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Recent Rogueware


      Kurt Baumgartner
 PC Tools ThreatFire Research
      Virus Bulletin 2008
Recent Rogueware
• Rogueware?
• Obfuscation Methods and Vundo Behaviors
• Survey Multiple Recent Rogueware
• MonaRonaDona Hoax
• Recent Binder and Downloader Components and Behavioral
  Challenges
• What Now?
Rogueware?
• Sometimes clumsy descriptions found on sites and blogs.
• Substantial definitions exist on well known sites like
  castlecops, spywarewarrior, and many others
• My definition: Rogueware-based schemes coerce computer
  users to pay for removal of nonexistent malware.
  R og uew a re a re s elec t s oftw a re c om ponents us ed in
  thes e s c hem es to a id in c oerc io n.
Rogueware Certifed
Rogueware?
•   Recent active and prevalent examples over the past couple
    of weeks
    – AntiVirus2008 and 2009
    – MultyCodecUpdr.7.2068.exe and its “promomodule” b..exe,
      which then drops sav components
    – pdf sploit -> 0xf9.exe -> AntiVirus2008, other adware


•   not-so-recent MonaRonaDona and Unigray Antivirus
Rogueware?
• Shameless re branding, shuffling of domains, redistribution,
  shock messaging
• Towards the end of last year, high level of active distribution
  channels and offers:
Rogueware?

~ Extras. Profit from downloads ~ .. from 70-150 $ c 1 thousand!
If you load: grabber-soksbot-spambot and would like to receive additional
    income from your downloads, we offer our software and get 70-150 $ 1 to
    thousands of downloads (all depends on the country).
As for software, we control:
adware, which in turn actively promotes antispyware software! Adware does not
    conflict with either the botnetami, or trojan, and does not kill your bots!
Survey Multiple Fakealerts - Intro


• Vundo obfuscation, behavior, commodity client side exploits
• Codec distribution, often via spammed links –
  MultyCodecUpgr.7.20680.exe
• P2P distribution and crack sites – binding keygen schemes,
  most active downloads
• Shuffling web sites and domains
• Common component behaviors – Shell_NotifyIcon
Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior


• Vundo's prevalence seems to be on a steep downward slope
  towards the end of this year
• Vundo loaders and dll's have maintained multiple layers of
  obfuscation, calls to random antiquated API's, polymorphism
• Vundo distributors most commonly implemented commodity
  exploits to download and execute components that dropped
  a randomly named dll and loaded it into its own process,
  then the loaded dll made copies of itself that it injected first
  into winlogon, then globally into explorer and other
  processes
• Process check – ad-aware, winlogon, explorer, other AV's
Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior
•   Anti-RE Obfuscation
    – Anti-RE: perverted code beyond recognition, i.e. prologues
      where normal “push ebp...move ebp,esp” is mangled




    – Anti-emulation: calling antiquated api's with “impossible”
      parameters to generate predictable values – this is not compiler
      “optimization”
Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior

•   Garbage assembly level instructions, loops and jmp flows:
    i.e. implement ridiculous custom GetProcAddress with
    multiple levels of needless instructions
Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior
•   Definitive Vundo loader winlogon injection
Vundo's Blatently Intrusive Behavior
•   Definitive SetWindowsHook WH_GETMESSAGE injection, from
    this injection, ads displayed, trayalert
Codec Distribution


• Zcodec.1140.exe -> 5491.exe -> sav.exe, etc
• 5491.exe is a simple self extracting compressed archive, no
  packing involved, drops sav.exe in %progfiles%AV2008
• No injections, no system tampering -- clearly “malicious”
  behavior?
MonaRonaDona Hoax - Intro


•   Bumbling rogueware scheme – early 2008
•   “Virus” bound to version of quot;Registrycleaner2008quot;
•   Hoax postings and content regarding this “virus”
•   “Virus”?
•   Fraudulent postings about unigray antivirus scanner and its
    user base, google/search engine top results
MonaRonaDona Hoax -- Planning


•   Create AV product that performs no beneficial activity
•   Attempt to establish reputation and price point by
    comparison between it and legitimate solutions
•   Write phony “virus”
•   Create confusion and chatter about it on popular forums
•   Wait for $$$ -- you will wait a long time
•   This does not work
MonaRonaDona Hoax – Hoax postings
•   Create forum chatter and search engine hits:
MonaRonaDona Hoax – “Virus”



• Svcspool.exe dropped to All Users StartMenu Startup by
  RegistryCleaner2008.exe
• Really a “virus”? No – no replication code. IE WindowBar
  manipulation, Task Manager disabled by dropper. Some
  amount of hiding, obfuscation
• “Top virus list”
Downloader Components – Intro



•   Malicious examples – 0xf9.exe, av2009install.exe
•   Static characteristics
•   Behavioral characteristics
•   Downloading sav.exe
•   Groups continue to use exploits to deliver downloaders, do
    testers know that?
Downloaders
•   Difficult for behavioral solutions to assess without using more
    hardcoded data – closer to signature based technologies




•   AV2009 UPX packed compiled Delphi executable
    – Simple and straightforward, like any other app...CreateWindow,
      InternetOpen, InternetOpenUrl, CreateProcess
    – Creating a dependence on static characteristics of file,
      connection endpoints,etc
    – InternetOpenUrl connects with
      http://securedownloads6.com/download/av_2009.exe
Downloaders
•   Simple CreateWindowEx for installer box, nothing obfuscated
    or injected here...
Downloaders
• Adobe exploit kits – Dancho Danchev's blog, Secure
  Computing
• 0xf9.exe is generally a ~20k upx packed Visual Basic
  compiled executable, standard part of a kit being reused
    – Names? “Downloader.MisleadApp”, Trojan-
      Downloader.Win32.VB.hww,Trojan-Downloader.Win32.VB.hyc
    – Trivial unpacking with upx, simple inspection of underlying code
      with Basic Decompiler
    – Straightforward download and setup of msadv.exe or
      mssadv_sp.exe in “Program FilesMicrosoft Security Adviser”
Recent Components -- MultyCodec
•   Multiple components delivered via phony video codec




•   MultyCodec.7.20680.exe drops c..exe, calls CreateProcess on
    the file, phones home
    – Based on http responses, “promomodule” carries out 'trayalert',
      'winalert', 'excelalert', etc
    – Changing behaviors from b..exe based on response – spoils
      automated analysis
    – Shell_NotifyIcon call based on 'trayalert'...”you have a security
      problem'
Recent Components -- AntiVirus 2008
•   Misleading scan results
Recent Components -- AntiVirus 2008
•   Misleading browser redirection
Microsoft Legal Efforts

• On Monday, Microsoft/State of Wash Atty General Office
  lawsuit filed against “John Doe”, maker of AV2008, Winfixer,
  etc
• CAN-SPAM enforced against some Spam Kings, ineffective
  against global spam industry. See inbox/bulk.
• Behavioral based products – will they have to hybridize, or
  will they just continue as another layer?
Questions?

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Recent Rogueware

  • 1. Recent Rogueware Kurt Baumgartner PC Tools ThreatFire Research Virus Bulletin 2008
  • 2. Recent Rogueware • Rogueware? • Obfuscation Methods and Vundo Behaviors • Survey Multiple Recent Rogueware • MonaRonaDona Hoax • Recent Binder and Downloader Components and Behavioral Challenges • What Now?
  • 3. Rogueware? • Sometimes clumsy descriptions found on sites and blogs. • Substantial definitions exist on well known sites like castlecops, spywarewarrior, and many others • My definition: Rogueware-based schemes coerce computer users to pay for removal of nonexistent malware. R og uew a re a re s elec t s oftw a re c om ponents us ed in thes e s c hem es to a id in c oerc io n.
  • 5. Rogueware? • Recent active and prevalent examples over the past couple of weeks – AntiVirus2008 and 2009 – MultyCodecUpdr.7.2068.exe and its “promomodule” b..exe, which then drops sav components – pdf sploit -> 0xf9.exe -> AntiVirus2008, other adware • not-so-recent MonaRonaDona and Unigray Antivirus
  • 6. Rogueware? • Shameless re branding, shuffling of domains, redistribution, shock messaging • Towards the end of last year, high level of active distribution channels and offers:
  • 7. Rogueware? ~ Extras. Profit from downloads ~ .. from 70-150 $ c 1 thousand! If you load: grabber-soksbot-spambot and would like to receive additional income from your downloads, we offer our software and get 70-150 $ 1 to thousands of downloads (all depends on the country). As for software, we control: adware, which in turn actively promotes antispyware software! Adware does not conflict with either the botnetami, or trojan, and does not kill your bots!
  • 8. Survey Multiple Fakealerts - Intro • Vundo obfuscation, behavior, commodity client side exploits • Codec distribution, often via spammed links – MultyCodecUpgr.7.20680.exe • P2P distribution and crack sites – binding keygen schemes, most active downloads • Shuffling web sites and domains • Common component behaviors – Shell_NotifyIcon
  • 9. Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior • Vundo's prevalence seems to be on a steep downward slope towards the end of this year • Vundo loaders and dll's have maintained multiple layers of obfuscation, calls to random antiquated API's, polymorphism • Vundo distributors most commonly implemented commodity exploits to download and execute components that dropped a randomly named dll and loaded it into its own process, then the loaded dll made copies of itself that it injected first into winlogon, then globally into explorer and other processes • Process check – ad-aware, winlogon, explorer, other AV's
  • 10. Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior • Anti-RE Obfuscation – Anti-RE: perverted code beyond recognition, i.e. prologues where normal “push ebp...move ebp,esp” is mangled – Anti-emulation: calling antiquated api's with “impossible” parameters to generate predictable values – this is not compiler “optimization”
  • 11. Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior • Garbage assembly level instructions, loops and jmp flows: i.e. implement ridiculous custom GetProcAddress with multiple levels of needless instructions
  • 12. Vundo's Blatantly Intrusive Behavior • Definitive Vundo loader winlogon injection
  • 13. Vundo's Blatently Intrusive Behavior • Definitive SetWindowsHook WH_GETMESSAGE injection, from this injection, ads displayed, trayalert
  • 14. Codec Distribution • Zcodec.1140.exe -> 5491.exe -> sav.exe, etc • 5491.exe is a simple self extracting compressed archive, no packing involved, drops sav.exe in %progfiles%AV2008 • No injections, no system tampering -- clearly “malicious” behavior?
  • 15. MonaRonaDona Hoax - Intro • Bumbling rogueware scheme – early 2008 • “Virus” bound to version of quot;Registrycleaner2008quot; • Hoax postings and content regarding this “virus” • “Virus”? • Fraudulent postings about unigray antivirus scanner and its user base, google/search engine top results
  • 16. MonaRonaDona Hoax -- Planning • Create AV product that performs no beneficial activity • Attempt to establish reputation and price point by comparison between it and legitimate solutions • Write phony “virus” • Create confusion and chatter about it on popular forums • Wait for $$$ -- you will wait a long time • This does not work
  • 17. MonaRonaDona Hoax – Hoax postings • Create forum chatter and search engine hits:
  • 18. MonaRonaDona Hoax – “Virus” • Svcspool.exe dropped to All Users StartMenu Startup by RegistryCleaner2008.exe • Really a “virus”? No – no replication code. IE WindowBar manipulation, Task Manager disabled by dropper. Some amount of hiding, obfuscation • “Top virus list”
  • 19. Downloader Components – Intro • Malicious examples – 0xf9.exe, av2009install.exe • Static characteristics • Behavioral characteristics • Downloading sav.exe • Groups continue to use exploits to deliver downloaders, do testers know that?
  • 20. Downloaders • Difficult for behavioral solutions to assess without using more hardcoded data – closer to signature based technologies • AV2009 UPX packed compiled Delphi executable – Simple and straightforward, like any other app...CreateWindow, InternetOpen, InternetOpenUrl, CreateProcess – Creating a dependence on static characteristics of file, connection endpoints,etc – InternetOpenUrl connects with http://securedownloads6.com/download/av_2009.exe
  • 21. Downloaders • Simple CreateWindowEx for installer box, nothing obfuscated or injected here...
  • 22. Downloaders • Adobe exploit kits – Dancho Danchev's blog, Secure Computing • 0xf9.exe is generally a ~20k upx packed Visual Basic compiled executable, standard part of a kit being reused – Names? “Downloader.MisleadApp”, Trojan- Downloader.Win32.VB.hww,Trojan-Downloader.Win32.VB.hyc – Trivial unpacking with upx, simple inspection of underlying code with Basic Decompiler – Straightforward download and setup of msadv.exe or mssadv_sp.exe in “Program FilesMicrosoft Security Adviser”
  • 23. Recent Components -- MultyCodec • Multiple components delivered via phony video codec • MultyCodec.7.20680.exe drops c..exe, calls CreateProcess on the file, phones home – Based on http responses, “promomodule” carries out 'trayalert', 'winalert', 'excelalert', etc – Changing behaviors from b..exe based on response – spoils automated analysis – Shell_NotifyIcon call based on 'trayalert'...”you have a security problem'
  • 24. Recent Components -- AntiVirus 2008 • Misleading scan results
  • 25. Recent Components -- AntiVirus 2008 • Misleading browser redirection
  • 26. Microsoft Legal Efforts • On Monday, Microsoft/State of Wash Atty General Office lawsuit filed against “John Doe”, maker of AV2008, Winfixer, etc • CAN-SPAM enforced against some Spam Kings, ineffective against global spam industry. See inbox/bulk. • Behavioral based products – will they have to hybridize, or will they just continue as another layer?