2. WHY INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION?
"In the transnational environment, international arbitration is the
only game. It is a de facto monopoly. … So the reason I insist that
international arbitration is not arbitration is that we can live without
arbitration. Countries A, B, and C may take different views –
encourage, discourage, or even outlaw arbitration – but if
international arbitration goes, international economic exchange will
suffer immensely."
~Jan Paulsson, "International Arbitration is not Arbitration,"
Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2008:2
3. Why International
Arbitration?
• A tale of 2 horror stories
• The Chevron and Dole cases
4. Chevron's Ecuadorian
Environmental Contamination Case
• Chevron purchases Texaco in 2001 (including
Ecuadorian affiliate Texpet)
• Texpet accused of causing environmental damage to
rain forest (1966-1992)
• Texpet and Ecuador reached a 1995 settlement
(assumption of responsibility by Petroecuador)
• Texpet sued in NY federal court 1993
• Case dismissed case in 1996: forum non conviniens
• Plaintiffs in 2003 re-filed in Ecuador and Chevron
now faces a $27 Billion adverse judgment
• Chevron filed an arbitration against Ecuador in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration alleging denial of
justice claim
5. Osorio v. Dole Food Company
• Oct. 20, 2009 S. Dist. Fla. Federal court
refused to enforce a $97 million dollar
award against Dole ($647K per person)
• 150 Nicaraguans sued for having been
exposed to a pesticide (DBCP) b/w
1970-1982
• Nicaraguan court awarded judgment based
on "Special Law 364" enacted in 2000 to
handle the DBCP
• Plaintiffs sought enforcement in Florida
• Court ruled: "the judgment in this case did
not arise out of proceedings that comported
with the international concept of due
process."
6. Use Of International
Arbitration
Disadvantages Not comfortable with
foreign law, courts and
to lack of understanding of
foreign procedure
international
Difficulty in recognizing
litigation judicial awards
Perception that foreign
courts may be corrupt
Not wanting to deal with
foreign language
Lack of confidentiality
Too much time
Too expensive
7. Use Of International
Arbitration
• Perceptions of international
arbitration*
International arbitration is the
preferred mechanism of dispute
resolution for cross border disputes
International arbitration is effective
Enforcement procedures work
* International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and
practice, Study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the School
of International Arbitration, Queen Mary, University of
London, 2006 and 2008
8. Use of International
Arbitration
73% of in-house counsel prefer
arbitration to resolve cross-border disputes
* International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practice, Study by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the School of International Arbitration, Queen
Mary, University of London, 2006 and 2008
9. Use Of International
Arbitration
• 73% of in-house prefer arbitration to
resolve cross-border disputes*
95% of in-house counsel insert some type of
dispute resolution clause to resolve cross border
disputes
62% insist on arbitral clauses
48% use standard arbitration clauses and 43%
tailor the clause to the individual contract
88% satisfied with international arbitration
* International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practice, Study
by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the School of International
Arbitration, Queen Mary, University of London, 2006 and 2008
10. Use Of International
Arbitration
Ease of enforcement
of arbitral awards
Advantages to
(New York Convention) international
Neutrality of arbitral arbitration
tribunals
Flexibility
Depth of expertise
of arbitrators
Privacy and
confidentiality
Finality
11. Use Of International
Arbitration
• Perceived disadvantages to international
arbitration
Cost
Length of time of proceedings
Possibility of intervention by national courts into
the arbitral process
Inability to compel third parties to join arbitral
proceeding
12. Use Of International
Arbitration
• Success of international arbitration*
25% of cases resolved prior to final hearing; plus
7% resolved by settlement and consent decree
49% of cases resolved with voluntary compliance
of arbitral award (76% of arbitral proceedings,
non-prevailing party voluntarily complied with
award)
11% of cases result in recognition and enforcement
proceeding
8% resolved by settlement followed by litigation
* International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practice, Study by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the School of International Arbitration,
Queen Mary, University of London, 2008
13. Use of International
Arbitration
• Statistics show increase use of
international arbitration*
In 1992 there were 809 more US alienage
contract cases than international arbitrations
In 2005, this was reversed: 1,749 more
international arbitrations than US alienage
contract cases
*Christopher A. Whytock, "The Arbitration-Litigation relationship in Transnational
Dispute Resolution: Empirical Insights from the US Federal Courts," in World
Arbitration & Mediation Review (Vol. 2, No. 5) (2008)
14. Use Of International
Arbitration
US alienage contract cases
vs.
international arbitrations
15. Use Of International
Arbitration
ICC Cases
• Case load doubled from 1992 (337 cases)
to 2008 (663 cases)
18. Historical Policy
Toward Arbitration
• Calvo Doctrine Summarized
–National law governs the rights of
foreign investors.
–A host state for foreign investors is not
required to confer any international
standard of treatment.
–Foreign investors should seek relief
through local courts alone (i.e., not
through diplomatic protection).
19. Historical Policy
Toward Arbitration
• Calvo Doctrine Restated
“The foreign investor [under ICSID], by virtue of the fact that
he is a foreigner, [is given] the right to sue a sovereign state
outside its national territory, dispensing with the courts of
law. This provision is contrary to the accepted principles of
our countries [in Latin America] and, de facto, would confer a
privilege on the foreign investor, placing the nationals of the
country concerned in a position of inferiority.”
~ Chilean Governor to the World Bank, Tokyo, 1964
20. Evolution of Latin American
Arbitration
1930 1960s-1970s
Late 1800s Global Protectionism 1975-2000
Calvo Doctrine Economic Demise of
Crisis Calvo
Doctrine 1990s
Free Market
Policies/BITs
1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
2010
Return of
1958
1976 Calvo?
New York
Convention Panama
Convention
31. ICSID Cases Against
Latin American States
Increase in ICSID Cases Against Latin American States
TOTAL CASES FILED EACH YEAR (EXCLUDING THE CARIBBEAN)
35 31
30 27 27
25
19
20
14
15
11 10 12
10 21
15
5
5 7
10
5 4 4 5
2
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Partial)
Total ICSID Cases
ICSID Latin American Parties
32. ICSID Cases Against Latin
American States
% of ICSID/ICSID(AF) Cases Against Latin American States
19%
58%
39%
42% 61%
81%
58% 19% 39%
PENDING CASES CONCLUDED CASES ALL CASES
TOTAL 103 101 204
LATIN
AMERICAN 60 20 80
STATES
33. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
ARBITRATION LAW
Argentina 1967, ‘81
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1989
PANAMA 1994
CONVENTION
ICSID CONVENTION 1994
BITs 55 IN FORCE
FTAs/MITs MERCOSUR 0
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 12
2004 30
2008 17
ICSID CASES PENDING 36
CONCLUDED 6
34. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Bolivia
ARBITRATION LAW 1997
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1995
PANAMA CONVENTION 1998
ICSID CONVENTION 1995 (07)
BITs 20 IN FORCE
FTAs/MITs ANDEAN COMMUNITY 1
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 2
2004 1
2008 0
ICSID CASES PENDING 2
CONCLUDED 0
35. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Brazil
ARBITRATION LAW 1996
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 2002
PANAMA CONVENTION 1995
ICSID CONVENTION NO
BITs 0 IN FORCE
FTAs/MITs MERCOSUR 0
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 10
2004 30
2008 49
ICSID CASES PENDING 0
CONCLUDED 0
36. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Chile
ARBITRATION LAW 2004
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1975
PANAMA CONVENTION 1976
ICSID CONVENTION 1991
BITs 39 IN
FORCE
FTAs/MITs US-CHILE FTA, CH-EU, CH- 11
EFTA
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 5
2004 8
2008 5
ICSID CASES PENDING 3
CONCLUDED 0
37. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Colombia
ARBITRATION LAW 1989, ’96,
’98
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1979
PANAMA CONVENTION 1986
ICSID CONVENTION 1997
BITs 2 IN FORCE
MITs ANDEAN COMMUNITY, GROUP OF 3 1
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 3
2004 8
2008 2
ICSID CASES PENDING 0
CONCLUDED 0
38. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Ecuador
ARBITRATION LAW 1997
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1962
PANAMA CONVENTION 1991
ICSID CONVENTION 1986 (09)
BITs 17 IN
FORCE
FTAs/MITs ANDEAN COMMUNITY 0
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 4
2004 0
2008 2
ICSID CASES PENDING 5
CONCLUDED 1
39. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Perú
ARBITRATION LAW ADOPTED 1996
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1988
PANAMA CONVENTION 1989
ICSID CONVENTION 1993
BITs 30 IN
FORCE
FTAs/MITs US-PERU FTA, ANDEAN COMMUNITY 2
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 2
2004 2
2008 2
ICSID CASES PENDING 2
CONCLUDED 1
40. Survey of Arbitration in Latin
America
Venezuela
ARBITRATION LAW ADOPTED 1998
TREATIES NY CONVENTION 1995
PANAMA CONVENTION 1985
ICSID CONVENTION 1995
BITs 23 IN
FORCE
FTAs/MITs ANDEAN COM. (w/drew),
GROUP OF 3, MERCOSUR 0
ICC CASES PER YEAR 2000 9
2004 3
2008 2
ICSID CASES PENDING 3
CONCLUDED 3
41. Luis M. O’Naghten
Shareholder, Akerman Senterfitt
Miami Global Practice Group
Practice Area: International complex commercial litigation and
arbitration before United States courts and international arbitration
panels (under ICC, AAA/ICDR, and UNCITRAL rules); handles a wide
range of disputes in several countries in Latin America and Spain;
focus on international financial frauds, energy disputes, corporate
disputes; fluent in Spanish; 20+ years in field
Clients: Foreign sovereigns; parties adverse to foreign sovereigns;
major international banks; US based and foreign multinational
corporations; US energy companies
Professional affiliations: ICC Commission on Arbitration; ICC
Task Force on Revision of Rules; USCIB Arbitration Florida Sub-
Committee
Education: Georgetown University; Columbia Law School
Contact: luis.onaghten@akerman.com or at 305.982.5687
Notas del editor
Sin dar una lección en historia, mencionare’ bravamente varios de estos elementos influyentes. La reputación de Latinoamérica como “contra arbitraje” esta basada en gran parte en La Doctrina Calvo, emanada por el Jurista Argentino - Carlos Calvo. Un doctrino de derecho publico internacional, Desarrollada en respuesta a inquietudes de soberanía y imperialismo Principio en tanto se relaciona a arbitraje internacional: 1. Los extranjeros no pueden reclamar o disfrutar de derechos, trato o protecciones superiores a los nacionales 2. Limitaba resoluci ón de disputas a las leyes y jurisdicción del Estado anfitri ón CLICK Brincando a los 1930s, una crisis global económica, impacto en el comercio internacional severamente, Resultando en Póliticas económicas proteccionistas Y Aislacionismo político y económico No sorprendentemente, fue un tiempo de poca inversión extranjera CLICK La panorámica internacional política cambio en los 40s y 50s notablemente, las naciones unidas se formo – y de ahí salieron varios esfuerzos “internacionales” políticos y económicos. Reconociendo las fuerzas de comercio internacional, se formo la Convención de Nueva York en 1958, a la cual ____ países latinoamericanos participo dentro de 3 anos 1970s: Proteccionismo Proteccionismo económico – La teoría del tiempo era sustituir la dependencia en las importaciones con industrias nacionales [STATE SUBSIDIZED INDUSRIES?] inversión extranjera comparativamente baja 1976: Características esenciales de la Convención de Panamá Acuerdo regional Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) Moldeado en base a la Convención de Nueva York sobre ejecuci ón de laudos arbítrales Ante la falta de selección por las partes, se aplican las Reglas de la Comisión Interamericana de Arbitraje Comercial (CIAC - basadas en UNCITRAL/CNUDMI) 1970s y 80s: Abandono de la doctrina Calvo Debilidad relativa económica y política Oposición estadounidense a la doctrina Calvo; interés en zonas de libre comercio en las Américas 1990s: Teorías económicas neo-liberales Aceleración de la globalización Acuerdos bilaterales de inversión Lla en Incorporación de México al NAFTA, aumento de acuerdos multilaterales de inversión, acuerdos bilaterales de inversión --- > LOS NÚMEROS HABLAN POR ELLOS MISMOS