KIRA - Multi Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment for Kenya - Generic orientation @ UNICEF
Background: It is widely recognized that in emergencies, the lack of good quality information combined with pressure for humanitarian actors to respond quickly can result in inadequately informed decision making. Globally, this has been identified as one of the major obstacles to providing high quality responses to people affected by disasters. Kenya has a well-established, bi-annual multi-sector food security assessment mechanism in the form of the Long and Short Rains Assessment led by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) with participation from a number of UN agencies and NGOs. However, there remains a gap in relation to an agreed format and mechanism for multi sector assessments for sudden onset emergencies. This includes sudden onset emergencies of a large scale and those of a more localized nature. This gap has been identified by the inter sector working group (ISWG) and was noted in the recent IASC Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of the 2011 Horn of Africa drought. It is one of the agreed areas of follow up from the RTE and is also a key priority under the ISWG April to June priorities . This initiative, also known as Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment (KIRA), has been undertaken to bring stakeholders together in order to develop a rapid assessment approach aligned to the work that is taking place at the global level through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF) on assessment tools, guidelines and processes. This is a joint initiative initially instigated by OCHA and UNICEF on behalf of Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team (KHPT), in partnership with the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB) and supported by the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS). It is being undertaken as a participatory process, welcoming inputs from all stakeholders including Government ministries and bodies, the Kenya Red Cross Society, NGOs, UN agencies and donors . An engagement plan has been developed, outlining process and identified activities for the management of the process, outputs and anticipated timelines. The objective is: To build a country-wide mechanism and capacity, capable at short notice to conduct a multi-agency, multi sector assessment of humanitarian needs. For more information: https://sites.google.com/site/kenyainitialrapidassessment/phase-1---planification Presentation @ UNICEF Supported Sector Working Group (10 Dec 2012) Kenya
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KIRA - Multi Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment for Kenya - Generic orientation @ UNICEF
- 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE KENYA INITIAL RAPID ASSESSMENT (KIRA) Nairobi, 30 Sept – 5 Oct 2012 (On behalf of Core Assessment Team) Minu K Limbu, Emergency Specialist (Information Management and Analysis) UNICEF Kenya Country Office Kenya Country Office Organised by the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment (KIRA) initiative, a partnership of:
- 2. The problem Lack of timely, Pressure on credible humanitarian Information actors to respond Pressure on Donors to allocate funds Poorly Informed Decision Making
- 3. Better Assessments = Better Aid
- 4. KENYA INITIAL RAPID ASSESSMENT (KIRA)
- 6. Elements of an Assessment Secondary data Lessons Learnt & information Lessons Learned Pre - Crisis In Crisis data Primary data DATA CONSOLIDATION ANALYSIS DISSEMINATION
- 8. Primary Data Collection - When ~Day 3 ~Day 15 ~Day 30 Disast Phase I Phase II Phase III er 0-72 Initial Sector Sector hours 1-2 weeks reports Sector reports Sector reports / Sector D reports Clusters reports give detail on impact of inform relief Confirm scale and severity, disaster (areas, groups, priority needs, and identify and recovery sectors) and inform relief programming constraints programming
- 9. Linkages to Kenya and Elections In 2007/08 Elections: Killed :Over 1,100 Displaced: Over 600,000 Source:
- 10. Preparedness for Elections 2013 May’012 June,012 – July- Oct’012 scenario planning Aug’012 building with • Humanitarian • The • Contingency Sectoral CP • Protection Government Planning working • UN/INGOs Workshop group • Donors Workshop SUB NATIONAL CP………………. 10
- 13. Elections Kenya 2013 Election Day Response Pre Election 03 04 Mar '13 Post Election Plans Dec '12 - 03 Mar '13 11 Mar '13 - 01 Apr '13 01 Jun '12 - 30 Apr '13 Today Jun '12 Jul '12 Aug '12 Sep '12 Oct '12 Nov '12 Jan '13 Feb '13 Mar '13 Apr '13 M Election Timelines 02 Nov '12 - 01 Apr '13 Voters Registration Update Voters Lists Distribute 02 Nov '12 - 07 Dec '12 24 Dec '12 - 31 Jan '13 Voter lists Inter-Agency (KHPT) Preparedness 01 Jun '12 - 07 Dec '12 May '13 Start Finish 01 Jun '12 30 Apr '13 Dec'012 Jan'013 Mar'013 -90 days deadline Certification of for Voters Voters Registration Registration 02 Feb '13 03 Dec '12
- 14. National CP Elections Kenya 2013 Workshop Election Day 03 Aug '12 Response Pre Election 03 04 Mar '13 Post Election Plans Dec '12 - 03 Mar '13 11 Mar '13 - 01 Apr '13 Kenya Initial Rapid 01 Jun '12 - 30 Apr '13 Assessment (KIRA) Initiatives 20 Aug '12 - 29 Nov '12 Today Jun '12 Jul '12 Aug '12 Sep '12 Oct '12 Nov '12 Jan '13 Feb '13 Mar '13 Apr '13 M Inter-Agency (KHPT) Preparedness F 3 01 Jun '12 - 07 Dec '12 National Level Contingency KIRA National/Hubs Level Trainings Planning (CP) 20 Aug '12 - 29 Nov '12 01 Jun '12 - 03 Aug '12 Election Timelines 01 Nov '12 - 01 Apr '13 Voters Registration Update Voters Lists Distribute 01 Nov '12 - 07 Dec '12 24 Dec '12 - 31 Jan '13 Voter lists May '13 Start Finish 01 Jun '12 30 Apr '13 Jul'012 Aug'012 Sep'012 Oct'012 Nov'012 Dec'012 Jan'013 Mar'013 KIRA Core Team KHPT Sectoral CP Simulation KIRA formation Finalized Exercise Tools/Methodology (UNICEF/OCHA/ACAPS/ 05 Dec '12 Finalization ECB) 07 Dec '12 07 Jun '12
Notas del editor
- This is the problem assessments are trying to solve….The lack of good quality information combined with pressure for humanitarian actors to respond quickly results in poorly informed decision making. This has been identified as a major obstacles to providing high quality responses to people affected by disasters.
- ultimately this is what we hope for that better assessments will result in better aid, aid that is more appropriate, more timely, more effective in addressing the needs of people affected by disaster. Of course we have no guarantees that a better assessment will result in better aid, assessments are not the silver bullet to solve all our humanitarian response issues. And while a good assessment does not guarantee a good response, we can be pretty sure that a bad assessment will result in a bad response.
- So what are we trying to do to improve assessments in Kenya?the collective aim of the KIRA is for a coordinated approach to assessments to cover the humanitarian community in Kenya….so that NGOS, UN, government, and donors and have a joint platform to share information, plans, best practice on assessments, reduce duplication of effort, use human and financial resources better, and capitalise on each others’ strengths.The inter sector working group (ISWG) identified a gap in multi sector assessment from the Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of the 2011 Horn of Africa drought. Addressing the gap of multi sector assessments was an agreed area of follow up to the RTE. A project was launched to support the development of a coordinated, multi sector rapid assessment mechanism, and this is how the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment (KIRA) was born.
- The good news is that there is help out there. The IASC has produced an Operational Guidance for coordinated assessments, outlining some of the key steps and requirements for undertaking coordinated assessments. They also have a defined approach specifically for rapid assessments, at which point in time it is strongly recommended that an assessment be multi-sector.
- We looked at what we mean by an assessment…that itis made up of the following components…Pre-disaster info: Population figures for affected areas, demographic breakdown, Common Operational Data sets (such as p-codes), large studiesFrom past baseline studies, census, sector specific information, nationalinstitutions (bureau of statistics)Disaster specific information: what is known already about the disaster from local government, national institutions, media, and reports from agencies working in affected areasLessons learned from previous similar events and other information that is known about the area that can inform how the situation is likely to unfold…this could include what worked and what didn’t work, immediate needs (e.g. saris)…also known information that may not be in the form of “data” such as child protection risks, locally specific water treatment practices, school holidays, or religious information (e.g. in the middle of Ramazan).And an element of primary data collection: in the early stages could be observations from flyovers, visits to the affected areas, key informant and community group interviews….in the initial days and weeks (phase 1 and 2) this primary data collection will be convenience and purposive sampling and at the community level. Bring the information through consolidation.Analyse and make sense of the information.The dissemination or sharing phase is less about “having a perfect report” and more about an ongoing process of updating information as knew knowledge and understanding of the situation comes to hand and making this available as widely as possible.
- Emphasize that there are three main times when primary data is collected:During the first 72 hours to confirm (or identify) scale and severity; confirm (or identify) priority needs (areas, groups, sectors), and identify constraintsNB – scale indicates how big the disaster is, severity indicates how bad it isDuring the initial 1-2 weeks to give detail on impact of disaster (on areas, groups, sectors) and to inform relief programmingFor in-depth assessments after 2 weeks by clusters to inform relief operations. Later assessments inform recovery programming. For an initial rapid assessment, the time focus is on the first 72 hours and the initial 1-2 week timeframe.
- As share dbyDr. James Kisia, Deputy Secretary General KRCSKenya experienced the worst elections violence in 2007/081,113 killed with 600,000 displaced in various parts of the countryThis was part of a pattern of elections related violence since introduction of multi party politics in Kenya-Violence1992,2002 and 2007 although different intensityKRCS on the basis of previous experience prepared for the 2007 elections, this gave the organization and edge in response.Argument that underlying causes of 2007 elections are yet to be addressed e.g political reform, reform of police, resettlement of IDPs.In addition, uncertainty about ICC, implementation of constitution, drought and land governance and use issues.On the basis of this KRCS is currently working on the 2012/2013 elections contingency by assessing a number of variables, indicators and actors.
- Coordination Hubs and