The French plan to "voluntarily" entice banks (against their will) to accept to buy new Geek debt at below market rates whent older debt matures is a default, whatever it is called. In my earlier days the "temporary default" rating agencies would ascribe to Greece did not exit: you either default on your debt obligations or you don't. Anyway, Greece has already technically defaulted last year when the ECB started to buy sub-investment grade Greek debt and the inevitable is now appearing in full ligth.
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
Greece has defaulted the french plan the ecb and rating agencies
1. http://marketsandbeyond.blogspot.com/
http://www.pcgwm.com/
Greece has defaulted: The French plan, the ECB and rating agencies
This is the best analysis I have read so far on Greece’s salvation, since Greece has de facto
defaulted, however European (and other) official are disguising it. Since I do not see the
point of reinventing the wheel, I post this analysis in-extenso without any comment.
Making Sense of the French Rollover Plan
Confusion continues to reign supreme over what the French rollover plan does for the
various entities. The details and mechanics are a bit sketchy, but I have attached the
proposal that I found, and will use that as a basis for the analysis. As I go through the
details, and incorporate the latest rating agency comments, the conclusion remains the
same – this is a good deal for the Participants, a mediocre deal for the Troika, and punitive
to Greece.
What a real rollover would look like
The French proposal is slightly complex at best and convoluted at worst. Before digging
into the specifics, let’s look at what a true rollover would look like. If Participants agreed
with Greece to extend the maturity AND reduce the coupon AND do it
immediately, that would be a clear example of a rollover that benefitted Greece.
There are 3 key elements to a real rollover. The first is that they would agree to the
rollover now. That would take away uncertainty. The maturity extension is the rollover,
and the longer it is delayed, the better for Greece. The coupon on the new debt should be
lower than the coupon Greece is currently paying. If all 3 of these criteria are met, and the
new bonds are pari passu with the existing bonds, then I think everyone would agree that
Greece benefits, the Troika would benefit, and the Participants would have made a
sacrifice. The French proposal, as we will see, potentially does not satisfy any of the 3
aspects listed – it is not immediate, the coupon will be higher than existing debt, and the
maturity extension is linked to taking some debt out of the market, so it’s not as clearly a
benefit as the headlines make it seem.
The Rollovers Should Not Trigger a CDS Credit Event
In any case, let’s assume Participants actually did the proper rollover. That should NOT
trigger CDS. The ISDA credit derivative definitions for a Restructuring Credit Event have
to meet 2 tests. The first part of the test is straightforward and is met if bonds are
extended, or the coupon is reduced, for example. This condition would be met. The
second condition is effectively that it is involuntary. If the actions of some bondholders
1
2. http://marketsandbeyond.blogspot.com/
http://www.pcgwm.com/
can force other bondholders into an agreement then this condition would be met and there
would be a CDS Credit Event. In the case of Greek bonds, that looks unlikely. I have only
looked at the offering circulars from a couple of bonds, but there does not appear to by
anything that could force a bondholder to change the terms of the debt. There is no
reason, that on a €1 billion issue, €950 million could be exchanged and €50 million could
remain outstanding. If that is the case, then there would be no CDS Credit Event under
this true rollover.
The Rating Agencies can be largely ignored
Of all the rating agencies, S&P, so far, has come out with the most comprehensive
definition of what they would do. The first thing S&P said it would do is lower the Greek
Issuer Rating to “SD”. First, I have to admit, that in all the years that I have followed the
credit markets, I cannot remember seeing an “SD” rating before. I am almost certain that
no regulator and no Participants have any rules based on the “SD” rating. So while Greece
is rated SD, the regulators and Participants should have a lot of leeway on how to treat the
debt, and since it would be performing, I don’t see why the status quo would be changed.
S&P goes on to say that a D rating would be applied to bonds that are maturing and are
subject to the plan. When will they do that? If they do it now, they will be rating bonds
that are paying interest and will pay par at maturity as D. The rating agencies, which have
enough problems with rating obligations too highly, will now be saying something is in
default, when it is paying. I suspect that regulators and Participants would ignore the D
rating and rely on the fact that the bonds are performing and are expected to be paid back
at par. The rating agencies could apply the D rating right at the time of maturity, but that
doesn’t have any impact on the Participants, because they would receive par on those
obligations and no longer hold them. So any downgrade of existing obligations to “D”
based on the proposal is unlikely to impact the Participants or regulators at all. The
downgrade will only serve to keep track of defaults for the rating agencies’ annual default
history studies.
The key question will be what are the new bonds rated. S&P makes it seem as though the
new bonds would have the current rating of the old bonds (“CCC”). So, again, status quo
would be retained.
A real restructuring would help Greece, help the Troika, and cost the
Participants some money, and would avoid a Credit Event and demonstrate
that the rating agency characterizations of default have no meaningful
accounting or funding impact for the Participants.
The French Rollover Plan in Detail
2
3. http://marketsandbeyond.blogspot.com/
http://www.pcgwm.com/
The Rollover Does Not Alter the Existing Maturity Schedule
According to the proposal I have attached, the following sentence seems to be the
operative one regarding timing:
During the period from July 2011 until June 2014 (the “Period”), following each
redemption of Existing GGB’s, each Participant undertakes to participate in one of the
following options
So, it looks like Participants agree to the plan now, but rollovers do not occur until each
individual bond matures. The immediate impact on the debt maturity schedule for Greece
is negligible. The Participants only share in the bailout if the Troika continues to provide
Greece with funding. Retaining the original maturity schedule is useful for the
Participants. If there is a default by Greece, the Participants will still hold their existing
short dated bonds which can get higher recoveries in sovereign debt restructurings.
Since the Participants do not provide a maturity extension up front, the key to Greece
paying its debts is the continued willingness of the Troika to release tranches of promised
bailout money. By waiting until each bond is repaid, the rollover plan addresses a couple
of key issues. The rating agencies can rate the debt whatever they want, but if the bonds
are paid in full at maturity the Participants will not have to take a write-down, so they
preserve non mark to market accounting. That is important for some of the Participants.
By waiting until the debt is repaid at maturity, it reduces the risk of some other credit
claiming “fraudulent conveyance” or arguing about “off market price” transactions.
Waiting until the bonds mature and are redeemed at par by Greece before “purchasing”
the new bonds is better from an accounting standpoint for the Participants than agreeing
now to extend the maturities when the bonds are trading below par.
Funds from a maturing bond are rolled into 3 assets
When a bond is redeemed at par, the Participant really receives 3 assets. The language is
confusing, the use of the SPV obfuscates the actual investment, but it is actually fairly
transparent to see through the headlines.
For every €100 million of maturing debt a Participant holds, they will be able to retain €30
million to do with as they please. Of the remaining €70 million, they purchase 2 assets, a
AAA rated 30 year, zero coupon bond, and a 30 year Greek amortizing bond. Yes, the plan
calls for them to purchase 1 asset, an SPV, but it is a simple SPV and is worth breaking the
SPV into its two components.
The Participant will buy €70 million of an SPV. The SPV will be “principal protected” by a
3
4. http://marketsandbeyond.blogspot.com/
http://www.pcgwm.com/
AAA rated asset and provide a coupon of between 5.5% and 8.0% depending on the GDP
growth of Greece. But let’s look through the SPV and see what the Participant really gets.
€20 million is spent to buy the AAA zero coupon bond. The zero coupon bond should cost
about 30% of face 1 and the actual proposal uses a price of 28.5%. So the investor owns a
AAA rated, zero coupon bond, that they spent €20 million to buy and has a face value of
€70 million. This asset might be used to get a principal only AAA rating on the SPV Note.
It might help with regulatory capital even, if the Participants can use a principal only
rating, but in any case it should be viewed as a separate asset.
So the remaining €50 million actually goes to Greece. Of the €100 million of debt the
Participant owned, €30 million is repaid in cash, €20 million they agree to use to buy a 30
year zero and €50 million goes to Greece. Since Greece clearly needs all the money it can
get, the only logical place for Greece to receive the €50 million the Participants are
keeping is from another loan from the Troika. Whatever entity (possibly some iteration of
EFSF) sold the zero coupon bond to the SPV is likely to provide financing to Greece. It
only makes sense since they will have €30 million of proceeds that needs to be invested
somewhere. The remaining €20 million must come from the promised tranches of Troika
bailout funds.
What does the loan to Greece look like?
It is possible to back out the details of the €50 million loan to Greece. The Participants
expect to receive €70 million at maturity from the SPV, so that the asset they paid par for
can be redeemed at par. Therefore it is logical to conclude that the SPV is not relying on
any money from Greece for principle redemption at maturity. The SPV is supposed to pay
a minimum of 5.5% coupon on the €70 million face amount of the SPV note. That is €3.85
million per annum. That has to be coming from the Greek loan – the SPV only has 2
assets, the Greek loan, and the zero coupon bond. The SPV (and Participants) are relying
on Greece to pay €3.85 million per year for 30 years. This is just like a mortgage. In fact it
is a 30 year mortgage, with initial amount of €50 million with annual payments of €3.85
million. That is equivalent to a 6.55% mortgage rate. Since none of the GGB bonds
maturity in the next 18 months, has a coupon higher than 5.25%, the Participants aren’t
helping Greece on their annual interest payments. If Greece is going to see a reduction in
average coupon, it would have to be coming from the loans from the Troika. So far, those
loans still seem to be coming around 5%, so there is no current interest expense benefit for
Greece.
This mortgage loan to Greece is very creative by the Participants. It helps explain why
there are no details of the loan terms in the proposal. It is a bit difficult to work out, but a
30 year, 6.55% mortgage is the only possible way to explain the cash flows. Not only is the
4
5. http://marketsandbeyond.blogspot.com/
http://www.pcgwm.com/
interest rate above current coupon rates, so Greece will be paying more, the duration of
the mortgage is far less than 30 years. The Participants would have you believe that they
have lent Greece money for 30 years. The reality is the loan has a much shorter duration
and will be half paid off in the 20th year. The terms, as you dig deeper, once again seem to
be better for the Participants than for Greece.
I almost forgot something. The 0 to 2.5% additional interest the SPV will be paying based
on the GDP of Greece for any given year. That would be an additional payment of up to
€1.75 million each year. That payment has to be coming from the Greek loan asset the
SPV holds, since it cannot be coming from the zero coupon bond, by definition. If that
happened in the first year of the SPV it would represent a payment by Greece of 3.5% of
the amount borrowed. Since the loan is a mortgage and principle is being paid down, the
potential additional payment by Greece as a % of interest is astronomical near the end of
the loan. If Greece only owes half the original principle by the end of year 21, that same
payment would be 7% from the perspective of Greece, on top of the 6.55% they are already
paying.
This coupon “kicker” linked to GDP that is paid on the full notional of the SPV is
problematic for Greece since they are paying a “kicker” on a notional that is 40% more
than they received. The problem becomes onerous because that kicker is linked to a fixed
amount, yet the money Greece borrowed from the SPV is being repaid annually like any
other mortgage. It is only safe to assume that the annual principle payments have to be
funded elsewhere, so Greece will owe interest on those borrowings too.
The Participants are not lending to Greece for 30 years, the duration is much
shorter, and the coupon payments start out potentially high, and become
usurious in the later years.
The structure is designed in a such a way to make it look like the Participants are being
helpful – 30 years at a low coupon, but separating the SPV into its zero coupon component
and the loan to Greece clearly demonstrate that the terms being offered to Greece are far
worse than the headlines that the Participants are selling to the public.
I would be surprised if Greece agrees to the loan terms as included in the
French proposal and wonder if they have even been consulted?
5