1. Economic Management during Political
Transition: Five Lessons for Malaysia
变天之际的经济管理
-- 大马可师法世界的五大原则
Woo Wing Thye 胡永泰
Penang Institute, George Town 乔治市槟城研究院
University of California, Davis 加利福尼亚大学达维斯校园
Fudan University, Shanghai 上海复旦大学
wtwoo@penanginstitute.org
April 23, 2013

2. Getting the Analogy Right:
A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (1/4)
找到正确的类比：一个病人投诉身体倦怠 （一）
• Outcome 1: Patient leaves clinic, laughing, clapping and dancing.
He came in slightly depressed but left in high spirits.
医生让他在离开诊所时欢笑甚至手舞足蹈。他入诊时的抑郁
疲态在离开时都已消失不见。这为之结果一。
• Outcome 2: Patient is put under heavy sedation, put on a
stretcher, rushed to the operating room of the General Hospital,
and confined to intensive-care unit (ICU) for a week before being
discharged in wheel chair. He had walked into the clinic but was
carried out.
医生让病人实行麻醉，推入手术室，然后安置 在加护病房内。
一周后，病人坐在轮椅上出院。基本上，他走着进来，然后
被抬着出去。这为之结果二。

3. Question: Is the clinic’s doctor
competent if it is Outcome 1 but
incompetent if it is Outcome 2?
你们会不会觉得：
结果一的医生是良医，
而结果二的则是庸医呢？

4. Getting the Analogy Right:
A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (2/4)
找到正确的类比：一个病人投诉身体倦怠 (二）
• Question was stupid question. Not enough information to
decide competence, we need to know:
– What’s long-run consequence in each Outcome?
– What’s the ailment of the patient?
其实这是个愚蠢的问题。 判断医生好坏的因素又岂
止于这两个结果。我们还得知道：
- 长期下来，这结果会演变成如何？
- 其实病人的病根到底是什么？

5. Getting the Analogy Right:
A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (3/4)
找到正确的类比：一个病人投诉身体倦怠 (三)
Long-run consequence for
Outcome 1: patient died after 2 hours. Doctor treated symptoms
(and not root cause) by giving large dosage of adrenaline-LSD
mixture, which exacerbated heart condition and caused death
Outcome 2: patient lived to see college graduation of
granddaughter because doctor had recognised a blocked artery
万一两个结果的未来是
- 结果一的病人两小时后就逝世。原因是医生治标而不治本，
直接给病人大量的肾上腺素和LSD（一种精神病药）， 加
剧了病人的心脏负担，导致他死亡。
- 而结果二的病人可以活至参加他孙女的大学毕业礼，因为
医生发现并解除了他的心脏血管阻塞。

6. Getting the Analogy Right:
A Patient Complains of General Fatigue (4/4)
找到正确的类比：一个病人投诉身体倦怠 (四)
My message: Higher growth of GDP in 2012:4Q is
Outcome 1 because it is not sustainable.
这提醒我们 2012 第四季的国内生产总值的高成长
率就如结果一，因为它是不能持久的。

7. 3 Questions I Want to Discuss Today…
今天主要回答的三大问题:
1. Is the Malaysian Economy
Sick? 大马的经济是否生病了？
2. What is Making the Malaysian
Economy Sick?那它生什么病？
3. What is the international
experience in curing the type
of economic sickness that
Malaysia is suffering from?
What general principles to
guide reform? 其他国家是用什
么药物来治这种病的？下药有什
么原则可以依据呢?

8. We Cannot Blame the Global Financial Crisis for Present
Economic Stagnation我国经济停滞不是世界经济危机的错
COUNTRY’S INCOME AS % OF US INCOME (Income in GDP per capita in PPP$,
data from Angus Maddison)国家收入作为美国收入的百分比 (人均国内生
产总值（以购买力平价计算）
1963 1996 2007
12.6% 55.7% 66.8%
10.7% 49.9% 61.4%
13.6% 30.7% 31.9%

9. What do the Federal programs reveal?
联邦政府的对策告诉了我们什么？
Great shortage of human
talent 人才严重短缺
Highly unequal geographical
distribution of development
区域发展高度不均
Severe shortfall in domestic investment
国内投资低靡
Drastic deterioration in performance of
governance institution 政府机构表现急速
下降
Most of the post-Mahathir “reforms” are in essence scaling up
of existing initiatives (palliatives) 大多数的后马哈迪时代“改
革”在本质上其实是对现有举措加大力度（治标不治本）

10. Root Causes of the Malaysian Economic Malaise (1)
马来西亚经济萎靡的主要病源 (一）
Private Sector Outcome/
Government Adjustment
Policy 政府政策 私人界的对应
后果
Abuse of socio-economic
policies and ignoring ability as Brain drain occurs in Shortage of human
criteria in order to benefit every ethnic group talent
cronies e.g. selection based on
relationship not performance
社会经济政策被滥用，
用人唯亲，不问实力。 各族群的人才流失 人才短缺

11. Root Causes of the Malaysian Economic Malaise (2)
马来西亚经济萎靡的主要病源 (二)
Private Sector Outcome/
Government Adjustment
Policy 政府政策 私人界的对应
后果
Tax on growth of firms, i.e.
mandated sale of proportion Capital flight & SMEs leave
Large shortfall in
of equities at discount to Malaysia to grow elsewhere
domestic investment
govt-selected individuals or choose NOT to grow
upon listing
惩罚正在增长的企业，如 资金外流和中小型企业外 国内投资低靡。
上市时必须把部分股份以 迁，不然就是停止增长。
折扣价卖给政府指定人选。
Over-centralisation at Federal Inadequate infrastructure Highly unequal
level, suppressive of local (production bottlenecks) geographical distribution
development initiatives outside of KL-Putrajaya of development
中央政府高度 集权，打压 吉隆坡和布城外的基本建 区域发展高度不均
了地方政府的发展计划。 设短缺，造成生产力瓶颈。

12. Root Causes of the Malaysian Economic Malaise (3)
马来西亚经济萎靡的主要病源 (三)
Private Sector Outcome/后
Government Adjustment 对私人
Policy 政府政策 界的影响 果
No transparency in Federal Public unable to monitor Deterioration in
operations performance governance
中央政府机制黑箱作业 民众无法监督政府表现 国家治理江河日下

13. Negative effects from brain drain, capital flight, insufficient hard infrastructure,
and sub-standard soft infrastructure not clearly seen before 2000 because
人才外流，资本外涌，硬体设施不足加上不合标准的软体设备所
造成的负面影响在2000年前并不明显，因为 :
BEFORE YEAR 2000 AFTER
前 2000 年 后
Negative growth aspects were Post-1990 external trends and pre-2000
outweighed by: extended period of mismanagement
• Massive inward FDI; have greatly reduced the magnitudes of
• Big investments by GLCs; offsetting factors, resulting in significant
• Large infrastructure projects financed slowdown in growth  Malaysia in the
by oil and gas revenue. middle-income trap
以上提及的负面影响被这些因素所抵 1990年后的外部趋势加上2000年前的
消： 长期不妥善管理大幅度地减低了这些
• 大量的外商直接投资涌入。 抵消因素的效应，显著地放缓了大马
• 国内官联公司的大肆投资。 的经济成长。我们也因此陷入了中等
• 石油和天然气行业收入所赞助的大 收入困境。

14. Principle 1: Treat the Root Causes of the Disease
not Its Symptoms. Diagnosis determines the
Direction of Reform 第一原则：应治本而非治标，
病因诊断决定改革方向。
Malaysia’s Fork in the Road 大马的改革分岔路
Reform the policies that are making
the Malaysian economy sick
改革那些造成经济萎靡的政策？
OR 或
Continue scaling up existing
policies to try to offset the ill-effects
caused by existing policies
推行一系列的新政策以尝试抵消现有政
策造成的伤害?

15. History made a big turn coming into the 21st century (1/2)
21世纪见证了很多历史性的改变 (一)
• 1991: implosion of the Soviet Union established in 1917
<74 years>; Soviet bloc 1945-92 <47 years>
1991年：成立于1917的苏联政府垮台<74 年>; 苏联东
欧集团（1945-92）瓦解 <47 年>
• 1997: defeat in Korean presidential election of the Grand
National Party (GNP), the successor to the military-
backed regime that took power in 1961 <36 years>
1997年：1961年以来军人所操控政权的继承者金泳三
大国家党政府（GNP）在大选中失败 <36 年>

16. History made a big turn coming into the 21st century (2/2)
21世纪见证了很多历史性的改变 (二)
• 1998: Soeharto resigned, he had ruled since 1965 <33
years>
1998年：1965年开始执政的印尼苏哈托总统辞职<33年>
• 2000: defeat in Taiwan’s presidential election of the
Nationalist Party (KMT) that had ruled since 1945 <55
years>
• 2000年： 1945 年就开始执政台湾的国民党（KMT） 政府在总统
选举中落败<55 年>
• 2000: defeat in Mexican presidential election of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that had ruled since
1929 <71 years>
2000年： 从1929年开始一党专政的 墨西哥制度革命党（PRI）
在总统选举中落败 <71 年>

17. Political Reversal in Korea, Mexico and Taiwan 韩国、墨
西哥和台湾的政治逆转
• 2013: GNP, KMT and PRI are now back in power
2013：南韩大国家党(GMT), 台湾国民党(KMT)和墨西哥
制度革命党(PRI)都卷土重来，再度回朝执政
• However, the new Mode of Governance has endured但
是，变天之后的新治理模式持续下来
– GNP, KMT and PRI are NOT restoring the state-backed
crony capitalism that had characterized their previous
reign, e.g. chaebol groups in Korea no longer as
influential in government policies
– GNP, 国民党 和 PRI 并没有恢复变天前的政府撑腰的
朋党资本主义。举例说，韩国财阀对现今政府不再有
举足轻重的影响力。

18. - Instead, the KMT, GNP and PRI are now
committed to the continuation and broadening of
the equitable and sustainable economic growth
strategies of their immediate predecessors in the
same way that the successive post-1998
Indonesian ruling parties have done.
- 反而, GNP, 国民党 和 PRI萧规曹随，延续
甚至扩大变天后新政的经济发展策略，注
重平衡与永续，一如1998年印尼变天以
来历届政府的做法。

19. Principle 2: New broom sweeps clean（1/2）
第二原则 :没有旧包袱，改革才到位 (一)
• New political leaders, not encumbered by inherited
vested interests, are more likely to initiate turning points
in economic management.
新政治领导班子，要是没有前朝政府利益关系的包袱
缠身，将更可能推动有利于改革经济的管理方案。
• Their successors (even if from competing party) will follow
the new direction until external conditions and internal
situation have changed substantially. Different direction is
pursued when new person is less beholden to past.
而他们的继承人 （就算再次变天，朝野易位）也将跟
随这新路向，直至内外形势出现重要变化。没有旧包
袱，新人才有可能有新路向。

20. Principle 2: New broom sweeps clean（2/2）
第二原则 :没有旧包袱，改革才到位（二）
– Chernenko’s heir Mikhail Gorbachev versus Boris Yeltsin
(Putin is continuing Yeltsin’s line)
– Mao’s heir Hua Guofeng versus Deng Xiaoping (Xi Jinping is
continuing Deng’s line)
– 苏联契尔年科(Chernenko)的继承人戈尔巴乔夫(Mikhail
Gorbachev) 对比 叶利钦（Boris Yeltsin） (现在普京正跟
随叶利钦路线)
– 毛泽东的继承人人华国锋 对比邓小平(现在习近平继续
跟随邓小平路线)
• Immediate economic response to reform: Growth for Deng
versus collapse for Yeltsin. Speed was the culprit?
经济对改革的立即反应: 邓小平造就成长而叶利钦遭遇崩
溃。这是不是因为改革太快，速度出了问题？

21. Principle 3: Reform Speed depends on the task (1/2)
第三原则: 改革应该多快，取决于什么需要改革（一）
• Debate on “fast, comprehensive (shock therapy) reform” versus
“gradual, piecemeal reform” is too simple-minded. The particular
aspect of economy being reformed sets the optimum technical
speed, e.g. the optimum speed for price deregulation and
enterprise privatization are different. 改革应当“快刀斩乱麻”
还是“摸着石头过河”？这个辩题其实见树不见林。事实是，
不同方面的经济改革，需要不同的改革速度。举例说，物价改
革不可以慢郎中，国企私有化不可以急惊风。
• No relationship between immediate economic response and
reform speed. East Asia vs Eastern Europe. Differences in national
initial conditions. Economic Development in East Asia vs Economic
Restructuring in Eastern Europe. 改革的速度和经济的立即反应
没有直接关系。举例说，东亚与东欧国情不同，改革起点状况
不一样，前者需要经济发展，而后者则需要经济重组。

22. Principle 3: Reform Speed depends on the task (2/2)
第三原则:改革应该多快，取决于什么需要改革（二）
• Same reform direction in Russia and China. Direction is more
important than speed (speed doesn’t matter when the direction is
wrong), but desirability of speed must be kept in mind. 中国和俄罗
斯采取同样的改革方向。其实，改革的方向比速度更重要，因
为只要方向错了，速度也无补于事。然而，在方向正确时，速
度自然可取。
• Slow reform is susceptible to being paralysed after honeymoon
period and to being captured by vested interest groups. Cannot
justify slow elimination of poverty when it could be faster! 改革若
缓慢,“蜜月期”一过，就容易遭遇阻滞甚至瘫痪, 也容易被既
得利益集团骑劫；而且，如果改革重点是消除贫穷, 那么逐步
渐进就完全说不过去。
• China’s slow speed due to political not economic factors. 中国经济
改革步骤之所以缓慢，其实并不是经济问题，而是政治问题.

23. Principle 4: Look at global experience for policy instruments (1/2)
第四原则：政策工具应当参考全球经验 (一)
• The adoption of best international practice sets the direction of
reform, but this has to be tempered by adaptation of the international
procedures to local circumstances. Adopt and Adapt is the key.
改革方向应该采行最佳国际标准，但国际方法同时必须调整以适应
当地形势。简言之，方向要放眼国际，方法要留心当地。
• Debate on “do not reinvent the wheel” versus “indigenous institutional
innovation” is caused by confusion between “institutional innovation in
the global sense” versus “institutional innovation in the local sense” e.g.
replacing central planning with market mechanisms is global-type
innovation while changing the sequence of steps to deregulate the
financial market market to suit local conditions is local-type innovation.
所谓“不必重新发明车轮”和“本土体制创新”的争论，其实是混
淆了“全球性体制创新”与“地方性体制创新”的结果。举例说：
让市场机制取代中央主导是全球性体制创新；而改变金融市场松绑
的步骤顺序以适应当地条件则是地方性体制创新。

24. Principle 4: Look at global experience for policy instruments (2/2)
第四原则：政策工具应当参考全球经验(二)
• Convergence in economic institutions to international norms is
generally more efficient in accelerating the catching-up process
than experimentation to discover new alternative non-
capitalist economic institutions, e.g. the debate on the
efficiency and durability of the collective form of ownership
(versus private ownership) for small-medium enterprises in
rural China in 1984-1995.
一国的经济成长要超日赶美，与其把经济当试验品来寻找
替代性的经济体制，毋宁让国内经济体制直接向国际规范
看齐。例子：中国在1984-1995年就中小型企业产权改革
（集体所有权或私有产权何者较有效率与较能持久）的辩
论。

25. Principle 5: Be aware that a MESS will be inherited (1/3)
第五原则：新政权必须处理烂摊子 (一)
• Political transition occurs generally because of
mismanagement by the incumbent; the most common
feature being a large hidden budget deficit that is
destabilizing the economy.
物必先腐而后虫生。变天之所以发生，往往是因为当
政者管理不当，而最常见的特征就是，庞大财政赤字
被隐藏在账面下，成为经济不稳定的导因。

26. Principle 5: Be aware that a MESS will be inherited (2/3)
第五原则：新政权必须处理烂摊子 (一)
• The aspiring government must hence be ready to start
governing immediately upon election victory, i.e. must
have a detailed election manifesto that is operational in
tackling the identified root causes of the economic crisis.
The resulting economic rehabilitation program has the
legitimacy to be implemented quickly because it had
been scrutinized by the electorate.
• 因此，新政府必须在大选获胜之后，胸有成竹准备执
政。 例如，它必须提出详细的竞选宣言，对症下药，
根治经济危机的症结。而它的经济复苏方案，因为已
经得到选民的审核，将有足够的合法性立即落实。

27. Principle 5: Be aware that a MESS will be inherited (3/3)
第五原则：新政权必须处理烂摊子 (二)
• In the absence of generous foreign aid, orderly resolution
of the budget deficit requires low-cost access to
commercial loans, which is possible only if the new
government presents new credible mechanisms to bring
the budget under control, and to raise the private
investment rate (hence increase GDP growth).
• 在缺乏慷慨外援的情况下，财政赤字的出路就是低息的
商业贷款，这必须通过新政府提出有说服力的方案，以
控制预算和提高私人界的投资额，（从而提升国内生产
总值的增长）。

28. We have applied these 5 principles in drawing up the
Penang Paradigm, a 10-year development plan for
Penang (and Malaysia). We are seeking PUBLIC
GUIDANCE to improve the report which is available
online.
这五大原则全被运用于《槟城典范》的规划内。这
是我们槟城研究院献予槟州（乃至全马）的一个十
年发展蓝图。我们正收集民众意见, 请不吝赐教。
Please help us with your
comments:
penangparadigm@penanginstitute.com
www.penangparadigm.com
尚请各方高明多多指教：
penangparadigm@penanginstitute.com
我们的报告重点可在此下载：
www.penangparadigm.com