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Afghanistan Force Requirements Frederick W. Kagan Director, Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute Kimberly Kagan President, Institute for the Study of War 19 SEP 2009
Disclaimer ,[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Contents 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan Topic Slides Objectives and Strategic Framework 4-5 Governance and Legitimacy 6-11 Afghan, US, and International Forces 12-17 International presence as an occupation 18 Prioritizing efforts country-wide 19-21 Regional Command South 22-32 Helmand 27-28 Kandahar 29-32 Regional Command East 33-35 Theater synergies 36 Force Requirements 37-38 Consequences of under-resourcing 39 Changing to a pure counter-terrorism strategy 40-44 Note on population figures 45 Contact information 46
Objectives ,[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
COIN Strategic Framework ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Governance and Troop Levels ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Afghan Government Legitimacy ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Sources of Legitimacy ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Legitimacy After the Election ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Legitimacy and Force Levels ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Legitimacy and the ANSF ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Security:  Making the Lines Cross Sooner 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan ANSF Size & Capacity Insurgent Size & Capacity International Forces An increase in international forces is needed both to accelerate ANSF training and to reduce the insurgent threat, lowering the requirement for ANSF capability to manage the residual threat and allowing a more rapid start to the reduction in international forces
ANSF Current Status ,[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan Bottom Line:  The ANSF now adds around 50,000 counter-insurgents to the mix
ANSF Expansion ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan Bottom line:  The ANA can add around 30,000 counter-insurgents by October 2010, for a total of 80,000—but only if decisions to accelerate ANSF expansion and resources necessary for it are made and committed at once
US Forces ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
ISAF Forces ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan Bottom line:  roughly 20 deployable non-US ISAF battalions can provide around 16,000 counter-insurgents
Available Counter-Insurgents ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Occupation? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Prioritizing Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Priority Areas 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Distribution of ANA and ISAF Forces 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan 8 US battalions 6 UK battalions 1 Danish battalion 2 Canadian battalions 1 Dutch battalion 1 Australian battalion 1 Romanian battalion 23 ANA kandaks 4 US battalions 6 ANA kandaks 2 US battalions 2 French battalions 1 Turkish battalion 1 Italian battalions 1 Polish battalion 11 ANA kandaks 2 Italian battalions 9 ANA kandaks 1 German QRF battalion 9 ANA kandaks 3 US battalions 19 ANA kandaks ISAF and ANA forces are generally deployed in accord with the threat and theater priorities—there are no excess forces in any areas to be moved around
Population of Contested Areas in RC(South) by District Source:  Afghanistan Information Management Services ( www.aims.org.af ), but see final slide for methodological detail 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
106 Miles Contested Districts in RC(South) with Terrain 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
106 Miles HQ HQ HQ Coalition Forces in RC(South) Each symbol represents one battalion (roughly 800 soldiers/Marines) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
106 Miles Contested Population Centers Enemy Sanctuaries and Support Zones 1,014,900 615,300 173,370 95,400 167,550 295,700 150,000 Populations of Contested Centers and Enemy Support Zones and Sanctuaries Source:  Afghanistan Information Management Services (www.aims.org.af) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
106 Miles Contested Population Centers Enemy Sanctuaries and Support Zones 1,014,900 615,300 173,370 95,400 167,550 295,700 150,000 HQ HQ HQ 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Coalition and Afghan Army Deployment in Helmand Province 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Coalition and ANSF Forces in Helmand 4,000 US Marines 3,200 British soldiers in combat units 800  British trainers with Afghan units 700  Danish soldiers 1,800 Afghan National Army soldiers TOTAL: 10,500 counter-insurgents Force-Ratio in Helmand River Valley (Sangin to Garmsir) 7 Coalition battalions 3 Afghan army kandaks TOTAL:  7,400 troops 615,000 population Current force-to-population ratio:  1:83 Ratio of 1:50 would require 12,300 counter-insurgents or 4,900 additional forces (roughly 1.5 additional brigades) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Coalition and Afghan Forces in Kandahar City and Environs 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Kandahar City ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Coalition and ANSF Forces in Kandahar City area 1,600 Canadian soldiers 2,400 Afghan army soldiers 800  US soldiers TOTAL:  4,800 counter-insurgents Force-Ratio in Kandahar City Area 2 Canadian battalions 1 US (Stryker) battalion 4 Afghan army kandaks TOTAL:  4,800 counter-insurgents 1,015,000 population Current force-ratio: 1:211 1:50 force ratio would require 20,300 counter-insurgents or 15,500 additional troops (roughly 4.5 brigades) Assuming No Coalition Forces Deploy in Kandahar City 312,700 population 2 Canadian and 1 US (Stryker) brigade 1 Afghan army kandak TOTAL:  3,000 counter-insurgents Current force-ratio:  1:104 1:50 force-ratio would require 6,254 counter-insurgents or 3,254 additional troops (roughly 1 brigade) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Coalition and ANA Forces in Kandahar Province 3,200 US soldiers 1,600 Canadian soldiers 2,400 Afghan army soldiers TOTAL:  7,200 counter-insurgents 1,151,100 population Current force-ratio:  1:160 1:50 force ratio would require 23,022 counter-insurgents or 15,822 additional forces (roughly 4.5 brigades) Assuming No Coalition Forces Deploy in Kandahar City 450,800 population 5,400 counter-insurgents Current force-ratio: 1:83 1:50 force-ratio would require 9,016 counter-insurgents or 3,616 additional forces (roughly 1 brigade) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Contested Areas in Greater Paktia 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
US and Afghan Forces in Greater Paktia 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Coalition and Afghan Forces 4,000 US soldiers 4,200 Afghan army soldiers TOTAL:  8,200 counter-insurgents 650,000 population in contested districts Current force-ratio: 1:79 1:50 force-ratio would require 13,000 counter-insurgents or 3,800 additional forces (roughly 1 brigade) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Theater Synergies ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Bottom Line:  Additional Requirements ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Other Considerations ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Consequences of Under-Resourcing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Counter-Terrorism? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
CT:  Intelligence? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
CT Bases in Pakistan? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
CT Bases in Afghanistan? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Legal Framework for Afghan CT Bases ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Afghan Population ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan
Contact Information ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and  Kimberly Kagan

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Afghanistan Force Requirements

  • 1. Afghanistan Force Requirements Frederick W. Kagan Director, Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute Kimberly Kagan President, Institute for the Study of War 19 SEP 2009
  • 2.
  • 3. Contents 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan Topic Slides Objectives and Strategic Framework 4-5 Governance and Legitimacy 6-11 Afghan, US, and International Forces 12-17 International presence as an occupation 18 Prioritizing efforts country-wide 19-21 Regional Command South 22-32 Helmand 27-28 Kandahar 29-32 Regional Command East 33-35 Theater synergies 36 Force Requirements 37-38 Consequences of under-resourcing 39 Changing to a pure counter-terrorism strategy 40-44 Note on population figures 45 Contact information 46
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  • 12. Security: Making the Lines Cross Sooner 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan ANSF Size & Capacity Insurgent Size & Capacity International Forces An increase in international forces is needed both to accelerate ANSF training and to reduce the insurgent threat, lowering the requirement for ANSF capability to manage the residual threat and allowing a more rapid start to the reduction in international forces
  • 13.
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  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20. Priority Areas 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 21. Distribution of ANA and ISAF Forces 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan 8 US battalions 6 UK battalions 1 Danish battalion 2 Canadian battalions 1 Dutch battalion 1 Australian battalion 1 Romanian battalion 23 ANA kandaks 4 US battalions 6 ANA kandaks 2 US battalions 2 French battalions 1 Turkish battalion 1 Italian battalions 1 Polish battalion 11 ANA kandaks 2 Italian battalions 9 ANA kandaks 1 German QRF battalion 9 ANA kandaks 3 US battalions 19 ANA kandaks ISAF and ANA forces are generally deployed in accord with the threat and theater priorities—there are no excess forces in any areas to be moved around
  • 22. Population of Contested Areas in RC(South) by District Source: Afghanistan Information Management Services ( www.aims.org.af ), but see final slide for methodological detail 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 23. 106 Miles Contested Districts in RC(South) with Terrain 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 24. 106 Miles HQ HQ HQ Coalition Forces in RC(South) Each symbol represents one battalion (roughly 800 soldiers/Marines) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 25. 106 Miles Contested Population Centers Enemy Sanctuaries and Support Zones 1,014,900 615,300 173,370 95,400 167,550 295,700 150,000 Populations of Contested Centers and Enemy Support Zones and Sanctuaries Source: Afghanistan Information Management Services (www.aims.org.af) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 26. 106 Miles Contested Population Centers Enemy Sanctuaries and Support Zones 1,014,900 615,300 173,370 95,400 167,550 295,700 150,000 HQ HQ HQ 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 27. Coalition and Afghan Army Deployment in Helmand Province 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 28. Coalition and ANSF Forces in Helmand 4,000 US Marines 3,200 British soldiers in combat units 800 British trainers with Afghan units 700 Danish soldiers 1,800 Afghan National Army soldiers TOTAL: 10,500 counter-insurgents Force-Ratio in Helmand River Valley (Sangin to Garmsir) 7 Coalition battalions 3 Afghan army kandaks TOTAL: 7,400 troops 615,000 population Current force-to-population ratio: 1:83 Ratio of 1:50 would require 12,300 counter-insurgents or 4,900 additional forces (roughly 1.5 additional brigades) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 29. Coalition and Afghan Forces in Kandahar City and Environs 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 30.
  • 31. Coalition and ANSF Forces in Kandahar City area 1,600 Canadian soldiers 2,400 Afghan army soldiers 800 US soldiers TOTAL: 4,800 counter-insurgents Force-Ratio in Kandahar City Area 2 Canadian battalions 1 US (Stryker) battalion 4 Afghan army kandaks TOTAL: 4,800 counter-insurgents 1,015,000 population Current force-ratio: 1:211 1:50 force ratio would require 20,300 counter-insurgents or 15,500 additional troops (roughly 4.5 brigades) Assuming No Coalition Forces Deploy in Kandahar City 312,700 population 2 Canadian and 1 US (Stryker) brigade 1 Afghan army kandak TOTAL: 3,000 counter-insurgents Current force-ratio: 1:104 1:50 force-ratio would require 6,254 counter-insurgents or 3,254 additional troops (roughly 1 brigade) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 32. Coalition and ANA Forces in Kandahar Province 3,200 US soldiers 1,600 Canadian soldiers 2,400 Afghan army soldiers TOTAL: 7,200 counter-insurgents 1,151,100 population Current force-ratio: 1:160 1:50 force ratio would require 23,022 counter-insurgents or 15,822 additional forces (roughly 4.5 brigades) Assuming No Coalition Forces Deploy in Kandahar City 450,800 population 5,400 counter-insurgents Current force-ratio: 1:83 1:50 force-ratio would require 9,016 counter-insurgents or 3,616 additional forces (roughly 1 brigade) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 33. Contested Areas in Greater Paktia 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 34. US and Afghan Forces in Greater Paktia 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
  • 35. Coalition and Afghan Forces 4,000 US soldiers 4,200 Afghan army soldiers TOTAL: 8,200 counter-insurgents 650,000 population in contested districts Current force-ratio: 1:79 1:50 force-ratio would require 13,000 counter-insurgents or 3,800 additional forces (roughly 1 brigade) 10/03/09 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
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