Hizbullah Discusses Its Operational Plan for War with Israel: Missile Fire on Tel Aviv and Conquest of the Galilee

1. Vol. 11, No. 18 2 November 2011
Hizbullah Discusses Its Operational Plan for War with Israel:
Missile Fire on Tel Aviv and Conquest of the Galilee
Shimon Shapira
 In recent weeks Hizbullah leader Hasan Nasrallah held a series of meetings with his top-
level military command as well as field commanders responsible for preparing for war
with Israel. According to a source close to Hizbullah, Nasrallah’s operational directive
was that in the next military conflict with Israel, Hizbullah will hit Tel Aviv with missiles
at the outset of the war, while also dispatching forces to conquer the Galilee.
 Hizbullah forces are being trained to fire at least ten thousand missiles, right at the
war’s outset, at military and strategic targets such as airfields, military camps, and vital
facilities including maritime ones, followed by the firing of rockets from launch sites
whose location will come as a surprise to Israel.
 The operational plan was formulated in tandem with senior Iranian strategic experts and
will include a force of five thousand fighters who have recently trained in Iran, tasked
with taking over designated zones in northern Israel including Nahariya, Shlomi, and
Carmiel.
 It was said that engineering units of the Iranian army had mined areas in the eastern
Bekaa Valley that were seen as possible landing sites for Israeli special forces, and that
Hizbullah had equipped itself with “smart" Iranian anti-tank missiles that can disrupt the
defensive systems of Israel's Merkava tanks.
 Nasrallah’s recent escalation of public statements stems from heightened fear in
Hizbullah that an Israeli and/or American attack on Iran is drawing nearer. As a strategic
arm of Iran, Hizbullah sees itself as Iran’s first line of defense against Israel.

2. On 27 October 2011 the Lebanese newspaper Al Joumhouria reported that in recent weeks the
leader of Hizbullah, Hasan Nasrallah, held a series of meetings with the organization’s highest
level military command, as well as field commanders and operational-level commanders
responsible for preparing Hizbullah’s military force for war with Israel. Nasrallah updated his
commanders on regional developments, the situation in Lebanon, and on Hizbullah’s internal
and organizational affairs. Nasrallah emphasized the supreme importance of maintaining the
organization’s field security, given U.S. and Israeli intelligence organizations’ successes in
penetrating Hizbullah and recruiting individuals holding sensitive posts. The exposure of agents
within Hizbullah was profoundly unsettling to Nasrallah and the other leaders.
According to a source close to Hizbullah, Nasrallah’s operational directive to the commanders
was to prepare for the fact that in the next military conflict with Israel, Hizbullah will hit Tel Aviv
with missiles at the outset of the war, while also dispatching forces to conquer the Galilee. The
source stressed that this is an operational directive and not a matter of psychological warfare.
Hizbullah’s conclusion from the lessons of the Second Lebanon War is that, next time, Israel will
have no red lines in waging all-out war against Lebanon and Hizbullah. Hence, Hizbullah is
planning “many surprises” that will change the force equation with Israel both at the start of
the conflict and during its operational phase. 1
The Operational Plan
The operational plan to conquer the Galilee was first aired in Nasrallah’s announcement on 16
February 2011, as part of events marking the third anniversary of the assassination of Hizbullah
commander-in-chief Imad Mughniyeh. Nasrallah told his fighters to be prepared for the fact
that, should Israel launch a war against Hizbullah, they will be conquering the Galilee. Since that
announcement, Hizbullah forces have been training and preparing to carry out Nasrallah’s
order. This preparation includes:
 Identifying landing sites for Israeli helicopters where explosive charges have been laid
and dispersed.
 Deploying substantial rocket and artillery firepower in areas Hizbullah does not see as
suitable for guerrilla warfare, mainly in parts of the Bekaa Valley.
 Visits by commanders to the front, which have included delegations of military experts
headed by Haj Zu Alfikar. He is none other than Mustafa Badr Aldin, Mughniyeh’s
replacement as the most senior security-military figure in Hizbullah, who is continuing to
act despite an extradition order against him for the murder of Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri. The senior military delegation visited the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon.
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3.  The end of a series of intensive training sessions for some 727 fighters in Iran, who
learned new combat methods for guerrilla and special commando units.
 The completion of courses for operators of advanced missiles and anti-tank weapons.
Here it was said that Hizbullah had equipped itself with “smart" Iranian anti-tank
missiles that can disrupt the defensive systems of Merkava tanks on the way to striking
them.
The military scenario for which Hizbullah forces trained is the firing of at least ten thousand
missiles, right at the war’s outset, at military and strategic targets such as airfields, military
camps, and vital facilities including maritime ones, followed by the firing of rockets from launch
sites whose location will come as a surprise to Israel.
The Operational Plan to Conquer the Galilee
The source said that the operational plan Hizbullah has formulated in tandem with senior
Iranian strategic experts is based on using a force of five thousand fighters who have recently
trained in Iran, particularly in the context of this plan. Another report said that in recent weeks
Hizbullah forces had completed intensive training in Iran and had been deployed in southern
Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. It was further reported that in the area of Maydon in the
western Bekaa Valley, Hizbullah engineering units had finished excavation work and the
improvement of positions, while engineering units of the Iranian army had mined areas in the
eastern Bekaa Valley that were seen as possible landing sites for Israeli special forces tasked
with attacking Hizbullah’s missile and artillery deployment.2
The source close to Hizbullah said its fighting force would number five brigades, each consisting
of a thousand fighters. Each brigade has a designated combat zone in northern Israel that it is
tasked with taking over. Each brigade is familiar with the layout and special topographical
conditions of its sector and has trained to conquer it.
 Brigade 1 will take over the town of Nahariya or parts of it, after crossing the border in
the area of Rosh Hanikra. According to Hizbullah information, means of protection in
that area are meager, the distance is small (seven kilometers), and there are no military
capabilities or special topography that will retard the unit in achieving its goal.
Concurrently, a force of 150 fighters from the first brigade will reach Nahariya by sea in
speedboats that Hizbullah already possesses. This force’s mission is to take as many
hostages as possible so as to prevent Israel from bombing the Hizbullah forces in this
sector.
 Brigade 2 will take over the town of Shlomi, which has 6,500 residents and is about 300
meters from the border. The aim is to cut the IDF's supply lines and force it to send
reinforcements from the east.
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4.  Brigade 3 was ordered to reach the town of Carmiel and conquer areas south of it with
the aim of blocking traffic from Acre, on the Mediterranean coast, to Safed.
 Brigade 4 will take over the communities of Malkiya, Ramot Naftali and Yiftach in order
to prevent the IDF from firing from these areas into southern Lebanon.
 Brigade 5 will serve as a strategic reserve force for special missions.
Syria
Hizbullah is discussing the question of whether Bashar Assad will take part in the war, and is not
excluding this possibility, particularly in light of Syria’s domestic situation. On 27 October 2011
the newspaper Al Akhbar, which is close to Hizbullah, disclosed that Nasrallah had met with
Assad a few days earlier in Damascus. It said Nasrallah had come to explain to Assad why
Hizbullah insists that the Lebanese government stop contributing to the funding of the
international investigatory commission (the STL) on former Lebanese premier Hariri’s murder.
Assad, according to the paper, did not give a clear answer on the issue and only emphasized the
need to maintain the Lebanese government’s representation. If such a Nasrallah-Assad meeting
indeed occurred, it can reasonably be assumed that the subject of a military conflict with Israel
was central to it.3
A day after the article appeared in Al Akhbar, the paper published a correction saying the
Nasrallah-Assad meeting had not occurred and apologizing for the error. 4 It should be stressed
that the paper is very close to Hizbullah and not infrequently serves as Nasrallah’s mouthpiece.
It is hard to imagine that it would publish a detailed report of this meeting, including specific
quotations, against Hizbullah’s wishes. It could be that, on second thought, Hizbullah decided
the timing of the article was unwise. As Assad kills his people, Hizbullah faces bitter criticism for
supporting him and is losing its standing in the Arab street. Indeed, since the reports in the
Lebanese press on Hizbullah’s operational plan and preparations to implement it, Hizbullah has
in no way related to these matters either directly or indirectly.
Summary
Nasrallah’s recent escalation of public statements on concrete targets for the next war – rocket
fire on Tel Aviv at its outset and the conquest of the Galilee, along with the completion of
military preparations – do not come in a vacuum. They stem from heightened fear in Hizbullah
that an Israeli and/or American attack on Iran is drawing nearer. Hence, as a strategic arm of
Iran that sees itself as Iran’s first line of defense against Israel, Hizbullah is seeking, with Iran’s
help, to deter Israel. This explains Nasrallah’s care in emphasizing that he is not referring to an
offensive thrust by Hizbullah but, rather, a harsh response to an Israeli move that would engulf
Lebanon in war. But even if what is envisaged is a reaction by Hizbullah, let alone a surprise
move by Nasrallah, it is important to see the picture as reflected in Hizbullah’s vision.
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5. * * *
Notes
1. Al Joumhouria, 72 October 7111.
2. Al Shiraa, 72 October 7111.
3. Al Akhbar, 72 October 2001.
4. Al Akhbar, 72 October 7111.
* * *
Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs.
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