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Hungary7 june
1. Hungary: Beyond the headlines
7 June client call
Kasper Bartholdy kasper.bartholdy@credit-suisse.com
Gergely Hudecz gergely.hudecz@credit-suisse.com
ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE IN THE DISCLOSURE APPENDIX. FOR OTHER
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, visit www.credit-suisse.com/ researchdisclosures or call
+1 (877) 291-2683. U.S. Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with
companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm
may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should
consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. Customers of
Credit Suisse in the United States can receive independent, third party research on the company
or companies covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such research is available.
Customers can access this independent research at www.credit-suisse.com/ir or call 1 877 291
2683 or email equity.research@credit-suisse.com to request a copy of this research.
7 June 2010
Produced by:
Date: 07/06/2010 Slide 1
2. Selected governments’ funding requirement and debt
25
Greece
Govt funding needs* (10F, % GDP)
Portugal
Turkey
20
Spain
Hungary
Poland More
15
Romania vulnerable
Czech Rep Brazil Egypt Israel
10 India
Less Ukraine Malaysia
vulnerable Mexico Philippines
Korea Colombia
South Africa
5 Russia China Thailand
Chile Indonesia Argentina
Peru Taiw an
Consolidated gross govt debt (10F, %GDP)
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Source: Credit Suisse and the quoted nations’ finance ministries
Slide 2
3. Hungary: Remarkable adjustment
General government budget deficit General government gross debt
% of GDP % of GDP
10 95
Optimistic
9 90
Baseline
8
7 85 Pessimistic
6 80
5
4 75
3 70
Actual, according to Eurostat ESA95
2
1 65
Target set by the previous government, EU, IMF
0 60
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E 2010F 2011F
Source: Eurostat, Credit Suisse Source: Eurostat, Credit Suisse
Slide 3
4. IMF lending to Hungary
Exhibit 4: IMF lending to Hungary
Size of the loan tranche Availability of the loan
Date Phase (in EUR at the time of approval) tranche Status of the loan tranche
November 2008 Approval of the stand-by €4.9bn Available immediately Drawn by the Hungarian
arrangement at the time authorities
March 2009 First review (completed) €2.4bn Available at the completion of Drawn by the Hungarian
the review authorities
June 2009 Second review (completed) €1.4bn Available at the completion of Drawn by the Hungarian
the review authorities
September 2009 Third review (completed) €54mn Available at the completion of Drawn by the Hungarian
the review authorities
December 2009 Fourth review (completed) €0.8bn Available at the completion of Not drawn
the review
March 2010 Fifth review (completed) €0.8bn Available at the completion of Not drawn
the review
Source: IMF, Credit Suisse
Slide 4
8. To watch:
Action plan expected on Tuesday (8 June)
Comments from the IMF / timing of the review
Comments from the EU / ECOFIN meeting
Slide 8
9. EMEA equities outlook
Hungary: Beyond the headlines 7 June client call
Alexander Redman
alex.redman@credit-suisse.com
ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE IN THE DISCLOSURE APPENDIX. FOR OTHER
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, visit www.credit-suisse.com/ researchdisclosures or call
+1 (877) 291-2683. U.S. Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with
companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm
may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should
consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. Customers of
Credit Suisse in the United States can receive independent, third party research on the company
or companies covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such research is available.
Customers can access this independent research at www.credit-suisse.com/ir or call 1 877 291
2683 or email equity.research@credit-suisse.com to request a copy of this research.
7 June 2010
Produced by:
Date: 07/06/2010 Slide 9
10. Hungary / 1
Market is implying a 30% chance of Hungarian sovereign default.
In our view this is too high and represents a market overreaction.
Implied default rates on 5-year CDS spreads
EMEA country 5-year CDS spreads
(assuming recovery rate of 40%)
450 90%
Default rate
400 80%
350 70%
300 Hungary 60%
250 50%
200 Turkey 40%
Russia
S Africa 30%
150 Poland
Israel
Czech 20%
100
10%
50 5YR CDS spread (bps)
Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr Jun 0%
09 09 09 09 10 10 10 0 250 500 750 1,000 1,250 1,500 1,750 2,000
Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL™ service, Credit Suisse research
Slide 10
11. Hungary / 2
However, within emerging markets the sovereigns which appear most vulnerable to contagion (as proxied by
Credit Suisse estimates of 2010 government funding requirements and the total stock of sovereign debt) are
indeed EEMEA regional plays: Hungary, Poland and Turkey.
We are 20% underweight Hungary in an EMEA equities portfolio (year to date the market has underperformed
MSCI EMEA by 17% in US$ terms). But the risk from further regional contagion remains.
Government funding requirements* versus government debt (10F, %GDP)
25
Greece
Govt funding needs* (10F, % GDP)
Portugal
Turkey
20
Spain
Hungary
Poland More
15
Romania vulnerable
Czech Rep Brazil Egypt Israel
10 India
Less Ukraine Malaysia
vulnerable Mexico Philippines
Korea Colombia
South Africa
5 Russia China Thailand
Chile Indonesia Argentina
Peru Taiw an
Consolidated gross govt debt (10F, %GDP)
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
*Note: Fiscal deficit + debt amortization Source: Credit Suisse Economics Team estimates
Slide 11
12. Hungary / 3
Hungary’s sovereign vulnerability is compounded by (i) the relatively short average time to maturity of its
government debt—just 4.4 years relative to Greece at 8.6 years, Spain 8.0 years and Portugal at 7.8 years, and
(ii) a large proportion (59% of the total or 49% of GDP) of sovereign debt is FX denominated (in Poland 35% of
sovereign debt is FX denominated or a much lower 18.5% of GDP).
However, in Hungary’s favour is that immediate sovereign FX refinancing needs are not that demanding.
Hungary must refinance (or repay) 11.2bn Euros over the next twelve months (or 11.1% of GDP) of which
government debt accounts for just 2.6bn Euros (2.5% of GDP).
Maturity breakdown of Hungary's medium and long-term
Sovereign debt weighted average time to maturity
external debt by sectors (Euros, millions)
16000 16
14000 14
Other private sector
12000 Banks 12
Government 10
10000
8
8000
6
6000
4
4000
2
2000
0
0
Ire m
er a l
Ja d
un nd
Po a
G ly
n
Be ny
Fr da
C UK
Po n
S
e
ry
ce
n
n
pa
ai
ec
G tug
U
Ita
iu
ga
la
a
la
hi
a
an
Sp
lg
an
m
re
C
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
r
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
H
Source: National Bank of Hungary, the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL™ service, FTSE, Credit Suisse research
Slide 12
13. Hungary / 4
Looking purely at external vulnerability it is once again the EEMEA countries which appear the most vulnerable
to any contagion from Greece within the emerging markets universe as proxied by the size of their current
account deficits, stock of FX denominated debt and pool of FX reserves. South Africa, Turkey, Romania and
Poland appear the most exposed. Hungary’s FX reserves are swelled by circa US$5bn of IMF/EU funds.
Bringing relative sovereign and external vulnerability together into a simple scoring process reveals Turkey,
Poland, Hungary and Romania to be the most exposed to Greek contagion, while China, Taiwan, Russia and
Thailand appear as the most isolated (see next slide).
C/A balance versus FX reserves versus FX debt* (2010F, % GDP, axes inverted)
Current account balance (10F, %GDP)
-6 More RomaniaS Africa
vulnerable Turkey
-4
India Poland
Hungary Brazil
-2 Czech Rep Colombia
Peru
Egypt Mexico
0 Indonesia
Korea Ukraine
2 Israel Chile
Thailand Argentina
4 Philippines
China
6 Russia
8 Taiw an
10
12
Less
14 vulnerable Malaysia
Gross non-gold FX reserves (10F, %GDP)
16
95 85 75 65 55 45 35 25 15 5
*Note: Bubble area is proportional to FX debt to GDP Source: Credit Suisse Economics Team estimates
Slide 13
14. Hungary / 5
Emerging market country risk ranking table (sorted by descending order of vulnerability)
Government funding Consolidated gross Central bank gross non- Current account Total foreign
needs* government debt gold FX reserves balance debt
Country 2010F (% GDP) 2010F (% GDP) 2010F (% GDP) 2010F (% GDP) 2010F (% GDP) Rank^
Turkey 20.9 47.6 10 -4.2 40.8 1
Poland 15.8 53.5 16.6 -2.3 55.7 2
Hungary 18.3 83.3 39.3 -0.5 133.9 3
Romania 13.7 34.3 24.2 -4.8 73.5 4
Brazil 11.3 60.6 13.6 -2.7 12.8 5
India 10.5 74.7 19.2 -3.3 16.2 6
Egypt 11 76.1 15.6 -1.2 14.5 7
Israel 11.2 77.6 28.7 1.9 36.9 8
Czech Republic 10.7 38.7 24.2 -0.8 44.3 9
Mexico 8.8 41.3 11.1 -1.2 16 10
Ukraine 8.5 36.3 21.2 -0.1 75.6 11
Colombia 8 44.7 11.1 -1.7 19.9 12
South Africa 6.5 35.5 11.6 -4.8 23.2 13
Argentina 3.8 54.6 15.1 2.8 40.2 14
Philippines 8.6 57.8 24.2 3.3 32.4 15
Chile 3.7 6.4 14.7 0.7 41.8 16
Korea 7.7 39.3 31.2 2.1 40.9 17
Indonesia 3.5 29.1 11.1 0.7 23.8 18
Malaysia 8.8 55 46.5 15.2 32.2 19
Peru 1.9 25.3 27.4 -0.4 25.7 20
Thailand 4.1 45.6 48.5 4.2 22.4 21
Russia 4.7 8.8 34.4 6.4 33 22
Taiwan 2.2 48 90.4 8 24 23
China 4.2 19.1 48 4.9 7.5 24
Source: Credit Suisse Economics Team estimates
* Fiscal deficit + debt amortisation ^ Ranked by the sum of the equally weighted ordinal rankings (most to least vulnerable) for the five metrics
Slide 14
15. Hungary / 6
On the latest published BIS data the total foreign claims on Hungary (total international consolidated cross-
border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies + local currency positions of reporting
banks' foreign offices with local residents) amount to US$149.8bn versus the Credit Suisse estimate of 2010E
GDP for Hungary of US$136.1bn (i.e. 110%).
US$136.5bn is with European banks (Austria US$37.2bn, Germany US$30.8bn and Italy US$25.2bn are the
principal creditors) and US$3.9bn with US banks. The portion which is forint positions of reporting banks'
foreign offices with local residents is US$46.7bn.
Total foreign claims on Hungary (BIS classification, US$bn)
Austria, 37.2
Others, 52.7
Germany, 30.8
US, 3.9
Italy, 25.2
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Credit Suisse research
Slide 15
16. Hungary / 7
A reminder that 63% of household credit and 56% of corporate credit in Hungary is FX denominated.
EMEA household FX credit % of total EMEA corporate FX credit % of total
80% 80%
70% Hungary 70%
Hungary
60% 60% Kazakh.
50% 50%
Poland
Turkey
40% Kazakh. 40%
Egypt
30% 30% Russia
Poland
20% 20%
Russia Czech
10% 10%
Egypt
0% Czech 0%
Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
Turkey
98 00 02 04 06 08 10 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Source: Central bank data, Credit Suisse research
Slide 16
17. Hungary / 8
Hungary appears somewhat cheap but not at distressed valuation levels.
The equity risk premium has ticked up to 9.7% over UST from the decade average of 7.4%.
Sector-adjusted 12m forward consensus PER for Hungary at 8.6 times versus the 14-year historical average of
9.3 times does not appear at distressed valuation levels to us. Relative to GEM Hungary is trading at a 19%
discount on forward sector-adjusted PER versus the long-run average of a 17% discount.
MSCI Hungary absolute +12 I/B/E/S consensus PER
MSCI Hungary equity risk premium over US10Y treasuries
(sector adjusted and unadjusted)
13% 18
12% 16
MSCI Hungary equity risk
11% premium over US 10Y treasuries
14
10%
12
9%
10
8%
8
7%
6% 6
5% 4
Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
4%
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan I/B/E/S MSCI Hungary +12m sector adjusted PER (x)
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 I/B/E/S MSCI Hungary +12m PER (x)
Source: MSCI, I/B/E/S, Credit Suisse research
Slide 17
22. Fixed Income Research Disclosure Appendix
Analyst Certification
Gergely Hudecz and Kasper Bartholdy each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that he or she analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her
compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.
Important Disclosures
Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail, please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: http://www.csfb.com/research-and-
analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html
Credit Suisse’s policy is to publish research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject issuer, the sector or the market that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein.
The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this research report received compensation that is based upon various factors, including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's Investment Banking and Fixed Income Divisions.
Credit Suisse may trade as principal in the securities or derivatives of the issuers that are the subject of this report.
At any point in time, Credit Suisse is likely to have significant holdings in the securities mentioned in this report.
As at the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the debt securities of the subject issuer(s) mentioned in this report.
For important disclosure information on securities recommended in this report, please visit the website at https://firesearchdisclosure.credit-suisse.com or call +1-212-538-7625.
For the history of any relative value trade ideas suggested by the Fixed Income research department as well as fundamental recommendations provided by the Emerging Markets Sovereign Strategy Group over the previous 12 months, please view the document at http://research-and-
analytics.csfb.com/docpopup.asp?ctbdocid=330703_1_en. Credit Suisse clients with access to the Locus website may refer to http://www.credit-suisse.com/locus.
For the history of recommendations provided by Technical Analysis, please visit the website at http://www.credit-suisse.com/techanalysis.
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Emerging Markets Bond Recommendation Definitions
Buy: Indicates a recommended buy on our expectation that the issue will deliver a return higher than the risk-free rate.
Sell: Indicates a recommended sell on our expectation that the issue will deliver a return lower than the risk-free rate.
Corporate Bond Fundamental Recommendation Definitions
Buy: Indicates a recommended buy on our expectation that the issue will be a top performer in its sector.
Outperform: Indicates an above-average total return performer within its sector. Bonds in this category have stable or improving credit profiles and are undervalued, or they may be weaker credits that, we believe, are cheap relative to the sector and are expected to outperform on a total-return
basis. These bonds may possess price risk in a volatile environment.
Market Perform: Indicates a bond that is expected to return average performance in its sector.
Underperform: Indicates a below-average total-return performer within its sector. Bonds in this category have weak or worsening credit trends, or they may be stable credits that, we believe, are overvalued or rich relative to the sector.
Sell: Indicates a recommended sell on the expectation that the issue will be among the poor performers in its sector.
Restricted: In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other
circumstances.
Not Rated: Credit Suisse Global Credit Research or Global Leveraged Finance Research covers the issuer but currently does not offer an investment view on the subject issue.
Not Covered: Neither Credit Suisse Global Credit Research nor Global Leveraged Finance Research covers the issuer or offers an investment view on the issuer or any securities related to it. Any communication from Research on securities or companies that Credit Suisse does not cover is
factual or a reasonable, non-material deduction based on an analysis of publicly available information.
Corporate Bond Risk Category Definitions
In addition to the recommendation, each issue may have a risk category indicating that it is an appropriate holding for an "average" high yield investor, designated as Market, or that it has a higher or lower risk profile, designated as Speculative and Conservative, respectively.
Credit Suisse Credit Rating Definitions
Credit Suisse may assign rating opinions to investment-grade and crossover issuers. Ratings are based on our assessment of a company's creditworthiness and are not recommendations to buy or sell a security. The ratings scale (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B) is dependent on our assessment of an
issuer's ability to meet its financial commitments in a timely manner. Within each category, creditworthiness is further detailed with a scale of High, Mid, or Low – with High being the strongest sub-category rating: High AAA, Mid AAA, Low AAA – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments
is extremely strong; High AA, Mid AA, Low AA – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is very strong; High A, Mid A, Low A – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is strong; High BBB, Mid BBB, Low BBB – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is
adequate, but adverse economic/operating/financial circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to meet its obligations; High BB, Mid BB, Low BB – obligations have speculative characteristics and are subject to substantial credit risk; High B, Mid B, Low B – obligor's capacity to
meet financial commitments is very weak and highly vulnerable to adverse economic, operating, and financial circumstances; High CCC, Mid CCC, Low CCC – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is extremely weak and is dependent on favorable economic, operating, and financial
circumstances. Credit Suisse's rating opinions do not necessarily correlate with those of the rating agencies.
Credit Suisse’s Distribution of Global Credit Research Recommendations* (and Banking Clients)
Global Recommendation Distribution**
Buy 2% (of which 100% are banking clients)
Outperform 31% (of which 87% are banking clients)
Market Perform 47% (of which 94% are banking clients)
Underperform 20% (of which 95% are banking clients)
Sell <1% (of which 89% are banking clients)
*Data are as at the end of the previous calendar quarter.
**Percentages do not include securities on the firm’s Restricted List and might not total 100% as a result of rounding.
Slide 22