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id
entry_timestamp_queue
entry_timestamp_create
entry_timestamp_change
entry_maintainer_queue
entry_maintainer_create
entry_maintainer_change
entry_changelog
entry_smss
software_type
software_vendor
software_name
software_version
software_platform
software_component
software_file
software_library
software_function
software_argument
software_input_type
software_input_value
software_website
software_affectedlist
software_advisoryquote
software_freetext_de
software_freetext_en
vulnerability_discoverydate
vulnerability_vendorinformdate
vulnerability_class
vulnerability_impact
vulnerability_risk
vulnerability_simplicity
vulnerability_popularity
vulnerability_historic
vulnerability_cvss_av
vulnerability_cvss_ac
vulnerability_cvss_au
vulnerability_cvss_ci
vulnerability_cvss_ii
vulnerability_cvss_ai
vulnerability_titleword
vulnerability_keywords
vulnerability_sourcecode
vulnerability_advisoryquote
vulnerability_freetext_de
vulnerability_freetext_en
advisory_date
advisory_location
advisory_type
advisory_url
advisory_via
advisory_identifier
advisory_reportconfidence
advisory_coordination
advisory_person_name
advisory_person_nickname
advisory_person_mail
advisory_person_website
advisory_company_name
advisory_confirm_url
advisory_confirm_date
advisory_disputed
advisory_advisoryquote
advisory_freetext_de
advisory_freetext_en
exploit_availability
exploit_date
exploit_publicity
exploit_url
exploit_developer_name
exploit_developer_nickname
exploit_developer_mail
exploit_developer_website
exploit_language
exploit_exploitability
exploit_reliability
exploit_wormified
exploit_googlehack
exploit_advisoryquote
exploit_sourcecode
exploit_freetext_de
exploit_freetext_en
countermeasure_remediationlev
countermeasure_name
countermeasure_date
countermeasure_reliability
countermeasure_upgrade_vers
countermeasure_upgrade_url
countermeasure_patch_name
Adventures in a Decade of Tracking and
Consolidating Security Vulnerabilities
Marc Ruef
www.scip.ch
area41 Security Conference
June 2014, Zürich, Switzerland
Agenda | Vulnerability Database Maintenance
1. Intro
Introduction 2 min
Who am I? 2 min
What is the Goal? 2 min
2. Vulnerability Database Maintenance
Design the Database 5 min
Handling of Sources 4 min
Interpretation of Data 4 min
Correlation of Data 4 min
Quality Management 5 min
Extrapolation of Data 5 min
Deliver your Results 5 min
Statistical Analysis 5 min
Provide Accessibility 5 min
Use Connectivity 5 min
3. Outro
Summary 2 min
Questions 5 min
area41 2014 2/34
Introduction | Who Am I?
Name Marc Ruef
Job Co-Owner / CTO, scip AG, Zürich
Private Website http://www.computec.ch
Last own Book „The Art of Penetration Testing“,
Computer & Literatur Böblingen,
ISBN 3-936546-49-5
Translation
area41 2014 3/34
2013 2007 20022004
Introduction | What Is a Vulnerability Database?
◦ What?
◦ A database collecting vulnerabilities
◦ Why?
◦ To do vulnerability management
◦ What is vulnerable?
◦ What is to patch?
◦ To do statistical analysis
◦ Costs of patch management
◦ Robustness of products
area41 2014 4
Introduction | scip VulDB Looks like This (Overview)
area41 2014 5
Introduction | scip VulDB Looks like This (Detail)
area41 2014 6
Design | What Should Your Vulnerability Database Do?
◦ How much?
◦ Full coverage
◦ Selective collection
◦ Inventory-only
◦ Vendor-selection
◦ Importance threshold
◦ Fixed only
◦ For whom?
◦ Everyone
◦ Public service
◦ Advertisement
◦ Customers
◦ Vulnerability management service
◦ Alerting service
◦ Tools
◦ Internal Use
◦ Knowledge-base
◦ For pentesters
◦ For administrators
area41 2014 7
Design | What Is an Entry?
◦ A VDB entry consists of different elements. Minimal elements
usually are:
◦ ID 12413
◦ Title Linux Low-Address Protection Denial of Service
◦ Disclosure Date 02/21/2014
◦ Description A vulnerability, classified as (…)
◦ Risk Rating problematic
◦ References CVE-2014-2039, BID 65700, …
area41 2014 8
Design | Details Are Cool…
◦ Entry
◦ Software
◦ …
◦ Vulnerability
◦ …
◦ Advisory
◦ …
◦ Exploit
◦ Availability → yes|no
◦ Publicity → public|private
◦ Disclosure Date → yyyyMMdd
◦ Developer → $name
◦ Language → Ruby|Python|C|…
◦ Reliability → low|medium|high
◦ …
◦ Countermeasure
◦ …
◦ Sources
◦ …
◦ Tools
◦ …
◦ Misc
◦ …
area41 2014 9
Design | But Details Take Time!
◦ We have compiled more than 13’400 entries since 2003
◦ A scip VulDB entry consists of ~150 possible data points
◦ We rate data points to prioritize:
◦ Important = 33 (must be processed if available)
◦ Normal = 32 (shall be processed)
◦ Optional = 85 (can be processed, if you have «too much time»)
◦ Statistical analysis of defined data points over all entries:
◦ Average = 49.92
◦ Min = 26
◦ Max = 90
◦ We currently add ~15 new entries per day (work-days only)
area41 2014 10
Sources | Possible Sources
◦ Vulnerability databases
◦ Vulnerability contributors (iDefense VCP, HP ZDI)
◦ Infosec mailinglists
◦ Vendor mailinglists
◦ Vendor advisories
◦ Code repositories
◦ News
◦ Blogs
◦ Social networks (e.g. Twitter, G+, LinkedIn)
◦ Friends, colleagues, co-workers, …
area41 2014 11
Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Advantages and Disadvantages
VDB  Pros Cons
IBM X-Force
http://xforce.iss.net
• Good coverage
• CVSSv2 base scores
• CVSSv2 temporal scores
• CVE support
• Sometimes a bit slow (2-3 updates per
week)
• «Arbitrary» listing (default view: 5
entries, no backlog)
• No RSS feed
OSVDB
http://www.osvdb.org
• Very quick (daily updates)
• Best coverage (everything!)
• CVSSv2 base scores (via MITRE)
• CVE support
• No listing (since Feb 2014)
• No own risk rating (CVSSv2 only)
• No RSS feed (since 2012)
Secunia
http://secunia.com/community
/advisories/historic/
• Good coverage
• Good listing (default view: 25 entries)
• CVE support
• Login required (since Apr 2014)
• Some details for paying customers only
• Combining multiple vulnerabilities in
one entry (by release/patch)
• They don’t like other projects (they
forbade to use their listing for
vulscan.nse in 2013)
• No RSS feed
• No CVSSv2 scores
SecurityFocus
http://www.securityfocus.com/
bid
• Good coverage
• CVE support
• Listing also shows updated entries
(default view: 31 entries)
• Site is slow
• Data for an entry is spread over 5 sub-
pages
• No CVSSv2 scores
SecurityTracker
http://securitytracker.com
• Sometimes quite quick
• Simple listing (default view: 5 entries)
• CVE support
• Selective coverage (popular products
only)
• No CVSSv2 scores
Sources | Evaluation Rating Introduction
◦ Criteria are those we think are
important
◦ We have addressed them as far
as possible in our project
(because of this prioritization)
◦ Rating is as fair as possible
◦ You might rate a bit differently
Description
Rating
Feature is supported: always/fully 3
Feature is supported: often/partially 2
Feature is supported: sometimes/somehow 1
Feature is never/not supported 0
Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Rating
VDB 
Coverage
(howmuch)
Quickness
(howfast)
Listing
(howvisible)
Search
(howsearchable)
Handling
(howergonomic)
TechDetails
(howdetailed)
RiskRating
(howmeasured)
CVSS
Base
CVSS
Temporal
CVE
Feeds
(howaccessible)
Total
CERT VU
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/
1 3 3 2 2 3 0 3 3 3 3 26
Exploit-DB
http://www.exploit-db.com
1 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 3 3 20
IBM X-Force
http://xforce.iss.net
3 1 1 1 2 2 0 3 3 3 0 19
NIST NVD
http://nvd.nist.gov
2 1 3 3 2 2 0 3 0 3 3 22
MITRE CVE
http://cve.mitre.org
2 1 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 3 2 17
OSVDB
http://www.osvdb.org
3 3 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 3 0 17
Secunia
http://secunia.com/community/advisories/historic/
3 2 3 3 2 2 3 0 0 3 0 21
SecurityFocus
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid
3 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 15
SecurityTracker
http://securitytracker.com
1 2 3 2 3 2 0 0 0 3 0 16
scip VulDB (rating ourselves comes with bias)
http://www.scip.ch/en/?vuldb
2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30
 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.2 0.6 1.4 0.9 3.0 1.4
Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Conclusion
◦ Being quick is not easy
◦ Technical details range from bad to good
◦ CVSS scores are pretty unpopular, especially «temporal scores»
◦ CVE has been established as the de facto standard (nice!)
◦ You can’t compare CERT VU, Exploit-DB, NIST NVD and MITRE
CVE with anything else
◦ Exploit-DB inherits abstraction from researchers and is not self-
consistent
◦ Secunia and SecurityFocus are very similar in many aspects
◦ X-Force and SecurityTracker remain pretty unpopular
◦ The «O» in OSVDB does not stand for «open» anymore
◦ Some features have been broken for ages (e.g. search on OSVDB
and X-Force)
◦ Not everyone is a big fan of feeds
area41 2014 15
Sources | Vendor Advisories: Advantages and Disadvantages
Vendor  Pros Cons
Adobe
http://helpx.adobe.com/security.
html
• Product-related listing
• Some technical details
• Priority rating
• CVE support
• Advisory per release/upgrade
• No RSS feed
Apple • Simple technical details
• CVE support
• No risk rating
• No CVSSv2 scores
• No listing
• Advisory per release/upgrade
• No RSS feed
Cisco
https://tools.cisco.com/security/c
enter/publicationListing.x
• Advisory listing
• Advisory per vulnerability
• Sometimes additional technical details
• CVSSv2 base scores
• CVE support
• Technical details with login only
• Some details for customers only
• No RSS feed
Google • CVE support • No listing
• Advisory per release/upgrade
• Technical details with auth only
• No risk rating
• No CVSSv2 scores
• No RSS feed
Microsoft
http://technet.microsoft.com/sec
urity/advisory
• Some technical details
• Listing (default view: 5 entries)
• RSS feed
• Patch day collection (2nd Tuesday of
each month)
• Severity rating
• No CVSSv2 scores
Oracle
http://www.oracle.com/technetwo
rk/topics/security/alerts-
086861.html
• Simple listing
• CVSSv2 base scores
• CVE support
• Patch day collection (quarterly)
• No technical details
• No RSS feed
Sources | Vendor Advisories: Rating
Vendor
VulnID
(howunique)
Frequency
(howfast)
Listing
(howvisible)
TechDetails
(howdetailed)
Risk
(howmeasured)
CVSS
Base
CVSS
Temporal
CVE
RSS
Total
FortiGuard
http://www.fortiguard.com/advisory/
3 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 21
Symantec
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/list.jsp
3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 21
Microsoft
http://technet.microsoft.com/security/advisory
3 2 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 20
Checkpoint
https://www.checkpoint.com/defense/advisories/public/summary.html
3 2 3 2 3 0 0 3 3 19
Cisco
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x (details auth only)
3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 0 18
Oracle
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alerts-086861.html
1 1 3 1 3 3 0 3 3 18
Adobe
http://helpx.adobe.com/security.html
3 3 3 2 2 0 0 3 0 16
HP
https://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive
3 3 3 1 0 3 0 3 0 16
SAP
https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/ (auth only)
3 3 3 2 3 2 0 0 0 16
D-Link
http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/
3 3 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 12
Google
http://www.google.com (details auth only)
3 3 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 12
Apple
http://www.apple.com
1 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 8
 2.66 2.58 2.58 2.08 1.41 1.16 0.0 2.66 1.25
Sources | Vendor Advisories: Conclusion
◦ Some vendors have really ugly advisory URLs
◦ Technical details range from bad to good
◦ CVSS scores are pretty unpopular, especially «temporal scores»
◦ Own risk ratings are also unpopular, because they are hard
◦ Nearly everybody likes CVE
◦ Microsoft and Oracle handle things better than it felt
◦ Juniper has a field «Last Updated» but no «Disclosure Date»
◦ SAP is very restrictive with information for non-customers, which
introduces a severe disadvantage (VDB’s can’t categorize them,
which decreases visibility)
◦ Vendors aren’t big fans of RSS feeds either
area41 2014 18
Sources | Vuln Contributors: Advantages and Disadvantages
Project  Pros Cons
iDEFENSE Vulnerability
Contributor Program
http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/cyber-
security/index.xhtml
• Started in 2003 • Incomplete listing
• No announcement of upcoming
advisories
• No CVSSv2 support
• No search capabilities
• No RSS feed
• All old links are broken since
Zero Day Initiative
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
• Provide announcement for
upcoming advisories
• Provide CVSSv2 Base Scores
• RSS feeds available
• No search capabilities
Sources | Vuln Contributors: Rating
Project 
Listing
(howvisible)
Search
(howsearchable)
Handling
(howergonomic)
TechDetails
(howdetailed)
RiskRating
(howmeasured)
CVSS
Base
CVSS
Temporal
CVE
RSS
Total
iDEFENSE Vulnerability Contributor Program
http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/cyber-security/index.xhtml
3 0 3 2 0 0 0 3 0 11
Zero Day Initiative
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
3 0 3 2 0 3 0 3 3 17
 3.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 3.0 1.5
Sources | Vuln Contributors: Conclusion
◦ Only 2 major players
◦ They are quite similar in most aspects
◦ Zero Day Initiative has 2 advantages of CVSSv2 and RSS support
◦ More competition might increase quality
area41 2014 21
Interpretation | How to Analyze
◦ The basic approach of processing a source is simple:
1. Check source for new entries
2. Review source entry
3. Add necessary data to database
1. If entry is available → Update existing entry
2. If entry is not available → Create new entry
3. If source is false-positive → Ignore entry and flag for future reference
4. Goto 1
area41 2014 22
Interpretation | MITRE CVE as an Example
cve
description
advisory
cert vu
software
Interpretation | MITRE CVE as an Example: What Is missing?
◦ What’s missing on a MITRE CVE entry?
◦ Disclosure date
◦ Exact naming of vulnerability class
◦ Risk rating
◦ Person responsible for disclosure
◦ Detailed mitigation/countermeasure
◦ …
area41 2014 24
Interpretation | OSVDB as an Example
cve
sectracker
product version
description
date
exploit
news
Interpretation | Contradicting Conventions (Disclosure Date)
02/19/2014
02/26/2014
Interpretation | Contradicting Conventions (Disclosure Date)
CVE-2014-2284
net-snmp 5.7.1 on Linux ICMP-MIB Denial of Service
02/19/2014
02/20/2014
02/21/2014
02/22/2014
02/23/2014
02/24/2014
02/25/2014
02/26/2014
02/27/2014
...
03/24/2014
SourceForge
ReleaseNote
SecFocus
SecTracker
VulDB
OSVDB
Secunia
RedHat
Our definition of
a (public) disclosure date:
The earliest known date to
disclose an issue to the public in
an unrestricted way.
(we’re going to adopt a more
differentiated approach in the
near future)
03/05/2014oss-security ...CVE
Interpretation | Put the Different Pieces Together
VDB 
Product
Version
VulnClass
Disclosure
Date
Advisory
URL
Attack
Context
Exploit
Solution
VulnDB
Sources
Misc.
Links
Total
CERT VU
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/
3 2 3 2 3 3 1 3 0 1 21
Exploit-DB
http://www.exploit-db.com
3 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 17
IBM X-Force
http://xforce.iss.net
3 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 22
NIST NVD
http://nvd.nist.gov
2 2 3 0 3 1 1 1 3 3 19
MITRE CVE
http://cve.mitre.org
2 2 2 0 3 1 1 1 3 3 18
OSVDB
http://www.osvdb.org
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30
Secunia
http://secunia.com/community/advisories/historic/
2 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 0 0 15
SecurityFocus
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid
3 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 0 1 20
SecurityTracker
http://securitytracker.com
3 3 3 1 2 3 1 3 0 1 20
scip VulDB
http://www.scip.ch/en/?vuldb
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30
 2.7 2.4 2.6 1.9 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.7
Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Conclusion
◦ OSVDB provides the best collection of data
◦ Secunia provides the worst collection of data
◦ SecurityFocus and Secunia usually don’t provide context
◦ X-Force, SecurityTracker and Secunia don’t provide exploit details
◦ SecurityTracker and Secunia have confusing disclosure dates
◦ SecurityFocus, SecurityTracker and Secunia don’t link to other
VDB
area41 2014 29
Correlation | That's Why You Have to Correlate
◦ Approach
◦ Merge different sources
◦ Compare similar data points
◦ Identify and verify contradictions
◦ Dangers
◦ Duplicates: Come up with annoying inconsistency
◦ Merges: Come up with dangerous mashups
area41 2014 30
Correlation | Now Things Are Getting Tricky
◦ Sometimes vulnerabilities can’t be identified individually
◦ CVE helps a lot! But not every vulnerability (immediately) has a CVE
number
◦ Some sources merge vulnerabilities into one entry
◦ Vendors do this within their patch release notes or patch days
◦ Secunia tends to compile different vulnerabilities of the same day or patch
generation into one entry (e.g. 58519). SecurityFocus does it sometimes
(e.g. 67553) and so does SecurityTracker in some cases (e.g. 1030269).
◦ Vulnerabilities with very few technical details often can’t be
distinguished from similar vulnerabilities (e.g. Apple HT6145: no info
available, but CVE assigned)
area41 2014 31
Correlation | Keep Track, Detect Collisions
◦ Keep track of your sources and the entries already reviewed
◦ Verify that every new entry is really new and not just a duplicate
or a minor fork of an existing entry. This is a very underestimated
task!
◦ We do that with collision detection
◦ Compare new values with existing values of other entries (e.g. URLs,
IDs, references). If there is a specified level of matches, we have to
check for a duplicate.
◦ Our reference maps help to distinguish. Projects like vFeed
support this very good. [https://github.com/toolswatch/vFeed/]
area41 2014 32
Correlation | To Split or Not to Split
Parameter
→ 5 entries
File
→ 4 entries
Component
→ 3 entries
Vuln Class
→ 2 entries
Advisory/Patch
→ 1 entry
Advisory
#VA42
Cross Site
Scripting
User Auth login.php
login_user
login_pass
News Portal
news.php news_id
archive.php news_year
SQL
Injection
Board forum.php post_id
area41 2014 33
Correlation | Split Example (MS Patch Day, IE Vuls, Feb 2014)
VulDB
(vuln split)
SecFocus*
(vuln split)
CVE
(vuln split)
Secunia
(combined)
Microsoft
(combined)
MS14-010 SA56796
CVE-
2014-0267
BID 65361 SID 12242
CVE-
2014-0268
BID 65392 SID 12239
… … …
CVE-
2014-0293
BID 65394 SID 12241
area41 2014 34
* SecurityFocus often combines (e.g. BID 67553)
Correlation | Unwanted Split (cPanel, Dec 2013)
◦ TSR 2013-0011, http://cpanel.net/tsr-2013-0011-full-disclosure/
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Reseller Login Handler Cookie information disclosure
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Login Security Handler Token information disclosure
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Branding Subsystem privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM usr/local/cpanel/share/counter privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Daily Process Log Screen Stored cross site scripting
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM cPAddons Upgrade Handler Password information disclosure
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Edit DNS Zone Interface information disclosure
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM SSH Authentication Handler privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM X3 Theme countedit.cgi Directory Traversal
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Bandmin passwd privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM cpsrvd Bypass privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Bandmin Reflected cross site scripting
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM API Call Handler UI::dynamicincludelist Directory Traversal
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Database Handler privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Backup Archive Handler privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Config Handler Cross Site Request Forgery
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Translatable Phrase Handler Locale::Maketext privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM CSRF Protection Bypass Cross Site Request Forgery
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM cross site scripting
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Logaholic Session File Handler /tmp privilege escalation
◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Virtualhost Installation Handler privilege escalation
area41 2014 35
Correlation | Split Pros and Cons
◦ Advisory / Patch
◦ Few entries
◦ Good for overview
◦ Good for patch management
◦ Vulnerability
◦ Some entries
◦ Possible splits for 3rd party components
◦ Element
◦ A lot of entries
◦ Good for statistical analysis
area41 2014 36
Quality | How to Provide the Best?
◦ Try to verify statements from researchers, vendors and
vulnerability database maintainers
◦ Check for plausibility
◦ Verify from other sources
◦ Re-test within a lab
◦ Eliminate wrong statements
◦ Delete false entries
◦ Preserve false entries (prefered by CVE, SecurityFocus)
◦ Add further explanations
◦ Flag (prefered by OSVDB, scip VulDB)
◦ advisory_disputed=1 (e.g. scipID 13305, 13000, 12643)
◦ advisory_reportconfidence=UR (CVSSv2 temp score metric)
◦ Try to find and compile additional details
area41 2014 37
Extrapolation | Versions of Affected Software
◦ Exact Version
◦ Internet Explorer 10 → X-Force, OSVDB, SecFocus, Secunia, VulDB
◦ Wildcards
◦ Internet Explorer 6.x → Secunia, SecFocus, SecTracker, VulDB
◦ Ranges
◦ Internet Explorer 8 – 10 → Secunia, CVE
◦ Internet Explorer prior 10 → SecurityTracker, Secunia
◦ Internet Explorer before 10 → CVE
◦ Internet Explorer up to 10 → VulDB
◦ Internet Explorer 8 and later → SecurityTracker
area41 2014 3810 119876
10
up to 10
8 to 10
Internet Explorer Versions
before 10
…
Extrapolation | What about The Unknown?
◦ Try to guess. Examples:
◦ «IE prior 9» → 6 – 9
◦ «IE prior 11» → 7 – 10
◦ Research and validate yourself
◦ A lot of work
◦ We combine with other projects (research or pentest)
◦ We enforce very important or interesting vulnerabilities
◦ Be quiet
area41 2014 39
Delivery | Chose your Channels
◦ Web Site
◦ Mail
◦ RSS
◦ Widgets
◦ Facebook
◦ Twitter
◦ LinkedIn
◦ App
◦ …
area41 2014 40
Statistics | Comparing Apples and Oranges
◦ Doing some statistics is easy. Doing it the right way is hard. Some
say it is even impossible.
[http://blog.osvdb.org/category/vulnerability-statistics/]
◦ Counting vulnerabilities doesn’t say anything:
◦ Weak code leads to a lot of vulnerabilities
◦ Complexity leads to a lot of vulnerabilities
◦ Popularity leads to a lot of vulnerabilities
◦ Bug bounty programs lead to a lot of vulnerabilities
◦ Open disclosure process leads to a lot of vulnerabilities
◦ We still provide statistical raw data and expect the viewers to
think about it
area41 2014 41
Statistics | Timelines Are Interesting
◦ Our timelines consist of multiple data
points
◦ vulnerability_introduction_date
◦ vulnerability_discovery_date
◦ vulnerability_vendorinform_date
◦ advisory_date
◦ advisory_confirm_date
◦ exploit_date
◦ countermeasure_date
◦ source_cve_assigned
◦ source_secunia_date
◦ source_nessus_date
◦ entry_timestamp_create
◦ entry_timestamp_update
Example Heartbleed [CVE-2014-0160]
area41 2014 42
Statistics | Timelines Trivia (excerpt from 2014)
◦ [CVE-2014-0160] OpenSSL TLS/DTLS Heartbeat information
disclosure got introduced in 01/01/2012 and fixed in 04/07/2014
◦ existed 827 days
◦ [CVE-2014-0179] libvirt XML Entity Expansion Handler denial of
service got introduced in 12/23/2009 and fixed in 05/06/2014
◦ existed 1.595 days
◦ [CVE-2014-3122] Linux Kernel try_to_unmap_cluster() denial of
service got introduced in 10/19/2008 and fixed in 04/10/2014
◦ existed 1.996 days
◦ [CVE-2014-3460] Novell NetIQ Sentinel Agent Manager directory
traversal vendor got informed in 09/04/2013 but did not respond
until 05/19/2014
◦ Novell ignored grace period of 257 days
area41 2014 43
Accessibility | Choose Additional Representation
◦ To allow users to work with your data, it might be the best way to
provide additional forms of representation:
◦ SQL
◦ XML
◦ JSON
◦ CSV
◦ CVRF [http://www.icasi.org/cvrf]
area41 2014 44
Connectivity | Use Data for Vuln Scanning
◦ We are able to construct specific requests with our fields
software_argument and software_input_value to create test cases
and exploits (very simple for web-based vulns)
◦ Because of the fields software_* we are able to provide CPE lists
[http://cpe.mitre.org/], which can be matched with tools like
Nmap. Random examples:
◦ ID 12313 → cpe:/a:sap:netweaver:7.30
◦ ID 12802 → cpe:/o:cisco:ios:15.4(1.1)t
◦ ID 13306 → cpe:/a:microsoft:internet_explorer:8
area41 2014 45
Outro | Summary
◦ Vulnerability databases help to manage vulnerabilities
◦ Different sources allow to collect a broad amount of issues
◦ Every source has some advantages and disadvantages
◦ Compiling and maintaining vulnerabilities takes a lot of effort
◦ Making your data accessible helps others
area41 2014 46
Outro | Thank You
◦ I‘d like to thank a bunch of people which helped to discuss the
many interesting aspects of vulnerability database management:
◦ Stefan Friedli, scip AG
◦ Steven M. Christey, MITRE
area41 2014 47
Outro | Questions
area41 2014 48
Security Is Our Business!
scip AG
Jakob-Fügli-Strasse 18
CH-8048 Zürich
Tel +41 44 404 13 13
Fax +41 44 404 13 14
Mail info@scip.ch
Web http://www.scip.ch
Twitter http://twitter.com/scipag
 Strategy | Consulting
 Auditing | Testing
 Forensics | Analysis
area41 2014 49

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Adventures in a Decade of Tracking and Consolidating Security Vulnerabilities

  • 1. id entry_timestamp_queue entry_timestamp_create entry_timestamp_change entry_maintainer_queue entry_maintainer_create entry_maintainer_change entry_changelog entry_smss software_type software_vendor software_name software_version software_platform software_component software_file software_library software_function software_argument software_input_type software_input_value software_website software_affectedlist software_advisoryquote software_freetext_de software_freetext_en vulnerability_discoverydate vulnerability_vendorinformdate vulnerability_class vulnerability_impact vulnerability_risk vulnerability_simplicity vulnerability_popularity vulnerability_historic vulnerability_cvss_av vulnerability_cvss_ac vulnerability_cvss_au vulnerability_cvss_ci vulnerability_cvss_ii vulnerability_cvss_ai vulnerability_titleword vulnerability_keywords vulnerability_sourcecode vulnerability_advisoryquote vulnerability_freetext_de vulnerability_freetext_en advisory_date advisory_location advisory_type advisory_url advisory_via advisory_identifier advisory_reportconfidence advisory_coordination advisory_person_name advisory_person_nickname advisory_person_mail advisory_person_website advisory_company_name advisory_confirm_url advisory_confirm_date advisory_disputed advisory_advisoryquote advisory_freetext_de advisory_freetext_en exploit_availability exploit_date exploit_publicity exploit_url exploit_developer_name exploit_developer_nickname exploit_developer_mail exploit_developer_website exploit_language exploit_exploitability exploit_reliability exploit_wormified exploit_googlehack exploit_advisoryquote exploit_sourcecode exploit_freetext_de exploit_freetext_en countermeasure_remediationlev countermeasure_name countermeasure_date countermeasure_reliability countermeasure_upgrade_vers countermeasure_upgrade_url countermeasure_patch_name Adventures in a Decade of Tracking and Consolidating Security Vulnerabilities Marc Ruef www.scip.ch area41 Security Conference June 2014, Zürich, Switzerland
  • 2. Agenda | Vulnerability Database Maintenance 1. Intro Introduction 2 min Who am I? 2 min What is the Goal? 2 min 2. Vulnerability Database Maintenance Design the Database 5 min Handling of Sources 4 min Interpretation of Data 4 min Correlation of Data 4 min Quality Management 5 min Extrapolation of Data 5 min Deliver your Results 5 min Statistical Analysis 5 min Provide Accessibility 5 min Use Connectivity 5 min 3. Outro Summary 2 min Questions 5 min area41 2014 2/34
  • 3. Introduction | Who Am I? Name Marc Ruef Job Co-Owner / CTO, scip AG, Zürich Private Website http://www.computec.ch Last own Book „The Art of Penetration Testing“, Computer & Literatur Böblingen, ISBN 3-936546-49-5 Translation area41 2014 3/34 2013 2007 20022004
  • 4. Introduction | What Is a Vulnerability Database? ◦ What? ◦ A database collecting vulnerabilities ◦ Why? ◦ To do vulnerability management ◦ What is vulnerable? ◦ What is to patch? ◦ To do statistical analysis ◦ Costs of patch management ◦ Robustness of products area41 2014 4
  • 5. Introduction | scip VulDB Looks like This (Overview) area41 2014 5
  • 6. Introduction | scip VulDB Looks like This (Detail) area41 2014 6
  • 7. Design | What Should Your Vulnerability Database Do? ◦ How much? ◦ Full coverage ◦ Selective collection ◦ Inventory-only ◦ Vendor-selection ◦ Importance threshold ◦ Fixed only ◦ For whom? ◦ Everyone ◦ Public service ◦ Advertisement ◦ Customers ◦ Vulnerability management service ◦ Alerting service ◦ Tools ◦ Internal Use ◦ Knowledge-base ◦ For pentesters ◦ For administrators area41 2014 7
  • 8. Design | What Is an Entry? ◦ A VDB entry consists of different elements. Minimal elements usually are: ◦ ID 12413 ◦ Title Linux Low-Address Protection Denial of Service ◦ Disclosure Date 02/21/2014 ◦ Description A vulnerability, classified as (…) ◦ Risk Rating problematic ◦ References CVE-2014-2039, BID 65700, … area41 2014 8
  • 9. Design | Details Are Cool… ◦ Entry ◦ Software ◦ … ◦ Vulnerability ◦ … ◦ Advisory ◦ … ◦ Exploit ◦ Availability → yes|no ◦ Publicity → public|private ◦ Disclosure Date → yyyyMMdd ◦ Developer → $name ◦ Language → Ruby|Python|C|… ◦ Reliability → low|medium|high ◦ … ◦ Countermeasure ◦ … ◦ Sources ◦ … ◦ Tools ◦ … ◦ Misc ◦ … area41 2014 9
  • 10. Design | But Details Take Time! ◦ We have compiled more than 13’400 entries since 2003 ◦ A scip VulDB entry consists of ~150 possible data points ◦ We rate data points to prioritize: ◦ Important = 33 (must be processed if available) ◦ Normal = 32 (shall be processed) ◦ Optional = 85 (can be processed, if you have «too much time») ◦ Statistical analysis of defined data points over all entries: ◦ Average = 49.92 ◦ Min = 26 ◦ Max = 90 ◦ We currently add ~15 new entries per day (work-days only) area41 2014 10
  • 11. Sources | Possible Sources ◦ Vulnerability databases ◦ Vulnerability contributors (iDefense VCP, HP ZDI) ◦ Infosec mailinglists ◦ Vendor mailinglists ◦ Vendor advisories ◦ Code repositories ◦ News ◦ Blogs ◦ Social networks (e.g. Twitter, G+, LinkedIn) ◦ Friends, colleagues, co-workers, … area41 2014 11
  • 12. Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Advantages and Disadvantages VDB  Pros Cons IBM X-Force http://xforce.iss.net • Good coverage • CVSSv2 base scores • CVSSv2 temporal scores • CVE support • Sometimes a bit slow (2-3 updates per week) • «Arbitrary» listing (default view: 5 entries, no backlog) • No RSS feed OSVDB http://www.osvdb.org • Very quick (daily updates) • Best coverage (everything!) • CVSSv2 base scores (via MITRE) • CVE support • No listing (since Feb 2014) • No own risk rating (CVSSv2 only) • No RSS feed (since 2012) Secunia http://secunia.com/community /advisories/historic/ • Good coverage • Good listing (default view: 25 entries) • CVE support • Login required (since Apr 2014) • Some details for paying customers only • Combining multiple vulnerabilities in one entry (by release/patch) • They don’t like other projects (they forbade to use their listing for vulscan.nse in 2013) • No RSS feed • No CVSSv2 scores SecurityFocus http://www.securityfocus.com/ bid • Good coverage • CVE support • Listing also shows updated entries (default view: 31 entries) • Site is slow • Data for an entry is spread over 5 sub- pages • No CVSSv2 scores SecurityTracker http://securitytracker.com • Sometimes quite quick • Simple listing (default view: 5 entries) • CVE support • Selective coverage (popular products only) • No CVSSv2 scores
  • 13. Sources | Evaluation Rating Introduction ◦ Criteria are those we think are important ◦ We have addressed them as far as possible in our project (because of this prioritization) ◦ Rating is as fair as possible ◦ You might rate a bit differently Description Rating Feature is supported: always/fully 3 Feature is supported: often/partially 2 Feature is supported: sometimes/somehow 1 Feature is never/not supported 0
  • 14. Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Rating VDB  Coverage (howmuch) Quickness (howfast) Listing (howvisible) Search (howsearchable) Handling (howergonomic) TechDetails (howdetailed) RiskRating (howmeasured) CVSS Base CVSS Temporal CVE Feeds (howaccessible) Total CERT VU http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/ 1 3 3 2 2 3 0 3 3 3 3 26 Exploit-DB http://www.exploit-db.com 1 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 3 3 20 IBM X-Force http://xforce.iss.net 3 1 1 1 2 2 0 3 3 3 0 19 NIST NVD http://nvd.nist.gov 2 1 3 3 2 2 0 3 0 3 3 22 MITRE CVE http://cve.mitre.org 2 1 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 3 2 17 OSVDB http://www.osvdb.org 3 3 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 3 0 17 Secunia http://secunia.com/community/advisories/historic/ 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 0 0 3 0 21 SecurityFocus http://www.securityfocus.com/bid 3 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 15 SecurityTracker http://securitytracker.com 1 2 3 2 3 2 0 0 0 3 0 16 scip VulDB (rating ourselves comes with bias) http://www.scip.ch/en/?vuldb 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30  2.1 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.2 0.6 1.4 0.9 3.0 1.4
  • 15. Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Conclusion ◦ Being quick is not easy ◦ Technical details range from bad to good ◦ CVSS scores are pretty unpopular, especially «temporal scores» ◦ CVE has been established as the de facto standard (nice!) ◦ You can’t compare CERT VU, Exploit-DB, NIST NVD and MITRE CVE with anything else ◦ Exploit-DB inherits abstraction from researchers and is not self- consistent ◦ Secunia and SecurityFocus are very similar in many aspects ◦ X-Force and SecurityTracker remain pretty unpopular ◦ The «O» in OSVDB does not stand for «open» anymore ◦ Some features have been broken for ages (e.g. search on OSVDB and X-Force) ◦ Not everyone is a big fan of feeds area41 2014 15
  • 16. Sources | Vendor Advisories: Advantages and Disadvantages Vendor  Pros Cons Adobe http://helpx.adobe.com/security. html • Product-related listing • Some technical details • Priority rating • CVE support • Advisory per release/upgrade • No RSS feed Apple • Simple technical details • CVE support • No risk rating • No CVSSv2 scores • No listing • Advisory per release/upgrade • No RSS feed Cisco https://tools.cisco.com/security/c enter/publicationListing.x • Advisory listing • Advisory per vulnerability • Sometimes additional technical details • CVSSv2 base scores • CVE support • Technical details with login only • Some details for customers only • No RSS feed Google • CVE support • No listing • Advisory per release/upgrade • Technical details with auth only • No risk rating • No CVSSv2 scores • No RSS feed Microsoft http://technet.microsoft.com/sec urity/advisory • Some technical details • Listing (default view: 5 entries) • RSS feed • Patch day collection (2nd Tuesday of each month) • Severity rating • No CVSSv2 scores Oracle http://www.oracle.com/technetwo rk/topics/security/alerts- 086861.html • Simple listing • CVSSv2 base scores • CVE support • Patch day collection (quarterly) • No technical details • No RSS feed
  • 17. Sources | Vendor Advisories: Rating Vendor VulnID (howunique) Frequency (howfast) Listing (howvisible) TechDetails (howdetailed) Risk (howmeasured) CVSS Base CVSS Temporal CVE RSS Total FortiGuard http://www.fortiguard.com/advisory/ 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 21 Symantec http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/list.jsp 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 21 Microsoft http://technet.microsoft.com/security/advisory 3 2 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 20 Checkpoint https://www.checkpoint.com/defense/advisories/public/summary.html 3 2 3 2 3 0 0 3 3 19 Cisco https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x (details auth only) 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 0 18 Oracle http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alerts-086861.html 1 1 3 1 3 3 0 3 3 18 Adobe http://helpx.adobe.com/security.html 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 3 0 16 HP https://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive 3 3 3 1 0 3 0 3 0 16 SAP https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/ (auth only) 3 3 3 2 3 2 0 0 0 16 D-Link http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/ 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 12 Google http://www.google.com (details auth only) 3 3 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 12 Apple http://www.apple.com 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 8  2.66 2.58 2.58 2.08 1.41 1.16 0.0 2.66 1.25
  • 18. Sources | Vendor Advisories: Conclusion ◦ Some vendors have really ugly advisory URLs ◦ Technical details range from bad to good ◦ CVSS scores are pretty unpopular, especially «temporal scores» ◦ Own risk ratings are also unpopular, because they are hard ◦ Nearly everybody likes CVE ◦ Microsoft and Oracle handle things better than it felt ◦ Juniper has a field «Last Updated» but no «Disclosure Date» ◦ SAP is very restrictive with information for non-customers, which introduces a severe disadvantage (VDB’s can’t categorize them, which decreases visibility) ◦ Vendors aren’t big fans of RSS feeds either area41 2014 18
  • 19. Sources | Vuln Contributors: Advantages and Disadvantages Project  Pros Cons iDEFENSE Vulnerability Contributor Program http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/cyber- security/index.xhtml • Started in 2003 • Incomplete listing • No announcement of upcoming advisories • No CVSSv2 support • No search capabilities • No RSS feed • All old links are broken since Zero Day Initiative http://www.zerodayinitiative.com • Provide announcement for upcoming advisories • Provide CVSSv2 Base Scores • RSS feeds available • No search capabilities
  • 20. Sources | Vuln Contributors: Rating Project  Listing (howvisible) Search (howsearchable) Handling (howergonomic) TechDetails (howdetailed) RiskRating (howmeasured) CVSS Base CVSS Temporal CVE RSS Total iDEFENSE Vulnerability Contributor Program http://www.verisigninc.com/en_US/cyber-security/index.xhtml 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 3 0 11 Zero Day Initiative http://www.zerodayinitiative.com 3 0 3 2 0 3 0 3 3 17  3.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 3.0 1.5
  • 21. Sources | Vuln Contributors: Conclusion ◦ Only 2 major players ◦ They are quite similar in most aspects ◦ Zero Day Initiative has 2 advantages of CVSSv2 and RSS support ◦ More competition might increase quality area41 2014 21
  • 22. Interpretation | How to Analyze ◦ The basic approach of processing a source is simple: 1. Check source for new entries 2. Review source entry 3. Add necessary data to database 1. If entry is available → Update existing entry 2. If entry is not available → Create new entry 3. If source is false-positive → Ignore entry and flag for future reference 4. Goto 1 area41 2014 22
  • 23. Interpretation | MITRE CVE as an Example cve description advisory cert vu software
  • 24. Interpretation | MITRE CVE as an Example: What Is missing? ◦ What’s missing on a MITRE CVE entry? ◦ Disclosure date ◦ Exact naming of vulnerability class ◦ Risk rating ◦ Person responsible for disclosure ◦ Detailed mitigation/countermeasure ◦ … area41 2014 24
  • 25. Interpretation | OSVDB as an Example cve sectracker product version description date exploit news
  • 26. Interpretation | Contradicting Conventions (Disclosure Date) 02/19/2014 02/26/2014
  • 27. Interpretation | Contradicting Conventions (Disclosure Date) CVE-2014-2284 net-snmp 5.7.1 on Linux ICMP-MIB Denial of Service 02/19/2014 02/20/2014 02/21/2014 02/22/2014 02/23/2014 02/24/2014 02/25/2014 02/26/2014 02/27/2014 ... 03/24/2014 SourceForge ReleaseNote SecFocus SecTracker VulDB OSVDB Secunia RedHat Our definition of a (public) disclosure date: The earliest known date to disclose an issue to the public in an unrestricted way. (we’re going to adopt a more differentiated approach in the near future) 03/05/2014oss-security ...CVE
  • 28. Interpretation | Put the Different Pieces Together VDB  Product Version VulnClass Disclosure Date Advisory URL Attack Context Exploit Solution VulnDB Sources Misc. Links Total CERT VU http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/ 3 2 3 2 3 3 1 3 0 1 21 Exploit-DB http://www.exploit-db.com 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 17 IBM X-Force http://xforce.iss.net 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 22 NIST NVD http://nvd.nist.gov 2 2 3 0 3 1 1 1 3 3 19 MITRE CVE http://cve.mitre.org 2 2 2 0 3 1 1 1 3 3 18 OSVDB http://www.osvdb.org 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30 Secunia http://secunia.com/community/advisories/historic/ 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 0 0 15 SecurityFocus http://www.securityfocus.com/bid 3 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 0 1 20 SecurityTracker http://securitytracker.com 3 3 3 1 2 3 1 3 0 1 20 scip VulDB http://www.scip.ch/en/?vuldb 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 30  2.7 2.4 2.6 1.9 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.7
  • 29. Sources | Vulnerability Databases: Conclusion ◦ OSVDB provides the best collection of data ◦ Secunia provides the worst collection of data ◦ SecurityFocus and Secunia usually don’t provide context ◦ X-Force, SecurityTracker and Secunia don’t provide exploit details ◦ SecurityTracker and Secunia have confusing disclosure dates ◦ SecurityFocus, SecurityTracker and Secunia don’t link to other VDB area41 2014 29
  • 30. Correlation | That's Why You Have to Correlate ◦ Approach ◦ Merge different sources ◦ Compare similar data points ◦ Identify and verify contradictions ◦ Dangers ◦ Duplicates: Come up with annoying inconsistency ◦ Merges: Come up with dangerous mashups area41 2014 30
  • 31. Correlation | Now Things Are Getting Tricky ◦ Sometimes vulnerabilities can’t be identified individually ◦ CVE helps a lot! But not every vulnerability (immediately) has a CVE number ◦ Some sources merge vulnerabilities into one entry ◦ Vendors do this within their patch release notes or patch days ◦ Secunia tends to compile different vulnerabilities of the same day or patch generation into one entry (e.g. 58519). SecurityFocus does it sometimes (e.g. 67553) and so does SecurityTracker in some cases (e.g. 1030269). ◦ Vulnerabilities with very few technical details often can’t be distinguished from similar vulnerabilities (e.g. Apple HT6145: no info available, but CVE assigned) area41 2014 31
  • 32. Correlation | Keep Track, Detect Collisions ◦ Keep track of your sources and the entries already reviewed ◦ Verify that every new entry is really new and not just a duplicate or a minor fork of an existing entry. This is a very underestimated task! ◦ We do that with collision detection ◦ Compare new values with existing values of other entries (e.g. URLs, IDs, references). If there is a specified level of matches, we have to check for a duplicate. ◦ Our reference maps help to distinguish. Projects like vFeed support this very good. [https://github.com/toolswatch/vFeed/] area41 2014 32
  • 33. Correlation | To Split or Not to Split Parameter → 5 entries File → 4 entries Component → 3 entries Vuln Class → 2 entries Advisory/Patch → 1 entry Advisory #VA42 Cross Site Scripting User Auth login.php login_user login_pass News Portal news.php news_id archive.php news_year SQL Injection Board forum.php post_id area41 2014 33
  • 34. Correlation | Split Example (MS Patch Day, IE Vuls, Feb 2014) VulDB (vuln split) SecFocus* (vuln split) CVE (vuln split) Secunia (combined) Microsoft (combined) MS14-010 SA56796 CVE- 2014-0267 BID 65361 SID 12242 CVE- 2014-0268 BID 65392 SID 12239 … … … CVE- 2014-0293 BID 65394 SID 12241 area41 2014 34 * SecurityFocus often combines (e.g. BID 67553)
  • 35. Correlation | Unwanted Split (cPanel, Dec 2013) ◦ TSR 2013-0011, http://cpanel.net/tsr-2013-0011-full-disclosure/ ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Reseller Login Handler Cookie information disclosure ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Login Security Handler Token information disclosure ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Branding Subsystem privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM usr/local/cpanel/share/counter privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Daily Process Log Screen Stored cross site scripting ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM cPAddons Upgrade Handler Password information disclosure ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Edit DNS Zone Interface information disclosure ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM SSH Authentication Handler privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM X3 Theme countedit.cgi Directory Traversal ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Bandmin passwd privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM cpsrvd Bypass privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Bandmin Reflected cross site scripting ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM API Call Handler UI::dynamicincludelist Directory Traversal ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Database Handler privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Backup Archive Handler privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Config Handler Cross Site Request Forgery ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Translatable Phrase Handler Locale::Maketext privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM CSRF Protection Bypass Cross Site Request Forgery ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM cross site scripting ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Logaholic Session File Handler /tmp privilege escalation ◦ 12/18/2013 cPanel WHM Virtualhost Installation Handler privilege escalation area41 2014 35
  • 36. Correlation | Split Pros and Cons ◦ Advisory / Patch ◦ Few entries ◦ Good for overview ◦ Good for patch management ◦ Vulnerability ◦ Some entries ◦ Possible splits for 3rd party components ◦ Element ◦ A lot of entries ◦ Good for statistical analysis area41 2014 36
  • 37. Quality | How to Provide the Best? ◦ Try to verify statements from researchers, vendors and vulnerability database maintainers ◦ Check for plausibility ◦ Verify from other sources ◦ Re-test within a lab ◦ Eliminate wrong statements ◦ Delete false entries ◦ Preserve false entries (prefered by CVE, SecurityFocus) ◦ Add further explanations ◦ Flag (prefered by OSVDB, scip VulDB) ◦ advisory_disputed=1 (e.g. scipID 13305, 13000, 12643) ◦ advisory_reportconfidence=UR (CVSSv2 temp score metric) ◦ Try to find and compile additional details area41 2014 37
  • 38. Extrapolation | Versions of Affected Software ◦ Exact Version ◦ Internet Explorer 10 → X-Force, OSVDB, SecFocus, Secunia, VulDB ◦ Wildcards ◦ Internet Explorer 6.x → Secunia, SecFocus, SecTracker, VulDB ◦ Ranges ◦ Internet Explorer 8 – 10 → Secunia, CVE ◦ Internet Explorer prior 10 → SecurityTracker, Secunia ◦ Internet Explorer before 10 → CVE ◦ Internet Explorer up to 10 → VulDB ◦ Internet Explorer 8 and later → SecurityTracker area41 2014 3810 119876 10 up to 10 8 to 10 Internet Explorer Versions before 10 …
  • 39. Extrapolation | What about The Unknown? ◦ Try to guess. Examples: ◦ «IE prior 9» → 6 – 9 ◦ «IE prior 11» → 7 – 10 ◦ Research and validate yourself ◦ A lot of work ◦ We combine with other projects (research or pentest) ◦ We enforce very important or interesting vulnerabilities ◦ Be quiet area41 2014 39
  • 40. Delivery | Chose your Channels ◦ Web Site ◦ Mail ◦ RSS ◦ Widgets ◦ Facebook ◦ Twitter ◦ LinkedIn ◦ App ◦ … area41 2014 40
  • 41. Statistics | Comparing Apples and Oranges ◦ Doing some statistics is easy. Doing it the right way is hard. Some say it is even impossible. [http://blog.osvdb.org/category/vulnerability-statistics/] ◦ Counting vulnerabilities doesn’t say anything: ◦ Weak code leads to a lot of vulnerabilities ◦ Complexity leads to a lot of vulnerabilities ◦ Popularity leads to a lot of vulnerabilities ◦ Bug bounty programs lead to a lot of vulnerabilities ◦ Open disclosure process leads to a lot of vulnerabilities ◦ We still provide statistical raw data and expect the viewers to think about it area41 2014 41
  • 42. Statistics | Timelines Are Interesting ◦ Our timelines consist of multiple data points ◦ vulnerability_introduction_date ◦ vulnerability_discovery_date ◦ vulnerability_vendorinform_date ◦ advisory_date ◦ advisory_confirm_date ◦ exploit_date ◦ countermeasure_date ◦ source_cve_assigned ◦ source_secunia_date ◦ source_nessus_date ◦ entry_timestamp_create ◦ entry_timestamp_update Example Heartbleed [CVE-2014-0160] area41 2014 42
  • 43. Statistics | Timelines Trivia (excerpt from 2014) ◦ [CVE-2014-0160] OpenSSL TLS/DTLS Heartbeat information disclosure got introduced in 01/01/2012 and fixed in 04/07/2014 ◦ existed 827 days ◦ [CVE-2014-0179] libvirt XML Entity Expansion Handler denial of service got introduced in 12/23/2009 and fixed in 05/06/2014 ◦ existed 1.595 days ◦ [CVE-2014-3122] Linux Kernel try_to_unmap_cluster() denial of service got introduced in 10/19/2008 and fixed in 04/10/2014 ◦ existed 1.996 days ◦ [CVE-2014-3460] Novell NetIQ Sentinel Agent Manager directory traversal vendor got informed in 09/04/2013 but did not respond until 05/19/2014 ◦ Novell ignored grace period of 257 days area41 2014 43
  • 44. Accessibility | Choose Additional Representation ◦ To allow users to work with your data, it might be the best way to provide additional forms of representation: ◦ SQL ◦ XML ◦ JSON ◦ CSV ◦ CVRF [http://www.icasi.org/cvrf] area41 2014 44
  • 45. Connectivity | Use Data for Vuln Scanning ◦ We are able to construct specific requests with our fields software_argument and software_input_value to create test cases and exploits (very simple for web-based vulns) ◦ Because of the fields software_* we are able to provide CPE lists [http://cpe.mitre.org/], which can be matched with tools like Nmap. Random examples: ◦ ID 12313 → cpe:/a:sap:netweaver:7.30 ◦ ID 12802 → cpe:/o:cisco:ios:15.4(1.1)t ◦ ID 13306 → cpe:/a:microsoft:internet_explorer:8 area41 2014 45
  • 46. Outro | Summary ◦ Vulnerability databases help to manage vulnerabilities ◦ Different sources allow to collect a broad amount of issues ◦ Every source has some advantages and disadvantages ◦ Compiling and maintaining vulnerabilities takes a lot of effort ◦ Making your data accessible helps others area41 2014 46
  • 47. Outro | Thank You ◦ I‘d like to thank a bunch of people which helped to discuss the many interesting aspects of vulnerability database management: ◦ Stefan Friedli, scip AG ◦ Steven M. Christey, MITRE area41 2014 47
  • 49. Security Is Our Business! scip AG Jakob-Fügli-Strasse 18 CH-8048 Zürich Tel +41 44 404 13 13 Fax +41 44 404 13 14 Mail info@scip.ch Web http://www.scip.ch Twitter http://twitter.com/scipag  Strategy | Consulting  Auditing | Testing  Forensics | Analysis area41 2014 49