This document discusses democratic consolidation in Nigeria after the return to civilian rule in 1999. It makes three key points: 1) Civilian rule has not necessarily led to democratic consolidation due to deep divisions in Nigeria's politics that predate military rule. Communal conflicts have killed over 10,000 and societal violence is increasing. 2) Civil-military relations remain problematic as the military remains entrenched in civic and economic life. True civilian control requires a democratic struggle beyond just elections or subordinating the military to the president. 3) Electoral politics threaten democratic gains if elections are not free and fair. Rising poverty and pressure to spend on local projects near the 2003 elections could further destabilize the

1. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA:
LOOKING BETWEEN THE MIRAGE AND THE MIRROR
J. ‘Kayode Fayemi, PhD,
Centre for Democracy & Development
Introduction
After fifteen years of military and authoritarian rule, great expectations accompanied
the resumption of civilian rule in Nigeria in May 1999. For a country that had suffered
severe deterioration in its economy and politics over the thirty years of military rule,
the assumption that civilian rule would herald a dawn of peace and a deepening of
democratic values and norms in society was understandable. However, this
assumption did not take into account the deep-seated divisions inherent in Nigeria’s
body politic. These were not the products of military rule even if it had exacerbated
them.
The scale, scope and intensity of conflict in Nigeria since the end of military rule
challenges the assumed teleological link between military disengagement from
politics, demilitarisation of Nigerian society and consolidation of our democracy in
that order. With over 10,000 dead in communal conflicts and an exponential increase
in societal violence, many will argue that it is too early to talk of democratic
consolidation in Nigeria. Indeed, the fact that the public still casts doubt on the
state’s capacity to manage domestic crises and to protect the security of life and
property underscores primarily the depth of disenchantment with the state of things.
As Nigeria drifts down the path of increasing violent conflict, perhaps we should first
move away from current disappointment and ask if anything could really have been
different from the current situation, given the provenance of civilian rule. Without
being complacent about consolidation in the context of a democratising polity, I think
it is important to first interrogate the notion of democratic consolidation in its
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2. variegated forms – especially in the context of transition societies. The notion as
currently conceived gives the impression of a pre-conceived destination – a model to
which we all should aspire in the world. This model parades a uni-dimensional list
that concentrates on the promotion of the dominant neo-liberal paradigm with a
number of mantras: Have elections, and every other thing shall follow! Private good,
public bad, the market is God! Deny the importance of Ideas, contestation and
struggles and focus on the external. In short, imitation democracy works, period!
Nigeria has become a debilitating example of this uncritical regurgitation of the
consolidation dogma in the current leadership’s search for endorsement and
acceptance by the outside world. So, in trying to address the topic of my paper, I
ask for some conceptual clarifications: what does it really mean to be a consolidated
democracy? Is there any known consolidated democracy in the world and more
importantly, is democratic consolidation achievable in a country with a prolonged
history of authoritarian rule, and in which the ethos, values and practise of militarism
have become systemic, rather than ad-hoc. Can we understand consolidation
outside a historical context that traces the roots of the democratic project?
Political reform, governance and democratisation
The nature of General Abacha's exit and the ascension to power of General
Abubakar arguably determined the outcome of the democratisation project in 1999.
However one may view the eventual outcome of the rushed transition programme,
the fact that the military elite was not responding to a full defeat by the population
can hardly be discounted in understanding the pacted nature of the democratisation
project and the compromised outcome that is reflected in today’s bad governance.
There is no doubt that the dominance of the political party hierarchy by retired
military officers and civilians closely connected to the military elite set the tone for a
party formation that pays little attention to ideology.
This compromised political settlement was therefore perceived in several sectors
(especially in the civil society) as a reason why military disengagement ought to be
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3. viewed with a great deal of scepticism and not a sine-qua non of demilitarisation of
the polity and the deepening of democracy. Indeed for many, the secretive nature of
the transition, which saw a government elected with no public access to the
Constitution, was seen as a major problem. At a time when the Constitution is no
longer seen merely as a set of rules and laws regulating the state and society but
also as a social contract and an expression of the general will of the nation, many
objected to an imposed Constitution and predicted it was bound to contain traps for
the new democracy.
In spite of the vociferous campaign for an open debate on the Constitution, the idea
of a people-driven governance arrangement was largely ignored by the military.
Instead, the Abubakar government established the Justice Niki Tobi led
Constitutional Debate Co-ordinating Committee (CDCC) to collate public comments
on the draft 1995 Constitution produced by General Abacha. However, the CDCC
had only two months to undertake this exercise and in spite of its members’
determination to do a good job, they were already hobbled by some of the central
principles that guided their work - in particular, its lack of transparency, openness
and credibility. More importantly, even when the CDCC managed to produce a draft
of the views gathered, they later discovered that the ruling military elite, which was
intent on its own agenda and wanted to avoid any issue that might return to haunt its
leaders after their exit from power, chose to ignore many of their recommendations.
This led to the eventual marginalisation of civil society voices that cautioned against
a rushed transition programme and an exclusive focus on electoralism. It also paved
the way for the low quality of the elected representatives, the majority of whom
emerged from the shadows of the military parties created during General Abacha’s
rule. Since many of the protagonists of those parties controlled resources through
various rent-seeking activities undertaken while they were still in office, they were
able to transfer these resources to the newly registered parties.
Civil-Military Relations in the context of Democratisation
Given the above context of the military hangover, the election of an ex-military
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4. general with significant support from the military constituency, was seen (in civil
society) as an extension of a continued military rule of sorts. The administration's
agenda for military re-professionalisation has followed the traditional pattern
embraced in countries moving from prolonged military and authoritarian state
structures to civilian, democratic structures. The focus has been more on the de-
politicisation and subordination of the military to civil authority. Other efforts at
improving civil-military relations through the demilitarisation of public order and the
promotion of civil policing as well as balancing the demands of defence with the
need for development have been little or non-existent.
While administration gained the confidence of sceptics by tackling the immediate
challenge of choosing military chiefs to lead the restructuring and re--
professionalisation project in the armed forces, its sackings of ‘Politicised’ military
officers on 10 June 1999 — two weeks after the government was sworn in was even
more popular. The retirement exercise which saw the exit of 93 officers (53 from the
army, 20 from the navy, 16 from the air-force and 4 from the police was welcome in
civil society). The government’s third move that saw the immediate termination of
several contracts awarded by the previous military administration as well as the
establishment of a judicial commission to investigate human rights violations under
military rule also won the approval of a hitherto sceptical civil society.
Popular as these measures were, the government’s attention still appeared to be
focussed on the superficial and the personal, not the deep seated institutional and
structural problems that plagued civil-military relations. The government assumed as
is common with the dominant model of civil–military relations that there is a level
playing field in which ‘autonomous military professionalism’ can be predicated on
‘objective civilian control’. This model espouses the entrenchment of an ‘independent
military sphere’ that does not ‘interfere in political matters’. In reality however, this
perspective treats civilian control as an event, a fact of political life, not a process
that has to be negotiated within a continuum, especially in a state emerging from
prolonged authoritarian rule in which the military has become entrenched in every
facet of Nigerian life. In a previous piece (Fayemi, 1999), I cautioned against the
danger of entrenched militarism and argued that civilian control should not be seen
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5. as a set of technical and administrative arrangements that automatically flow from
every post-military transition, but rather as part of complex political processes, which
must address the root causes of militarism in society, beyond the formal removal of
the military from political power or the retirement of politically tainted officers. Three
years after, events in Nigeria underscore why there is a need to redefine the notion
of the a-political military — a notion that has been central to the discourse of the
dominant literature on civil–military relations.
In Nigeria where the military has become entrenched in all facets of civic and
economic life and where politics has featured a reconfiguration rather than a
transformation of power, anchoring the need for objective civilian control to the
notion of an a-political military underestimates the seriousness of the issues at stake.
While formal mechanisms for control are not in themselves wrong, the reality
underpinning Nigeria's crisis of governance is that subordinating the armed forces to
civil control can only be achieved when civil control is seen as part of a complex
democratic struggle that goes beyond elections and beyond subordination to the
president and his Defence Minister.(Fayemi, 1998). These processes are
expressions of institutional relationships that are inherently political, subjective and
psychological. Only when the political and psychological issues arising out of military
involvement in politics are grasped can we begin to look at objective control
mechanisms.
Given the burden of Nigeria’s authoritarian past and the military’s loss of credibility, it
was thought that elected civilians and civil society would be allowed to play a key
role in military restructuring and in the redefinition of roles and missions to help
restore confidence in the institution within the general public. However, there is a
conflict between those who feel that legislative and popular oversight should be
central to democratic, civilian control and others who think that the president and his
defence minister, as ex-military leaders, should have the freedom to restructure the
military without checks and balances simply because ‘they know what they are
doing’.
As a result the legislature has largely functioned as a rubber stamp as far as military
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6. matters are concerned. Not only are parliamentarians often unaware of
developments, their role in terms of determining policy on the size and character of
the armed forces, overseeing their activities and approving actions taken by the
executive, has been short-changed by an overbearing executive branch. Even the
military, at least that part of it that wants professionalism restored has become wholly
disenchanted with the performance of the government and become opposed to its
dependence on foreign assistance in the reform of the institution, rather than
improving governance. (Fayemi, 2002) No issue has brought this disenchantment
into clearer focus than the recent bomb blast in the Ikeja military barracks which led
to a loss of over one thousand lives, a clearly avoidable tragedy given the warnings
the government had received from the military and the legislature on the neglect of
military facilities. It is not surprising therefore that there is a huge clamour in civil
society for a review of the constitutional dimension of military matters aimed at
clarifying the role of the executive, the legislative branch and wider society in
ensuring stable civil–military relations.
Beyond the constitutional gaps on the role of the military, perhaps the most sensitive
issue in civil society has been its role in maintaining internal security. Given the
threats posed to internal security by the militarised (dis)order since the new
government assumed office, the role of policing has been the subject of widespread
debate in the country, especially against the backdrop of opposition to the use of
military power in the ‘aid to civil authority’, the rise of ethnic militias, and public
perceptions of police inefficiency and collusion with agents of crime and insecurity.
Whilst the United Nations suggests a police to citizen ratio of 1:400 the ratio in
Nigeria is currently 1:1,000. Added to the severe personnel shortages are
inadequate accommodation and transportation, poor communication networks;
poorly funded training institutions; and an insufficient crime intelligence-gathering
capacity.
The Obasanjo government has shown some determination to:
• 'Demilitarise' the responsibility for internal security by giving the police the sole
responsibility for maintaining internal security and public order
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7. • Strengthen the efficiency of the police force by reforming its doctrines, giving it a
new mission statement, codifying its procedures, improving training and
standards especially to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses;
• Increase the resources available to the police, reducing the ‘dead wood’ in its
ranks, expanding its role in intelligence and security information gathering and
injecting new blood into the force
• Increase the size of the police force and the pay of its members.
In spite of the government's declared commitment to the above and the extensive
ceremony surrounding a new mission statement for the police, there is evidence to
suggest that the government still has serious doubts about excluding the military
completely from internal security issues. This is especially so given the recurrence of
situations where the police have found it difficult to cope with the provision of basic
security. Yet, many continue to argue that the inability of the police to perform its
function well is not just a technical one of achieving professionalism, but also one of
reluctance on the part of the government to address the larger issue of local
accountability of security institutions and law enforcement bodies.
The question of engaging civil policing for democratic governance is central to the
issue of returning security to the community, ensuring democratic accountability and
revisiting the structure of federalism in the country. The question regarding the
decentralising of the police organisation, structure and operations has been central
to this discourse given the problems that have attended the centralised control of the
police force and the uses to which it has been put under previous regimes. To create
a service culture, and not a regimented force arrangement, accountability must be
central to public order and the police cannot be trusted within the community if they
retain a structure that is only accountable to the centre and not the communities they
seek to serve. While others especially in government circles have expressed
concern about the possible negative uses of decentralised policing especially given
the nature of the inter-ethnic squabbles and community clashes that are prevalent in
the country today, the search for basic security by the ordinary people has led to the
rise of vigilantism in places where the police is seen as an ‘agency of insecurity’.
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8. Indeed, emboldened by their citizens’ campaigns for basic security, many states are
responding by employing the services of ethnic militias for internal security duties.
For example, in Anambra, Rivers, Enugu, Oyo, Osun, and Lagos states, ‘Bakassi
Boys’ and Odua People’s Congress operatives have taken charge of some policing
functions such as traffic management and are confronting armed robbers with the
often tacit approval of the state executives and even endorsement of the federal
police authorities. The problems of policing cannot be seen in isolation from the
criminal justice system and the overall quest for proper governance in the country.
Reforms to the judicial system have been much slower than reforms to the military
and the police. Until there is a comprehensive approach to access to justice and law
enforcement, even the resolution of the technical and administrative issues that the
government is concentrating on will not bring about the desperately needed change
in the sector.
Another issue central to fraught civil-military relations has been the challenge posed
by the management of security expenditure. The debate on how much is enough to
maintain defence remains a realistic issue on the agenda and civil society has been
very interested in this. Government also recognises that strengthening the military
professionally without the corresponding provision of adequate resources and
political support may lead to frustration and possibly to unfulfilled and exaggerated
expectations on the part of the soldiers. On the other hand, civil society clamours for
downsizing, right-sizing and sectoral reform without the corresponding realisation
that this may lead to an increase in military expenditure, at least in the interim – in
terms of demobilisation and re-integration costs. Indeed, one of the major problems
faced by the current government is how to manage military pensions and save ex-
service people the trouble of receiving their pensions promptly.
Yet the major concern in civil society is that government seems to be ignoring
concerns about the need to attend to social and developmental spending and are
worried that this may threaten the overall goal of stability, human security and
democratic consolidation. In a country where people living below the poverty line
has risen from fifty percent in 1999 to over seventy percent now, this is clearly a real
threat which the government does not appear to be seriously getting to grips with as
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9. any analysis of sectoral allocations in the annual budget shows if this can be taken at
least in theory as an indicator of government intention on poverty eradication. The
worry in civil society is that the situation is going to deteriorate as the country moves
towards the 2003 election with the attendant pressure to spend on pork-barrelled
projects that are neither regenerative nor poverty reducing.
Electoral politics and the Future of the nation
If there is one issue that threatens to undermine the little gains that have been made
since the return to civilian rule in 1999, it is the conduct of electoral politics and the
implications of the 2003 elections on the polity. Ironically, one of the critical
pathways for resolving Nigeria’s over-centralised politics and consolidating
democracy is the institutionalisation of electoral politics beyond the routine ballot box
run every four or five years.
A key path to ensuring that this happens is in the institutionalisation of political party
development that can then argue and ensure acceptable rules for the operation and
conduct of electoral politics. Again, there is very little one can say about the state of
electoral politics without reference to the nature of political transition in 1999. The
rushed transition provided the template for the entrenched dictatorial tendencies
inherent in today’s political system. First, in its denial of the constitutional provision
of freedom of association through the limitation placed on political party formation
and annulment of independent candidacy, the 1999 electoral law succeeded in
ousting the politics of ideas, contestation and dialogue from Nigeria’s body politic,
leaving the terrain open to agglomeration of opportunistic interests.
Three years down the line, the irony is not lost on most Nigerians that the main
opposition to the current excesses of the PDP government remains within the PDP
party structure, especially its legislative wing. The other two parties have abandoned
their role. The evidence is clear that the parties have never been the battleground of
contestation and ideas, but a crucible for plotting electoral agenda in 2003, one that
seeks to entrench the grip of those currently in office whilst excluding others. While
the idea of remaining in power is not really unique in politics, what is most worrying
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10. for civil society is the fraud that has attended this and the threat that election now
poses to the exacerbation of conflict in the country.
Perhaps the most worrying of these developments is the controversy that has
attended the electoral bill and the role played by the executive and legislative
branches of government in this plot to undermine the tender fabrics of the nation’s
democracy. From the way the various players have conducted themselves, it is of
course evident that public good has not been uppermost in their minds. The fact that
the Supreme Court has thrown out the bulk of this Electoral Act is positive but we
have to see how this actually translates into electoral sanity in the country.
Civil society on its part has been working with the legislature to ensure that there is a
level playing filed, which is looking increasingly unlikely for the 2003 election.
Through the Electoral Reform Network, a coalition of several civil society bodies, it
has argued for locating the reform of the electoral law within the context of
constitutional reform. In particular, it has campaigned for the de-linking of the
Electoral Commission from the state if it is to be seen as the independent arbiter that
it ought to be in the conduct of elections. Civil society has also campaigned for the
liberalisation of the conditions for party formation as a mechanism for strengthening
political party structures. It rejects the argument that having more political parties will
automatically result in instability. The inevitability of instability thesis is of course one
that government and its institutions have promoted in order to retain the current party
framework, and one supported at first by the three political parties. The divisions
within the ranks of the ruling party, PDP is also ensuring that a significant section of
the party in parliament is now keen to see additional political parties whose platform
can be used – in case they get thrown out of the party. Whilst this may work in
favour of those who have campaigned for political parties in the context of freedom
of association, it will still leave the field severely in favour of entrenched political
party machines not in the least interested in the transformation of the polity.
Many in civil society are now contesting what is seen as a false dichotomy between
political society and civil society in addressing the danger of electoral politics. The
limitation of these efforts however is in the use of the ‘masters’ tools to destroy his
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11. house. Some civil society leaders have embarked on various campaigns to
change from within, through current political parties. Whilst this is a tactic that may
advance their electoral chances, it is bound to do very little to change the practice of
politics. If anything, it is likely to deepen the influence of those who currently consider
themselves as kingmakers in the polity.
Ultimately, if electoral politics is to have any impact on democratic consolidation, we
cannot divorce ideas from pragmatism. There is no alternative to the hardwork
necessary in building political movements with a long-term agenda to win power for
the good of the polity. This requires determination, hard-work and direct
engagement with a populace that has become totally disenchanted with politicians.
But this is not a 2003, nor even a 2007 or 2011 project. It is not a time-bound
project, although it is useful to have in sight some stages in this development of this
project and benchmarks for measuring progress. In my view, what is needed now is
a local Porto Alegre movement with an intellectual wing that concentrates on firing
the imagination of the people on the alternatives to the current politics of
opportunism. Some may even say that what I am calling for amounts to a return to
the barricades. Indeed, I see some room for some selective return to the politics of
the barricades, but this must be backed by well thought through initiatives that
connect deeply with the people. Constitutionalism and the place of rules based
governance offers us the best chance in civil society to do this and experience in
other parts of Africa has shown that it is possible to build a civil society movement
around this – using it to address issues of relevance to the people. This leads me to
the last issue I was asked to address by the organisers of this meeting –
constitutional reform.
Civil society perspectives on Constitutional Reform
The Nigerian civil society has been consistent in exploring the linkages between
constitutionalism and governance and constitutionalism and democratic
consolidation. In a country where institutions are weak and government has become
one where ‘anything is possible’ because of the lack of respect for the rule of law,
civil society was very insistent that the country was going to be saddled with a
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12. ‘democracy without democrats’. Although this has been the clear position of civil
society, there was a section of it that felt if was better to engage electoralism as a
tool for reversing the problems of an imposed constitution. Hence, civil society
through the efforts of the coalition of mainstream NGOs, Transition Monitoring
Group, played a critical role in monitoring the 1999 elections.
When the constitution was eventually unveiled to Nigerians in the aftermath of the
presidential elections, the fears in civil society were confirmed. All the pertinent
issues that agitated the minds of Nigerians about the need for national restructuring
had been papered over in the constitution. The departing military junta significantly
watered down even the few issues that the CDCC had been bold to raise in their
own submissions. In short, the document had no standing with the people and the
state missed the opportunity of using the process of constitution making as a tool for
bridge building between the civil society and state. In July 1999, a civil society
coalition, the Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform was established
(www.cfcr.net) and the Forum with its extensive national network has since
championed the cause of using constitutionalism as an entry-point for ensuring
democratic consolidation and gaining legitimacy. This campaign has focussed on
extensive consultation and grass root mobilisation on the content of the constitution
with specific focus on Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Access to Justice, Citizenship,
Independent Institutions of the Constitution, Electoral Law and Political Parties,
Gender and Constitutionalism, Security Sector and the Constitution, Ethnicity &
Religion. In addition to the work of the Forum, others like the United Action for
Democracy has produced a model constitution for debate. Also, no fewer than
twenty conferences had been held across the country on various aspects of the
constitution, reinforcing the widespread view that the constitution remains the single
most important issue to address if Nigeria is to move down the path of consolidation.
Even where constitutional and other legal provisions are badly trampled, the
existence of a people driven, process led legal framework to guide governance offers
a starting point for a successful transformation processes.
In response to this widespread civil society campaign, the government set up its own
technical committee to review the constitution whilst the National Assembly
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13. proceeded to do the same. In spite of the various efforts which underscores the
unpopularity of the body of law governing the country, it is also evident that the
leadership in the executive and legislative branches of government have shown very
little interest in restructuring the current nature of politics and openly opposes the
campaign for national dialogue even as the system overheats from the disaffection
that is widespread within the state.
The recent judicial action by the Supreme Court has proved to be one other method
utilised in civil society to pursue constitutional changes. Public interest litigation is on
the rise and the judiciary seems to be waking up to its responsibilities, but this is just
one more tactic, which cannot constitute an overall strategy. In my view,
constitutional reform remains a pivotal strategy to focus on and perhaps it may be
time for civil society to selectively return to the barricades in order to get the
government to pay more attention to constitutional reform as a mechanism for
averting societal violence and promote developmental democracy.
Prospects for reform and lessons for the future
In conclusion, let me return to my analogy of the mirage and the mirror in addressing
the question whether Nigeria is going to consolidate its fledgling democracy. It is
certainly uncharitable to say that nothing has changed in Nigeria since May 1999. A
lot certainly has changed and there is evidence to show that Nigerians do not want a
return to their pre-May 1999 situation. This is not merely conjectural as a recent
survey of the Afrobarometer group on Nigeria recently reveals. The tolerance level
for the military is still very low in the country, just about thirty percent if that survey is
to be believed – although the survey also revealed that this has increased from the
less than twenty percent tolerance level in February 2000.
Yet even if this gives us an indication of a consolidation mirage which appears
before us but remains unattainable in its constant disappearance as we move closer
to it, the reality of the Nigerian situation is also that consolidation of democracy is a
process, a struggle which has to be waged at all levels – one that is bound to reveal
an ugly picture if we confront the truth by looking at ourselves in the mirror. The
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14. challenge is to recognise this true picture in the mirror and take effective steps to
address the ugliness that confronts us. It is clear to even the young in Nigeria that
the leadership remains in denial that the question of the national structure is the
central issue that will not go away in our quest for democratic consolidation as a
nation. The question that many continue to pose will have to be answered with all its
attendant ramifications: What is this nation called Nigeria? What does it mean to be
Nigerian? This was the question we avoided in the events leading up to May 1999
and it has come back to haunt us. Without resolving the issue of the national
structure on the basis of contestation and dialogue, it is difficult to see how we can
attain consolidation on the basis of imitation democracy. But if we resolve the
structural dimension of the crisis of governance, we begin on a journey to attaining
what Dick Sklar has referred to in his seminal writings as developmental democracy
or ‘democracy in stages or parts. The question is: how long can we wait?
References
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