About 370 million people live in low-income fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS). They have higher poverty rates, lower growth rates, and weaker human development indicators than other low-income countries. This presentation outlines main findings from the evaluation of World Bank Group assistance to FCS.

1. World Bank Assistance to
Low-Income Fragile and
Conflict-Affected States
Anis Dani, Lead Evaluator, IEGCC
International Launch Seminar
Nairobi, December 2, 2013

2. Outline
 Evaluation Approach
 Portfolio outcomes
 Country level outcomes
 Internal drivers of quality
 Three dimensions of results
 Gender in FCS
 Concluding remarks

3. Evaluation Approach
 Scope:
 Assessment of the relevance and effective of World Bank Group
country strategies and assistance programs to FCS
 Focus is on low-income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
 This is an evaluation of WBG performance, not of the performance of
partner countries
 Methodology:
 Comparative analysis of 33 IDA-only FCS with 31 non-FCS –
portfolio and country results, budget, staffing, and aid flows
 Comparison across time – FY07-12 compared with FY01-12
 6 case study countries (Cameroon; Congo, DR; Nepal, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Republic of Yemen)
 3 Country Program Evaluations (Afghanistan, Liberia, Timor-Leste)
 Other countries with fragile and conflict-affected situations will be
the subject of a separate evaluation

4. Portfolio outcomes in IDA FCS
have improved
Scope of work
 The World Bank Group has a
long history of engagement in
FCS – exemplified in the name
IBRD
 Historically, portfolio
performance in FCS lagged
significantly behind other
countries
 Since 2007, results in IDA FCS
indicate a turnaround
 FCS IDA countries perform
better than non-FCS IDA, and
are almost at par with Bankwide
average
Outcomes by number
of projects

5. However, results in the private
sector have been weaker
Late start and weak
results in FCS
 IFC investments in IDA FCS
lag behind that in non-fragile
countries.
 One third of the FPD projects
evaluated in FCS were MS+,
compared to two-thirds in
non-fragile IDA countries.
 IFC’s Advisory Services in FCS
perform at par with projects in
countries that are not fragile.
 MIGA’s portfolio growth
recent, with few guarantees
evaluated to draw meaningful
conclusions. SIPs struggle
financially & operationally.
IFC commitments
grew faster in non-FCS

6. Project outcomes not matched by
outcomes at country level
 The Bank is most responsive to
fragile and conflict-affected
states (FCS) in the immediate
aftermath of conflict
 FCS classification is inaccurate
 Country assistance strategies are
not well adapted to FCS
 Prolonged use of ISNs, which are
not evaluated, is problematic
 Recent CASs reflect greater
attention to fragility/conflict
drivers but effects on operations
not yet evident
 Sustained budget support in FCS
is positively correlated with
policy and institutional results

7. Share of ODA to FCS from donors
The share of overall
official development
assistance (ODA)
flows in IDA-only
countries has
changed in favor of
FCS
However, the share
of IDA flows to FCS
remains below 30%
of total IDA
commitments

8. Positive effects of internal drivers
on results need to be sustained
 FCS classification based on CPIA ratings is no longer
consistent with fragility and conflict risks in many FCS.
Classification leads to errors of omission and too rapid
graduation from FCS list
 Fragility analysis for CAS needs to be taken into account in
design of operational programs
 Internal drivers of quality since 2007 need to be sustained:
 increased staff and project budgets
 huge increase in TA financed by Trust Funds
 Incentives at IFC and MIGA need more attention
 Despite increased field presence, IFC HR incentives not fully
aligned with Bank incentives, and performance incentives are
not aligned with strategy for FCS
 MIGA faces similar challenges due to smaller size and
complexity of underwriting projects in FCS.

9. Results assessed along three
strategic dimensions
Building capacity of the state
Building capacity of citizens
Supporting inclusive growth and jobs

10. Building state capacity
 Relatively good progress on public financial management
where sustained support has been most effective
 Recent attention to public expenditure reviews of
security sector draws on Bank’s comparative advantage
 Efficiency of revenue mobilization also improved in FCS
 Civil service reform has been more challenging; of
necessity, reliance on PIUs and externally-funded
consultants leads to sustainability issues
 On decentralization, more effort and results in AFR than
in other regions where lack of consensus within
government and among donors affects progress

11. Building capacity of citizens
 WB investments in FCS widely acknowledged as
increasing access to education and health services
 Most FCS are likely to achieve at least one of the MDG
targets, although FCS lag behind non-fragile IDA states
 State capacity strengthened by outsourcing to private
and non-profit service providers, especially in health
 Results monitoring is mixed, with more focus on outputs
than outcomes
 Increased attention to voice, accountability and third
party monitoring, which can be an

12. CDD and citizen capacity
 CDD growth in IDA FCS to build local institutions and
provide public goods and services
 Especially useful in countries with diverse populations,
where governments previously lacked outreach to all
communities and ethnicities due to weak infrastructure
and public services (e.g., Afghanistan)
 Where large-scale programs exist, CDD has enhanced
reach of the state and enhanced its legitimacy
 But CDD programs in FCS have not evolved over time
and in many countries have not yet developed plans for
sustainability

13. Inclusive Growth and Jobs
 Support for inclusive growth and jobs has been slow and
faces continued challenges in IDA FCS
 Investment climate support necessary but not sufficient.
Other PSD constraints—power, transport, land not
adequately addressed
 WBG support for agriculture not commensurate with its
effects on food security and employment in FCS
 Support for natural resources focused on regulatory reform
with less attention to local economic development and
fragility risks
 WBG synergies in telecom, power sector, and microfinance
have played transformational role, but only found in a few
countries
 WBG lacks a strategic and effective framework for job
creation in FCS: short-term jobs and skills development
programs lack synergies with education and the private
sector

14. Gender in FCS
 In several FCS, women and girls have been deliberately
targeted to humiliate, intimidate, punish, and forcibly
displace members of a community or ethnic group
 Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR)
programs were not gender-sensitive and focused primarily
on ex-combatants; few programs for victims of violence
 Ffew good examples in FCS (AFG, Nepal) of linkages from
analytical work to strategy, to project interventions.
 Overall, despite recognition of gender disparities in some
CASs, very few programs addressed these constraints
beyond health, education and CDD projects.
 No evidence of measures to address gender-based violence or
the constraints identified by IFC Women, Business, and the Law
database
 Lack of targeted programs for economic empowerment of
women in FCS affected by gender-based violence, despite
increase in female-headed households

15. Concluding Remarks

16. Operationalizing the 2011 WDR
 Progress made but this effort needs to be sustained and, in
some areas, intensified
 CASs in FCS more fragility focused but operations need to
adapt accordingly
 Community of Practice and knowledge management
 Partnerships with UN have improved at corporate level;
results more mixed at country level
 Security—support for DDR and PERs in security sector
 Justice—J4P not well integrated in CAS or operations; and
lack of clarity of niche and comparative advantage
 Jobs—need a framework and WBG synergies
 Risks and results—need more realistic risk assessment and
monitoring, and contingency planning.

17. Recommendations
 The Bank Group should develop a more suitable and accurate mechanism
to define FCS status
 CASs should be tailored better to FCS, with clear articulation and
monitoring of risks and contingencies for rapid adjustment if those risks
materialize
 Provide increased support to reform-oriented FCS for capacity building
through predictable, programmatic budget support, complemented by TA
and Ils
 Develop and implement a plan to ensure the institutional sustainability of
CDD programs
 programs need to be more responsive to the conflict context and help
address effects of violence against women and the legal constraints on
economic empowerment
 develop a more realistic medium- to long-term framework for inclusive
growth and jobs in FCS and ensure synergies across WBG
 IFC and MIGA should adapt their business models, risk tolerances,
product mix, sources of funds, staff incentives, procedures, and
processes to be more responsive to the special needs of FCS

18. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/
fcs
URL for the full report released on December 2, 2013