How serious is the ballistic missile threat?

1. Assessment of BMD Global
capabilities
Missile Defence as a Factor in Establishing a
New Security Environment
International Conference
Moscow, 3-4 May 2012
Colonel-General V.V. Gerasimov

2. Briefing Objectives
• Presenting the findings from the
assessment of global BMD capabilities
• Highlighting the available tech
opportunities to respond to missile threats
in a joint manner

3. BMD Information Capabilities

4. BMD Global Information
Capabilities
• modernizing the deployed missile
warning radars
• fielding mobile BMD radars
• increasing the capabilities of low orbit
satellite grouping
• tapping into the information resources
held by allies and partners

5. Deployment of BMD Information
Assets

6. Conclusions
• The deployed information subsystem covers the
entire territory of the Russian Federation
• Impediments are about to emerge and block the
employment of Deterrence Forces
• Subsystem’s capacities can be further enhanced
• Comprehensine applications of the deployed
information assets solidly beef up the BMD
efficiency

7. BMD Weapons

8. Conditions
• Missile launch lines feature research purposes
• Targets’ positions are hypothetical, though close
to reality
• BMD assets performances get estimated
through processing the available data and
running comparative analyses
• No use of BMD penetration aids
• Calculations are built on computer models
developed by the Ministry of Defense experts

9. Threats to the Russian Strategic
Nuclear Force From: the West

10. Threats to the Russian Strategic
Nuclear Force From: the Center

11. Threats to the Russian Strategic
Nuclear Force From: the East

12. Threats to the Russian Strategic
Nuclear Force From: the East

13. Conclusions
• Concept for a BMD posture is global in
character
• BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific
Region are elements of the global BMD
system primarily intended for protection of
selected sites in the US territory
• BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian
Strategic Nuclear Force based across Russia
• Deployed BMD assets already have the
capability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles

14. Capabilities Assessment
BMD Assets in Poland

15. Baseline Data
• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios
• Launch area – south
• Missile range – up to 11000 km
• Targeting – east coast of the USA
• BMD interceptor positions:
– Poland (shooters featuring Phase 3 and 4 capabilities)
– Russia (south)

16. Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories appear to be outside of the killing
zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is impossible.

17. Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for
fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception in possible.

18. Capabilities That Can Threaten
Russia
Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for
fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception is possible.

19. Capabilities Assessment
BMD Assets in Romania

20. Baseline Data
• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios
• Launch area – south
• Missile range – up to 3000 km
• Targeting – South and Central Europe
• BMD positions:
– Romania (shooters featuring third-phase capabilities)
– Russia (south)

21. Conclusion. South Europe-bound trajectories fall within the killing zone for
third-phase BMD interceptors. Interception is possible.

22. Conclusion. Part of the Western Europe-bound trajectories happen to be
outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is
partial.

23. Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing fourth-phase
BMD killing zone. Interception is possible

24. Conclusions
• Romania-based BMD shooters featuring first and
second-phase performances will have limited capabilities
to assure protection of South Europe against missiles
launched from the south
• Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase
performances would pose a threat to the Russian
Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure
protection of the entire Western Europe against the
threat of missile strikes from the south
• Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be
posing a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force
• There is room for cooperation aimed at developing an
effective European-wide BMD system (development of
the joint defense area)