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Am I Being Spied On?
Low-tech Ways Of Detecting High-tech
Surveillance
Dr. Phil
@ppolstra
http://philpolstra.com
What this talk is about
● Determining if you are a victim of spying
– Video surveillance
– Tailing
– Audio eavesdropping
– Devices embedded in your computer,
tablet, or smart phone
Why you should care
● Government assault on Constitution is
well known
● Local governments
● Competitors
● Stalkers
● People who just don't like you
Video surveillance
Common flaw all night vision
cameras share
Detecting this flaw with any
digital camera
Finding a camera with a
phone
Other Ways to Detect IR
Detecting wireless cameras
Free way: Android tablet or
smartphone (ad hoc nets)
Inexpensive way: BeagleBone based system
Simple way using Airodump-ng
Slightly more sophisticated with Python#!/usr/bin/env python
from scapy.all import *
import os, sys, time, operator
interface = "mon0"
clientsIKnow = { }
def sniffClientStrength(p):
if p.haslayer(RadioTap) and p.haslayer(Dot11):
try:
sigStrength = int(-(256-ord(p.notdecoded[-4:-3])))
if str(p.addr2) not in clientsIKnow.keys():
clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength
else:
if sigStrength > clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)]:
clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength
except KeyboardInterrupt:
sys.exit(1)
except:
pass
def main():
os.system('clear')
try:
while True:
sniff(iface=interface, prn=sniffClientStrength, timeout=2)
if clientsIKnow:
sorted_list = sorted(clientsIKnow.items(), key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True)
for item in sorted_list:
print item[0], item[1]
time.sleep(1)
os.system('clear')
clientsIKnow.clear()
sorted_list = []
except KeyboardInterrupt:
pass
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
More sophisticated Way
Moderately expensive way:
Detecting signals in licensed
bands
● Use an Linear Technologies LTC5582
RMS RF power detector
● Measure LTC5582 output on volt meter
or BeagleBone or ??
● Bandpass filters can be used to look at
individual frequency bands
Moderately Expensive Way
Moderately Expensive Way
Physical surveillance
● Tailing
– Common vehicles used
– Standard techniques
● Stakeout
– Common vehicles used
– Standard techniques
Tailing Vehicles
● Non-government spies choose vehicles to blend in
– Probably not the red Ferrari behind you
– Likely vehicles
● Bland colored Honda or Toyota sedan
● Bland colored SUV
● Whatever is commonly seen in the area
● Government spies drive vehicles issued to them
– Black SUV
– Crown Victoria
– Other vehicles too!
General Tailing Techniques
● Follow distance varies from about 2
cars behind to a block
● Bumper beeper may be used to extend
follow distance to 0.5 – 10.0 miles
● Tail is generally considered blown if
subject has 3 suspicious impressions
Single Car Tailing
● Generally will be closer than multi-car
tails
● More likely to follow traffic laws
● May use a bumper beeper to help
relocate the subject if lost
Multi-car Tailing
● In most cases everyone is behind the
subject
● Some cars may be on parallel streets
– More likely in urban areas
● Tailing vehicles may change relative
positions
● Vehicles might occasionally appear to
go a different direction only to rejoin
later
Combating Tailing
● Look!
– Check around your car for trackers
– Watch for vehicles who seem to be
behind you for long distances
– Watch for vehicles that go away and
then come back
Combating Tailing (contd)
● Detect electronic devices
– Use the previously describe RF
detection system without any
filters
– Scan the AM radio band on your
car radio before you go
● Many homemade or privately available
trackers operate in this frequency band
● If you hear nothing but a strong tone it is
probably a tracker on your car!
Combating Tailing (contd)
● Active techniques
– Drag a few traffic lights
– Take unusual routes
– Drive through residential neighborhoods
– Take a few alleys or deserted side
streets
– Occasionally park for no reason
Stakeout Vehicles
● Same vehicles used in tailing may be
used
● Additional vehicles might be used
– SUV
– Commercial vans
– Pickup trucks with toppers
Combating Stationary
Surveillance
● Look!
– People in parked vehicles
– Construction/utility workers who are
around too long or appear to be
doing nothing
– Commercial vans parked for
extended periods
– Anyone with view of all your exits
Combating Stationary
Surveillance (contd)
● Active techniques
– Get out your binoculars and spy back
– Run outside and jump in your car
● Run back inside and see if anyone
seems to notice
● Drive around the block and see if anyone
followed you
Audio bugging
Detecting active bugs
● Free way: analog AM/FM radio might detect
some bugs
● Inexpensive way: USB TV Tuner Software
Defined Radio (SDR)
– Can detect signals in 50 MHz - 2 GHz
– Commercial bugs are usually 10 MHz - 8
GHz
● Moderately expensive way: Broadband amplifier
connected to TV antenna
● Expensive way: Drop $500 on a commercial
detector
Detecting bugs with a radio
● Must be analog
● Scan through the AM/FM
bands to see if you can hear
the audio you are generating
● Works with only the simplest
bugs
Detecting passive bugs
● Must try to excite bug with RF in correct
band
● If you are close enough and the signal
is strong can still work with wrong
frequency
● Detection is same as active bugs
Exciting the bug
● Free way: Blast it with 2.4 GHz from
your Alfa
● Inexpensive way: Noisy broadband
transmitter attached to TV antenna
Bugs in your computing
devices
● Bugs can be installed by
– intercepting shipments
– "service" professionals
– spies in your local IT staff
– pissed off guy in your office
Detecting bugs
● Free way: Look!
– Bugging devices can be installed externally
– I described a small dropbox easily hidden
behind a computer at DC21
– Same dropbox is easily hidden in other
items on your desk
● Example: Dalek desktop defender
● Example: TARDIS
● Check every device connected to your
computer especially USB and network
Hiding Places
Bugs may be internal
● Open the case and look for obvious
signs
● Pictures of NSA devices have been
leaked
● Inexpensive way: Current leaks
– Bugs need current to run
– Turned off devices shouldn't draw any
power
A modified universal laptop
power supply can be used to
detect this current leakage● Modify the power supply to detect current
● For laptop or phone remove the battery and measure
current with device "off"
– Current flow indicates possible bug
● For tablet fully charge the battery
– Measure the current flow
– Small current might indicate issue with charging circuit
or battery
– If the current peaks when you speak or move in view of
the camera there may be a bug
Laptop Adapter
Laptop Adapter
For a desktop computer
● Physical inspection is best
– Can attempt to detect leakage current
with Kill o Watt or similar
● Many computer power supplies leak
current so this is not conclusive
● Desktop bug might only work when
computer is on
Passive bugs
● Excite as described for passive audio
bugs
● Use same techniques as described
above to detect excited bug
● Won't detect all passive bugs (such as
the expensive NSA bugs)
Summary
● Chose your level of paranoia
● Even if you aren't paranoid you can still
detect many spying activities at no cost
● Truly paranoid can still test without
financial ruin
References
● Hacking and Penetration Testing with
Low Power Devices by Philip Polstra
(Syngress, 2014)
● Jacob Appelbaum talk on NSA spy
device catalog
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=vILAlhwUgIU
Questions?
● Come see me after
● @ppolstra on Twitter
● Http://philpolstra.com or http://polstra.org
● More info on BeagleBone drones

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Detecting High-tech Surveillance with Low-tech Methods

  • 1. Am I Being Spied On? Low-tech Ways Of Detecting High-tech Surveillance Dr. Phil @ppolstra http://philpolstra.com
  • 2. What this talk is about ● Determining if you are a victim of spying – Video surveillance – Tailing – Audio eavesdropping – Devices embedded in your computer, tablet, or smart phone
  • 3. Why you should care ● Government assault on Constitution is well known ● Local governments ● Competitors ● Stalkers ● People who just don't like you
  • 5. Common flaw all night vision cameras share
  • 6. Detecting this flaw with any digital camera
  • 7. Finding a camera with a phone
  • 8. Other Ways to Detect IR
  • 10. Free way: Android tablet or smartphone (ad hoc nets)
  • 12. Simple way using Airodump-ng
  • 13. Slightly more sophisticated with Python#!/usr/bin/env python from scapy.all import * import os, sys, time, operator interface = "mon0" clientsIKnow = { } def sniffClientStrength(p): if p.haslayer(RadioTap) and p.haslayer(Dot11): try: sigStrength = int(-(256-ord(p.notdecoded[-4:-3]))) if str(p.addr2) not in clientsIKnow.keys(): clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength else: if sigStrength > clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)]: clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength except KeyboardInterrupt: sys.exit(1) except: pass def main(): os.system('clear') try: while True: sniff(iface=interface, prn=sniffClientStrength, timeout=2) if clientsIKnow: sorted_list = sorted(clientsIKnow.items(), key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True) for item in sorted_list: print item[0], item[1] time.sleep(1) os.system('clear') clientsIKnow.clear() sorted_list = [] except KeyboardInterrupt: pass if __name__ == '__main__': main()
  • 15. Moderately expensive way: Detecting signals in licensed bands ● Use an Linear Technologies LTC5582 RMS RF power detector ● Measure LTC5582 output on volt meter or BeagleBone or ?? ● Bandpass filters can be used to look at individual frequency bands
  • 18. Physical surveillance ● Tailing – Common vehicles used – Standard techniques ● Stakeout – Common vehicles used – Standard techniques
  • 19. Tailing Vehicles ● Non-government spies choose vehicles to blend in – Probably not the red Ferrari behind you – Likely vehicles ● Bland colored Honda or Toyota sedan ● Bland colored SUV ● Whatever is commonly seen in the area ● Government spies drive vehicles issued to them – Black SUV – Crown Victoria – Other vehicles too!
  • 20. General Tailing Techniques ● Follow distance varies from about 2 cars behind to a block ● Bumper beeper may be used to extend follow distance to 0.5 – 10.0 miles ● Tail is generally considered blown if subject has 3 suspicious impressions
  • 21. Single Car Tailing ● Generally will be closer than multi-car tails ● More likely to follow traffic laws ● May use a bumper beeper to help relocate the subject if lost
  • 22. Multi-car Tailing ● In most cases everyone is behind the subject ● Some cars may be on parallel streets – More likely in urban areas ● Tailing vehicles may change relative positions ● Vehicles might occasionally appear to go a different direction only to rejoin later
  • 23. Combating Tailing ● Look! – Check around your car for trackers – Watch for vehicles who seem to be behind you for long distances – Watch for vehicles that go away and then come back
  • 24. Combating Tailing (contd) ● Detect electronic devices – Use the previously describe RF detection system without any filters – Scan the AM radio band on your car radio before you go ● Many homemade or privately available trackers operate in this frequency band ● If you hear nothing but a strong tone it is probably a tracker on your car!
  • 25. Combating Tailing (contd) ● Active techniques – Drag a few traffic lights – Take unusual routes – Drive through residential neighborhoods – Take a few alleys or deserted side streets – Occasionally park for no reason
  • 26. Stakeout Vehicles ● Same vehicles used in tailing may be used ● Additional vehicles might be used – SUV – Commercial vans – Pickup trucks with toppers
  • 27. Combating Stationary Surveillance ● Look! – People in parked vehicles – Construction/utility workers who are around too long or appear to be doing nothing – Commercial vans parked for extended periods – Anyone with view of all your exits
  • 28. Combating Stationary Surveillance (contd) ● Active techniques – Get out your binoculars and spy back – Run outside and jump in your car ● Run back inside and see if anyone seems to notice ● Drive around the block and see if anyone followed you
  • 30. Detecting active bugs ● Free way: analog AM/FM radio might detect some bugs ● Inexpensive way: USB TV Tuner Software Defined Radio (SDR) – Can detect signals in 50 MHz - 2 GHz – Commercial bugs are usually 10 MHz - 8 GHz ● Moderately expensive way: Broadband amplifier connected to TV antenna ● Expensive way: Drop $500 on a commercial detector
  • 31. Detecting bugs with a radio ● Must be analog ● Scan through the AM/FM bands to see if you can hear the audio you are generating ● Works with only the simplest bugs
  • 32. Detecting passive bugs ● Must try to excite bug with RF in correct band ● If you are close enough and the signal is strong can still work with wrong frequency ● Detection is same as active bugs
  • 33. Exciting the bug ● Free way: Blast it with 2.4 GHz from your Alfa ● Inexpensive way: Noisy broadband transmitter attached to TV antenna
  • 34. Bugs in your computing devices ● Bugs can be installed by – intercepting shipments – "service" professionals – spies in your local IT staff – pissed off guy in your office
  • 35. Detecting bugs ● Free way: Look! – Bugging devices can be installed externally – I described a small dropbox easily hidden behind a computer at DC21 – Same dropbox is easily hidden in other items on your desk ● Example: Dalek desktop defender ● Example: TARDIS ● Check every device connected to your computer especially USB and network
  • 37. Bugs may be internal ● Open the case and look for obvious signs ● Pictures of NSA devices have been leaked ● Inexpensive way: Current leaks – Bugs need current to run – Turned off devices shouldn't draw any power
  • 38. A modified universal laptop power supply can be used to detect this current leakage● Modify the power supply to detect current ● For laptop or phone remove the battery and measure current with device "off" – Current flow indicates possible bug ● For tablet fully charge the battery – Measure the current flow – Small current might indicate issue with charging circuit or battery – If the current peaks when you speak or move in view of the camera there may be a bug
  • 41. For a desktop computer ● Physical inspection is best – Can attempt to detect leakage current with Kill o Watt or similar ● Many computer power supplies leak current so this is not conclusive ● Desktop bug might only work when computer is on
  • 42. Passive bugs ● Excite as described for passive audio bugs ● Use same techniques as described above to detect excited bug ● Won't detect all passive bugs (such as the expensive NSA bugs)
  • 43. Summary ● Chose your level of paranoia ● Even if you aren't paranoid you can still detect many spying activities at no cost ● Truly paranoid can still test without financial ruin
  • 44. References ● Hacking and Penetration Testing with Low Power Devices by Philip Polstra (Syngress, 2014) ● Jacob Appelbaum talk on NSA spy device catalog https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=vILAlhwUgIU
  • 45. Questions? ● Come see me after ● @ppolstra on Twitter ● Http://philpolstra.com or http://polstra.org ● More info on BeagleBone drones