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Denial of Service: Limiting the Threat
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],AGENDA
Hi! All about me.
Introduction ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],discussion, truthfully conducted, must lead to public advantage: the discussion stimulates curiosity, and curiosity stimulates invention - Charles Tomlinson - Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks - 1850
Ooh! Die bang-maak goed
February Fun
February Fun ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
February Fun - the aftermath ,[object Object],[object Object]
Future Imperfect - predictions 2001 Peter G. Neumann SRI International We are likely to see some organized, possibly collaborative, attacks that do some real damage, perhaps to our critical infrastructures, perhaps to our financial systems, perhaps to government systems all of which have significant vulnerabilities.
Future Imperfect - predictions 2001 Bruce Moulton Fidelity Investments Hactivism and other cyber attacks emanating from countries with weak or non-existent legal sanctions and investigative capabilities will escalate. This is likely to be the root of at least one headline-grabbing cyber incident (much bigger than DDOS or LoveBug) that will send a loud wake-up call to the commercial sector.
Future Imperfect - predictions 2001 Marcus H. Sachs US Department of Defense 2001 will also see continued  development of distributed denial of service attack networks. These attack networks will no longer rely on manual establishment by the attacker, but will automatically establish themselves through the use of mobile code and html scripting.
The Nuts & Bolts Stuff
Understanding the ‘Net
[object Object],Understanding DoS „ The real requirement is not quick recovery but the absence of outages“ „ We talk today of 'Internet Time'; the Internet does not allow for delays“ Steven J. Ross, Information Systems Control, March 2000
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Why do DoS?
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],How DoS works
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Classical DoS examples
DoS using Amplifiers - SMURF check: www.netscan.org
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Revisiting SYN floods
New Kid on the block - DDoS
Profile of a typical attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Building an attack network ,[object Object],[object Object]
Common DDoS tools ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Common DDoS tools ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The challenge of DDoS ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Boom! Assesing the impact
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],What me worry?!
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],RSADDoS (in the motherland)
Whoah Cowboy! icsa.net, February 2000: „ The Internet has now taken a drastic "hit" to its reliability and integrity due to the recent DDoS attacks. It is only through the cooperation and unification of all Internet users that we will find the solution-and stop DDoS from taking the Internet out from under our commerce, education, communities, and individuals.“ But has it really been all that bad?
Pow! Fighting back
DoS defense strategies ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ingress Filtering ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Egress Filtering ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Planning for disaster ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DDoS - Defending yourself ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Protecting web servers from DoS ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Responding to a DoS attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Getting Greasy
Configuration Examples - CISCO ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Interesting other stuff
Things to consider ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Other possible tricks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],DoS the SA way
THE BOTTOM LINE ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
questions?

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Denial of services : limiting the threat

  • 1. Denial of Service: Limiting the Threat
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  • 9. Future Imperfect - predictions 2001 Peter G. Neumann SRI International We are likely to see some organized, possibly collaborative, attacks that do some real damage, perhaps to our critical infrastructures, perhaps to our financial systems, perhaps to government systems all of which have significant vulnerabilities.
  • 10. Future Imperfect - predictions 2001 Bruce Moulton Fidelity Investments Hactivism and other cyber attacks emanating from countries with weak or non-existent legal sanctions and investigative capabilities will escalate. This is likely to be the root of at least one headline-grabbing cyber incident (much bigger than DDOS or LoveBug) that will send a loud wake-up call to the commercial sector.
  • 11. Future Imperfect - predictions 2001 Marcus H. Sachs US Department of Defense 2001 will also see continued development of distributed denial of service attack networks. These attack networks will no longer rely on manual establishment by the attacker, but will automatically establish themselves through the use of mobile code and html scripting.
  • 12. The Nuts & Bolts Stuff
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  • 18. DoS using Amplifiers - SMURF check: www.netscan.org
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  • 20. New Kid on the block - DDoS
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  • 29. Whoah Cowboy! icsa.net, February 2000: „ The Internet has now taken a drastic "hit" to its reliability and integrity due to the recent DDoS attacks. It is only through the cooperation and unification of all Internet users that we will find the solution-and stop DDoS from taking the Internet out from under our commerce, education, communities, and individuals.“ But has it really been all that bad?
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Notas del editor

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