Napoleon, Part 2, session iii, Wellington

Napoleon
Part Two
session iii
Wellington

Thursday, September 8, 11

painted by
Francisco de Goya,
1812-1814

Napoleon
Part Two
session iii
Wellington


“If we can maintain ourselves in Portugal,
the war will not cease in the Peninsula, and,
if the war lasts in the Peninsula, Europe will
be saved.”

--Arthur Wellesley,
First Duke of Wellington
Autumn 1809


major topics for this session

I. “The Scum of the Earth”

II. Light Infantry Tactics

III. Wellington’s First Offensive

IV. Lines of Torres Vedras

V. Guerrieros

VI. Badajoz

VII. Salamanca

VIII. Vitoria


Wellington’s “Appreciation of the Situation”--March 1809
Portugal could be defended by quite a small expeditionary force,
provided that four requirements were met:
1) The Spanish must continue to resist and must support England
2) England must retain command of the seas
3) The expeditionary force must not suffer defeat or undue loss
4) The French must be prevented from concentration 100,000 men against them

It was on the strength of this far-sighted assessment that England’s
main army landed in Portugal in 1809. Wellesley’s strategy throughout
was to ensure that it survived, which was why he remained so ﬁrmly on
the defensive for the ﬁrst three years and took few risks. He fought
when the odds were favorable, and won, and prevented the French from
ever concentrating enough men to defeat him.
Then in 1812, the tide turned. Napoleon, like Hitler, invaded Russia,
and immediately faced the problem of war on two fronts, as well as a
vast coastline to defend against Allied sea-power. In 1812, as in 1942,
the Allies were at last in a position to take the offensive. Eighteen
months later, the war was won.
Julian Paget, Wellington’s Peninsular War, p. 6


I. “The Scum of
the Earth”


One of the preferred formations for maneuver,
the ‘quarter-distance’ column had the companies
arrayed one behind another, in lines (ranks) two
deep (2-man files) and a gap of five yards
between companies. The frontage was thus
about 20 yards and the depth about 50 yards.
The grenadier company (G) usually led the
battalion, the light company (L) was at the rear,
the color-party (CP) was at the center. Officers
were mounted “in order the more readily to
correct mistakes, to circulate orders...and
especially to take care that when a column halts,
that they are most speedily adjusted before
wheeling up into line. These operations no
dismounted officer can effectually perform, nor
in that situation can he see the faults, or give the
aids which his duty requires.” The commanding
officer, the battalion major, (CO) rides at the
right front of the column, the second-in-
command (2ic) behind him, and the adjutant (A)
at the rear. Each company commander, a
captain, (CC)--only one is identified here--
marched at the center of his company.
INSET- at the rear of a marching company, a
subaltern officer, a sergeant and a drummer
march in the third rank.

Philip Haythornethwaite, British Napoleonic Infantry
Tactics, p. 59


8 Company Column into Line

COLUMN TO LINE
Among drill-masters, Guibert was famous for his ‘column of attack’, even
though it was doubtful that he ever intended it as an assault formation. Its great
virtue was that it allowed a compact column to deploy into line fairly quickly
and easily, and for a line to ploy back again into column with equal ease.

Grifﬁth, p. 11


Battalion Formations


Illustrated here are two varieties of hollow square; we have
placed them in the usual ‘checker’ relationship, adopted so
that each face of any adjacent squares had a clear ﬁeld of ﬁre.


In the foreground is one with fairly uniform sides, with
opposite faces of two and three companies each, about 25 to
30 yards long (depending upon the strength of the battalion).
At the right of the front face--conventionally occupied by No.
4 Company--the rear two ranks are ﬁring by platoon.


In the background is an ‘oblong’ about 60 yards by 20 yards,
with the end faces of single-company frontage. As formed
from column, the front and rear companies--each in two
ranks closed up on those immediately behind and in front
respectively, forming ‘ends’ of the square four ranks deep,
while the other six companies in the column wheeled to the
ﬂanks and faced outwards.


In the hollow center of the
formation thus created stood the
colors, ofﬁcers and drummers, and
casualties might be dragged
inside from the ranks. For
example, Rees Gronow of the 1st
Foot Guards described the center
of his square at Waterloo as a
‘perfect hospital’, in which it was
impossible to take a stride without
encountering dead and wounded.


Inset 1 Beside a mounted field
officer, whose high viewpoint
allows him to supervise the
integrity of the faces of a square
under fire, drummers remove a
casualty from the ranks. He will
get little treatment, if any, until the
battle is over; the regimental
surgeons normally set up a
dressing post well behind the
fighting line, with the unit’s
baggage and other rear-echelon
personnel.


Inset 2 Cross section across the
face of a square, with the two front
ranks kneeling and the rear
standing; note that they are closely
packed, each soldier slightly to one
side of the man in front of him.


II. Light Infantry
Tactics


Private, 95th Rifles
The 95th Regiment was the only regiment in the
British Army to be equipped entirely with Baker
rifles instead of smoothbore muskets…. This
elite unit was not only equipped with rifles but
also received special training [at Shorncliffe
camp under General Sir John Moore] that
emphasized small unit tactics and
marksmanship. Moreover, the small-unit
training of the riflemen created a level of trust
between officers, non-commissioned officers and
other ranks that was unique in the British
Army of that period.
The soldier wears the green tunic that was
distinctive of rifle-armed units, including the 5th
Battalion of the 60th Regiment and the two light
battalions of the King’s German Legion
(KGL). He also carries the Baker rifle…. Its
main disadvantages were that it was slower to
load than the normal musket and was not as
useful in hand-to-hand fighting, since it was
shorter and carried a rather unwieldy sword
bayonet.


British Riflemen

✦ 1800-the Baker rifle was developed, a foot shorter than the
Brown Bess musket, and rifled rather than smooth bore

✦ rifling is a series of spiral grooves that impart spin to the ball


British Riflemen

✦ 1800-the Baker rifle was developed, a foot shorter than the
Brown Bess musket, and rifled rather than smooth bore

✦ rifling is a series of spiral grooves that impart spin to the ball

✦ both weapon and tactics were derived from the American
Revolution

✦ 1804-the 95th was formed and fought with Wellington from
1808-1815

✦ the Plunkett position, was named for Irish soldier Thomas
Plunkett, remembered for a feat at Cacabelos during
Moore's retreat to Corunna in 1809. Here Plunkett shot the
French Général de Brigade Colbert at a range of between 200
The 95th Regiment of Foot and 600 meters using a Baker rifle. Muskets couldn’t hit a
dark green, faced black man-sized target beyond 50 yards

From 1802 the Rifle Corps, later the 95th , was
permitted to recruit in the usual way instead of
selecting men from other
regiments….recruitment from the civilian
population...recruiting parties being sent out to
centres of population or country fairs, where
civilians might be persuaded in return for a
substantial cash bounty….Recruiters would ply
likely candidates with alcohol...and it was not
uncommon for men to enlist under the influence,
and then reconsider when sober. Harris recalled
that the first man he enlisted--a chimney-sweep
from Rye-- was thought so likely to run off that
Harris had to sleep in the same bed with him
that night, handcuffed to the recruit.
On such occasions gullible civilians would be
regaled with stories of army life and the promise
of promotion--often exaggerated to the point of
absolute deception--….
COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY, p. 58

Osprey, British Rifleman, 1797-1815, PLATE D


This shows recruits to the 95th receiving
instruction in the use of the Baker rifle. As a
corporal superintends, one man rams the ball
and propellant charge into his rifle (the tight
fit required some pressure to ram it down,
hence the use of the palm or heel of the hand
instead of the fingers), while the other, having
primed his rifle, closes the priming pan and
pulls the hammer or cock back to ‘full cock’
preparatory to firing…. Elsewhere two
riflemen demonstrate preferred positions for
shooting--the rifle sling braced around the left
elbow when standing, or pulled tight by the
left hand when kneeling, with the left elbow
resting upon the left knee. Distinctions for
marksmanship were introduced from an early
period: the lowest standard of marksmen had
black cockades on their shakos, the 2nd class
white, and the best shots green.

COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY, pp. 58-59
Osprey, British Rifleman, 1797-1815, PLATE E


Green Jackets of the KGL

Shown here is a member of the 1st Light
B a t t a l i o n o f t h e K i n g ’s G e r m a n
Legion….As late as 1814 only 60% of the
light battalions were armed with rifles; the
rest had smoothbore muskets….
Also here is a Baker rifle (2) with the
stock cut back to take the awkwardly long
sword bayonet (5) and (5a)


Osprey, British Rifleman, 1797-1815, PLATE G


D: Light Infantry
A move to ‘Fix one general uniform for Rifle Corps,
permitting no other variation than...buttons and
facing’ was being discussed before the formation of
the King’s German Regiment. The fact that they
were clothed in rifle green is a strong indication that
the regiment’s intended role was that of a rifle unit….
D1 Corporal, KGR, 1803 His shako and breastplate
bear the device of the crowned bugle horn, the badge
for rifle units….He is armed with an India pattern
musket...and carries a 32 round pouch, canvas
knapsack, and rolled greatcoat.
D2 Private, 2nd Light Battalion, KGL,
1809 ...carries a 60 round pouch, rolled greatcoat
and India pattern musket.
D3 Officer 1812 Note the continued wearing of the
crowned bugle on his shako, the whistle on his belt,
and the profusion of silver lace on his pantaloons and
Hessian boots

Osprey, The King’s German Legion (1) 1803-1812, PLATE D


E: KGL Light Infantry, Spain 1811
E1 Sergeant-bugler, 2nd Light Battalion He wears
his uniform jacket with ‘night cap’ and ‘nankeen’
trousers. The red collar and cuffs were the mark of a
bugler, as were the padded red-and-green wings.
E2 ‘Sharpshooter’, 1st Light Battalion, ...carries a
60 round pouch, powder horn and sword belt. He is
armed with a riﬂe of German manufacture.
E3 ‘Sharpshooter’ of a line battalion He too is
armed with a German riﬂe and sword-bayonet.


Osprey, The King’s German Legion (1) 1803-1812, PLATE E


This scene from the Peninsular War depicts members of the 95th Rifles engaging French light
infantry in a skirmish; it is derived in part from a well-known painting by Denis Dighton. The
riflemen are following two cardinal rules of effective skirmishing… :taking advantage of natural
cover and using aimed fire against selected targets. A feature of Dighton’s painting--and other
contemporary pictures--is the fact that several riflemen depicted have removed their head-
dress, presumably to minimize the target they presented to the enemy. officers are usually
depicted directing the fire of their men, though a few carried rifles themselves.

Osprey, British Rifleman, 1797-1815, PLATE I


Illustrated here is a variation on the ordinary method of skirmishing, known as ‘chain order’.
Used to drive away enemy skirmishers, this tactic employed bodies of men somewhat more solid
than ordinary skirmish lines, and so it was calculated to require a smaller reserve. To form a
chain, three-quarters of the unit were deployed, with the remaining quarter forming the reserve
between 50 and 120 paces to the rear…. The chain was formed of men in groups of four… each
group separated from the next by ten paces. The whole moved forward (the reserve keeping pace
but maintaining its station) until contact was made with the enemy. To engage, the right-hand
man of each group then took three paces forward and fired, before returning to the group,
whereupon the second man did likewise, followed by the third and fourth, by which time the first
man would have reloaded and be ready to begin the process again. Thus a continuous fusillade
was maintained by the chain….In this illustration a chain advances over broken terrain, the men
are taking advantage of natural cover in the usual way, while the remaining one-quarter of the
unit follows in reserve.

Osprey, British Rifleman, 1797-1815, PLATE H


This imaginary scene depicts light infantry,
involving ﬁve companies advancing upon
French light infantry defending a village.


(1) One company is in extended order, in which
each pair of skirmishers were supposed to be at
least two paces apart. The lead man only ﬁres
when his partner is loaded. Then he falls back
and loads. Ofﬁcers stand to the rear.


They are supported by a company
(2) waiting in open order, the ﬁles
are about two feet apart, standing
‘at the trail’ with their ofﬁcers in
front


A third company advances in three bodies; the
leading group (3a) advances in open order, a
support in close order (3b) about 50 yards to
the rear, and a reserve (3c) about 60 yards to
the rear


The maintenance of a strong reserve to
reinforce the skirmish line or cover its retreat,
was paramount; thus the presence of another
company at the rear (4) , in close order, with
ofﬁcers at each end of the front rank.


The riﬂe company (5a) is in ‘chain order,’ with
groups of four men 10 paces apart. One man in
each group advances to ﬁre while the other
three are in various stages of reloading (see
INSET). Again, part of the company (5b) is
held in reserve.


A Contemporary Re-enactor Group of the 95th



Notice the inaccuracy, anyone?



What’s not to love about re-enacting!

Wellesley is unique among generals in that he managed to select the same
sort of ground for most of his major engagements. From [Talavera] down
to Waterloo, he habitually posted his troops behind a low ridge which
protected them from ricocheting cannon balls while compelling the French
columns to advance uphill. A screen of British riflemen was thrown out
along the forward slope to meet the enemy skirmishers on their own terms.
If possible these light troops lingered to harass advancing columns which
were also being subjected to a galling fire of shrapnel shells from the guns
at the rear. At the last moment the sharpshooters fell back, and the two
ranks of infantry met the main French shock with platoon volleys delivered
from 50 to 100 yards. A bayonet counterattack might be ordered if the
columns were sufficiently shaken, and the cavalry waited to pursue a
broken foe.
Montross, pp. 517-518


Shrapnel

Although he began to campaign for its adoption in 1784, It took until 1803 for the
British artillery to adopt the shrapnel shell (as "spherical case"), albeit with great
enthusiasm when it did. The Duke of Wellington's armies used it from 1808 in the
Peninsular War and at the Battle of Waterloo, and he wrote admiringly of its
effectiveness.
Wikipedia


French 6-company battalion advances up the
slope, the voltigeur company (V) forward as
skirmishers, the 4 line companies (1D & 2D) and
grenadiers (G) in reserve.

the massed drums (Dr) pas de charge
Boom-boom,
Boom-boom, Boomaboom,
Boomaboom, Boom-boom
Vive l’Empereur!


All that they can see are the British light
company skirmishers (L), now dividing and
falling back & the ﬁeld ofﬁcers (FO) acting as
forward observers--the commander orders the
British battalion forward--INSERT 2


As the skirmishers fall back to
either ﬂank, the line companies ,
in two ranks, march forward to
the crest of the ridge. INSERT 1
shows a company commander,
sword, and his sergeant, halberd


The British line advances to the crest & delivers 1 or
more volleys. The French only attempt to deploy into line
on the appearance of the British, too late to complete the
maneuver; they are shot down as they attempt to change
formation.


The voltigeurs (V) are driven back into the
ruin of the first two companies (1D). The
companies on each flank of the British line
incline inwards the better to deliver enfilading
fire. The British light company (L) has formed
into two bodies on each flank, ready to run
forward again as required.


INSERT 1--Infantrymen delivering ﬁre
simultaneously by each rank


INSERT 2-The front rank at “Present!”
while the rear rank ‘Make Ready!’


As the French break
and the British ‘charge
bayonets,’ the French
grenadiers never get a
chance to go into
action.

INSERT 2--the
skirmishers, here the
60th, Royal Americans,
are advantageously
placed to loot the
French casualties.


As the French break
and the British ‘charge
bayonets,’ the French
grenadiers never get a
chance to go into
action.

INSERT 2--the
skirmishers, here the
60th, Royal Americans,
are advantageously
placed to loot the
French casualties.

Hence, the origin of the phrase: “The thin red line.”


Military Organizer

✦ British soldier and politician, a general in the
British army and a marshal in the Portuguese
army

✦ at Wellington’s recommendation, he was
appointed to command the Portuguese army in
the Peninsula

✦ 1811-his most important independent command
was the bloody battle of Albuera

✦ 1812-with Wellington he fought at Badajoz and
Salamanca

✦ Wellington admired his organizational abilities
more than his generalship and recommended
William Carr Beresford, 1st Viscount Beresford, that Beresford should succeed to command in
1st Marquis of Campo Maior, GCB, GCH, GCTE, the Peninsula should he, himself, be killed
PC
1768 – 1856


“...a rough, foul-mouthed devil as ever lived.”--Wellington

✦ a Welsh British army ofﬁcer “who was
respected for his courage and feared for his
irascible temper”

✦ at Wellington’s request, he was appointed to
command the Third Division in the
Peninsula

✦ At Badajoz, the successful storming of the
fortress was due to his daring self-reliance
in converting the secondary attack on the
castle, into a real one. He was himself
wounded in this terrible engagement, but
would not leave the ramparts, and the day
after, having recently inherited a fortune, he
gave every survivor of his command a
guinea

✦ killed in the Battle of Waterloo while Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton GCB
commanding the force which stopped a 1758 – 18 June 1815
critical attack on the British left-center


“Daddy” Hill

✦ a trusted brigade, division and corps
commander under Wellington. He became
commander in chief of the British army in
1829

✦ 1793-served at the siege of Toulon and in 1801,
in Egypt

✦ 1808-commanded a brigade at Rolica and
Vimiero

✦ 1809-commanded the 2nd Division at Talavera,
one of the few occasions at which he was
noticed to swear

✦ his care for his troops’ wellbeing earned him
his nickname

General Rowland Hill, 1st Viscount Hill of ✦ 1815-at Waterloo, he commanded II Corps
Almaraz GCB, GCH and led the charge against the Imperial Guard
1772 – 1842 near the end of the battle


“Black Bob”
“there was a sullenness which seemed to brood in his innermost soul and generate passions which knew no bounds”- George Napier

✦ a Scottish British army officer

✦ 1799-attaché to General Suvorov in Switzerland

✦ 1807-commanded light troops under Sir John
Moore

✦ 1809-at Wellington’s request, he was appointed to
command the Light Division (43rd, 52nd, and 95th) in
the Peninsula

✦ in trying to bring his division to fight at Talavera, he
set a military march record, 62 miles in 26 hours

✦ his brigade was raised to division strength by the
addition of two picked Portuguese regiments of
Caçadores (hunters)

✦ One of the quickest and most brilliant, if not the
very first, of Wellington's generals, he had a fiery
temper, which rendered him a difficult man to deal
with, but to the day of his death he possessed the Major-General Robert Craufurd
confidence and affection of his men in an 1764 – 23 January 1812
extraordinary degree


III.Wellington’s
First Offensive


The Northamptonshire Regiment (the 48th
Regiment of Foot) was raised in 1741. It
was part of the Great Siege of Gibraltar
from 1779-83 and was awarded the Castle
and Key emblem. The most famous Battle
Honour TALAVERA was gained in 1809
during the Duke of Wellington’s campaigns
against the French in the Peninsula. At the
same time they earned the nickname “The
Steelbacks” for their ability to show
complete contempt when being ﬂogged
with the cat-o’-nine tails, then a normal
method of administering punishment in the
Army even for very minor crimes.

http://www.royalanglianmuseum.org.uk/northants.html


Talavera
27-28 July 1809


Having driven Marshal
Soult's French army
Wellington’s First Offensive There they encountered
46,000 French under
from Portugal,
Marshal Claude Victor,
We l l e s l e y ' s 2 0 , 0 0 0
with the French king of
British troops advanced
Spain, Joseph
into Spain to join 33,000
Bonaparte in nominal
Spanish troops under
command
General Cuesta
The combined Allied
They marched up the
force had a stirling
Tagus valley to Talavera
opportunity to defeat
de la Reina, c. 120 km
the French corps of
southwest of Madrid
Victor at Talavera, but
Cuesta's insistence that
the Spanish wouldn't
fight on a Sunday
provided the French
with their chance to
escape

✦ 27 July-the French attacked in mid-afternoon and initially captured the strategic Medellin Hill, it was taken and lost until,
finally, by dark the British held it firmly. There Wellesley’s 29th & 48th would use his reverse slope tactic the next day

✦ 28 July-the next day, heavy cannonading preceded various infantry and cavalry skirmishes until dark

✦ at daylight, the British and Spanish discovered that the bulk of the French force had retired

✦ August-the unreliable behavior of his Spanish ally and the arrival of Marshal Soult led Duke Wellington of Talavera to
withdraw to Portugal and the Lines of Torres Vedras


Silence fell on the field. The French were done, defeated, and the British
had the victory and the field.
And with it the dead and wounded. There were more than thirteen
thousand casualties, but no-one knew that yet…. The wounded cried for
water, for their mothers, for a bullet, for anything other than the pain and
helplessness in the heat. And the horror was not done with them. The sun
had burned relentlessly for days, the grass on the Medellin and in the
valley was tinder dry, and from somewhere a flame began that rippled and
spread and flared through the grass and burned wounded and dead alike.
The smell of roasting flesh spread and hung like the lingering palls of
smoke. The victors tried to move the wounded but it was too much, too
soon, and the flames spread and the rescuers cursed and dropped beside
the fouled Portina stream and slaked their thirst in its bloodied water.

Bernard Cornwell, Sharpe’s Eagle, p. 250


George Gordon Noel, Lord Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, Google e-Books


IV. Lines of Torres
Vedras


The next few weeks [of September 1809, after Talavera, Wellington]
spent in riding all over the ‘Lisbon peninsula’, as the hilly quadrilateral
between Lisbon, Torres Vedras, the coast and the Tagus [River] is
called. With him rode his chief engineer, Colonel Richard Fletcher, who
on 20 October received a twenty-one point memorandum full of
references to ‘damming’, ‘redoubts’, ‘barriers’ and ‘signal posts’, and
introduced by a thousand-word essay on how these mysteries would
enable the position they had surveyed to be held against any sweep by
Napoleon’s eagles, winter or summer. It was a classic case of Wellington
seeing for himself; what one of his ofﬁcers, Sir Harry Smith, was to call
his ‘old practice with the army’. When any problem was reported or
question put to him he would always reply:
‘I will get upon my Horse and take a look; and then tell you!’
The result of these particular rural rides would be seen in due course,
when thirteen months of closely guarded secrets came to an end and
Wellington was ready to astonish the world with his Lines of Torres
Vedras.

Elizabeth Longford, Wellington; The Years of the Sword, pp. 208-209


“...one of the ﬁnest defensive positions in Europe.”--Julian Paget

The Battle of Bussaco
Print after Major Thomas S. St. Clair, engraved by C. Turner, 1898


! 1810- the Emperor ordered marshal
Massena to drive the British “Leopard”
from Portugal

! he ﬁrst had to capture the fortress cities
which controlled the only road which
an army could use to enter central
Portugal

! the Spanish garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo
held out until 9 July

! the siege of Almeida ended with the fall
of the Portuguese fortress in August

! Massena’s army of 65,000 found their
way to Lisbon blocked by the 10-mile-
long ridge at Bussaco which was
occupied by 25,000 British and 25,000
Portuguese under the command of the
marquis of Wellington


(1) Renier sent Merle up the steep slope to be hurled
back by the 88th, the Connaught Rangers

(2) a similar fate was experienced by Heudlet

(3) when Foy followed him he hit the least prepared unit
in the Allied army--a Portuguese militia unit--and
routed it, thus gaining the ridge top. Wellington
brought men from his unengaged right flank to
dislodge them

(4) Ney then put forward his two brigades which were
devastated by Crawfurd’s light division

(5) after this failed assault, Massena settled for heavy
skirmishing

(6) The French suffered 522 dead, 3,612 wounded, and
364 captured, including over 300 officers ( 1 general
killed, 4 wounded)--a higher ratio of officers to men
than any other Peninsular battle.


The Allied losses numbered 200 dead, 1,001 wounded, and 51 missing.
The British and Portuguese each lost exactly 626 men.

Although he still had 20,000 fresh infantry with him, Masséna had had
enough. It was not yet midday, but the battle was virtually over, even if
some minor skirmishing took place during the afternoon…. The French
spent the remaining hours of daylight in collecting their dead and
wounded and entrenching their bivouac, as Wellington was to notice
with some satisfaction as he stood surveying the battlefield from his
unassailable crest.

Eventually, on the 29th and 30th, Masséna’s cavalry found a way round to
the north of the ridge. He then moved off to the right to flank the
position, but Wellington, after spending the night in the convent, had
already begun the planned retreat of his army into the previously
fortified Lines of Torres Vedras.

Robertson, Wellington at War, pp. 135-36


The Lines of Torres Vedras
In many ways the Peninsular War has often
been seen as a backwater to the major
campaigns and battles of the Napoleonic
Wars, but in actual fact it was the deciding
factor in the defeat of Napoleon's army in
1813, leading to the signing of the Treaty of
Paris. Indeed, had Massena's advance and
retreat from the Lines of Torres Vedras been
seen as a battle, it would have been one of the
greatest victories of all time. With the recent
dramatization of the 'Sharpe' stories into
television dramas, many of the more famous
battles of the Peninsular War have come to the
public's attention. The glamour attached to the
famous battles of Corunna, Talavera, Ciudad
Rodrigo, Almeida, Busaco, Badajoz have all
somewhat over-shadowed the importance of
the defence works of the Lines of Torres
Vedras.


The Lines of Torres Vedras
The origins of the Lines date back to a
survey and proposals made by a Portuguese
army engineer, Major Jose Maria das Neves
Costa towards the end of 1808, but it was
the strategy adopted by Wellington in 1809
that resulted in their construction. Knowing
that his army could be supplied by sea and if
necessary, evacuated by the Royal Navy,
We l l i n g t o n c h o s e t o a v o i d m a j o r
engagements with the French army and
decided to make a gradual withdrawal
towards Lisbon, using a scorched earth
policy as he retreated. He was well aware of
the formidable natural obstacles offered by
the range of hills that ran across the
peninsula north of Lisbon and on the 20
October 1809 he issued a memorandum to
commence the construction of four lines of
brown areas indicate high ground
defence works to supplement the local
terrain - the Lines of Torres Vedras, thus
choosing and preparing in advance the
battleﬁeld upon which he wished to ﬁght.


...when the French turned back from [Sobral] on 14 October 1810 the
tide of French conquest in Europe turned also. The skirmish at the foot
of the mountain had caused only sixty-seven Allied and 120 French
casualties. Such a limited action; such prodigious results.

Longford, Wellington, p. 240

The Monument at Alhandra to Colonel Fletcher, Wellington’s Chief
Engineer, who constructed the Lines, is inscribed ‘Non Ultra’, or ‘No
Further.’

Paget, Wellington’s Peninsular War, p. 35


The French invasion of Portugal in the late summer of 1810 was
defeated by hunger, and it marked the last time that the French tried to
capture the country. Wellington, by now commander of both the
Portuguese and the British armies, adopted a scorched earth policy that
brought huge hardship to the Portuguese people. Attempts were made
to deny the invaders every scrap of food, while the inhabitants of
central Portugal were required to leave their homes, either to take to
the hills, go north to Oporto or south to Lisbon….
The strategy worked, but at a very high price. One estimate reckons
that forty to ﬁfty thousand Portuguese lost their lives in the winter…,
most from hunger, some from the French…. It was, by any reckoning, a
hard-hearted strategy, throwing the burden of the war onto the civilian
population. Was it necessary? Wellington conclusively defeated
Masséna on the heights of Bussaco, and had he guarded the road
around the north of the great ridge, he could probably have repulsed
the French there and then, forcing them back to Ciudad Rodrigo across
the Spanish border, but that, of course, would have left Masséna’s army
relatively undamaged. Hunger and disease were much greater enemies
than redcoats and riﬂemen, and by forcing Masséna to spend the winter


in the wasteland north of the lines, Wellington destroyed his enemy’s
army. At the beginning of the campaign, in September 1810, Masséna
commanded 65,000 men. When he got back to Spain he had fewer than
40,000, and had lost half his horses and virtually all of his wheeled
transport. Of the 25,000 men he lost, only about 4,000 were killed,
wounded, or taken prisoner at Bussaco (British losses were about
1,000); the rest were lost because the Lines of Torres Vedras
condemned Masséna to a winter of hunger, disease and desertion.
So why ﬁght at Bussaco if the Lines of Torres Vedras could do the job
better? Wellington fought there for the sake of morale. The Portuguese
army did not have a sterling record against the French, but it was now
reorganized under Wellington’s command and by giving it a victory on
the ridge, he gave that army a conﬁdence it never lost. Bussaco was the
place where the Portuguese learned they could beat the French and,
rightly, it holds a celebrated place in Portuguese history.

Bernard Cornwell,”Historical Note,” in Sharpe’s Escape, pp. 353-354


an excellent website
Masséna had no chance of breaking through with the forces
at his disposal, and a stand-off ensued until a lack of
supplies and the imminent arrival of British reinforcements
in the spring of 1811 led Masséna to fall back.

With one French army under Soult checked by Graham's
victory at Barrosa on 5th March 1811, Wellington was able
to push Masséna out of Portugal. Counter-attacks at
Fuentes de Oñoro on 3rd and 5th May 1811 were repulsed
after desperate struggles in the streets of the village.
Masséna, having failed to re-take Portugal, was replaced by
Marmont. A further bloody battle took place at Albuera on
16th May as Soult's move north was intercepted by a
combined British-Portuguese-Spanish force under
Beresford. Although Beresford's handling of the battle - in
which the French made the largest single infantry attack of
the War - attracted much criticism, Soult was finally forced
to retreat. French armies continued to threaten Wellington
throughout the latter months of 1811, but at no time were
able to catch him at a disadvantage. The turning point of the
war had been reached.

http://www.peninsularwar.org/penwar_e.htm


V.Guerrieros


This was where the paradox of Peninsular warfare came in. Wellington
himself was the ﬁrst to appreciate it. From his new headquarters...he wrote
to [War Minister] Lord Liverpool on the last day of January 1810 about
Spain’s last hope.
It is probable that, although the armies may be lost and the principal Juntas [governing
committees] and authorities of the provinces may be dispersed, the war of the partizans may
continue.
Spain was to be saved, in fact, not by grape-shot, graybeards and
grandees, but by hardy guerrillas and the sudden ﬂash of the knife.

Longford, p. 211


Guerrilla (little war)Warfare
✦ whenever smuggling was shut down, the smugglers joined the guerrieros, as did
many of the monks from the monasteries Napoleon closed

✦ when a village was burned or hostages shot in reprisal for the gruesome
murders of captured French soldiers, there were more resistance ﬁghters,
young and old, men and women

✦ “If the French sent out a battalion from one of their fortiﬁed bases, it never
came back; if they sent out a division, it saw nothing.”

✦ convoys of supplies which once required a company escort, now required a
battalion, or a regiment

✦ a rider carrying dispatches suffered the same escalating requirement for
protection. All too often his letters wound up on Wellington’s desk

✦ the French soldiers came to hate Spain and all Spaniards. The sentiment was
reciprocated even more intensely


Uncoordinated and sometimes feckless though their operations were, the
guerillas were Wellington’s main source of military intelligence; without
them he would have moved blind in the presence of superior French forces.
Also, their constant gnawing at the French communications tied down
troops that otherwise might have concentrated to overwhelm him. But
without Wellington’s dangerous little army, the guerillas would have been
eliminated by the same methods the French found successful in the Vendée,
Egypt, Piedmont, Naples and the Tyrol.

Elting, Swords, p. 514


French Counterguerilla Strategy & Tactics
followed the general rules employed at least since the days of Alexander the Great

✦ after defeating the enemy’s armies, you occupied the major communication
centers and established control of the main roads

✦ if the population was restless you established fortified campsites a day’s march
along those highways so that your troops and convoys could find shelter for
the night

✦ at critical points where there was danger of ambuscades, you built
fortifications in commanding positions

✦ a system of patrols kept the territory along the roads under constant
surveillance

✦ as your occupation became better established, you extended your control to
the secondary roads
Elting, p. 548


Los Desastres de la Guerra (The Disasters of War) are a series of 82 prints
created between 1810 and 1820 by the Spanish painter and printmaker Francisco Goya


Los Desastres de la Guerra (The Disasters of War) are a series of 82 prints
created between 1810 and 1820 by the Spanish painter and printmaker Francisco Goya

Although deeply affected by the war, he kept private his thoughts on the art he produced in response to the
conﬂict and its aftermath. He was in poor health and almost deaf when, at 62, he began work on the prints.
They were not published until 1863, 35 years after his death. It is likely that only then was it considered
politically safe to distribute a sequence of artworks criticizing both the French and restored Bourbons

Reprisals
The guerrilla war in Spain was notorious for its
brutality, with both sides committing terrible
acts of savagery. Girod was clearly shocked by
the ﬁrst atrocities he witnessed: ‘Our advanced
guard had found the hanging bodies of some
unfortunate Chasseurs à Cheval, who had been
made prisoner several days before and had
been terribly mutilated….The enemy had let it
be known that it was a ﬁght to the death
between them and us and that we could expect
no quarter.’ Girod adds that in retaliation for
this atrocity, Marshal Victor ordered 300
Spanish prisoners to be executed.


Osprey, French Napoleonic Infantryman 1803-15, PLATE F


The myth of French invincibility in battle was soon
exposed by the defeats of Dupont and Junot at Bailén
and Vimiero in 1808. Despite the withdrawal from La
Coruña, Britain - through her navy's domination of the
seas - was able to take advantage of an alliance with
Portugal and Spain to gain a foothold on Continental
Europe. By 1810-1811, 300,000 French troops had been
sucked into the Peninsula, and yet only 70,000 could be
spared to confront Wellington; the remainder were
pinned down elsewhere by the threat of local
insurrections and the actions of guerrillas. With the
French unable to concentrate their forces against the
British-Portuguese army, Wellington was able to move
on to the offensive.
http://www.peninsularwar.org/penwar_e.htm


The guerrillas were not an unmixed blessing

✦ they were independent, irregular and insubordinate

✦ their goals sometimes ran contrary to Wellington’s

✦ some bands were more like criminals than patriots

✦ some played a double game, seeking their own advantage

✦ still, the net effect of the Guerrilla worked importantly to weaken the
French effort to win “hearts and minds;” to pacify the Spanish
countryside


...all who have served in the Peninsula can attest that a less efﬁcient and
more mischievous body od marauders never infested any country. It is not
denied that they cut off, from time to time, a small convoy, or an isolated
detachment; but unfortunately they did not conﬁne their operations to
attacks upon the enemy. Whoever fell in their way, be he friend or foe,
rarely escaped unplundered; and the inhabitants of the smaller villages
everywhere dreaded their appearance as much as that of the French.

Londonderry’s Narrative, quoted in Ian Robertson, Wellington at War in the Peninsula, p. 19


VI. Badajoz


VI. Badajoz

Badajoz


January 1812

July 1812


The infantry hated sieges. Weeks were spent digging the trenches
known as parallels to enable the guns to be brought close enough
to bring the walls down. This was done in all weathers and under
the constant bombardment from the defenders. The actual assault
was viewed with some relief and there was never any shortage of
volunteers for the ‘Forlorn Hope’, the small group that lead the
main attack. If the commander survived he was assured of
promotion. If the men survived, they would be the ﬁrst at the
shops, the wine cellars and the women.

The sequel to the third British siege of Badajoz was one of the
blackest episodes in the history of the British Army. All control
was lost for a period and the men indulged in an orgy of drunken
rape and plunder. The awful aspect of it was that the inhabitants
were our allies.

http://british-cemetery-elvas.org/badajoz.html


NOTE the orientation of
this map. It has been
rotated 90º clockwise.
North is where east
usually is.


VII. Salamanca


Early on July 22, Marmont's army was moving south, with its leading elements southeast
of Salamanca. To the west, the Marshal could see Wellington's 7th Division deployed on a
ridge. Spotting a dust cloud in the distance, Marmont surmised that most of the British
army was in retreat and that he faced only a rearguard. He planned to move his French
army south, then west to turn the British right flank.
Marmont was mistaken. Wellington actually had most of his divisions hidden behind the
ridge. His 3rd and 5th Divisions would soon arrive from Salamanca. Wellington had
planned to retreat if outflanked, but he was watching warily to see if Marmont made a
blunder.
Marmont planned to move along an L-shaped ridge, with its angle near a steep height
known as the Greater Arapile. That morning, the French occupied only the short, north-
pointing part of the L. For his flanking move, Marmont sent his divisions marching west
along the long side of the L. The Anglo-Allied army lay behind another L-shaped ridge,
inside and parallel to the French L, and separated from it by a valley. Unseen by the
French, Wellington assembled a powerful striking force along the long side of the British L.
As Marmont reached to the west, the French became strung out along the long side of the
L. Thomières's division led the way, supported by Curto's cavalry. After that came
Maucune, Brenier, and Clausel. Bonet, Sarrut, and Boyer were near the Greater Arapile.
Foy and Ferey still held the short side of the L


1-When the 3rd Division and D'Urban's brigade reached the
top of the French L, they attacked Thomières. At the same
time, Wellington launched the 5th and 4th Divisions, backed
by the 7th and 6th Divisions, at the long side of the French L.

The 3rd Division came at the head of Thomières's division in
two-deep line. Despite column formation, the French division
initially repulsed its attackers, but was then charged and
routed by a bayonet charge. Thomières was killed.

2-Seeing British cavalry in the area, Maucune formed his
division into squares. This was the standard formation to
receive a mounted attack, but a poor one to defend against
infantry. Deployed in two-deep line, Leith's 5th Division easily
defeated Maucune in a musketry duel. As the French foot
soldiers began falling back, Cotton hurled Le Marchant's
brigade (5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd and 4th Dragoons) at them.
Maucune's men were cut to pieces by the heavy cavalrymen's
sabres. Many of the survivors surrendered.

! Le Marchant hurriedly reformed his troopers and sent them at the next French division, which was winded from a rapid march. The
heavy dragoons mauled Brenier's hastily formed first line, but Le Marchant pressed his luck too far. He was killed trying to break a
French square in Brenier's second line. William Ponsonby succeeded to command of the brigade

! During this crisis, the French army lost its commander. As Pakenham's 3rd Division prepared to attack Thomières, Marmont finally woke
up to his army's peril. He dashed for his horse, but was caught in a British shellburst which broke his arm and two ribs. His second-in-
command, Bonet was wounded very soon after. Records conflict, Marmont claiming that he was wounded as his wing became
overextended, and his incapacitation led to the error not being corrected before Wellington attacked. His enemies place his wounding
during Wellington's attack. For somewhere between 20 minutes and over an hour, the Army of Portugal remained leaderless


3-Cole's 4th Division attacked Bonet's division and
4-Pack's Portuguese assaulted the Greater Arapile. With the help of
a 40-gun battery firing from the Greater Arapile, both attacks were
repulsed by the French.
5-Assuming command, general Bertrand Clausel did his best to
salvage a bad situation. He committed Sarrut's division to shore
up the wrecked left flank, and then launched a dangerous
counterattack at Cole's 4th Division using his own and Bonet's
divisions, supported by Boyer's dragoons. This attack brushed
aside Cole's survivors and struck the 6th Division in
Wellington's second line.

6-Marshal William Beresford reacted promptly to this developing
threat and immediately sent William Spry's Portuguese brigade of
the 5th Division to engage the French infantry, while Wellington
moved the 1st and 7th Divisions to assist. After bitter resistance,
the divisions of Clausel and Bonet were defeated and the French
army began to retreat.

! As the rest of the French army streamed away, Ferey formed his division in a single three-deep line, with each flank covered by a battalion
in square. Led by Clinton's victorious 6th Division, the British came up to this formation and were initially repulsed


3-Cole's 4th Division attacked Bonet's division and
4-Pack's Portuguese assaulted the Greater Arapile. With the help of
a 40-gun battery firing from the Greater Arapile, both attacks were
repulsed by the French.
5-Assuming command, general Bertrand Clausel did his best to
salvage a bad situation. He committed Sarrut's division to shore
up the wrecked left flank, and then launched a dangerous
counterattack at Cole's 4th Division using his own and Bonet's
divisions, supported by Boyer's dragoons. This attack brushed
aside Cole's survivors and struck the 6th Division in
Wellington's second line.

6-Marshal William Beresford reacted promptly to this developing
threat and immediately sent William Spry's Portuguese brigade of
the 5th Division to engage the French infantry, while Wellington
moved the 1st and 7th Divisions to assist. After bitter resistance,
the divisions of Clausel and Bonet were defeated and the French
army began to retreat.

! As the rest of the French army streamed away, Ferey formed his division in a single three-deep line, with each flank covered by a battalion
in square. Led by Clinton's victorious 6th Division, the British came up to this formation and were initially repulsed

! After ordering his artillery to crossfire through the centre of the French line, Wellington ordered a second assault. This attack broke
Ferey's division, killing its commander

! Foy's division covered the French retreat toward Alba de Tormes where there was a bridge they could use to escape. Wellington,
believing that the Alba de Tormes crossing was blocked by a Spanish battalion in a fortified castle, directed his pursuit along a different
road. However, Maj-Gen D'Espana had withdrawn the unit without informing Wellington, so the French got away

The Army of Portugal suffered 7,000 killed and wounded and 7,000 captured. Besides
Marmont's severe wounding, two divisional commanders were killed and another wounded.
Half of the 5,214 Anglo-Allied losses came from the 4th and 6th Divisions. Cotton, Cole, and
Leith were wounded.
The battle established Wellington as an offensive general. It was said that Wellington
"defeated an army of 40,000 men in 40 minutes." Six days after the battle, Foy wrote in his
diary,
This battle is the most cleverly fought, the largest in scale, the most important in results, of any that
the English have won in recent times. It brings up Lord Wellington's reputation almost to the level of
that of Marlborough. Up to this day we knew his prudence, his eye for choosing good positions, and
the skill with which he used them. But at Salamanca he has shown himself a great and able master of
manoeuvring. He kept his dispositions hidden nearly the whole day: he allowed us to develop our
movement before he pronounced his own: he played a close game; he utilised the oblique order in the
style of Frederick the Great.

The Battle of Salamanca was a damaging defeat to the French. As the French regrouped,
the Anglo-Portuguese entered Madrid on August 6 and began the Siege of Burgos, before
retreating all the way back to Portugal in the autumn when renewed French
concentrations threatened to trap them.

Wikipedia


VIEW OF CADIZ AND ITS ENVIRONS

! During the siege, which lasted two and a half
years, the Cortes Generales government in Cadiz
(the Cádiz Cortes) drew up a new constitution
to reduce the strength of the monarchy (a
constitution eventually revoked by Fernando
VII

! In October 1810, a mixed Anglo-Spanish
relief force embarked on a disastrous landing
at Fuengirola. A second relief attempt was
made at Tarifa in 1811. However, despite
defeating a detached French force of
15,000-20,000 under Marshal Victor at the
Battle of Barrosa, the siege was not lifted

The Siege of Cádiz was a siege of the large Spanish
! In 1812, the Battle of Salamanca eventually naval base of Cádiz by a French army from February 5,
forced the French troops to retreat from 1810 to August 24, 1812 during the Peninsular War.
Following the occupation of Madrid on March 23, 1808,
Andalusia, for fear of being cut off by the
Cádiz became the Spanish seat of power, and was
allied armies.[8] Defeat at Cádiz contributed targeted by 60,000 French troops under the command of
to the liberation of Spain from French Marshal Claude Victor for one of the most important
occupation, due to the survival of the Spanish sieges of the war. Defending the city were 2,000 Spanish
government and the use of Cádiz as a jump off troops who, as the siege progressed, received aid from
point for the Allied forces 10,000 Spanish reinforcements as well as British and
Portuguese troops.


French hopes of recovery were stricken by Napoleon's disastrous
invasion of Russia in 1812. He had taken 30,000 soldiers from the
hard-pressed Armée de l'Espagne, and, starved of reinforcements and
replacements, the French position became increasingly unsustainable
as the allies renewed the offensive in May 1813.
Wikipedia


In a strategic move, Wellington
planned to move his supply base
from Lisbon to Santander

LOC

LOC

LOC
LOC

Lisbon
LOC

Lisbon

In a strategic move, Wellington
planned to move his supply base
from Lisbon to Santander

LOC

Santander

LOC

Burgos

Lisbon
The Anglo-Portuguese
forces swept northwards
in late May 1813 and
seized Burgos; they then
outﬂanked the French
army, forcing Joseph
Bonaparte into the
valley of the River
Zadorra.
Lisbon

VIII.Vitoria


3

1-Wellington's co-
ordinated attack was
o p e n e d b y H i l l ' s 2nd
Division, and Cadogan's
Brigade crossing the
Zadorra at Puebla to attack
the heights overlooking the
French position


2-Graham's force comprising
the 1st and 5th Divisions,
Pack's and Bradford's
Portuguese Brigades and
Longa's Spanish Brigade
began to press from the north
against the road from Vitoria
to Bayonne. By noon the road
had been cut.
3

1-Wellington's co-
French position


3-Crucially, Wellington 2-Graham's force comprising
learned late in the morning the 1st and 5th Divisions,
that the French had left the Pack's and Bradford's
bridge across the Zadorra Portuguese Brigades and
at Trespuentes unguarded. Longa's Spanish Brigade
Kempt's Brigade was began to press from the north
immediately despatched against the road from Vitoria
from the Light Division to to Bayonne. By noon the road
seize the bridge. Concealed had been cut.
by high ground on the
hairpin bend of the 3
Zadorra, the light infantry
were able to take the
bridge virtually
unopposed.

1-Wellington's co-
French position


The British 59th Regiment at Vitoria


3-Crucially, Wellington
learned late in the morning
that the French had left the
bridge across the Zadorra
at Trespuentes unguarded.
Kempt's Brigade was
immediately despatched
from the Light Division to
seize the bridge. Concealed
3
hairpin bend of the
bridge virtually unopposed.


Kempt's Brigade was
3
hairpin bend of the
4-The pressure on the
French position now
rapidly became unbearable
as allied attacks were
pressed home from several
directions. Picton's 3rd
Division - supported by a
ﬂanking attack by Kempt's
Brigade - stormed over the
Zadorra to the east of
Trespuentes


Kempt's Brigade was
3
hairpin bend of the
4-The pressure on the
French position now
rapidly became unbearable
as allied attacks were
pressed home from several
directions. Picton's 3rd
Division - supported by a
flanking attack by Kempt's
Brigade - stormed over the
Zadorra to the east of
Trespuentes

✦ From the west, Cole's 4th Division and the rest of Alten's Light Division crossed the Zadorra. Meanwhile, Hill continued to
press from the south

✦ Throughout the afternoon, the French were gradually rolled-up from the west before being finally sent into headlong retreat.

✦ Wellington's casualties from the battle amounted to 5,100. Joseph suffered not only 8,000 casualties but also the
loss of virtually all his artillery and transport. Joseph's army was spent as a fighting force


Napoleon, Part 2, session iii, Wellington

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