The 2012 Basque regional election, held on 25 March, resulted in a new
government of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The incumbent Socialist Party suffered a
dramatic reduction in electoral support, obtaining just 19% of the vote, far below the 30%
they had attained in 2009. This was the first election held in the Basque Country without the
looming shadow of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; “Basque Homeland and Freedom”).
However, the influence of the economy was stronger than the nationalism issue in this
election, as we show in this electoral report.
Rohan Jaitley: Central Gov't Standing Counsel for Justice
Basque Regional Elections 2012: The Return of Nationalism under the Influence of the Economic Crisis
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Basque Regional Elections 2012:
The Return of Nationalism under
the Influence of the Economic
Crisis
Braulio Gómez Fortes
a
& Laura Cabeza Pérez
a
a
Universidad de Deusto , Avda de las Universidades
24, Bilbao , Spain
Published online: 10 Jun 2013.
To cite this article: Braulio Gómez Fortes & Laura Cabeza Pérez (2013): Basque Regional
Elections 2012: The Return of Nationalism under the Influence of the Economic Crisis,
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3. ELECTION REPORT
Basque Regional Elections 2012:
The Return of Nationalism under
the Influence of the Economic Crisis
BRAULIO GO´ MEZ FORTES & LAURA CABEZA PE´REZ
Universidad de Deusto, Avda de las Universidades 24, Bilbao, Spain
ABSTRACT The 2012 Basque regional election, held on 25 March, resulted in a new
government of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). The incumbent Socialist Party suffered a
dramatic reduction in electoral support, obtaining just 19% of the vote, far below the 30%
they had attained in 2009. This was the first election held in the Basque Country without the
looming shadow of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; “Basque Homeland and Freedom”).
However, the influence of the economy was stronger than the nationalism issue in this
election, as we show in this electoral report.
KEY WORDS: Regional elections, nationalism, economic voting, Basque Country
Introduction
Elections for the Basque Parliament were held in the Basque Country on 21 October
2012, five months earlier than scheduled. The regional incumbent Socialist Party
(PSE) suffered a dramatic fall in electoral support, obtaining just 19% of the vote,
far below the 30.7% they achieved in 2009. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)
returned to power after a short one-term parenthesis of Socialist rule. Following the
elections, a minority government was formed by PNV, headed by In˜aki Urkullu as Pre-
sident (Lehendakari) of the Cabinet. This was the first election held in the Basque
Country without the looming shadow of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; "Basque
Homeland and Freedom”). The Basque terrorist organization had declared a permanent
ceasefire and cessation of armed activity one year before the elections.
The so-called izquierda abertzale (pro-independence Basque left) was allowed to
run in this election under the name of EH-Bildu1
and became the second largest party
of the new Basque parliament. The nationalist parties, PNV and EH-Bildu, represent
Correspondence Address: Braulio Go´mez Fortes, Universidad de Deusto, Avda de las Universidades 24,
Bilbao, Spain. Email: brauliogfortes@gmail.com
# 2013 Taylor & Francis
Regional and Federal Studies, 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2013.798650
Downloadedby[85.86.30.72]at14:2911June2013
4. two-thirds of the new regional parliament. Nevertheless, the nationalist agenda is
expected to be overshadowed by the urgency to combat unemployment during the
next term.
This electoral report is structured as follows. In the first section we briefly present
the main features of the Basque political institutions and the context in which the 2012
Basque parliamentary election took place. In the second section we describe the
campaign strategies of the main parties. The third section is devoted to the election
results. In the final section we explain the loss of popular support for the incumbent
party with the help of economic voting theory.
Political and Economic Context
The Basque Country is one of the wealthiest regions of Spain and Europe, with a GDP
per capita of E32 288 compared to the E23 271 of Spain; in contrast the Basque
inhabitants account for around only 6% of the Spanish population. As a result of the
decentralization process set in motion in 1978 at the beginning of the Spanish transition
to democracy, the Basque Country is granted full fiscal autonomy. The Spanish Con-
stitution protects the historical fiscal rights of the Basque territories (‘fueros’), which
means that the Basque Country, as well as Navarra, collect taxes themselves and nego-
tiate with the central government how much of their tax revenue will be allotted to the
Spanish state. The Basque regional government is responsible for the provision of most
services closest to the citizens. More than half of regional public spending is devoted to
education and health services. In addition, the Basque regional government has signifi-
cant powers in areas such as urban and local government, public safety, social services,
infrastructure, transport, agriculture, and the environment.
The regional government is free to determine its own electoral calendar. The
Basque Parliament (Eusko Legebiltzarra/Parlamento Vasco) has 75 members,
elected by province through the proportional d’Hondt formula. The representatives
come from a closed party-list, with a 3% threshold by province. The three provinces
elect the same number of seats in the Regional Parliament (25 each one) even
though they are very different in terms of population (Biscay 1 150 000 inhabitants;
Gipuzkoa 710 000; and A´ lava 320 000). Unlike the systems used in other Spanish
regions, the Basque Country does not use the population criterion. This implies that
a seat ‘costs’ more votes in Biscay and Gipuzkoa than in the least populated A´ lava.
In other words, a vote does not have the same value in all the Basque provinces.
The party system in the Basque Country differs from the party system in the rest of
Spain. The Basque Country party system has been characterized by the presence of not
one, but several nationalist parties. These parties have had a majority of the votes in the
Basque parliamentary elections. The two main state-wide parties together, the left-
leaning PSE (the Basque affiliate of the PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)
and the right-wing PP (Popular Party), have not been able to attract more than 50%
of the votes in any Basque election. In fact, the state-wide centre-right PP have had
a substantially smaller electoral support in the Basque Country than in other parts of
Spain. This is mainly due to the conservatives’ historical position against decentraliza-
tion, and also, to a lesser extent, because the PNV is an alternative for those voters who
defend a right-wing agenda.
2 B. Go´mez Fortes & L. Cabeza Pe´rez
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5. The moderate PNV has been the hegemonic political party in the Basque Country
since the transition to democracy. It is the largest and oldest Basque nationalist party.
The PNV opposes political violence. It won all Basque Parliamentary elections and led
every regional government from 1980 until 2009, headed by Carlos Garaicoechea
(1980–85), Jose´ Antonio Ardanza (1985–99) and Juan Jose´ Ibarretxe (1999–2009).
In the 2009 election, although the PNV garnered the most votes, the main state-wide
parties PSE and PP received a majority of seats in the Basque Parliament, surpassing
the number of seats obtained by the nationalist forces. This success of the non-
nationalist parties was possible for three reasons. First, for the first time in Basque
regional elections, there was no abertzale—or left-wing separatists—list. Just one
month before the election, the various abertzale parties were banned by the
Supreme Court of Spain from standing in the election, accused of having links with
the terrorist organization ETA. The abertzales called on their supporters to cast
blank ballots. Secondly, the PNV underwent a gradual weakening of its leader, Juan
Jose´ Ibarretxe, due to the rejection by the Spanish Parliament of his proposal,
widely known as the “Ibarretxe Plan”, to reform the Statute of Autonomy (the legal
document organizing the political system of the Basque Country) in order to give
the Basques greater autonomy. The PNV internal division between a separatist wing
and those autonomists who wanted to remain Spanish has also been influential.
Lastly, the socialists were stronger than ever after winning the national elections
one year earlier and, consequently, the PSE won a record high 30.7% of the votes
and 25 seats. As a result, PSE leader Patxi Lo´pez formed the first non-nationalist
government with the support of the Spanish conservative party.
The socialist Lehendakari, Patxi Lo´pez, had been quite unpopular since the start of
his term in office. The primary cause of his unpopularity was his agreement with the
right-wing party, the PP, despite promising during the election campaign that the
PSE would not sign such a deal. Most socialist voters rejected this contra nature
pact. In Euskadi, the PP bears tons of negative baggage, not least the perception
shared by most voters that it is the anti-Basque and ultra-centralist party. The PP
ended the governing pact with the Socialist Party in May 2012 and Patxi Lo´pez was
not able to pass a budget in the Basque regional parliament. The decision to call
early elections was inevitable.
The second cause of unpopularity was the economic crises. The management of the
regional economy by the socialists was widely criticized even though the Basque
economy itself was doing quite well compared to other regions in Spain. The unem-
ployment rate was 15.9% in the fourth quarter of 2012, the second lowest in the
country (and 10% below the national rate), but had doubled since the start of the
term (Figure 1). Moreover, the region’s debt had grown exponentially since 2009.
The debt/GDP ratio stood at 2.2% when Patxi Lo´pez took office in 2009, and it
grew to 10.2% in 2012. This debt load, however, is still inferior to the national
average of 13.5%.
The 2012 regional elections were the Basque Country’s first electoral experience
without the fear of violence. However, the bad economic situation overshadowed
the end of ETA’s terrorist activity. The Basque terrorist organization announced defini-
tive cessation of armed activity in October 2011. The absence of ETA meant these
were the first truly free elections for decades. With the end of violence, the Basque
Election Report: Basque Regional Elections 2012 3
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6. nationalist left—the abertzale left—was allowed to enter the political arena once
again. In 2011, the constitutional court allowed the abertzales to participate in the
May local elections and in the November general elections. The coalitions of the abert-
zale left (Bildu in May, Amaiur in November) won 26% and 24%, respectively, in the
two elections in 2011. When ETA was still active, their political arm had never reached
20% of votes. EH Bildu, the new coalition of left-wing radical separatists is now the
region’s second political force and a principal rival to the PNV, whose position on
sovereignty is more moderate.
The Election Campaign
This election was marked by both the first anniversary since ETA had announced a
"definitive cessation of its armed activity" and the highest unemployment figures
ever. Not surprisingly, the economic crisis and the national status of the Basque
Country were virtually the only two topics of debate between the candidates during
the campaign. Although the Basque elections were held in the light of the renewed
and growing independence movement in Catalonia, the new fight between the
Catalan government and the central government had no relevant effects on the electoral
campaign.
PNV not only presented a new candidate for President of the Basque government,
but also a new discourse, away from the secessionist line this party used to exploit
when Juan Jose´ Ibarretxe was its leader. This time, In˜igo Urkullu sought the shortest
way to attract voters, pushing identity discourses into the background. He did so
with the help of his proposals that were related to the issue that mattered the most
for citizens: the economic crisis. Proof of this can be seen in the PNV electoral
Figure 1. Unemployment rates in the Basque Country and Spain, 2008–12.
Source: National Statistics Institute, EPA (Economically Active Population Survey).
4 B. Go´mez Fortes & L. Cabeza Pe´rez
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7. manifesto. According to Regional Manifestos Project data (Go´mez et al., n.d., www.
regionalmanifestosproject.com), almost one-third of all the sentences of PNV’s 262-
page long manifesto were devoted to economic issues (32%), while the policies on
nation-building and self-government took up just 11% of the space.
Under the leadership of this woman, a Basque nationalist author and university pro-
fessor, the pro-independence Basque left-wing coalition ran a campaign focused on the
recognition of the Basque Country’s right to self-determination and defiance of the
economic austerity programme that the PP defends. The data from the Regional Mani-
festos Project reveal that EH Bildu was the only party which had not given top priority
to the measures taken to overcome the economic situation. Its emphasis on economic
issues (13% of the manifesto) lags behind its real priority: the construction, mainten-
ance and development of Basque national identity and independence proposals (20%).
Main non-nationalist parties (PP, PSE and UPyD) emphasized the risks of autonomy
and the benefits of closer ties with the rest of Spain. This was the centrepiece of Antonio
Basagoiti’s discourse. A quantitative content analysis of the PP candidate’s Twitter
account made by the Regional Manifestos Project shows that one-third of all his tweets
(36%) were about anti-nationalism. With slogans, such as "If you don’t go, they win",
the PP was trying to feed the fear of Basque nationalism and the old ghosts of terrorism.
This strategy was evident from the very beginning, since Basagoiti said: "There are only
two ballots, independence and the PP" in the election campaign opening. Unemployment
and the crisis were not a sensible electoral asset for the PP in its attack on Patxi Lopez’s
government. For most of the Basques, the national government is the main culprit for the
economic situation, and the PP was the ruling party at that level.
On the opposite side, PSE was unable to put the end of ETA violence and the peace
process at the centre of the debate, although both the Lehendakari Patxi Lo´pez and the
PSOE’s Secretary General, Alfredo Pe´rez Rubalcaba, insisted on attributing this
success to his party. As a part of their defensive strategy, the Basque socialists also
tried to brag about their economic performance since the situation in the Basque
Country was not as bad as in the rest of Spain. Nevertheless this strategy was
doomed to fail. According to the pre-electoral survey carried out by the CIS (Centre
for Sociological Research) one month before the election, just 7% of Basques qualified
as good the work of the Basque government in the economic field. From the citizens’
point of view, the party most capable of dealing with unemployment and the economic
crisis was the PNV (24%) and not the PSE (less than 8%).
Finally, UPyD presented themselves to the voters as the "only constitutionalist
alternative", the only party capable of standing up to the threat of "rupture of coexis-
tence" posed by the nationalist parties with the connivance of PP and PSE. Meanwhile,
Ezker Anitza, a United Left affiliate, ran a campaign against austerity and in favour of
the rights of workers and the poor, while avoiding engagement with the Basque right to
decide.
Election Results and Government Formation
The incumbent Socialist Party suffered a dramatic reduction in electoral support,
obtaining just 19% of the vote, far below the 30.7% they had attained in 2009. Conse-
quently, its parliamentary representation fell from 25 to 16 seats. Patxi Lo´pez, the first
Election Report: Basque Regional Elections 2012 5
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8. non-nationalist Lehendakari, is the first head of the Basque government who was not
re-elected for the second term. These results demonstrate the decline in support for the
socialists in Spain in recent years. We have to bear in mind that since the 2011 local
elections the PSOE has done nothing but lost voters at all levels (local, regional and
national elections).
As we can see in Table 1, no single party won a majority in this election. Not sur-
prisingly, as with all the Basque elections in the last three decades, the Basque Nation-
alist Party came out top in the poll. PNV obtained 34.6% of the vote and 27 seats. This
means a loss of three seats compared with the last election. Nevertheless, this time it
was enough to return to power in the region where this party has ruled for 26 of the past
32 years.
But the striking thing about this election is undoubtedly the astonishing results of
EH Bildu. The coalition, dominated by members of ETA’s political wing, obtained the
highest ever electoral support for the radical left-wing separatists. EH Bildu received
the second largest number of votes (25%) in the Basque Country and became the
leading party in Gipuzkoa, with 32.2% of the vote. They currently control 21 seats
in the 75-seat chamber. This result goes far beyond the previous electoral ceiling of
any other brand of left-wing nationalism in the Basque Country.
The Popular Party, with 11.7% of votes, lost three seats, ending with a total of 10.
The reason for this decline is probably related to the discontent over the austerity
measures implemented by the same party at the national government. The PP lost
almost 16 000 votes compared to the 2009 Basque election and, notably, more than
80 000 votes compared with the 2011 national election.
Finally, the Spanish-centralist party Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD), with
1.9% of the vote, held on to its solitary seat. Nevertheless, Ezker Anitza and Ezker
Batua-Berdeak—the present and former affiliates in the Basque Country of the
Spanish United Left (IU, IzquierdaUnida)—failed to win representation. Fragmenta-
tion has taken its toll on the "non-nationalist left”, leaving out both formations after
18 years of uninterrupted presence in the Basque parliament. But the undemocratic
nature of the voting system in the Basque Country, where a vote can have four
times more value in the less populated province, as we explained above, has played
Table 1. Summary of the 2012 Basque Parliament election results
a
In 2009: Aralar + EuskoAlkartasuna
Source: Electoral results, Department of Home Affairs, Justice and Public Administration, Basque
Government.
6 B. Go´mez Fortes & L. Cabeza Pe´rez
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9. its part as well. In fact, Ezker Anitza did not win any seats at all, even though it had
8700 more voters (2.7%) than UPyD. Its leader, Mikel Arana, resigned from his
post the day after the election.
The overall result marks a major step forward for Basque nationalism as a whole.
PNV and EH Bildu spread their electoral victory over almost all the Basque municipa-
lities (134 and 102, respectively), except just 14 municipalities where PSE and PP
retain their primacy. Together, the nationalists control almost two-thirds of the new
parliament (48 seats out of 75). The votes for nationalist parties have always exceeded
those obtained by non-nationalist parties in all the regional elections held in the Basque
Country since 1980 (Figure 2). In 2012 the difference reached almost 250,000 votes in
favour of the nationalist parties, which is the highest figure in the last two decades.
Following the elections, there were three options for the PNV: to form a minority
government, or to reach an agreement with either EH Bildu (together they sum 48 out
of 75 seats) or the PSE (43 seats) to form a majority government. According to the
post-electoral survey, a minority government was the favourite alternative for 23%
of the Basques, an alliance between the two nationalist parties was the best option
for a quarter of the population (26%), while 22% of voters favoured an alliance
between the PNV and the socialists.2
Finally, PNV chose to form a minority govern-
ment. In˜igo Urkullu was sworn in as Lehendakari on 13 December.. His political
project will have three priorities: overcoming the economic crisis, consolidation of
the peace process and an increase in self-government, seeking to push forward a
new political status for the Basque Country within the European Union. The new gov-
ernment will have to look for different allies in order to make progress in each of these
issues during the term. Urkullu has pledged to make the economy his first priority.
Figure 2. Difference between the vote for nationalist and non-nationalist parties in the Basque
elections, 1980–2012. Vote for nationalist parties (PNV, EH Bildu, Amaiur, Batasuna, HB, EH,
EHAK, Aralar and invalid votes in 2009); vote for non-nationalist parties (PSE, PP, EBB,
EzkerAnitza, UPyD, UCD/CDS and UA).
Source: Cabinet of Sociological Prospective, Basque Government.
Election Report: Basque Regional Elections 2012 7
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10. Discussion
According to surveys,3
the economy has remained far and away the most important
issue for Basque voters during the last four years. The perception of the economic situ-
ation changed dramatically during the mandate of the Lehendakari Patxi Lo´pez. The
number of citizens who consider the regional economic situation to be bad or very
bad had increased from 38.5% in 2007 to 60.8% in late 2012. The economy and unem-
ployment were the main problems in the region for almost all Basques (85%). The
majority of voters (62.2%) rejected the regional government’s handling of economic
issues.4
Previous studies have reported that economic variables influence popular support
for subnational incumbents in regional elections (‘regional economic voting’)
(Svoboda, 1995; Anderson, 2008; Niemi et al., 1995; Riba and Diaz, 2002; Rico,
2011; Sanchez-Cuenca and Barreiro, 2011; Queralt, 2012; Go´mez Fortes et al.,
2013). These studies have demonstrated the existence of a positive relationship
between the economic situation and support for regional governments. At the time
of writing this electoral report, there is no post-electoral data available to fully
Figure 3. Difference in popular support for the Regional Incumbent (PSE) between 2009 and
2012 and unemployment rate by municipality.
Source: own elaboration based on data from the official election results (Department of Home
Affairs, Justice and Public Administration, Basque Government) and the Spanish Public
Employment Service.
8 B. Go´mez Fortes & L. Cabeza Pe´rez
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11. explore the influence of the economy on this election. But the electoral results already
give us some idea. The economic downturn may well have taken its toll on the regional
incumbent. The PSE has lost support in 2012 in virtually all the Basques cities, towns
or villages. It has lost votes in 9 out of ten municipalities. But, as shown in Figure 3, the
PSE has lost more votes precisely in the municipalities with the highest unemployment
rate. In other words, the more unemployed a town has, the more votes the incumbent
has lost.
The PSE’s losses were somewhat greater in its traditional stronghold of the Bilbao
Metropolitan area, where it lost more than ten percentage points. In fact, the PSE’s col-
lapse was such that the PNV was placed ahead of the PSE in some of the party’s tra-
ditional bases, including Bilbao’s working-class Left Bank (Barakaldo, Sestao,
Basauri)—although, in these cases, it was due to the PSE’s collapse since 2009
rather than any PNV inroads. The PSE lost votes to other parties, as well as a good
number of its voters to abstention (the primary explanation for the small decrease in
turnout).
The influence of the economy was stronger than the nationalism issue in this
election. Previous studies based on spatial proximity models have shown that the
Figure 4. Ideological and nationalist scale.
Source: CIS, Pre-electoral survey 2959.
Election Report: Basque Regional Elections 2012 9
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12. weight (importance) voters give to the right–left dimension is greater than that
given to the nationalism issue in the Basque Country (Fernandez Albertos, 2002;
La Calle, 2005). The gap between PSE and PP on the ideological spectrum
(Figure 4) is too wide for left-wing voters and even more so when they are suffering
the worst economic situation of recent decades with the PP as the main political
power in central government. The pact between the two parties was never under-
stood by PSE voters. In fact, 77.1 % of voters feel there is a great distance
between them and the PP.5
These voters are much closer to the PNV on the left–
right axis than the PP (Figure 4), and the moderate nationalist party is the favourite
partner for the majority of socialist voters.
The results of this regional election reflect the political pluralism shown by the
Basque electorate. Moreover, without the threat of terrorism and with a delicate
economic situation, the minority PNV government will look to reach agreements
with all political forces. The PSE will surely support the current regional incumbent
with the aim to make the electorate forget its pact with the right-wing PP as soon as
possible.
Notes
1
Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu, Basque Country Gather) is a left nationalist coalition officially launched
on 10 June 2012 by Eusko Alkartasuna, Aralar, Alternatiba and independents individuals from the
Basque leftist nationalist environment, most of whom had been members of the outlawed Batasuna.
2
Post-electoral survey, Cabinet of Sociological Prospective, Basque Government.
3
http://www.ehu.es/euskobarometro/ (accessed 28 April 2013).
4
Data from the 2012 Basque Regional election pre-electoral survey conducted by the Centro de Inves-
tigaciones Sociolo´gicas (Estudio Nº2959).
5
Pre-electoral survey (CIS 2959)
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