and procedures for the management of mine action operations. These national standards,
regulations and procedures are consistent with IMAS, and other relevant national and
international standards, regulations and requirements.
In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the United
Nations, or some other recognised international body, to assume some of the responsibilities,
on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka and to fulfil some of the functions of the national
mine action office.
3
See Annex Documents

The AMAO will continue to provide operational coordination such as establishing priorities,
tasking, quality assurance and information management. Until the MAOSL is established,
many of the functions traditionally performed by a ‘national mine action centre’ will be
undertaken by the NSCMA acting on recommendations made by the Technical Working
Group (Chaired by the secretary of the NSCMA) which, in turn, receives recommendations
from a Field Working Group comprising of mine action operators and facilitated by
UNDP. At the request of the Government, some functions currently are performed by
UNDP in support of NSCMA and AMAO.” (Emphasis and italics added)
The text continues by outlining the role of the national Mine Action Office, which the UNDP
Project office currently supports:
“The MAOSL, once established, will be responsible for;
a) Policy implementation
b) the co-ordination or planning of all mine action activities in their area of responsibility;
c) the provision of technical advice to the NSCMA;
d) the maintenance of mine action records and databases;
e) (if delegated by the NSCMA), the accreditation and licensing of mine action
organizations;
f) the investigation of mine action related accidents and incidents; and
g) Monitoring, evaluation and training recommendations.”
Thus, the above activities of MAO-SL fall within the domain of the UNDP Project. Although
the Ministry has provided leadership and guidance, nominal efforts have been made to
transfer some of these capacities, such as the IMSMA database, to the Ministry. It is now the
time for the Ministry to set up its own Mine Action office so that the handover process from
UNDP can begin.
Overall, the activities of the UNDP seem well targeted in achieving the objectives of a
capacity building support project to the national mine clearance Programme. It has achieved
its aims to a remarkable degree, but still needs to focus on more uniform regional coverage,
and the sustainability of capacity building of staff and quality assurance processes.
While future staffing needs will depend on the pace of demining activity, the current work
plans for Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Vavuniya will require the input of a TA and expansion of
QA and PCIS teams. The territory covered by the Vavuniya office is too extensive, and some
operational tasks are not done, which is why original Project plans included a base in
Trincomalee. It appears the Vavuniya office needs the supervision of a Technical Advisor to
assure that the work gets done and staff are allocated in the most efficient way. Thus far, the
East is not well supported by a Mine Action Office. It needs a regional Mine Action Office.
1.2 Assumptions
NSCMA Cooperation
Although the goals of the UNDP Project and the NSCMA are much the same, there were
miscalculations about the nature of the functional relationship between the UNDP Mine
Action Project and the Ministry, as well as the role of the UNDP Country Office. The main
problem stems from limited delegation of adequate authority by the NSCMA to the Technical

Advisers to oversee the technical operations. As a result, the field presence of the TAs is
limited in many regions, resulting in uneven performance of the support offered.
UNDP aims to accomplish a technical work in a manner that will give thorough and quality
field support and build the capacity of offices to carry on the tasks after the Project ends. The
organizational chart accompanying the Project document indicates the UNDP Technical
Adviser playing a lowly role in the Mine Action Office.4
Although the Ministry prefers a
limited involvement of international advisors, it should be acknowledged that the TAs in fact
provide input to NSCMA, GA, and MAO, ans support the main roles and processes of those
bodies in demining.
While it is appreciated that the Ministry claimed ownership of the Mine Action Programme,
it does need to acknowledge that partners providing technical assistance that will enable the
Programme to function independently should be allowed to carry out their tasks with the
necessary independence to provide effective technical support, with a minimum of ongoing
consultation. The UNDP Country Office is responsible for the Mine Action Project‟s
contribution, and must safeguard that it is able to fulfill its donor mandate.
Clearance Rates in a Conflict Region
The Project made little allowance for disruptions due to renewed conflict. While mine
clearance rates increased in large measure once the government programme became fully
functional in 2003, in 2005 its achievements peaked. It will be difficult to forecast mine
clearance rates in this current period of unrest. Calculations thus far by the NSCMA are
apparently based on the best clearance rates, although the most accessible minefields have
already been cleared. The more complex and unmapped ones remain, and the mined “high
security zones” (HSZ) in the North and East are inaccessible at least as long as the conflict
continues. This makes calculation of an end state of mine clearance highly speculative.
Indeed, statistics offered by the mine action offices in Jaffna and Vavuniya indicated that in
Jaffna only 20% of the suspect land had been cleared. In Vavuniya and the East it ranges
from 2-10%. It is not clear what percentage of the uncleared land is high priority. The
technical survey that the Project will coordinate over the next year should reduce large areas
of suspect land and make the extent of future mine clearance needs more evident.
Although the UNDP MAP had originally envisaged assisting the NSCMA until the high as
well as medium-priority sites were cleared, it now seems that it may be handing over
responsibilities by the end of 2008 in line with the Government‟s revised focus and target
date of clearance of high priority zones only. Due to the renewed state of conflict that
interrupts clearance donor interest in this sector is also gradually decreasing. However, the
UNDP Project was not intended to oversee the last mine cleared, but to build government
capacity to perform the task and to meet ongoing needs. This strategy means that the Project
does not need to be interrupted by an increase in conflict.
As the Ministry points out, by 2008 it plans to have up to six hundred trained soldiers in its
own mine clearance team, as well as a potential pool of about a thousand other deminers
trained by the international demining agencies. As long as it now develops its own national
Mine Action Office with technically qualified local staff, the Ministry can be prepared to take
over from the UNDP MAP by the end of 2008. It can then reassess its human and financial
resource base and priority demining list. The cost of demining will be much lower without
the costs of foreign agencies and their higher local staff salaries.
4
See UNDP Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka, Annex

System Capacity
There is an ongoing assumption that the provision of skills to local staff in mine action field
offices equips them to carry out independently the projects and processes established by the
international technical adviser. There is little realization that it is often the very presence of
an impartial outsider that makes the process possible. We observed that the lack of such a
person in the leadership role led to adverse effects on team work, or slackness in operations.
Examining in detail the system and social assumptions in place is as important as developing
the skills of individuals. Without a keen understanding of the limited capacity of the system,
it will be hard for the individuals in the district mine action offices to sustain a high level of
functioning and quality assurance once the Technical Advisers leave.
While the Jaffna office functions well with current staff levels and no changes are
recommended, the Kilinochchi and Vavuniya offices need more staff and technical
supervision in order to meet the demands for the services and provide an adequately trained
pool of mine action officers to meet upcoming needs for the technical survey, ongoing
demining, and monitoring. In addition, the Colombo Mine Action Officer is busy responding
to urgent matters and lacks the time to tend to longer-term issues. Staffing issues should be
reassessed, especially as building the capacity of the National Mine Action Office will
require much planning and collaboration.
The Technical Advisers can best decide if some field staff can be shared between offices.
Right now Vavuniya staff cannot cope with the workload as well as travel to Mannar,
Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Operational issues are left undone. It may be that the presence
of a Technical Adviser could help that office allocate its staff resources for better field
coverage, but more staff will be needed if the Project seeks to do its job well. When
reviewing the anticipated workload to meet the priorities of 2006, the UNDP and Ministry
agreed to have three Technical Advisers and 1 IMSMA international consultant and should
proceed to filling the two vacancies that have developed since this decision was taken.
There is some question as to how the system will be maintained once the international
technical adviser is withdrawn.5
Perhaps demining activities will be nearly completed and so
a Mine Action Officer in the GA‟s office can coordinate ongoing activities, including Quality
Assurance, MRE and IMSMA database management. Again, broader representation
throughout the affected regions would facilitate this transition to national control. In the
meantime, short courses or short-term advisers could train the staff on some specific issues
that could improve Programme technical capacity and performance.
1.3 Compatibility of Objectives
This project had basic objectives related to capacity building for effective mine clearance and
was sought by the Ministry to help it coordinate demining activities in the field. Nonetheless,
the Project‟s aim of building technical capacity was at times perceived as being in
competition with the NSCMA‟s leadership in the National Programme.
The UNDP Project is directed mostly by Technical Advisers who provide expertise on all
mine action related systems and processes that can make this project a success. The NSCMA,
understandably concerned to keep control of the Project‟s contribution to the National
5
The staffing diagram as part of the original project document indicated a lowly position for the Technical
Adviser. In practice, he provides critical technical input at the top of the chart to the head of NSCMA, the GA
and the Mine Action Officer.

Programme, has tended to become involved in project management and operational details.
This relationship has not always yielded optimal delivery and efficiency of results.
In fact, both the National Programme and UNDP Project share the same main end goals in
mine action. The Technical Advisers have a good grasp of the needs of quality assurance in
mine clearance operations. They also encourage members of their staff to develop their skills
and present their findings as part of a constructive team. To develop a comprehensive
approach a joint view needs to be developed with the NCSMA (and the Ministry of Nation
Building and Development) on the authority and expertise of the UNDP Technical Advisors
who should assume the day to day management functions of the project under the overall
strategic guidance of the NCSMA.
The Government is relying on outside expertise for a limited period. Until then, it requires a
foreign field presence to assure completion of the Programme mission, especially in conflict
areas. Now is the time to set up a National Mine Action Office with an Officer who can begin
to observe and learn from the UNDP Project work in the field and be prepared to supervise
the field offices by the end of 2008.

1.4 Lack of Strategic and Risk Management Plan
Strategic Plan
The Government of Sri Lanka has set out a strategy for mine action that provides a view of its
vision for a mine impact free Sri Lanka by 2008. Furthermore, much work has been done at a
district level to establish a prioritization mechanism under the authority of the Government
Agents, and the relationship between implementing agents and the UNDP project are
exceptionally good.
However, the strategy does not provide a definition of „mine impact free‟6
and there appears
to be a risk of a shortfall in achievement with an end date set at 2008, if current progress rates
are maintained. Some demining agencies interviewed considered this date a reasonable target
providing the security situation does not further deteriorate and that access continues to be
given to minefield clearance tasks.
There is no strategic plan that provides a quantitative assessment of the resources likely to be
needed to achieve the aims of the strategy. There is also no agreed exit strategy for UNDP
and international involvement and little has been done by the UNDP MAP to assist with a
quantitative risk management strategy. Such a strategic plan is necessary in order to mobilize
sufficient human and financial resources in a timely manner.
The UNDP MAP should, in line with its stated objectives, provide technical assistance in the
production of such a plan for the Ministry and for the UNDP Project. The strategic plan
should be crafted to make allowances for contingencies and would improve donor confidence
in the planning process. It should include:
 The analysis of the capacity that should be left behind at the end of international
intervention in mine action in Sri Lanka, for operation by Sri Lankan resources, in order
to identify the training or equipment that might be necessary in order to help establish
such capacity. The high level of institutional development and education in Sri Lanka
suggests that any such interventions are likely to be small or moderate as much human
and material infrastructure already exists. However, a National Mine Action Office in the
Ministry must be established to oversee and maintain this process.
 A quantitative analysis of the resources necessary to achieve the “mine impact free”
target set out in the national strategy. The definition used by the Project is when “the
mined areas are not having a negative socio-economic impact on communities, e.g. the
mines may be in remote, marked and unpopulated areas.”7
In addition, MRE and marking
systems warn the public of uncleared minefields and UXO. It may be difficult to calculate
projected cost of demining as national deminers will cost far less than the international
agencies, and INGOs may not remain or receive funding if the conflict escalates.
Such a strategic plan will then help facilitate the generation of a suitable exit strategy for the
UNDP as well as for the international implementing agencies and foreign donors. This might
6
“Impact free” could be defined as being the point where there is no economic demand for the land left
uncleared, and where all reasonable and practicable steps have also been taken to prevent casualties in the
areas that remain contaminated. This definition has been adopted by the United States Department of State, one
of the largest donors to mine action in Sri Lanka. However, thus far, the “value” of the land in Sri Lanka has
been calculated for its importance to resettling communities, not for its economic productivity.
7
Murugathas, V, Guide for Technical Survey, p 6.

facilitate resource mobilization for a variety of possible scenarios. Not only was a strategic
plan listed in the original project Results Framework, it was also mentioned by the Project
Steering Committee in September 2005 as a priority need.
Risk Management
The security situation in Sri Lanka remains uncertain and has apparently deteriorated since
the formulation of the National Strategy. As a result, the implementing NGOs are reporting
problems with gaining access to task sites. This could have an implication for future progress
rates, as could the outbreak of war.
There is one particular aspect of risk that is specific to the context in Sri Lanka. The mine
action project has been designed and implemented to operate under the current situation of
“no war no peace” resulting from the 2002 peace accords. There are two significant risks to
the project that stem from this situation.
 Risk of destabilization through the collapse of current ceasefire agreement is felt to be
significant given the current situation. The implications for the mine action program
include:
o Loss of demining teams due to their recall to other duties
o Loss of donor support for mine clearance at a time of combat
o The risk of re-mining if full hostilities break out.
There are some risk management strategies that UNDP could help prepare for in order to
minimize the impact of such events. These would include:
o Maintaining the current RMAO structure to ensure continuity once the
situation re-stabilizes
o Providing a safe haven for the existing IMSMA records
o Preparing plans for a new impact survey to be conducted at the end of any new
period of hostility to re-assess the contamination.
 The establishment of a lasting peace settlement would require a significant revision of
the current clearance plans. Respondents from the Sri Lankan Army suggested that they
would need help from implementing NGOs to clear the high security zones so that
inhabitants could return. Risk to the public is low, however, as the HSZ would not be
released until they were demined.

2. Project Implementation
2.1 Cooperation and Coordination
This Project achieves a high degree of coordination and cooperation with donors, government
officials, the military, implementing agencies and UN partners. Demining agencies train local
deminers to conduct mine clearance. They also undergo accreditation and quality assurance
monitoring. Government Agents oversee the district steering committee meetings that set
priorities for demining and confirm the task completion. UNICEF and local NGOs assist with
Mine Risk Education (MRE) activities and rehabilitation of landmine victims. All
implementing partners submit their field data for the IMSMA database, and rely on Mine
Action Project maps in order to assess development options for cleared land.
The prevailing differences in interpretation and approach between the Ministry of Nation
Building and Development and the Project need to be remedied if this Project is to complete
its mission.
One area of limited cooperation and coordination was the support offered to the Project by
the UNDP Country Office due to its own restricted capacity. The very technical nature of the
Project has led the UNDP to delegate the main management responsibility to the Project. The
shortfall in human resources capacity seems to have been ameliorated in late 2005 and has
allowed for closer support on budgetary management and overall management guidance on
the side of the UNDP Country Office. It is recommended that UNDP Country Office staff
increases the frequency of field visits to strengthen their understanding on the issues affecting
the Project.
In addition, the oversight and recommendations of the Project Steering Committee seem to
lack a mechanism for implementation. Although many of their findings seek to assure the
Project reaches its goals, the question remains as to who takes the ultimate decision in
defining roles, responsibilities and strategy, and who enforces it.
2.2 Quality and Appropriateness of Structures
This project is executed through the DEX modality for reasons that continue to be relevant.
First, UNDP brings neutrality to the Project, which works across lines of conflict to serve
members of each community. The international TAs working under a UN support project
have increased leverage for protection of national mine action staff and have scope for
building trust and mediate between the different parties. In the light of the security situation
which restricts the movements of the MAO teams and access across defensive lines, this
strongly influences the overall success of the project. Second, the donors prefer to see their
funds administered by UNDP as UNDP procedures on monitoring and financial reporting suit
their needs. Third, the administrative management of the Project might put a heavy burden on
the capacities of the NSCMA, if it were to be administered by their office.

2.3 Capacity Building
NCSMA
The project began with the focus on building the capacity of the Ministry to coordinate mine
clearance agencies through a National Steering Committee on Mine Action (NSCMA). This
body is composed of all key stakeholders in mine action, such as the UNDP, UNICEF,
donors, clearance operators and other mine action organizations. The NSCMA is presided
over by the Ministry of NBD‟s Secretary and chaired by his Advisor, and meets every six
weeks to address issues in mine clearance that have occurred in the interim period.
Meetings provide an opportunity for mine clearance agencies, donors, the Government, the
Sri Lankan Army, Tamil representatives and other interested parties to provide an update of
their field work and to raise operational issues.
The NSCMA does provide a formal occasion for demining agencies to meet and review their
progress, and meetings are well attended. The Ministry also issues a Progress Report on Mine
Clearance, and the Secretary and Advisor are genuinely interested in making NSCMA a
success. However, in order to obtain a comprehensive picture on progress of mine clearance,
various sources of information are required. The mission met with agency representatives in
the field and visited their demining sites.
A key issue NCSMA needs to resolve is which reporting system the Ministry will adopt for
mine clearance activities. Currently it has its own system, while the UNDP Mine Action
offices are using IMSMA. It may be that NSCMA leadership can attend a short course to
learn more about how to extract valuable data from IMSMA.
Quality Assurance
Perhaps the most critical technical function that the UNDP Project plays is in the introduction
of the methodology that regulates mine clearance techniques and capabilities. Not only is it
of vital importance that agencies be exposed to the varied forms of clearance and the benefits
of each. They need to follow an approved system of marking a site that will lead to safe and
reliable mine clearance. Protective clothing, suitable working hours and break time, first aid
equipment on site, and other issues are checked as part of the QA inspection process.
MRE also undergoes QA visits. One such visit discovered that a local NGO implementing
partner had not carried out the family visits it claimed. As so much of MRE depends upon the
honest representation of activities, UNICEF then terminated the contract for services with
that agency.
QA teams are one area where this project needs to expand. Three teams of eight persons now
serve the project with random field monitoring. Each field office will need a QA team. The
training in survey methodology and analysis will make the Mine Action staff more useful
over time, as aims and needs in mine action are reviewed.

Accreditation
The accreditation process seeks to identify, through a realistic exercise, how mine clearance
agencies actually operate and whether their methods can be relied upon. Careless marking
and clearance may lead the government and public to think that a patch of land is safe when it
is not. Several mine agencies did not initially receive accreditation. They improved their
clearance and safety measures and today are respected for the services they perform.
Much effort has gone into establishing an effective and credible accreditation process in Sri
Lanka. The work undertaken to establish this process is commendable, and demonstrates
almost the ideal of capacity development, i.e. how UNDP technical assistance under the
guidance and direction of the Ministry of Nation Building and Development has developed a
capacity that is now overseen by a Sri Lankan institution (i.e. the SLA).
It is unfortunate that such an effective development is slightly marred by the reported fact
that one agency (MMIPE) has failed its accreditation but has been allowed to continue
operating. This has quality and liability implications for both the Programme and the UNDP
MAP, as the ability of an agency that cannot pass the accreditation to produce clear ground
must be in doubt. The situation is somewhat ameliorated, as MMIPE are apparently not active
at the moment. Assistance should be offered to MMIPE to enable them to reach accreditation
standard and resume clearance operations. The appeals procedure for agencies that fail
accreditation must be formalized.
Prioritization and Post-Clearance Impact Surveys
Prioritization of mine clearance sites in Jaffna and Vavuniya occurs through a highly
participatory process coordinated by the Government Agent. Sites are classified as high,
medium and low risk, with high and medium-risk ones first tasked for clearance as areas with
known minefields that cannot be easily avoided. Low risk areas are those that would have
little productive use, or are not readily accessible. One way to assess the prioritization process
would be to review how many accidents occurred in areas now classified as “low-risk”. It
appears that the prioritization process in government held areas is acceptable8
, and that
informal assessments of land use, value and accessibility are the deciding factors.
The Government‟s goal is to clear most high and medium-risk sites, in order to eliminate the
impact of mines, if not their presence. The actual success of a mine clearance operation can
be measured in various ways:
- the number of mines/UXO cleared(which is standard used by Halo Trust),
- the amount of area cleared or released( the variance of which causes some
discrepancies in reporting),
- the value to community life and resettlement
- the economic value of the cleared land. 9
Thus far, the government programme seems focused on assessing the first three, and
Government Agents (GA) in the districts repeated that their primary interest in prioritizing
mine clearance sites was the community life for resettlement of displaced persons (IDPs).
Although a cursory review of the Post-Clearance Impact Surveys (PCIS) available at this
stage reveals that most demined sites list the vast number of direct and indirect beneficiaries
as coming from clearance of roads, fields, schools, temples and electricity grids and not
8
Questions were raised about site selection in LTTE-controlled areas, especially the Vanni.
9
In this document, the term “cleared” refers to areas cleared of mines and UXO. In Sri Lanka the term “cleared”
can also carry the political connotation of land freed of LTTE control and under the authority of the SLA.

housing, we did see some evidence of resettlement.10
The PCIS also indicate some plans of
government and INGO assistance for housing development in support of IDP returns.
According to the priorities confirmed by the Government Agents, more effort needs to be
made to assure that cleared land is actually able to be redeveloped for resettlement.11
Consideration of the economic productivity of the land has been a factor in the areas where
farmers and fishermen seek to resettle, as each wants to live in an area that also assures his
livelihood.
Some revision needs to be made of the PCIS process to allow for a thoughtful analysis of the
practical effects of mine clearance. Norwegian People‟s Aid (NPA) uses a Task Impact
Assessment reporting format which provides a lot of useful socio-economic detail. Ideally,
the impact assessment process would have uniform inputs and survey methods to enable
better analysis of regional impact. And they would seek to identify what keeps former
inhabitants from returning to their land after it has been demined. Analysis of available data
suggests some factors, such as lack of livelihood or habituation to better facilities, but more
thorough research needs to be done, especially to include those who have not returned.
IMSMA and Reporting
This database set up by the Project not only collects information on mine clearance, but also
on the monitoring of quality assurance visits as well as activities relating to Mine Risk
Education. As the Ministry has its own reporting system, there is some confusion over the
ongoing value of the database, as at this point in time, no one at the Ministry will be able to
maintain the system once the UNDP project ceases.
Much work has been done to establish a credible and effective data collection system. The
MAO personnel are well trained in the issues of data collection and collation, and
comprehensive quality checking procedures are in place to minimize the risk of transcription
errors.
IMSMA is not a particularly flexible geographic information system (GIS) but the ability of
the UNDP MAP personnel to enter and recover data is commendable, even when compared
with other systems. Furthermore, the close relations between the MAO and the implementing
NGOs and the Army mean that the ability of the IMSMA staff to keep the data updated is
particularly good, with the cooperation of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) being noteworthy.
There are two problems with the current system:
Technical problems with the base mapping that the GIS uses. The current base map is a
scanned paper map and as a result this contributes to some positional errors of the data points.
Improved digital maps are available from the Survey Department and cooperation with the
Survey Department could go some way to improving the positional accuracy of the mapping
data.
Inability to analyze the raw data. IMSMA produces very accurate and verifiable numeric data
but the personnel are currently limited in their ability to interpret and analyze the data to
10
This from the Jaffna Post Clearance Impact Assessments of 2005 and 2006. Unfortunately charts from the
first year included beneficiaries of both resettlement and housing, while in the second year they were lumped
under the single heading of “housing”, making it difficult to quantify real numbers or chart differences between
the years.
11
During our visit, the High Court issued a ruling that required the government either to release private land
currently occupied as high security zones or to provide alternative lands for resettlement that would not
compromise original ownership rights. This identification of other sites in the heavily mined areas of the North
and East could require a reprioritization of current demining tasks.

identify trends, spot systemic problems in mine action implementation and track the
performance of service providers against a quantified strategic plan. This is largely due to the
lack of suitable technical advisers.
Largely as a result of the problems in interpreting the data presented by IMSMA, the Ministry
of Nation Building and Development has collected ad hoc progress reports from
implementing agencies. These appear to use different reporting periods and do not have
access to the comprehensive data checking processes used in the IMSMA framework. As a
result, the two data sets are different and diverging.12
This strains the credibility of the
reporting process.
It seems prudent that (a) only the IMSMA data set be used for reporting processes, but that
(b) effort is also made to improve its ability to support a credible analysis of progress.
It may be that IMSMA can be made more accessible to the Ministry with further
demonstrations of its content and utility, and how to extract desired data. When the UNDP
support ends, IMSMA records would be available as an archive of the Project‟s activities.
Ideally, they should be maintained in an ongoing system that could be of future use to land
use and survey departments of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), if not to the Ministry.
2.3.1 Mine Clearance Technical Operations
DMAO
The second aim of the UNDP Project was to develop a support structure to assist mine
clearance agencies in the field. These District Mine Action Offices serve the purpose of
building local capacity to coordinate, assist and oversee demining activities, with an emphasis
on Quality Assurance, Accreditation, Post Clearance Impact Surveys and interpretative data
from the IMSMA database. As mentioned above, current staffing levels allow for adequate
performance in the offices in Colombo and Jaffna. The presence of Technical Advisers means
that staff are well supervised and their skills are continually developed.
That is not the case with the offices in Kilinochchi and Vavuniya, where their resources are
stretched to the limits and things are left undone. In Vavuniya, task files are not prepared for
the demining agencies and completion certificates are not issued in a timely fashion. More
supervision would develop the competencies of the staff to match those of their counterparts
in Jaffna. The optimal resource needs of the offices in Kilinochchi and Vavuniya (and a new
one in Trincomalee) must be assessed by a Technical Adviser.
International Human Resources
Although much local capacity has been developed, the UNDP MAP is weakest in its ability
to provide support in the higher analytical functions needed to make the project most
effective. This is largely due to the small number of expatriate technical advisers (TA). It can
be desirable to avoid large numbers of expatriate technical advisers embedded in
cumbersome structures, as may be observed in some other mine action projects. However,
inadequate staffing of the Project has impaired the ability of the remaining TA to provide
capacity development assistance in better field coverage and comprehensive planning of all
key aspects of Project functions, the analysis of accident and post-clearance impact data,
MRE statistics and IMSMA data.
12
Halo Trust reports distinguish between land that is cleared and land that is released, which is a much larger
area. This could explain part of the discrepancy from dual reporting systems.

The increase in tension also makes the role of the UN expatriate personnel as independent
and objective monitors of activity in the conflict areas even more important, and so the need
for TA presence in Kilinochchi should be addressed. The TA from Jaffna can spend more
time there and test the sustainability of the DMAO structure set up in Jaffna.
Furthermore, the ability of the MAP to provide assistance in the East has been severely
constrained by the reluctance of local staff to travel from Vavuniya. The vast field area
covered by the Vavuniya office should be split in order to allow the establishment of a new
RMAO in Trincomalee that could also serve Batticaloa. In addition, the Vavuniya office
needs more oversight and training from a short-term Technical Adviser. Such persons should
only be needed for a limited duration, depending on assessed needs in a strategic plan.
Wherever possible, capacity development should be done on a project basis using short term
consultants, rather than longer term posts, to emphasize the transitory nature of the UNDP
involvement. Some of this short-term capacity development might be found through Sri
Lankan consultants.13
In addition, the Survey Department could be asked for assistance in
improving some of the cartographic problems.
Morale
As has been mentioned above, much work has been undertaken to develop a successful local
capacity in the Project Office and the Mine Action field offices. However, the morale of the
local staff is low and there is a considerable risk that the investment in human capital could
be wasted if these trained people leave for other jobs. Recent salary increases have helped
redress the inequalities with other comparable international agency posts, but three issues
remain:
 Security. RMAO personnel find it hard, under the current security climate, to make
journeys that put them at risk, particularly when crossing between Government and
LTTE areas. To a certain extent this problem is ameliorated by the presence of an
expatriate, but the journey times between Vavuniya and Trincomalee also add to the
coverage problem. It should be possible to divide the Vavuniya office in order to staff a
new office to cover the eastern districts without needing to recruit large numbers of
additional staff.
 Short-term contracts. The UNDP cannot offer contracts beyond the current project end
(i.e. December 2006) until a new project document or an extension is agreed. Short-term
contracts, coupled with the general unsettlement of the times, may encourage the local
personnel to leave for other, more stable employment. Staff should be offered annual
contracts.
 Uncertain relationship with the Ministry of Nation Building and Development. The
problem appears to oscillate between two extremes: on occasion the Project has
unilaterally taken policy decisions that were felt to be in the purview of the Ministry,
while at other times the Ministry involved itself in minor managerial decisions involving
travel, staff training and recruitment. The Ministry has the authority devolving from the
sovereign Government of Sri Lanka, while the Project is contractually liable to its donors
to achieve the results set out in its project document and funding agreements. This
uncertainty impinges on staff morale as they are not sure who is responsible for what
decisions. A clear re-definition of the functional relationship between the Ministry, the
UNDP country office, and the MAP should help resolve these issues.
13
Grig.Gen. Chandrasiri and his consulting firm may be one source of suitable expertise.

Staff morale is particularly critical in small project teams where the loss of even a few
individuals has a serious effect on the available human capital. In such cases, there is a very
strong risk that the project could lose the capacity that has been developed.
Capacity development is quite a fragile process linked to the working environment, the
quality and amount of technical supervision, accessibility of supplies and transport to the
field, as well as security considerations in this conflict setting. Adequate staff support over
time is the best assurance of lasting impact.
Technical Survey
The UNDP Project has been funded by the EC to undertake a Technical Survey that would
take about a year in order to help reduce the amount of suspect land and provide a more
accurate assessment of mine clearance needs.
Recognizing that not all mines will be cleared and given the current rates of progress, just
over half of the time taken to clear under 50% of the contaminated areas is available to clear
the remaining 50%, which underlines the fact that, assuming the same types of terrain and the
same clearance techniques, not all of the remaining land could be cleared by the end of 2008.
The technical survey may be able to identify the boundaries of contaminated areas. However,
the international mine action standard (IMAS) that covers technical survey is widely thought
of as one of the weakest IMAS, in that it does not provide clear and comprehensive
guidelines of how technical surveys should be undertaken.
The problem can be summarized thus: the boundaries of regular minefields that are most
suitable for manual technical survey techniques are largely identified during the standard
minefield planning processes, and the boundaries of irregular minefields – which are the ones
that potentially offer the most „reduction‟ - cannot be reliably identified by manual
techniques. Area reduction in such sparsely mined areas can only be suitably achieved by a
combination of machines and dogs, both of which are still in comparatively short supply in
Sri Lanka.
Economic scoping techniques
It has been possible in other countries to identify the overall size of the landmine
contamination problem in broad terms through the use of economic cost-benefit analysis
techniques. This would allow planners to identify the amount of land that is worth clearing by
comparing the cost of clearance with the market value of the produce that could be grown on
that ground, measured over the lifespan of the landmine and UXO contamination and
allowing for the effect of time on prices. Conducted with the technical survey, this would
determine the amount of land that needs to be cleared and allow a definitive estimate of the
resources needed to achieve „impact free‟ by the end of 2008.
2.3.2 Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance
UNICEF is supporting the coordination of the MRE sector and the implementation of
projects in the area of MRE and survivor assistance. It has a variety of local NGO partners in
each region that carry out mine and UXO awareness through a multi-faceted approach
involving community mobilization, coverage through the school curriculum and media
campaigns. Although mine accidents have fallen, it is difficult to assess the impact of MRE in
accident reduction because it is concomitant with mine clearance and reduced movements of
population. Surveys of MRE participants can indicate that mine awareness education has had
an impact, which varies between regions.

Current aims seek to focus on young men, who are the largest risk group. Fencing and
marking systems to alert returnees to the presence of minefields are also an ongoing need.
While the largest number of entries in the Quality Assurance monitoring of IMSMA are from
MRE little is really known about how general public knowledge of mine and UXO risks
affects behavior. Informal demining of private land does occur14
and may be the standard
employment for someone trained in demining. It would be interesting to investigate the
circumstances behind the hiring of private deminers.
Victim assistance is complex because local NGOs cannot only assist those disabled because
of landmines. The same psycho-social counseling, access to prostheses and mobility devices,
as well as vocational training is meant to help all victims regain a normal life and livelihood.
It would be useful to revisit victims and assess their current status and needs.
As IMSMA data indicates a large number of victims due to “unknown” causes, it appeared
that they might have been engaged in illegal activities. But it seems that field staff might not
have spoken with the victim directly, but with his family, who did not know the details of the
landmine accident. This variance in survey methodology introduced avoidable distortions and
should be corrected through a reliance on the primary source when charting casualties.
2.3.3 Landmine Ban Advocacy
Support for the signature of the Sri Lankan Government of the Ottawa Convention on the
banning of landmines and for the LTTE to sign the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment15
continues. Many donors now state they will not contribute more funds for mine clearance
until the government signs the Convention.
The Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies sponsored a conference in 2004 that addressed
the issue of the Landmine Ban, and a Landmine Action Day was held in April of this year.
Parties involved with advocacy note that the Government has agreed to sign the Convention
if the LTTE agrees to sign the Geneva Call Deed, but the matter was meant to be pursued
through the Geneva talks which are on hold. Signing and ratifying the Convention still does
not assure compliance, so the best formula for securing support for the ban is an effective
peace process that restricts the need for mining.
3. Sustainability
Mine Clearance
In the best case scenario, most of the high and medium priority sites would have been
demined by the new 2008 target date. An important factor to be determined in a strategic plan
is what level of mine clearance activity will be needed in a variety of contingencies. The
Ministry plans to make operational as civilian deminers a group of SLA members trained by
RONCO. In a situation of conflict they may be needed by the Army. Deminers trained by
INGOs will remain as a skilled workforce even if their agencies cease operations.
Some local MAO staff indicated that they would seek to remain in their job even if the
UNDP ceased to provide support and funding. Even though a government salary would be
comparatively lower, staff were proud of their skills level and wanted to continue in a line of
work that made them feel useful. This is probably also true of deminers.16
14
UNICEF, MRE Programme in Sri Lanka.
15
The parallel document for Non-State Actors.
16
According to UNICEF, there are private deminers earning a good income clearing land.

Mine Action Offices
The most important factor for sustainability of the UNDP capacity development in Mine
Action field offices is the successful establishment of a National Mine Action Office to take
over the UNDP technical and supervisory role. A technically qualified national Mine Action
Officer should be able to oversee and maintain the structures the UNDP has established in the
field.
As the UNDP builds the capacity of the Government to oversee all aspects of mine clearance,
that capacity building function is likely to continue for the next two years, regardless of the
conflict or clearance rates, in order to equip a sufficient number of staff in the skills the
national Mine Action Offices will need.
Most mine action field offices are located on the compound of the Government Agent, so
facilities are available at little or no cost. At one point, junior civil servants in training were
meant to be available to the Mine Action Project offices. That option should be reviewed
again.
By 2008, actual mine clearance activity could be low, either due to ongoing unrest making
sites inaccessible or to completion of the task. In either event, the NSCMA and its district
counterparts will have to coordinate needs assessments. There should be ongoing quality
assurance visits as long as demining occurs. More teams should be trained in Impact
Assessments, Quality Assurance and Post-Clearance Impact Surveying.
Database of defined and contaminated areas
As some areas potentially will remain contaminated, there needs to be a database of defined
and contaminated areas. While UNDP-funded personnel are managing the IMSMA database
for now, there is a need to identify a suitable home and budget to maintain this database at the
end of the Project. Initial inquiries suggest that it could be possible to house the database
within the Survey Department, which is part of the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.
Otherwise it should be stored as an archive accessible to agencies interested in land use data.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capacity
A sustainable EOD capacity is needed to deal with items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).
The UXO problem in Sri Lanka is comparatively light and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) has
undergone extensive training in mine action in a programme funded by the USA. It may be
that there is no need for additional investment for an EOD capacity, but this needs to be
confirmed.
Community-based marking activities
There is a difference in the degree of mine contamination marking from region to region.
This has been blamed on people stealing marking, and differences in population density,
access to wood, and type of material used for marking may all be contributory factors. In
some parts of the country, marking fencing appears to be used successfully for other
purposes, suggesting that communities that „own‟ the fencing may be less likely to steal it.
The absence of mined area marking is known to contribute to the risk of mine casualties, and
so, in order to reduce impact, research should be done on the viability of community-based
marking activities.
Mine Risk Education (MRE) capacity
There will be an ongoing need for targeted MRE activities in Sri Lanka to advise people
about the areas that will remain contaminated, and also to whom they should report any UXO
that they discover. Many agencies have been implementing MRE activities in Sri Lanka,
coordinated by UNICEF on behalf of the government. However, UNICEF needs to develop

an exit strategy for international involvement and a sustainable home for the residual MRE
activity that will be needed.
Mine Victim Assistance (MVA)
The survivors of landmine and UXO explosions often require assistance for the rest of their
lives, given that prostheses wear out every two to three years. Work needs to be undertaken to
ensure that the existing MVA activities are fully incorporated into sustainable health
programs in Sri Lanka.
Protection Role
It is unclear in a setting of continued conflict who will provide a protection role for field mine
action officers to enable them to travel and carry out their work. If their field activities are
constrained for too long - or in the event mine clearance is no longer needed - many would
presumably seek other work. It appears that the survey techniques, the analysis and reporting,
the data entry and the team work would equip Mine Action Project staff well to transfer their
skills and experience to other employment possibilities. Other international agencies may
agree to play a protection role of Mine Action Project staff.

4. Revised Project Strategy
Should the UNDP and Ministry of Nation Building and Development agree on the terms of a
continued role for the UNDP Project in its capacity building role for NSCMA and a National
Mine Action Office, there will be a few areas requiring UNDP technical input:
 Provide additional Field Technical Advisers to assure uniform coverage of Mine Action
Project services. Assist the new National Mine Action Officer (Ministry technical staff
person) in gaining knowledge of how the field offices work and the services they offer.
 Assist in the drafting of strategic plans for NSCMA, the national MAO and the field
offices to address ongoing demining issues after 2008 that will be sustainable with Sri
Lankan government funding.
 Oversee the Technical Survey, which will help to determine the size and scope of the
activities necessary for demining agencies to achieve the mine impact free target, in order
to assist planning and resource mobilization.
 Train more QA teams and revise PCIS methodology to have greater utility as a planning
tool for resettlement and development.
 Provide short-term training in support of project staff for targeted capacity development
and management skills.
Already discussed is the need for more international technical assistance through Technical
Advisers based in Kilinochchi (from Jaffna), Vavuniya (short term) and Trincomalee.
Complaints from demining organizations about the lack of operational support from the
Vavuniya office for demining in the East indicate a need to improve services in those areas.
The above activities should be detailed through a document outlining the roles and
responsibilities of the Mine Action Project in relation to NSCMA, the national MAO and the
Ministry, with a clear delegation of authority, as well as a detailed strategic plan of the
UNDP's objectives, inputs and project completion.
It is the desire of UNDP to do the job well, with thorough coverage and sustainable results –
for both structures and processes. This will be achieved through three activities:
1. Development of a Strategic Plan that outlines UNDP activities in mine action and
capacity building until 2008 and a National Strategic Plan for how they will prepare for the
transition.
2. Mine Clearance Support, technical survey and monitoring
3. Capacity Building of National and field Mine Action Offices, through Technical
Advisers, short-term assistance, skills workshops and assessments of future needs

5. Analysis for UNDP Project Involvement until 2008
5.1 SWOT Analysis
Strengths
Landmines continue to have a significant impact on Sri Lanka. Several agencies have
reported how their projects - particularly resettlement projects - are constrained by mines.
UNDP involvement in mine action is therefore relevant in terms of these development goals.
Sri Lanka has a national strategy with a projected end date of 2008 and a planned end state of
a 'mine impact free‟ Sri Lanka outside the high security zones. There is unanimous support
for the extension of mine action effort beyond 2006; the dates suggested in the Sri Lankan
strategy (i.e. between 2007 and 2008) are considered reasonable estimates for high priority
sites.
A great deal has been achieved: mine clearance capacity has been developed, standards are
generally high and coordination, quality assurance, accident investigation and reporting
mechanisms have also been established. The concept of operations followed by UNDP and
the assistance provided by the UNDP Mine Action Project (MAP) have been universally
welcomed by all stakeholders that have been interviewed, including the Government Agents,
mine action implementing agencies, development agencies and donors.
Sri Lanka has an effective educational system; the human resource pool is good and it is
possible to find highly educated personnel. As a result the input needed to establish truly
sustainable elements for a national mine action program is comparatively small and easily
obtainable within the context of the planned extension of the program (and the MAP) to
2008.
Weaknesses
A lot has been done; however the program faces a series of challenges - not least in the
provision of continued donor support - unless these challenges are addressed. A major
oversight has been the failure to build capacity at the central level in a national Mine Action
office.
The MAP project is under staffed and as a result is unable to concentrate on providing
appropriate strategic advice and project management skills as it is forced to use its available
resources to manage day to day activities. For example, although a national strategy exists
there is no strategic plan that sets out the resources necessary to achieve an undefined end
state of „mine impact free by 2008‟ and as yet no plan to achieve a sustainable capacity in the
roles currently undertaken by the UNDP project that could operate after the end of
international funding.
Many of the higher technical skills are not fully developed. While project staff are trained and
able to carry out quality control/quality assurance tasks, they have limited skills in the higher
analytical processes that constitute quality management, post clearance impact survey and
accident investigation. Local staff morale is also low and many are considering seeking
alternative employment. Such a loss of human capital could have a significant effect on the
success of the project in developing sustainable capacity.
Opportunities

The Project has the potential to assist Sri Lanka to address and overcome challenges and thus
help meet the goals set out in its strategy document. The development of a quantitative
strategic plan, including appropriate risk management and exit strategies, will help mobilize
resources and assist in the successful conclusion of international involvement in the Sri
Lankan mine action program within the forecast end date of 2008. Donors have stated that
they welcome continued UNDP involvement in this regard.
A review of the institutional framework and the relationship between the Ministry of Nation
Building and Development (MNBD), the UNDP Country Office and the MAP should provide
the opportunity to clarify a division of responsibilities and allow the Project to meet its
responsibilities. This will include the creation of a National Mine Action Office to carry on
the Project role.
Threats
Of most concern is the security situation in Sri Lanka. This is clearly an external threat and
cannot be controlled by the UNDP. However, the development of a risk management strategy
as part of a strategic plan should also allow the Project to support the Government
Programme in the event of significant changes to the current „no war no peace‟ situation.
Furthermore, the ongoing role of the expatriate technical advisors within the MAP helps
provide a guarantee of independence and protection to the local staff employed in sensitive
areas.
The Project accomplishments in developing functional field capacity risk being lost if no
technical capacity is established in a national Mine Action Office to provide guidance,
technical support and training and oversight.
There is also the risk of loss of institutional memory and human capital due to staff turn-over.
This situation needs to be addressed as a matter of priority as a loss of critical personnel in
the short term will seriously hamper the chances of the MAP achieving its full aims.
5.2 Analysis of Technical Assistance
It has been shown that the UNDP Mine Action Project has to assist in capacity building tasks,
at the same time as being required to undertake independent monitoring. The project is
currently under-staffed in terms of Technical Advisers (TA) and cannot fully manage any
expansion of the project activities without abandoning other duties such as the training of the
National and regional Mine Action Office staff.
A possible personnel structure to fulfill critical project functions until the end of
implementation period could be as follows:
 One TA in Colombo to provide advice at a national level, to manage the capacity
development and short term assistance projects, and assist in coordination in the
establishment of the national Mine Action Office.
 One TA in each region to assist with coordination at a local level, to provide independent
monitoring and provide training to RMAO staff. The geographic dispersion of the
RMAO suggest that TA would be required in the following locations:
o Jaffna/Kilinochchi with more time spent in Kilinochchi until its capacity is
built and to test the sustainability of the Jaffna office

o Vavuniya, short-term, until the local capacity is built, especially in operations
o Trincomalee, can help build capacity of Vavuniya, and the East
 One international IMSMA consultant based in Colombo to assist with specific tasks
related to improved data collection and management, including mainstreaming one
reporting system.
These staff positions may be filled as in-kind contributions from donors. The Sri Lankan
Army has been very satisfied by the contribution of the RONCO project manager, and it
might be possible to persuade the US Department of State to ask RONCO to extend this
person‟s contract to take on one of these positions. Other donors might be willing to do
likewise and there are several sources of suitable personnel.
5.2.1 Project planning and strategic advice
A priority is the drafting of a Strategic Plan for the UNDP Project and the NSCMA that
includes the development of and handover to the National Mine Action Office, and the
sustainable development of field offices and mobilization of resources to expand short-term
activities in support of project completion. This suggests that there is a full-time job for a
senior technical planning adviser in Colombo until the end of the Project. This person would
be unavailable in this period to assist substantially in any of the field supervision tasks due to
project workload. Indeed, by the second half of 2008, the MAP should only need one adviser
for the entire project.
5.2.2 Field technical advice
Expatriate technical assistance has developed the capacity of the regional offices to a high
standard. However, work needs to be undertaken to develop the higher analytical skills of the
AMAO, and also to split the field coverage of the Vavuniya office to improve the quality of
service provided to the Eastern provinces. This will need a short term surge of temporary
assistance. By 2007, it is forecast that field TAs should only need to provide part-time
assistance to each district, with the possible exception of Kilinochchi which may need a more
constant monitoring presence.

5.2.3 Mechanisms for providing short term assistance
There are a number of specialists to provide such short term assistance. These include:
 Use of personnel recruited by UNDP under a Special Services Agreement (SSA). This
method is comparatively quick and is easily administered by the UNDP Country Office.
 Use of personnel provided by donor funding. For example, the European Commission has
framework contracts specifically designed to allow the provision of such advice, such as
“Lot 7” and “Lot13.” This has the advantage of being a separate funding stream, but the
negotiation of such processes can be comparatively slow when compared with the UNDP.
 Use of a local implementing partner to recruit and provide consultants. It may appropriate
to subcontract the provision of consultants via a local partner, such as the newly-formed
demining NGO named “DASH.” The UNDP project staff could work with such an
implementing partner to ensure that the correct caliber of personnel is selected. This
method is unlikely to be any cheaper than the SSA model, especially taking the
management fee of the local agent into account, but it may be more politically expedient
and thus reduce delays that are apparently caused by the approval process. Given the
short time frame of the project, being able to minimize such delays could be significant.
5.2.4 Capacity development through short term skills workshops
Many of these could be dealt with in short term skills research missions and workshops. The
skills issues include:
 Development of an analytical approach to use of Post Clearance Impact Survey Data in
refining priority setting
 Potential for community based marking approaches to delineating hazardous areas that
will be left uncleared in the immediate future
 Coordinated approach to setting GPS to ensure consistent readings
 Use of economic cost benefit analysis techniques to assess the size of the contamination
problem

6. Conclusion
The year 2005 was the best on record for mine clearance in Sri Lanka. This year, 2006, may
not even reach the levels of 2003, which the UNDP project began. And yet, this is not a
reflection of the efficacy of either the Government‟s Programme or the UNDP‟s support
project. At this uncertain stage in the political process, the UNDP should continue with its
Technical Survey of suspected areas in order to assess the further need for demining. As the
survey will take a year, it ensures an important role for the UNDP until the end of 2007.
Whether mine clearance activity continues apace or not, a final capacity building effort will
need to be made in the last year of the project, in 2008. In the best case scenario, mine
clearance activities will continue, the survey will clarify what remains to be done, and the
national and district mine action offices will have the capacity to carry on their monitoring,
QA and PCIS work without the direct assistance of the UNDP and its Technical Advisers.
Any future mine clearance, including the high risk areas as they are released, can be handled
by the civilian deminers trained by each agency, the HDU and the SLA members trained by
RONCO and intended to work for the Ministry of NBD as civilian deminers.
To be determined is how the IMSMA database will be managed. For now, donors prefer the
impartiality of the UNDP in maintaining such sensitive information. In future, the
Government survey department may want to incorporate its information into their land use
data.
The key findings with regard to the future of the Project can be summarized as follows:
 Now that NSCMA is successfully functioning, the Project should encourage the
Ministry to hire a technical officer to start up the national Mine Action office, so that the
Project TAs can share with them the skills and management capacity building that they
perform in the field. This Office should be ready to take over by the end of 2008.
 Continue the project-based approach to leave behind a suitable capacity that the
government can sustain as it carries out residual functions after the „mine impact free‟ end
state is achieved. This means expansion of trained staff to provide full coverage of activities
in areas of the North and East. Testing sustainability can be tried with the Jaffna office as that
TA spends more time in Kilinochchi.
 Assist demining agencies through a technical survey to assess remaining needs as the
Government Programme moves towards a quantified end state acceptable to all stakeholders.
 Use short term technical assistance (in refinement of QA, PCIS, IMSMA) to provide
specific skills inputs necessary to address particular shortfalls identified in the project. Field
offices in Kilinochchi and Trincomalee need most attention; the operations officer in
Vavuniya needs correction or replacement, along with short-term TA oversight for the entire
office. However, all field offices will need some protection and intervention by international
staff who can act with neutrality and authority in difficult situations.
 Continue the role of independent monitoring, but at a size necessary to make this
process viable, using other sources of personnel apart from UNDP if necessary.
 Conduct appropriate risk management planning activities
 Reduce the project size at a rate commensurate with the remaining activity.

The aim of this UNDP Project is to develop local and national capabilities to implement and
manage effective mine action activities that are targeted to the resettlement and
reconstruction goals of the country. That requires a national Mine Action Office that can
function with minimal external support. If it can achieve a consensus on these future
activities with the Ministry and NSCMA, the UNDP should continue to support the mine
action program until 2008.
7. Appendices
A. Evaluation Methodology
Qualitative Methods
 Review of project documentation, including, quarterly reports and evaluations
 Review of mine clearance documentation, including contracts, report and
prioritization and impact data
 Interviews with key informant members of the UNDP Mine Action Project, the
UNDP Country Office, the Ministry of Nation Building and Development,
Government Agents, donors. other UN and international agencies, and implementing
partners.
 Individual and group meetings with UNDP field office staff
 Semi-structured interviews with NGOs involved in project implementation
 Direct observation of projects
 Oral presentation of draft report to stakeholders for feedback
UNDP project documentation was extensive. Key informant interviews lasted about an hour.
Field visits were generally made with the NGO implementing partner, who demonstrated
their demining methodology and the variety of sites. At each visit to a UNDP field office and
implementing partner field site we were given a briefing on the scope of activities and
problems faced. The problems were noted and checked against other sites to identify
recurring issues.
As this evaluation took place in a time of renewed conflict and during breaks in the demining
cycle, some sites had suspended operations. Nonetheless, we were able to observe a variety
of different methods and terrains and compare the operations of different demining agencies.
In order to triangulate data sources and assess the value of the UNDP support to demining,
we spoke with other donors and international agencies. Members of the NGO or UN office
accompanying me served as translator. UNDP program managers joined one field visit.
A key limitation to the evaluation was lack of access to returnees and other beneficiaries,
mostly because of time constraints. We did visit a Halo Trust site in Jaffna that was very
close to a village and spoke with residents there, and we spoke with people at a Welfare
Center in Trincomalee who were soon to be resettled. As the evaluation focused on the
UNDP Project and not the Government Programme, assessment of whether the prioritization
process tasked sites that provided the most benefit for resettlement was beyond the scope of
this study.

In meetings with the Government Agents, local NGO implementing partners and
beneficiaries, our National Consultant, Mr. Edward, served as out interpreter.
Quantitative Methods
The QA staff conducted some field PCIS interviews with beneficiaries seeking basic
information about whether they had returned home or otherwise benefited from the demining
process, and their means of livelihood.
It was difficult to draw patterns from these surveys as much of the information was
incomplete or filled out by a third party with limited knowledge. Many of the PCIS had been
filled out with knowledge from the Divisional Secretary, which led to repetitive and
incomplete answers. As this survey process is in its early stages, but due to be made in six-
month intervals, much remains to be discovered about the direct and indirect benefits of
demining.
Time constraints prevented us from consulting IMSMA data on MRE, which constitutes the
largest number of entries in the system. We did find some records of QA visits to MRE
while in the field office of Vavuniya. Ironically, the MRE session visited while we were
there by a QA team was interrupted by SLA officers who asked for help with checking the
nearby road for Claymore “mines”.
B. Interviews and Meetings
UNDP Country Office
Miguel Bermeo, United Nations Resident Coordinator
Beate Trankmann, Deputy Resident Representative
Kerstin Eppert, Programme Analyst
Chip Bowness, Asia Region Land Mine Action Adviser
Nishanie Jayamaha, National Liaison Officer, UN Humanitarian Information Center
UNDP Mine Action Offices
Tim Horner, Technical Advisor, Colombo
Krishanti Weerakoon, Mine Action Officer
Ming Yu Hah, Communications Advisor
Vartharajah Murugathas, IMSMA Officer
Dhanushka Jayamaha, IMSMA Assistant
Graeme Abernethy, Technical Advisor, Jaffna
Elmo Anandarajah, Mine Action Officer, Jaffna
S. Denison Latheeskaran, Operations Officer, Jaffna
Ezthileri Nadarajah, Operations Assistant, Jaffna
M.L. Ketheeswaran, QA Team Leader, Jaffna
Baktharishikesh, IMSMA, Jaffna
Jena, RMAO Director,Kilinochchi
George Kumar, Mine Action Officer, Vavuniya
Gogulan Sewsnthinathan, IMSMA Assistant,Vavuniya
M. Shiyam, PCIS, Vavuniya
Singarayar Antony Reginols Vaz, QA Inspector, Vavuniya
Damian Bonifass, QA Inspector, Vavuniya
Government Officials
M.S. Jayasinghe, Secretary, Ministry of Nation Building and Development, and Chairman of
NSCMA

Dr. A.S. Kunasingham, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of NBD and Secretary of NSCMA
J.H.J. Jayamaha, Additional Director General, Dept. of External Resources, Ministry of
Finance
S.D. Ranasinghe, Deputy Director, Dept of External Resources, Ministry of Finance and
Planning
Brigadier ADGA Jayawardane, RSP IG, Director Operations, Sri Lankan Army
B.J.P.Mendis, Surveyor General
Mrs. Shyamalie Perara, Superintendent of Surveys, GIS, Surveyor General‟s Office
Mr..Ganesh, Government Agenct, Jaffna
Major Pradeep, SLA, Jaffna
Lt. Indoka Athigoli, SLA, Jaffna
T. Rasanayagam, Government Agent, Kilinochchi
S. Shanmugam, Government Agent, Vavuniya
K.G. Leelananda, Government Agent,Trincomalee
Demining and Development Agencies
Stephen Pritchard, Programme Manager, The HALO Trust
David Elliott, Operations Manager, The HALO Trust
Magnus Johansson, Technical Advisor, Danish Demining Group
N. Sivanathan, Administrative Secretary, Jaffna Jaipur Center
S. Sathiendra, Coord. RFA, Jaipur Center
S. Sri Shanmura ,MRE Coordinator, Sarvodaya, Jaffna
S. Sritharan, Administrative Officer, Sarvodaya, Jaffna
N.K. Kumar, Coordinator, White Pidgeon, Jaffna
Sithanparanathan, Family Rehabilitation Center, Jaffna
Mahen, Save the Children, Jaffna
Charles Frisby, Project Manager, Norwegian People‟s Aid, Kilinochchi
Luke Atkinson, Programme Manager, Norwegian People‟s Aid
Uthayan, DPS Room Manager, HDU, Kilinochchi
Maj. S.L. Parjapati, Sarvatra Technical Consultants
Brig. S.S. Brar, Sarvatra Technical Consultants
Daniel Jean, Programme Manager, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Fredrik Palsson, Chief of Party, RONCO Consulting Corporation
Brig. Ananda Chandrasiri, Director, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)
Lt. Col. Deepal Subasinghe, CEO, DELVON Computers
M.S. Ireneuss, Director, Secretariat for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs in the North and East(SIHRN)
V. Balakumaa, Planning and Development Secretariat, Kilinochchi
Laurence Christy, Director, Planning Division, Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation
S.C.S. Chithambaronathan, District Coordinator, Family Rehabilitation Centre
Allen Jelich, Country Representative, Danish Refugee Council
UN Agencies
Eric Debert, Child Protection Officer-Mine Action, UNICEF Colombo
S. Sivanesasingam, Project Assistant-Mine Action, UNICEF Jaffna
Judith Bruno, UNICEF, Jaffna
T. Umesh, Project Assistant-Mine Action, UNICEF Kilinochchi
Hakim, UNICEF,Vavuniya
Axel Bishop, Programme Officer, UNHCR Colombo(by phone)
Edward Benson, Acting Head of Field Office, UNHCR Jaffna
Marin Din Kajdomcaj, Head of Field Office, UNHCR Kilinochchi
Mireille Girard, Head of Sub-Office, UNHCR Vavuniya
Irene Flueckiger, Head of Sub Delegation, ICRC Jaffna

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