The US Navy in WW II; session i

The U.S. Navy in World War II
session i-1919-1939-Why England [and America] Slept

“In reading statements like that of Sir Arthur Balfour, Chairman of the Balfour Steel Company
[and former British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary-jbp], made in 1933, ‘One of the
gravest menaces to peace today is the totally unarmed condition of Germany,’ we should not
dismiss it as being blindly stupid. We must remember that in the summer of 1939 a sufficient
number of the Senate of the United States believed that there would not be a war in Europe this
year, and refused to repeal the embargo on arms. Every country makes great errors and there is
usually a good reason for it at the time.”

!

John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept. New York : Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940, p. xxvii

June 1938-John Kennedy sailed with his father
and brother Joe, Jr. to work with his father,
Joe, Sr., who was FDR’s Ambassador to the
Court of St. James, London
1939-to prepare for his Harvard senior honors
thesis, he toured Europe, the USSR, the
Balkans and the Middle East
he then went to recently occupied
Czechoslovakia and Hitler’s Third Reich
1 September 1939-Kennedy returned to
London the day WW II began. He was in
Parliament two days later as Chamberlain
regretfully delivered the war message

the paperback edition

1940-his completed thesis, “Appeasement in
Munich,” became the bestseller, Why England
Slept

major topics in this session
•

I. Ending the War to End All Wars

•

II. The Democracies Disarm

•

III. The March of Fascist Aggression

•

IV. Final Failure of Collective Security

•

V. Popular Opinion and Grand Strategy

Text

I. Ending the War to End all Wars
the League of Nations

“…our ideas about the First World War are…confused. Few…have much idea why Europe
took to arms, though they may know that a Ruritanian bigwig with an extravagant
moustache got shot.”

!

Sir Max Hastings, “1914 : Why Britain Had to Go to War.” in BBC History, November, 2013, p. 41

“…our ideas about the First World War are…confused. Few…have much idea why Europe
took to arms, though they may know that a Ruritanian bigwig with an extravagant
moustache got shot. The most widely held belief is that the war was simply a ghastly
mistake—an exercise in futility for which all the powers involved shared blame, its folly
compounded by the murderous incompetence of the generals.
“This is the ‘poets’ view’, ﬁrst articulated by the likes of Siegfried Sassoon, Robert
Graves, and Wilfred Owen. Amid the mud and blood, they felt no discernible cause was
worth the ghastly slaughter that was taking place—that it would be better to end it on any
terms rather than to pursue a meaningless victory.”

!

Sir Max Hastings, “1914 : Why Britain Had to Go to War.” in BBC History, November, 2013, p. 41

“World War I utterly destroyed the polity of Europe, so carefully
nurtured through a hundred years of painstaking statesmanship. What
survived was no brave new world but the wreckage of a social and
economic order. Nor could anyone hope to restore that serenity and
confidence in inevitable progress which had characterized the preceding
century.
!

“In the Allied states demobilization and rebuilding began at once.
Munitions and shipbuilding programs were shelved. Obnoxious controls
could be abolished. Dangerously inflated national budgets could be
balanced. In the United States particularly, the tradition of isolationism
made the people impatient to get back to what President Harding a little
later was to call ‘normalcy.’”

Sea Power, p. 476

Postwar Operations of the U. S. Navy
Nov 1918-Nov 1919—the immediate task was to bring home the American Expeditionary Force—more than
2,000,000 men. All available ships—cruisers, battleships, cargo vessels, German ships turned over to the Allies
under terms of the Armistice—were diverted to ferrying troops
to Sept 1919—another major chore was lifting the North Sea Mine Barrage, now simply a hazard to peaceful
shipping. A fleet of 89 sweepers completed this difficult & dangerous task
quasi-diplomatic missions:
American Adriatic Squadron administered the 300 mile Dalmatian coast of the new Yugoslavia
RAdm. Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, 1919-1927, mixed diplomacy and naval power. Evacuated the
Whites from the Black Sea ports after Red victory in 1920. Evacuated 262,000 Greeks from Turkish Aegean coast, 1921-22
until Apr 1920-aid to the Whites was concealed in missions to Archangel and Vladivostok to guard munitions sent to the preBolshevik government. Another aim was to keep the Japanese from seizing Russia’s Maritime Province

Postwar Operations of the U. S. Navy
Nov 1918-Nov 1919—the immediate task was to bring home the American Expeditionary Force—more than
2,000,000 men. All available ships—cruisers, battleships, cargo vessels, German ships turned over to the Allies
under terms of the Armistice—were diverted to ferrying troops
to Sept 1919—another major chore was lifting the North Sea Mine Barrage, now simply a hazard to peaceful
shipping. A fleet of 89 sweepers completed this difficult & dangerous task
quasi-diplomatic missions:
American Adriatic Squadron administered the 300 mile Dalmatian coast of the new Yugoslavia
RAdm. Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, 1919-1927, mixed diplomacy and naval power. Evacuated the
Whites from the Black Sea ports after Red victory in 1920. Evacuated 262,000 Greeks from Turkish Aegean coast, 1921-22
until Apr 1920-aid to the Whites was concealed in missions to Archangel and Vladivostok to guard munitions sent to the preBolshevik government. Another aim was to keep the Japanese from seizing Russia’s Maritime Province

1920s—Mission Accomplished—public apathy characteristic of post-war periods. Only “showing the flag”
operations such as the Yangtze Patrol
a new emphasis on technical R & D and on improving operating procedures was characteristic of the whole interwar
period

The New Alignment of Powers—“The prewar balance of power in Europe was
destroyed”—[“the war after the war”—jbp]

Germany was prostrate and convulsed by political revolution, presumably disarmed for the indefinite future
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires dismembered, Russian Empire torn by revolution and civil war
nor did the victors fare much better:
France and Italy were on the verge of bankruptcy
Britain also found herself relatively poor and deeply in debt to the United States
this economic situation led the victors to demand reparations from the Central Powers at the Paris Peace conference
the human losses were so severe that they would experience a dearth of able leadership for a generation to come

for Japan and the United States the result was quite the opposite
Japan’s efforts were mainly in the Pacific where she scooped up territorial gains at a minimal cost
America, a “debtor nation” in 1914, now found herself the world’s foremost creditor. Her economic efforts had shown the world the
miracles which American industry could accomplish

Ibid.

Text

The Paris Peace Conference
January-June, 1919

The Big Four: David Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, Georges
Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson

Wilson arrived at the Paris Peace Conference after a triumphal tour of the Allied Countries
where he was hailed as their savior. The other Big Three, all cynical old-school European
statesmen, couldn’t grasp that Wilson actually believed in his Fourteen Points and would
fight for them. Britain particularly disliked Point 2, “Freedom of the Seas,” which potentially
nullified their use of blockade and the value of their naval supremacy. All three were
skeptical of Point 4: “…national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent
with domestic safety” The Three had thought that the Fourteen Points had been just
another piece of wartime propaganda such as they had engaged in. They were also united
in opposing Point 5, the adjustment of colonial claims, as threatening their empires.

!

A frustrated President Wilson gave in on all but Point 14: “A general association of nations
must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees
of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” He
believed that the League of Nations could undo whatever evil consequences came from
the other terms of the peace treaties. The supreme irony would be that he couldn’t
convince his own country to enter this paramount accomplishment. His frustration led to
partisan fury and a stressful whistle stop campaign to build popular support for the treaty.
He never recovered fully from the stroke which ended his effort in October, 1919.

!
jbp

William Orpen – The Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles 1919 (detail)!
Germany’s chief of delegation swallows the bitter pill, source of so much evil

On the other hand…
In preparation for the WW I centennial the BBC prepared a list of ten
myths:
The
Versailles
Treaty
was
extremely
harsh

The
treaty
of
Versailles
conﬁscated
10%
of
Germany's
territory
but
le;
it
the
largest,
richest
na>on
in

central
Europe.

It
was
largely
unoccupied
and
ﬁnancial
repara>ons
were
linked
to
its
ability
to
pay,
which
mostly
went

unenforced
anyway.

!

The
treaty
was
notably
less
harsh
than
trea>es
that
ended
the
1870-‐71
Franco-‐Prussian
War
and
World

War
Two.
The
German
victors
in
the
former
annexed
large
chunks
of
two
rich
French
provinces,
part
of

France
for
between
2-‐300
years,
and
home
to
most
of
French
iron
ore
produc>on,
as
well
as
presen>ng

France
with
a
massive
bill
for
immediate
payment.

!

A;er
WW2
Germany
was
occupied,
split
up,
her
factory
machinery
smashed
or
stolen
and
millions
of

prisoners
forced
to
stay
with
their
[Soviet,
jbp]
captors
and
work
as
slave
labourers.
Germany
lost
all
the

territory
it
had
gained
a;er
WW1
and
another
giant
slice
on
top
of
that.

!

Versailles
was
not
harsh
but
was
portrayed
as
such
by
Hitler
who
sought
to
create
a
>dal
wave
of
an>-‐
Versailles
sen>ment
on
which
he
could
then
ride
into
power.

e-Mail from Geoff Strauss, 22 Jan 2014

Käthe Kollwitz’ sculpture
“Mother with her dead son”
Berlin, the Neue Wache, 1993—after uniﬁcation

In Germany:Two Equally Dangerous Consequences
The Left’s determination to stamp out militarism, artistically
embodied in Käthe Kollwitz’ work. Her son had died in the war

the Right was furious with the Communist uprisings in the naval
bases, Berlin and Bavaria and the Socialist government of the
Weimar Republic
this gave rise to the “Backstab” myth:
the German army had never been defeated on the battleﬁeld
the nation had been stabbed in the back by the “Socis” and the
“Kommis,” many of whom were Jews

the Right was furious with the Communist uprisings in the naval
bases, Berlin and Bavaria and the Socialist government of the
Weimar Republic
this gave rise to the “Backstab” myth:
the German army had never been defeated on the battleﬁeld
the nation had been stabbed in the back by the “Socis” and the
“Kommis,” many of whom were Jews

various conservative nationalist militarist groups arose to denounce
the hated Versailles Diktat, among them a small group calling
themselves the National Socialist German Workers Party, Nazi for
short

“Socialist Realist” painting of how Hitler liked to recall his early campaign—US Army collection

“The preamble to Article V of the Treaty says, ‘In order to render possible the initiation of a
general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the
military, naval, and air clauses which follow. This clause was reinforced by another:

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

The Allied and Associated Powers…recognize that the acceptance by Germany of the
terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment
of a general reduction of armaments, and they intend to open negotiations immediately
with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of general reduction….

The Germans have since argued that this implied an almost contractual obligation for the Allies
to disarm when they had…

!
Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 10

The End of the German High Seas Fleet—The armistice required Germany
to intern her warships until their final fate would be determined by the peace treaty
Germany’s capital ships, Kaiser Wilhelm’s pride, had been kept in port after the indecisive battle of Jutland,
May, 1916
Nov 1918-now they sailed across the North Sea to the British base at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands
north of Scotland
as news from the peace conference began to leak, the German commander Adm. von Reuter made secret
preparations to scuttle the fleet rather than allow it to be parceled out among the victors
this act of defiance succeeded in destroying most of the major ships
15 of the 16 capital ships
5 of the 8 cruisers
32 of the 50 destroyers

highly popular in Germany, as redeeming the national honor, this gesture fueled the post-war bitterness
between the victors and the vanquished

SMS Bayern sinking
21 Jun 1919

Only the upper works of the Hindenburg remain above water

The League of Nations & Disarmament

“…many in Britain [believed] that any increase in armaments
was a blow to the League of Nations
“…League supporters felt that ‘without disarmament, in
short, the League can have no reality
“…Article VIII, calling for the reduction of armaments, is
really the first clause of the Covenant [the League’s Charter
or constitution], as the first seven clauses deal with the
mechanics of the League machinery
“A waste of money, and life, a sham and a blot on mankind, a
danger for peace, armaments were the first evil which the
drafters of the League Covenant sought to secure.”
Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 7-8

Postwar Building Programs
“All through the war, the Japanese had pursued an active naval building program in their new
yards, and immediately afterwards were pushing to completion several capital ships* on the
ways. On the other hand, French and Italian construction had been largely suspended during
hostilities, and the empty national treasuries of those countries gave little prospect of a spirited
renewal of large-scale building.
“Of all the naval powers, only Britain’s recent ally, the United States, seemed in any position
to challenge Britain’s naval ascendancy….Britain had had a long tough war and felt entitled to a
period of relaxation. Certainly it would be less than friendly for the United States at such a time
to bring on a naval armaments race.
“This pardonable British prejudice however failed to take into account the stubborn complex
personality of the American President. A man of peace dedicated to the spirit of reform, he had
nevertheless been the Commander in Chief of a great nation in time of war….What the cynical
leadership in Europe’s capitals could never quite realize about Wilson was the incredible fact
that he always meant what he said….
“This aside on Wilson’s character is germane to American naval policy in the immediate
postwar period…..[Britain’s rejection of Point 2] Wilson’s reaction was to request Congress for
a new building program that would double the heavy 1916 schedule.
Sea Power, pp. 478-479
_______________
* there is no rigorous definition of the term but major warships displacing 10,000 tons or more is often used—jbp

America and Britain Compared
“At the end of the war the United States had 16 dreadnought* battleships, none more than
eight years old.”

_______________
*the modern “all-big-gun” ship type pioneered by HMS Dreadnought, 1906-1923

Sea Power, p. 479

eight years old.

USS Texas, 1912-1945

_______________

Sea Power, p. 479

eight years old. Though the British could count 42 capital ships in their navy, 13 of these were
already obsolescent. Besides after the experience of Jutland, the nine battle cruisers (bigger than
a heavy cruiser, smaller than a battleship)…

HMS Invincible, 1909-1916
sunk at Jutland

_______________

Sea Power, p. 479

already obsolescent. Besides after the experience of Jutland, the nine battle cruisers• (bigger
than a heavy cruiser, smaller than a battleship) in the total could be questioned as vessels
worthy of a place in the line. For the United States merely to complete its 1916 program,
incorporating the lessons of the war in the new ships, would have provided 35 modern units,
and a fleet qualitatively much superior to the battle-worn British Grand Fleet. The entire
proposed 1919 program would mean a fleet of over 50 first-line vessels, utterly eclipsing the
British navy.

_______________

Sea Power, p. 479

already obsolescent. Besides after the experience of Jutland, the nine battle cruisers• (bigger
than a heavy cruiser, smaller than a battleship•) in the total could be questioned as vessels
worthy of a place in the line. For the United States merely to complete its 1916 program,
incorporating the lessons of the war in the new ships, would have provided 35 modern units,
and a fleet qualitatively much superior to the battle-worn British Grand Fleet. The entire
proposed 1919 program would mean a fleet of over 50 first-line vessels, utterly eclipsing the
British navy….
“…the British began to plan what would be needed to match or excel the American
program….
“Most probably, Wilson, irritated at the British attitude on the ‘freedom of the seas’ issue and
concerned over Japanese saber-rattling in the Far East, simply desired a much larger navy….On
the other hand, it has also been suggested that he intended to use the threat of completion of the
1919 program as a club over the head of the British, who did not then appear enthusiastic about
Wilson’s dream—the League of Nations.”

_______________

Sea Power, p. 479

Text

II. The Democracies Disarm
the Washington Treaty for Naval Disarmament
(1922)

Scene at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, December 1923, with guns from
scrapped battleships in the foreground. One of these guns is marked "Kansas",
presumably an indication that it came from USS Kansas (BB-21).!
Ship being dismantled in the background is USS South Carolina (BB-26).

The Background of the Washington Conference
“Whatever Wilson intended, his vision of a new world order flickered out in the last year of
his presidency. The rejection of the League of Nations by his own country, his party’s
repudiation in the 1920 election, and his own serious illness all combined to embitter his
departure from the White House. He excoriated America’s ‘sullen and selfish isolation’.

Sea Power, p. 480


departure from the White House.• He excoriated America’s ‘sullen and selfish isolation’.

!
“With popular support, Harding and the Republican Party had disowned the League, but the
notion of disarmament appeared to have great public appeal. In early 1921 Senator Borah of
Idaho introduced what was to become a joint congressional resolution favoring a tripartite
disarmament conference; it passed the Senate unanimously, and the House by a vote of 332 to
4. Almost immediately the British Foreign Office intimated that it would be happy to follow
America’s lead in calling such a conference.”

Sea Power, p. 480

departure from the White House.• He excoriated America’s ‘sullen and selfish isolation’.

!
“With popular support, Harding and the Republican Party had disowned the League, but the
notion of disarmament appeared to have great public appeal. In early 1921 Senator Borah of
Idaho introduced what was to become a joint congressional resolution favoring a tripartite
disarmament conference; it passed the Senate unanimously, and the House by a vote of 332 to
4. Almost immediately the British Foreign Office intimated that it would be happy to follow
America’s lead in calling such a conference. Accordingly Charles Evans Hughes, Harding’s
able Secretary of State, made informal overtures to the governments of Britain, Japan, France
and Italy.

Sea Power, p. 480

“The Background of the Washington Conference

“All but Japan promptly replied with polite enthusiasm. The Japanese appeared reluctant.
Diplomatic friction between Japan and the United States had been frequent and acute. During
and immediately after the war, Japanese territorial aims on continental Asia [cf. their occupation
of Vladivostok during the Russian Civil War, 1919-20,- jbp] had become more obvious. With
good reason the Japanese suspected that the conference was in part a device to abrogate the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance [of 1902, Britain’s first move away from ‘Splendid Isolation’- jbp],
which they wished to preserve. On the other hand, they were persuaded that the projected
American naval building program was directed at them. And they could afford an armaments
race with the United States even less than the British. Besides, it would be incompatible with
the Imperial Japan to stay at home from a major conference attended by all the other first-class
powers. So, after a two-and-a-half-week delay, Tokyo announced that Japan too would discuss
naval disarmament and Far Eastern affairs in Washington.”

Ibid.

“The way to disarm is to disarm.”— Charles Evans Hughes
12 November 1921-after an emotional ceremony dedicating the tomb of the unknown soldier in Arlington
National Ceremony, the delegates to America’s ﬁrst international conference convened in the Memorial
Continental Hall of the DAR

“The way to disarm is to disarm.”— Charles Evans Hughes
12 November 1921-after an emotional ceremony dedicating the tomb of the unknown soldier in Arlington
National Ceremony, the delegates to America’s first international conference convened in the Memorial
Continental Hall of the DAR
Secretary of State Hughes startled the delegates and delighted the press by opening the conference with
America’s proposal:
a ten year building “holiday” on capital ships
the scrapping of capital ships “built and building” to reach the famous 5 : 5 : 3 ratio between the U.S., Britain, and
Japan. That is, the U.S. would scrap ships to reach a maximum of 500,000 tons, &c. (France and Italy were to be
limited to 175,000 tons @)
aircraft carriers would be limited to 27,000 ton displacement
other categories of lesser ships were also defined [ but limits were never agreed upon in the final treaty!]
disagreement on terms regarding submarines led to this also being left unresolved in the final Five Power
Treaty

Japan’s Internal Dispute
“The Japanese delegation was divided. Japanese naval doctrine required the maintenance
of a ﬂeet 70% the size of that of the US, which was felt to be the minimum necessary to
defeat the US in any subsequent war; … thus a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable.!

Wikipedia


defeat the US in any subsequent war; … thus a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the director of the delegation, Katō Tomosaburō•, favoured accepting a 60%
ratio to the prospect of an arms race with the US, as the relative industrial output of the two
nations would cause Japan to lose such an arms race and might cause an economic crisis
as a consequence.!

Wikipedia

defeat the US in any subsequent war; … thus a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the director of the delegation, Katō Tomosaburō•, favoured accepting a 60%
ratio to the prospect of an arms race with the US, as the relative industrial output of the two
nations would cause Japan to lose such an arms race and might cause an economic crisis
as a consequence.!
“His opinion was opposed strongly by Katō Kanji•, the president of the Naval Staff College,
who acted as his chief naval aide at the delegation, and who represented the influential
"big navy" school of thought. This school of thought held that in the event of war the USA
would be able to build indefinitely more warships, given its huge industrial power, and
Japan thus needed to prepare as thoroughly as possible for the inevitable conflict with
America. Katō Tomosaburō was finally able to persuade the Japanese high command to
accept the Hughes proposals, but the outcome of the Treaty was a cause of controversy in
the Japanese navy for years to come.”

Wikipedia

The Non-Fortiﬁcation Clause
“An integral part of the [final] treaty was the controversial non-fortification clause, bitterly denounced
by the professional representatives of the American navy. This provided that the Pacific powers were not
to arm or fortify bases in their island possessions, except that the Japanese might do as they chose in their
home islands, and the Americans in the Hawaiian group. It did mean, however, that Britain was barred
from fortifying Hong Kong, Borneo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts; Japan was barred from further
fortifying Formosa or the former German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator, which had been
mandated to her…the United States was barred from fortifying Samoa, Wake, Guam, and, most
important, the Philippines.
“American naval authorities were shocked [that this effectively underwrote] Japanese naval
supremacy in the Far East. Subsequent history has of course largely substantiated this view.
“Yet in the context of the times, the willingness of the American delegation to surrender on this point
is understandable. The Japanese were displeased at the imputation of inferiority implied in the 5 : 5 : 3
ratio. It is likely that the non-fortification clause was an essential part of their price of acceptance of the
treaty. Second, there was a well-founded conviction on the part of the American delegation that it was
bargaining away an empty right, one that Congress would probably either never exercise at all or else
implement on too modest a scale to make any difference in event of war….On the other hand, there was
good reason to think Japan would fortify her island possessions in the absence of treaty provision.9”
____________
9 In fact, of course, the Japanese broke their word on this provision, but not until several years after the treaty.


The Nine-Power Treaty10 and the Four-Power Pact11
in addition to the most important Disarmament Treaty, two other documents were produced at the Washington
Conference
the Nine-Power Treaty was essentially a multilateral endorsement of America’s “Open Door” policy, originally
promoted at the turn of the century
it reaffirmed the territorial integrity of China at a time when she was convulsed by warlords and there was the very real
prospect of Japanese and , later, Soviet aggrandizement

“The Four-Power Pact was designed to save face for Japan in the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It
provided that the signatory powers would “respect” each other’s Far Eastern possessions
“Both these treaties represented considerable triumphs for American diplomacy
“In them, Japan, the only nation [then capable] of aggressive designs in the Far East, agreed formally to policies
inconsistent with aggression”

10 Nine-Power Treaty: U.S., Britain, Japan, France, Italy, plus Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, China
11 Four-Power Pact: U.S., Britain, Japan, France

Sea Power, p. 482

Results of the Washington Conference
“At the time, world opinion hailed the Washington treaties as a triumph of diplomacy, a milestone in the world’s
progress to a millennium of peace
“…ratified…, the world’s navies settled down to a period of comparative stagnation in new construction.”

Sea Power, p. 482

Results of the Washington Conference
“At the time, world opinion hailed the Washington treaties as a triumph of diplomacy, a milestone in the world’s
progress to a millennium of peace
“…ratified…, the world’s navies settled down to a period of comparative stagnation in new construction.”
“The American State Department could count the conference a success in achieving its main goals…

“On the other hand, in failing to limit cruiser tonnage, the treaty had simply diverted British and Japanese
appropriations to lesser ship types, in which the U.S. was to become more and more inferior…..
“Finally, most damning, the simple fact is that aggression has seldom been arrested by ‘a scrap of paper’.
“It may reasonably argued that the limitations of the Washington Disarmament Conference were in fact a step along
the path leading to the Pearl Harbor attack. Certain it is, in any event, that the naval treaty made no such contribution
to world peace as its sponsors hoped.”


“Later Naval Disarmament Conferences”
1927-the Geneva Naval Conference “…called by [U.S. President] Coolidge specifically to impose the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio
on cruiser tonnage was a total failure
1930-at the London Conference “Britain and the U.S. reached a compromise on the troublesome cruiser issue, each
to be allowed 339,000 tons….Japan acceded to the agreements conditional to an altered 10 : 10 : 7 ratio in cruisers
and parity in submarines.

Sea Power, p. 483

“Later Naval Disarmament Conferences”
1927-the Geneva Naval Conference “…called by [U.S. President] Coolidge specifically to impose the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio
on cruiser tonnage was a total failure
1930-at the London Conference “Britain and the U.S. reached a compromise on the troublesome cruiser issue, each
to be allowed 339,000 tons….Japan acceded to the agreements conditional to an altered 10 : 10 : 7 ratio in cruisers
and parity in submarines.
“Submarine tonnage for all three powers was fixed at 52,700 each. The ban on capital ship construction was
extended to the end of 1936
“Since France and Italy had refused participation, it was felt necessary to include certain “escape clauses’ permitting
further construction in the event a non signatory power engaged in competitive building.
“Even in 1930 the auguries for navies regulated by the precise scales of diplomacy had ceased to be favorable.”

Sea Power, p. 483

“Throughout the decade of the 1930’s, the post-Versailles international political system was
on greased skids sloping off to war. A General Disarmament Conference in 1932-33 at Geneva•
failed abjectly. [more about this later]


“Throughout the decade of the 1930’s, the post-Versailles international political system was
on greased skids sloping off to war. A General Disarmament Conference in 1932-33 at Geneva•
failed abjectly. [more about this later] The Second London Naval Disarmament Conference
(1935-36) was a final effort at perpetuating the principle of treaty limitation of navies. The
aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany, and their manifest contempt for existing treaties
foredoomed the London Conference. Britain had already surrendered a principle to Germany in a
bilateral naval treaty in 1935, by the terms of which Germany was “allowed” 35 percent of
Britain’s naval tonnage and parity in submarines. Both France and Italy were engaged in
substantial building programs. Italy refused participation at the start. The Japanese then
demanded full parity in all categories. The American delegation demurring, the Japanese
withdrew from the conference. The U.S., Britain, and France finally signed a treaty so watered
down with “escalator clauses” as to be virtually meaningless. For practical purposes, all treaty
limitations of navies expired December 31, 1936.


American Building Policy in the 1930’s
4 March 1933-a new phase began with the inauguration of
FDR
like TR earlier, he “showed a perception of the intimate
relationship between diplomatic and military strength.
“He recognized the true seriousness of the deteriorating world
situation, and knew that navies cannot be improvised in the
face of an emergency.

Sea Power, p. 484

4 March 1933-a new phase began with the inauguration of FDR
like TR earlier, he “showed a perception of the intimate
relationship between diplomatic and military strength.
“He recognized the true seriousness of the deteriorating world
situation, and knew that navies cannot be improvised in the face of
an emergency.
“Furthermore, again like the earlier Roosevelt, he had gained
professional knowledge of the service as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy and had a hobbyist’s enthusiasm for the sea service.

Sea Power, p. 484

4 March 1933-a new phase began with the inauguration of FDR
like TR earlier, he “showed a perception of the intimate relationship between diplomatic and military strength.
“He recognized the true seriousness of the deteriorating world situation, and knew that navies cannot be improvised
in the face of an emergency.
USS Philadelphia (CL-41) was laid down on 28 May 1935 at the
Philadelphia Navy Yard; launched on 17 November 1936; sponsored by
“Furthermore, again like the earlier Roosevelt, he had gained Mrs. George H. Earle, ﬁrst lady of Pennsylvania; and commissioned at
professional knowledge of the service as Assistant
Philadelphia on 23
Secretary of the Navy and had a hobbyist’s enthusiasm for the sea service. September 1937, Captain Jules James in command.

“The first substantial naval authorization of [his] first term came as a relief measure to assist the depressed steel and
shipbuilding industries; section 202 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized new
construction in cruisers and lesser types to full treaty strength.
27 Mar 1934-the Vinson-Trammel Bill passed, providing for an eight-year replacement building program amounting
to 102 ships
1934-1940-the naval appropriations implementing this program grew year by year finally approaching a billion
dollars annually.”
Sea Power, p. 484

1938- the Second Vinson Act authorized an additional 20% over-all tonnage increase
“In addition to new construction, modernization of older vessels was undertaken; a new emphasis on naval aircraft
and on carriers became apparent; new naval bases and air stations were established.

U.S. Navy N3N trainers
awaiting engines and other
parts at Naval Aircraft
Factory, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (USA), 28 June
1937.

Sea Power, p. 484

After the fall of France, in June 1940, the limiting factor in American defense spending ceased to
be Congressional reluctance to underwrite the services’ maximum programs: it was from then on
simply the physical limitations of America’s industrial capacity. By the time of the Pearl Harbor
attack (7 Dec 1941), the United States Navy had the following combat vessels in commission or on
the ways:

In Commission
Battleships

Building

17

15

Carriers

7

11

Cruisers

37

54

Destroyers

171

191

Submarines

111

73

Ibid.

The United States Merchant Marine
“Virtually since the American Civil War, the American merchant marine has been at a
competitive disadvantage in comparison with the shipping of other countries. In the 20th
century, this has stemmed both from high construction costs and high costs of operation, which
in turn have largely stemmed from high American labor costs. In those enterprises to which
assembly-line techniques can be adapted, American industry can pay high wages and still
undersell foreign competition in world markets. But neither the building nor the operation of
ships lend themselves to the assembly line. In spite of high tariff protection, American ship
building and operation could never compete effectively with that of other countries except with
the additional crutch of federal subsidy….
“In 1936, Congress passed an important Shipping Act, which established a five-man Maritime
Commission under Rear Admiral Emory S. Land USN (Ret.), and initiated a new program of
direct subsidy, both for construction and operation….To qualify for subsidy, an operator had to
carry crews two thirds of whom were United States citizens, and submit to certain investigatory
and regulatory powers exercised by the commission.
“Beginning in 1938, the Maritime Commission fostered a replacement program…which
aimed to retire slow, obsolete craft at a rate of 50 ships a year….Under the forced draft of
wartime, new construction was enormously increased. Yard capacity and the availability of
shipyard workers• were the only effective limiting factors after the Pearl Harbor attack.

shipyard workers• were the only effective limiting factors after the Pearl Harbor attack.”

enter Rosie to ﬁll the worker gap

shipyard workers• were the only effective limiting factors after the Pearl Harbor attack. By
September 1942, 300 tankers and 2,000 standard-design Liberty• and Victory ships had been
contracted for.”

Technological Progress in the United States Navy
“It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital
ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new”
battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II,…
USS North Carolina (BB-55)
ﬁtting-out stage, 17 Apr 41
Brooklyn Navy Yard

op. cit, p. 485

battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II, represented an enormous
advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was
seven knots faster and possessed superior armor and much improved ﬁre control. She
also of course had a very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval
types made a more than commensurate advance.
USS West Virginia (BB-48)

in San Francisco Bay, ca., 1934

Ordered:!
5 December 1916!
Builder:!
Newport News Shipbuilding!
Laid down:!
12 April 1920!
Launched:!
19 November 1921!

op. cit, p. 485

“In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter •

U S S JUPITER
MARE ISLAND, CAL.

!

OCTOBER 13, 1918

op. cit, p. 485

Jupiter a more than commensurate advance.
types madeunder conversion
“In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • was converted into the Langley • (19,360 tons), the
ﬁrst United States Navy aircraft carrier.
Ordered:!
5 December 1916!
Builder:!
Newport News Shipbuilding!
Laid down:!
12 April 1920!
Launched:!
19 November 1921!

USS Langley, CV-1

op. cit, p. 485

USS Lexington (CV-2)!
Ordered:!
1916 (as battlecruiser)!
1922 (as aircraft carrier)!
Builder:!
Fore River Ship and Engine Building Co., Quincy,
Massachusetts!
Laid down:!
8 January 1921!

!

Launched:!
3 October 1925!

!

Commissioned:!
14 December 1927!

under conversion

!

Reclassified:!
As aircraft carrier, 1 July 1922!

Struck:!
24 June 1942!
Identification:!
Hull number: CC-1, then CV-2!
Nickname:!
"Lady Lex"!
Fate:!
Sunk during the Battle of the Coral Sea, 8 May 1942!
“In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • was converted into the Langley • (19,360 tons), the
first United States Navy aircraft carrier. Two battle cruiser hulls, which otherwise would
have been scrapped under the Washington Treaty, were converted to the 33,000-ton
Lexington •…

!

op. cit, p. 485

USS Saratoga (CV-3)!
Ordered:!
1917 (as battlecruiser)!
1922 (as aircraft carrier)!
Builder:!
New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden, New Jersey!
Laid down:!
25 September 1920!


!

Launched:!
7 April 1925!

!

! ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new”
Reclassified:!
1 July 1922 to aircraft carrier!
! advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was
Struck:!
15 August 1946!
USS North Carolina (BB-55)
seven fitting-out stage, and 41
Identification:! knots faster 17 Apr possessed superior armor and much improved fire control. She
Hull number: CC-3, then CV-3!
Brooklyn Navy very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval
also
Nickname:! of course had aYard
Sara Maru, Sister Sara!
types
Honors and! made a more than commensurate advance.
awards:!
8 battle stars!“In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • was converted into the Langley • (19,360 tons), the
Fate:!
first United States Navy aircraft carrier. Two USS West Virginia (BB-48)
battle cruiser hulls, which otherwise would
Sunk by atomic bomb test, 25 July 1946!
San Francisco Bay, ca., 1934
have been scrapped under the Washingtonin Treaty, were converted to the 33,000-ton
Lexington • and Saratoga •, commissioned in 1928. It was on the flight decks of these
three vessels that the operational techniques were worked out that were to make the
United States Navy’s air arm the world’s finest. By December 7, 1941, as we have seen,
America had seven carriers in commission, and eleven more on the ways.
Commissioned:!
16 November 1927!

op. cit, p. 485

“The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet
boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved
submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject
of a continuing research and development (R & D) program.

!

USS S-44 built 1924

Ibid.


!

Ibid.

9 V-boats were built, 1919-1934


!

Tambor class
ﬂeet boat,
1939-1941

Ibid.


!

Gato class
ﬂeet boat,
1940-1944
77 built

Ibid.



!
“Other scientific advances changed standard tactics in important ways. Complete conversion
of the U.S. fleet to oil fuel shortly after World War I led to the building of high speed naval
tankers and an effective technique for fueling at sea.•…
Ibid.



!
“Other scientific advances changed standard tactics in important ways. Complete conversion
of the U.S. fleet to oil fuel shortly after World War I led to the building of high speed naval
tankers and an effective technique for fueling at sea.• This in turn expanded the possible radius
of action of the fleet, no longer dependent on closely spaced coal deposits. Carrier aircraft and
long-range naval reconnaissance planes effectively took over the traditional scouting role of
cruisers. Much improved radio communication promised to increase effective operational control
by the higher echelons of command.”
Ibid.

Text

III. The March of Fascist Aggression
members of Hitler’s Reichstag give one another
“the German Greeting”

The Collective Security System
“Throughout the between-wars period the diplomacy of the western democracies aimed at providing a collective security
system
“The cornerstone…was…enforcement of the Versailles Treaty which undertook to insure the permanent disarmament of
Germany, and the strengthening of the League of Nations.”
Mar 1919-French President Clemenceau coined the term “cordon sanitaire” to describe his alliance system to block
Soviet expansion. France concluded defense treaties with the new states along the Soviet western border

Ibid.

The Collective Security System
“Throughout the between-wars period the diplomacy of the western democracies aimed at providing a collective security
system
“The cornerstone…was…enforcement of the Versailles Treaty which undertook to insure the permanent disarmament of
Germany, and the strengthening of the League of Nations.”
Mar 1919-French President Clemenceau coined the term “cordon sanitaire” to describe his alliance system to block
Soviet expansion. France concluded defense treaties with the new states along the Soviet western border
1924-a similar French attempt at collective security was the so-called “Little Entente,” a series of bilateral treaties with
middle European successor states aimed at checking ambitions of •Germany, Austria or Hungary : • Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania

G
Cz
A

H

R

Y
Ibid.

“Joint international action was the order of the day. Besides the disarmament conferences
described above, there were conferences on war debts and reparations, treaties of conciliation
and commerce. Germany entered the League after the Locarno Treaties (1924). Even Communist
Russia, outcast among nations, was at the behest of France admitted to the League in 1933.
Through the 1920s, there seemed no good reason to think a new war inevitable….
“But the apparent stability was extremely temporary. To Britain, France, and the United
States, the status quo was satisfactory. For that very reason, their diplomacy was passive, and as
the following decade was to show, comparatively impotent. They failed to take effective joint
action, and as war loomed nearer and nearer, their inadequate armaments and pacifistic
populations emboldened the dictator-states to make more and more brazen demands….
“Japan, Germany, and Italy, the self-styled “have-not” nations, nationalistic, imperialistic, and
opportunistic, came to assume the dynamic roles in the history of the 1930s. They were not
satisfied with the status quo, and were prepared top risk war to remold their corners of the world.
“The proximate causes of the aggressions of the Fascist countries in the 1930s may well be
the alleged “injustices” of the Versailles Treaty (in the case of Germany), and the Great
Depression that by destroying the means of livelihood of millions of men made them ready to
follow any demagogue. But the deep-rooted underlying causes were the grandiose national
objectives of Germany, Italy, and Japan—….”
op. cit., p. 486

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486
junior Japanese army ofﬁcers staged a terrorist incident on the
Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway

Japanese newspaper photo of the bomb “damage”

1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War

South
Manchurian
Railway

19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese
possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria.


junior Japanese army ofﬁcers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway

19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria.

19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and

appealed to the League of Nations


19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and

the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to “prove” Chinese culpability for the incident

19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession
since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the
League of Nations
the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to
“prove” Chinese culpability for the incident

7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State Henry Stimson
proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not
recognize any state created by the Japanese aggression

19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese
possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and
the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to
“prove” Chinese culpability for the incident
7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State Henry Stimson proclaimed the
Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any state created
by the Japanese aggression

Mar 32-Japan created the state of Manchukuo and
made Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor, their puppet ruler.


19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the
League of Nations
7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State henry Stimson proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any state created by the
Japanese aggression
Mar 32-Japan created the state of Manchukuo and made Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor their puppet ruler. Then

of the League

Japan marched out


19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China
protested and appealed to the League of Nations
7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State Henry Stimson proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any
state created by the Japanese aggression
Mar 32-Japan created the state of Manchukuo and made Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor their puppet ruler.
Then Japan marched out of the League

2 Oct 32-the Lytton Report rejected the Japanese claim of self-defense though it didn’t
state that Japan had staged the incident
“The failure of the democracies to cope with this treaty-breaking threat to the general
peace was a lesson not lost on Mussolini and Hitler.” Ibid.

A museum in China today
commemorating September 18th
Who else remembers?

(Korea)

Konstantin v.
Neurath
Germany’s Foreign
Minister (1932-1938)

makes a fateful
announcement to the
world
During the early days of Hitler's rule, Neurath lent an aura
of respectability to Hitler's expansionist foreign policy.—
Wikipedia

Germany’s
new
Chancellor
proudly reports his
decision to the German
Volk

14 October 1933—Germany Withdraws from the League and the
Disarmament Conference

“…in summing up the year, it may be said that while the [English] nation as a whole
condemned Hitlerism, with its treatment of the Jews, its militarism, and regimentation of
national life, and while each of the different political parties condemned Germany’s withdrawal
from the Disarmament Conference, nevertheless, among nearly all groups the dominating desire
was still directed toward achieving disarmament. With some it was for economic reasons; with
others, because of the hope that they placed in the Disarmament Conference. But in the country
as a whole, it was due to the fact that England, in the year of 1933, was pacifist as it never was
before and probably never will be again….
“We stated before that men’s ideas change slowly and that a nation’s ideas change even more
slowly. It takes shocks—hard shocks—to change a nation’s psychology. Let us turn to 1934 and
see whether the leaders or external forces would give England the necessary jolts to move her
from this Utopian pacifism.”

Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 55-57.

Chap. IV “Beginnings of the Shift from Disarmament to Rearmament, 1934”
Kennedy, Why England Slept


Chap. IV “Beginnings of the Shift from Disarmament to Rearmament, 1934”

“The Commons debates in July indicate the feelings of the different groups clearer than any
others. Hope had finally vanished in regard to bringing about a successful conclusion to the
Disarmament Conference. Therefore, on July 19, 1934, [Br. Prime Minister] Baldwin
introduced the first of a long series of defense programs, caused by the menace of Nazi
Germany. It was small compared to that of subsequent years, but it marks the beginnings of the
change from a disarmament psychology to one of rearmament…From this time on, the picture
begins to change. England was stirring in her sleep.”


“Italy next broke the peace by the invasion and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935•.”

Ibid.

“Italy next broke the peace by the invasion and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935•. It was not so
much the intrinsic importance of Manchuria and Ethiopia to the democratic world that counted.
Rather it was that these naked aggressions proved at once the impotence of the League of
Nations at its designed function and the bankruptcy of the collective security system.”

Ibid.

“Italy next broke the peace by the invasion and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935•. It was not so
much the intrinsic importance of Manchuria and Ethiopia to the democratic world that counted.
Rather it was that these naked aggressions proved at once the impotence of the League of
Nations at its designed function and the bankruptcy of the collective security system.”

The Hoare-Laval Pact
…was a December 1935 proposal by British Foreign
Secretary Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister
Pierre Laval for ending the Second Italo-Abyssinian
War. Italy had wanted to seize the independent black
nation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) as part of its empire
and also to avenge an 1896 humiliating defeat. The
Pact offered to partition Abyssinia , and thus achieve
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini's goal of making the
independent nation of Abyssinia into an Italian
colony. The proposal ignited a ﬁrestorm of hostile
reaction in Britain and France, and never went into
effect.

Ibid.

“It is us today. It will be you tomorrow.”—Emperor Haile Selassie, 30 June 1936

Hitler’s March to War-1933-1934
consolidating political power:
30 Jan 1933-Machtergreifung (seizure
of power) appointed Chancellor

23 March 1933-Enabling Act

Oct 1933-withdrawal from
Disarmament Conference and League
of Nations

of Nations
30 Jun-2 Jul 1934-“Night of the Long
Knives” the Röhm purges

of Nations
2 Aug 1934-President Hindenburg dies.
Hitler becomes Führer u. Reichskanzler

of Nations
2 Aug 1934-President Hindenburg dies.
Hitler becomes Führer u. Reichskanzler
3 Aug-the German Army swears a
personal oath of allegiance to him
19 Aug-90% plebiscite approves

at the Tannenberg memorial where
Hindenburg is laid to rest

Oct 1933-withdrawal from Disarmament
Conference and League of Nations
2 Aug 1934-President Hindenburg
dies. Hitler becomes Führer u.
Reichskanzler
3 Aug-the German Army swears a
personal oath of allegiance to him

19 Aug-90% plebiscite approves

Volk outside the Reich
Note error

3 & 4

reversed

hoodwinking the democracies:
Mar 1935 -Wir wollen wieder Waffen (we will be armed again) announces a Luftwaffe and a 600,000 man army,
both violating the Versailles limitations. But widespread sympathy for Germany’s “unilateral disarmament” after the
failure of the Geneva conference meant no opposition to this violation

Mar 1935 -Wir wollen wieder Waffen (we will be armed again) announces a Luftwaffe and a 600,000
man army, both violating the Versailles limitations. But widespread sympathy for Germany’s “unilateral
disarmament” after the failure of the Geneva conference meant no opposition to this violation
18 June 1935-Anglo-German Naval Agreement (35%)

7 Mar 1936-Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Mar 1935 -Wir wollen wieder Waffen (we will be armed again) announces a Luftwaffe and a 600,000 man army, both violating the
Versailles limitations. But widespread sympathy for Germany’s “unilateral disarmament” after the failure of the Geneva conference meant
no opposition to this violation
Jul 1936-responds to Franco’s request for aid in the Spanish Civil War

the Condor Legion tests aerial
warfare


Aug 1936-orders Göring to prepare and execute a Four-Year Economic Plan for war


25 Nov 1936- Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan

Mar 1935 -Wir wollen wieder Waffen (we will be armed again) announces a
Luftwaffe and a 600,000 man army, both violating the Versailles limitations.
But widespread sympathy for Germany’s “unilateral disarmament” after the
failure of the Geneva conference meant no opposition to this violation
Aug 1936-orders Göring to prepare and execute a Four-Year Economic Plan
for war

5 Nov 1937-“Hossbach Memorandum” meeting with military
—war as early as ’38-no later than ’42

Hitler's military adjutant, !
Colonel Count Friedrich
Hossbach.

Mar 1935 -Wir wollen wieder Waffen (we will be armed again)
announces a Luftwaffe and a 600,000 man army, both violating
the Versailles limitations. But widespread sympathy for Germany’s
“unilateral disarmament” after the failure of the Geneva conference
meant no opposition to this violation
Jul 1936-responds to Franco’s request for aid in the Spanish Civil
War
Aug 1936-orders Göring to prepare and execute a Four-Year
Economic Plan for war
5 Nov 1937-“Hossbach Memorandum” meeting with military—war
as early as ’38-no later than ’42

6 Nov 1937-Italy joins the Anti-Comintern Pactinformal beginning of the Axis

Mar 1935 -Wir wollen wieder Waffen (we will be armed again) announces a Luftwaffe and a
600,000 man army, both violating the Versailles limitations. But widespread sympathy for
Germany’s “unilateral disarmament” after the failure of the Geneva conference meant no
opposition to this violation
5 Nov 1937-“Hossbach Memorandum” meeting with military—war as early as ’38-no later than
’42
6 Nov 1937-Italy joins the Anti-Comintern Pact-informal beginning of the Axis

early 1938- Blomberg-Fritsch affair—army thoroughly cowed

First, Blomberg
was forced to
resign for marrying
a former prostitute
and refusing to put
her aside.
Next, Fritsch was
forced out on
charges that he was
a homosexual.
Both had resisted
Hitler’s war plans

5 Nov 1937-“Hossbach Memorandum” meeting with military—war as early as ’38-no later than ’42

Feb 1938-end Sino-German Treaty, ally with Japan

5 Nov 1937-“Hossbach Memorandum” meeting with military—war as early as ’38-no later than ’42
Feb 1938-end Sino-German Treaty, ally with Japan
12 Mar 1938- Anschluss—Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer

Hitler addresses ecstatic Viennese

“Not being challenged, later in the year he demanded of Czechoslovakia that she cede to
Germany the German-speaking Sudetenland, a fringe of parishes along Czechoslovakia’s
borders.”

!
Sea Power, p. 487

Text

Sudetenland
the mountainous border surrounding Bohemia
and Moravia

Text

IV. Final Failure of Collective Security
the Big Four decide the Czechs’ fate without
consulting them, 29.ix.38 at Munich

In 1919, the Treaty of St Germain had stripped
off the northern tier of Austria-Hungary to make
Czechoslovakia

pink=Germans; blue=Czechs; brown=Poles
olive=Ukrainians; dark green=Slovaks
light green=Magyars; olive=Ruthenians

“Unlike the Austrians, the Czechs are primarily a Slavic, not a Germanic people. They had
military alliances with France and Russia. With mountainous frontiers, a good army, and a
substantial armaments industry, they were prepared to fight. Nearly everyone in Europe expected
war.”

!
Ibid.

Hitler and Henlein at the Berghof
summer, 1938
Konrad Henlein, 1898-1945, head
of the Sudeten German movement
WW I Austrian Army POW on the
Italian Front
gymnastics teacher, active in
politics after 1928
made ties with the NSDAP in 1935
he led the pro-Nazi Sudeten
Germans in a series of uprisings
designed to justify Hitler’s demands

Text

(to the historic meeting 29 Sept 1938 in Munich)
Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, Hitler
conspicuously absent, Czech President Beneš

Text

after 13 hours, the agreement
at 0230 30.ix.1938

Text

the winners the next day
the dictators receive applause for saving the
peace

“The upshot was that France dishonored her commitment. In exchange for empty and false
promises from Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain bargained away the Czech’s freedom.
Moreover, Russia was able to claim later that because the western democracies had proved they
could not be trusted, Russia herself had to look elsewhere for her security. But in the West such
was the passionate hope for peace [and abject fear of German air superiority, jbp]•

!
Ibid.

Guernica is a painting by Pablo Picasso. It was created in response to the
bombing of Guernica, a Basque Country village in northern Spain, by
German and Italian warplanes at the behest of the Spanish Nationalist
forces on 26 April 1937 during the Spanish Civil War.-Wikipedia!

“The upshot was that France dishonored her commitment. In exchange for empty and false
promises from Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain bargained away the Czech’s freedom.
Moreover, Russia was able to claim later that because the western democracies had proved they
could not be trusted, Russia herself had to look elsewhere for her secur ity. But in the West such
was the passionate hope for peace [and abject fear of German air superiority, jbp]• that cheering
multitudes surrounded Chamberlain’s homecoming plane at Croydon Airfield.”

!
Ibid.

Text

“I have here, signed by Herr Hitler himself...”
the sad, ill chosen words-”peace with honor” and “peace for our time”

“The peace that he had so dearly bought was in fact to last a little less than a year.”

!

Ibid.

A.R.P. = Air Raid Precautions
“I believe Chamberlain was sincere in thinking that a great step had been taken towards healing
one of Europe’s fever sores. I believe that English public opinion was not sufficiently aroused to
back him in a war. Most people in England felt, “It’s not worth a war to prevent the Sudeten
Germans from going back to Germany. They failed at that time to see the larger issue, involving
the domination of Europe. But though all these factors played a part in the settlement at Munich,
I feel that Munich was inevitable on the grounds of lack of [British] armaments alone.”

!
Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 186

Text

V. Popular Opinion and Grand Strategy
1939-rethinking

“Roaring
‘Twenties”

“Great
Depression”

Prosperity
Euphoria

Fear
Scapegoating

Bad
Good

It’s hard to remember that in 1930 only 1.0% of American men and women had a
high school diploma; 0.2%, a college degree.
!
It is no wonder that public opinion looked for scapegoats and simple explanations for
the Great Depression. Who better to blame than Wall Street, the Banks (long a target
of the Populists and Progressives) and the “idle rich,” especially “war proﬁteers.”
!
“The Depression was Hoover’s fault.” “Capitalism was unjust.”
!
The stage was set for a New Order.
!
jbp

an agrarian reformer, as a newspaper man he had blasted
“Big Business”

“Merchants of Death”

1927-29-his first senatorial success was helping to convict
Harding’s crony, Albert Fall in the Teapot Dome scandal
his reputation as “Gerald the Giant-Killer” led Sen. George
Norris to push his appointment to head the Munitions Comm:
"Nye's young, he has inexhaustible energy and he has courage. Those
are all important assets. He may be rash in his judgments at times, but
it's the rashness of enthusiasm.”—Sen. Geo Norris

1934-36-Nye created headlines by drawing connections
between the wartime profits of the banking and munitions
industries to America’s entry into World War I
Banks had loaned Germany $27 million but the Entente Powers
$10.35 billion!

Sen.Gerald Nye (R) ND!

wartime profits by the arms manufacturers were documented

1892 – 1971!
in office 1925-1945!
Chairman, Senate Munitions Committee!
1934-1936

the conclusion seemed obvious (but wrong)—America had gone to
war, not to make the world safe for democracy, but to protect her
economic interests—the interests of the 1%

1936-the Democratic Senate shut down the inquiry when Nye
unwisely attacked Woodrow Wilson as deliberately serving
these “fat cats”

An Unexpected Critic
then the most highly decorated Marine in history
1930-when passed over for Commandant of the Corps (for
his “unreliable,” read unorthodox and outspoken behavior), he retired
1932-he supported the Bonus Army March on Washington, DC

then he began an attack on “Big Business”
he warned of an American fascist plot to “march on Washington,”( like
Mussolini’s 1922 March on Rome) and overthrow FDR

Maj. Gen’l. Smedley Butler, USMC
1881-1940

winner of two Congressional Medals of Honor

Wikipedia

An Unexpected Critic
then the most highly decorated Marine in history
1930-when passed over for Commandant of the Corps (for
his “unreliable,” read unorthodox and outspoken behavior), he retired
1932-he supported the Bonus Army March on Washington, DC

then he began an attack on “Big Business”
he warned of an American fascist plot to “march on Washington,”( like
Mussolini’s 1922 March on Rome) and overthrow FDR
1935-after touring with a popular speech of the same title, he
published this book. Five chapters:
War is a racket

Who makes the proﬁts?

Who pays the bills?

How to smash this racket!

To hell with war!

Wikipedia

America, 1938; the year of Munich—The Battle Lines Are Drawn

“The United States has witnessed a similar situation [to that in England]. The Labour Party in
England used the argument that an increase in armaments meant that Britain must be deserting
the League on which her foreign policy was based. Likewise, in America in 1938, when
Roosevelt put forward a heavy defense budget, Senate leaders like Borah and Johnson, and
House leaders like Hamilton Fish, argued that this must mean a desertion of America’s
traditional foreign policy of neutrality and isolation. Again and again in speeches, they stated
that unless the President had made new commitments, there was no necessity for increasing
military expenditures. As the President had been very outspoken against the dictatorships in his
“Quarantine the aggressors” speech at Chicago in October of the previous year, their words
sounded logical to many.”

!
Kennedy, p.73

The Neutrality Acts of the 1930s
“Powerful forces in the United States Congress pushing for non-interventionism and strong Neutrality Acts
were the Republican Senators Borah, Vandenberg, Nye and Robert M. La Follette, Jr.
“Democratic President Roosevelt and especially his Secretary of State Cordell Hull were critical of the
Neutrality Acts, fearing that they would restrict the administration's options to support friendly nations
“Even though both the House and Senate had large Democratic majorities throughout these years, there was
enough support for the Acts amongst Democrats (especially those representing Southern states) to ensure
their passage
“Although Congressional support was insufﬁcient to override a presidential veto, Roosevelt felt he could not
afford to snub the South and anger public opinion, especially whilst facing re-election in 1936 and needing
Congressional co-operation on domestic issues
“With considerable reluctance, the president signed the Neutrality Acts into law.”
Wikipedia

“The ‘merchants of death’ propaganda…helped make possible the neutrality legislation of the
late 1930’s, which amounted to a deliberate surrender of the neutral rights the United States had
twice gone to war to preserve. As in Great Britain and France, in the United States there was a
widespread feeling that no war was worth fighting. Contemporary literature reflected a profound
cynicism about the motives and competence of World War I leadership.18 A great many American
students gave vociferous approval to the “Oxford Pledge,” by which British undergraduates were
swearing “under no circumstances” to serve King and country.”

________
18

Dozens of titles might be cited. Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms C.S. Forester’s The General, Erich Maria
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front are examples from the novels. Plays and movies with a strong pacifist
overtone reached nearly all of the population in the Western democracies.

Sea Power, p. 488

Popular Thinking on Grand Strategy

“Along with a pacifistic and isolationist public opinion went a popular misconception of
grand strategy that made many persons believe that in any event American participation was not
necessary. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart and other military writers of reputation had severely
criticized Allied generalship in World War I for useless sacrifice of men in trying to break the
trench line. It was freely predicted that, if World War II came, the pattern of the Western Front
would be the same except that this time the Allies, snug in the impregnable Maginot Line,•”

!
Ibid.

“Along with a pacifistic and isolationist public opinion went a popular misconception of
grand strategy that made many persons believe that in any event American participation was not
necessary. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart and other military writers of reputation had severely
criticized Allied generalship in World War I for useless sacrifice of men in trying to break the
trench line. It was freely predicted that, if World War II came, the pattern of the Western Front
would be the same except that this time the Allies, snug in the impregnable Maginot Line,•
would remain on the defensive. The Germans, finally driven to action by the relentless pressure
of naval blockade, would break themselves on the Maginot barrier. The French and British land
offensive, when it came, would be a matter of sweeping up the exhausted fragments of the
Wehrmacht. In brief, the war would be won by a combination of the Maginot Line and superior
British sea power. America could afford to keep hands off. In view of the fact that apparently the
French general staff accepted this concept, it is perhaps pardonable for a large part of the
American public to have done so.”

!
Ibid.

“As everyone knows, the Maginot Line was to prove anything but impregnable. For that
matter the role assigned to sea power in the prospective Allied strategy was not a realistic one.”
.
Sea Power, p.488

Sea Power is a prerequisite, a necessary but not sufﬁcient cause, of world power. Britain,
who held it in 1939, could not defeat Germany by that factor alone. Conversely, had
Germany held it, she could have conquered England.

!

But that’s another story…

!

jbp

Conclusion

“I say, therefore, that many of the very factors intrinsic in democracy resulted in England’s
falling further and further behind. For democracy and capitalism are institutions which are
geared for a world at peace. It is our problem to find a method of protecting them in a world at
war.”

!
Kennedy, p. 226

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