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Failure Mode
Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
Presentation complied by Drug Regulations – a
not for profit organization from publicly available
material form FDA , EMA, EDQM . WHO and
similar organizations.
Visit www.drugregulations.org for the latest in
Pharmaceuticals
19/17/20159/17/2015.
 Introduction
 History
 Purpose
 Objective
 Failure Modes
 Risk Priority Number
 FEMA Team , Process, Boundaries, Scope
 Ten Steps for FEMA
 Examples of Ranking
 FEMA for a Drying Process
 FEMA for a Granulation Process
 Preparation of a RISK Profile
29/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Systematic Method for Identification and Prevention
of
 Product & Process Problems before they occur
 Focused on Preventing Defects
 Ideally conducted in Product & Process Design Stage
 Conducting on existing products & processes yields
substantial results.
39/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 First formal FEMA was conducted in Aerospace Industry in
1960’s
 Became key tool for improving safety of chemical
processes
 Safety FMEA today is a key tool to prevent safety accidents
& incidents
 Engineers have always used FMEA to identify potential
failures of product & processes
 Automotive Industry used FMEA for Quality Improvement
49/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Preventing Product & Process problems before they occur.
 Used both in Design of Product and Manufacturing
Processes
 Reduces cost by identifying product & process
improvements early in the development process
 Results in a robust Product & Process
 Formal FMEA process should be part of Quality System
59/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Essential to have documented Data and Information
about Product & Process
 Otherwise it becomes a guessing game based on
opinions.
 FMEA will then focus on wrong failure modes
 FMEA should be based on facts : on DATA
69/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 To look for all ways in which a product or process can
fail
 Failures are not limited products
 Failures can occur when the user makes a mistake
 These failures should also be included in FMEA
79/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Ways in which a product or process can fail are called
FAILURE MODES
 Each FAILURE MODE has a potential effect
 Some effects are more likely to occur than others –
each failure mode has a probability
 Each FAILURE MODE has relative RISK associated with
it.
89/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 FMEA process is way to identify the failures, effects,
and risks within a process or product and then
eliminate or reduce them.
99/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 The relative risk of a failure and its effects is
determined by three factors
 Severity: The consequences of the failure should it
occur
 Occurrence: The probability or the frequency of the
failure occurring
 Detection : The probability of the failure being
detected before the impact if the effect is realized.
109/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Each Potential Failure Mode is rated in each of the
three factors on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 , low to
high.
 Risk Priority Number( RPN) is determined by
multiplying the ranking of the three factors ( severity
X occurrence X detection )
 The RPN is determined for each potential failure and
each effect.
119/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 The RPN is used to rank the need for corrective action
to eliminate or reduce the potential failure modes.
 Failure modes with highest RPN should be attended
first
 Special attention should be given when the severity
ranking is high : 9 or 10
 RPN will range from 1 to 1000 for each failure mode.
129/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Once corrective action is taken , a new RPN is
determined by re-evaluating the severity , occurrence
and detection.
 The new RPN is called “ Resulting RPN”
 Improvements and corrective actions must continue
until the “ Resulting RPN is at an acceptable level for
all potential failure modes.
139/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
Potential Areas of Use(s)
 Prioritize risks
 Monitor the effectiveness of risk control activities
 Equipment and facilities
 Analyse a manufacturing process to identify high-risk
steps or critical parameters
RNP: Risk Priority Number
149/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 All FMEA projects are team based
 Bring Variety of perspectives & experiences to the project
 Teams are formed when needed and disbanded once the project
is complete
 Best size of team is around 4 to 6
◦ Manufacturing, Engineering, Maintenance, Materials , Quality ,
Development
 Customers , Internal as well as external to the organization can
give a unique perspective
 Some Team members should be familiar with the product and
process
159/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Members who are not familiar will bring unbiased objective ideas
to the table.
 Team leader should be appointed by the Management or
selected by the team
 Team leader should not dominate the team and does not
normally have the final word
 Team leaders role is like a facilitator
 A scribe should be appointed for taking minutes
 Process expert in the team will paly a key role
◦ Design Engineers in Design FEMA or Process Engineer in Process FEMA
169/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 FMEA is a critical look at a Product or a Process
 Team members have a stake in product or the process
 Members can not allow egos to come in the way of FMEA
 It should be understood that the objective is to find issues with the
Product and the Process and not the person
 Team members should have some knowledge of the FEMA process
 A formal training though not essential could help
 However team members should be familiar with Data analysis tools
like Statistical Quality Control , Flow charting and other similar
techniques.
179/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Important to clearly define the scope and boundaries for
the team to function
 Responsibility :
◦ Conduct analysis
◦ Make recommendations
◦ Implement recommendations
 Spending Budget
 Resources available
 Deadline & other constraints
 Communication process to convey results
189/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 The scope of the FEMA must be well defined
 Specific and a clear definition of the process and
product should be written and understood
 Team member should have scope to clarify doubts
 Specific and clear definition is more important for a
process FEMA
 Start UP FEMA Worksheet will always help
◦ See next slides for sample worksheets
199/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
209/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
1. Review the Process or Product
2. Brainstorm potential failure modes
3. List Potential effects of each failure mode
4. Assign a Severity Ranking for each failure mode
5. Assign Occurrence Ranking for each failure mode
6. Assign detection ranking for each failure mode or effect
7. Calculate the RPN for each effect
8. Prioritize the Failure Modes for Action
9. Take action to eliminate or reduce high risk failure modes
10. Calculate the RPN again as the failure modes are reduced or
eliminated.
219/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
 Document the FEMA process in a FEMA worksheet
 Form captures all important information
 Serves as an excellent tool for communication
 See subsequent slides for examples of Worksheet
229/17/2015
Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
9/17/2015. 269/17/2015
• 10 Extreme
• Predicted to cause severe impact to quality (Product out of specifications, no
Expert Statement possible)
• 7 High
• Predicted to cause significant impact on quality (Failure to meet specifications,
no Stability data, Expert Statement possible)
• 3 Moderate
• Predicted to cause minor impact on quality (Failure to meet specifications,
Stability data available)
• 1 Low
• Predicted to have no/minor impact on quality of the product (Quality within
specifications)
9/17/2015. 279/17/2015
• 8 Regular failures
• Expected to happen regularly
• 4 Repeated failures
• Expected to happen in a low frequency
• 2 Occasional failures
• Expected to happen infrequently
• 1 Unlikely failures
• Unlikely to happen
9/17/2015. 289/17/2015
• 4 Normally not detected
• Failure very likely to be overlooked, hence not detected
(no technical solution, no manual control)
• 3 Likely not detected
• Failure may be overseen
(manual control, spot checks)
• 2 Regularly detected
• Failure will normally be detected
(manual control, routine work with statistical control)
• 1 Always detected
• Failure can and will be detected in all cases
(monitoring, technical solution available)
299/17/2015
10 Dangerously High Failure could lead to death or permanent injury to the customer. Financial:
>$1,000,000
9 Extremely high Failure could lead to injury to the customer. Failure would create non-
compliance with registered specifications. Failure likely to lead to recall.
Financial: $1,000,000
8 Very High Failure could lead to adverse reaction for customer. Failure would create
noncompliance with GMP regulations or product registrations. Failure
possible to lead to recall. Financial: $500,000
7 High Failure leads to customer percept ion of safety issue. Failure renders
individual unit(s) unusable. Failure causes a high degree of customer
dissatisfaction. Recall for business reasons possible but Authority required
recall unlikely. Financial: $100,000
6 Moderate Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction and numerous
complaints. Failure unlikely to lead to recall. Financial: $50,000
5 Low Failure likely to cause isolated customer complaints. Financial: $10,000
4 Very Low Failure relates to non-dosage form issues (like minor packaging problems)
and can be easily overcome by the customer. Financial: $5,000
3 Minor Failure could be noticed by the customer but is unlikely to be perceived as
significant enough to warrant a complaint.
2 Very Minor Failure not readily apparent to the customer. Financial: <$1,000
1 None Failure would not be noticeable to the customer. Financial: none
10 Very High: Failure
is almost
inevitable
More than one occurrence per day or a probability of more than three
occurrences in 10 units (Cpk < 0.33 or <1σ).
9 One occurrence every three to four days or a probability of three occurrences
in 10 units (Cpk ~ 0.33 or ~1 σ).
8 High: Repeated
failures
One occurrence per week or a probability of 5 occurrences in 100 units (Cpk ~
0.67 or ~2 σ).
7 One occurrence every month or one occurrence in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.83 ~2.5
σ).
6 Moderate:
Occasional
Failures
One occurrence every three months or three occurrences in 1,000 units (Cpk ~
1.00 or ~ 3 σ).
5 One occurrence every six months to one year or one occurrence in 10,000
units (Cpk ~ 1.17 or ~ 3.5 σ).
4 One occurrence per year or six occurrences in 100,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.33 or ~ 4
σ).
3 Low: Relatively
few Failures
One occurrence every one to three years or six occurrences in 10,000,000
units (Cpk ~ 1.67 or ~5 σ).
2 One occurrence every three to five years or 2 occurrences in 1,000,000,000
units (Cpk ~ 2.00 OR ~6 σ).
1 Remote: Failure is
unlikely
One occurrence in greater than five years or less than two occurrences in
1,000,000,000 units (Cpk > 2.00 OR >6 σ).
For batch failures use the time scale for unit failures use the unit scale.
10 Absolute
Uncertainty
The product is not inspected or the defect caused by the failure is not
detectable.
9 Very Remote Product is sampled, inspected, and released based on Acceptable Quality
Level (AQL) sampling plans.
8 Remote Product is accepted based on no defects in a sample.
7 Very Low Product is 100% manually inspected in the process.
6 Low Product is 100% manually inspected using go/no-go or other mistake-proofing
gauges.
5 Moderate Some Statistical Process Control (SPC) is used in the process and product is
final inspected off-line.
4 Moderately High SPC is used and there is immediate reaction to out-of-control conditions.
3 High An effective SPC program is in place with process capabilities (Cpk) greater
than 1.33.
2 Very High All product is 100% automatically inspected.
1 Almost Certain The defect is obvious and there is 100% automatic inspection with regular
calibration and preventive maintenance of the inspection equipment.
339/17/2015
349/17/2015
 Severity (S)
◦ Link to end product functional failure
◦ Medical Department involvement
 Probability (P)
◦ Use historical data
◦ Similar processes products
 Detection
◦ Method validation studies
◦ Historical data
Drying Process
359/17/2015
Rankin
g
Severity (S) Probability (P) Detection (D)
10 Death More than once a day Impossible to detect
9 ↓ 3 – 4 times a day Remote
8 Permanent injury Once a week Very slight
7 ↓ Once a month Slight
6 Temporary injury Once in three month Low
5 ↓ Once in half – one year Medium
4
Reported/
dissatisfied
Once a year Moderately high
3 ↓ Once in 1 – 3 years High
2 Notice/ no report Once in 3 – 5 years Very High
1 ↓
Less than once in 5
years
Virtually certain
Drying Process
9/17/2015. 36
Process
Potential Failure
Mode
Potential Cause S P D RPN
1. Set up Contamination Disheveled gown of operator
Insufficient cleaning of
equipment
2. Start
drying
Contamination Damage of inlet-air filter
Degradation of
product
Damage of thermometer
3. Maintain
temperature
Long drying time Unstable supply-air volume
High Loss On Drying
(LOD)
Damage of timer
Low LOD High dew-point
Non-uniformity of
LOD
Uneven temperature
distribution
Drying Process RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
Existing controls: IPC of LOD and degradation product after drying process
Drying Process
Process
Potential Failure
Mode
Potential Cause S P D RPN
1. Set up Contamination Disheveled gown of operator 3 5 8 120
Insufficient cleaning of
equipment
7 2 8 112
2. Start
drying
Contamination Damage of inlet-air filter 7 3 6 126
Degradation of
product
Damage of thermometer 7 3 3 63
3. Maintain
temperature
Long drying time Unstable supply-air volume 2 4 5 40
High LOD Malfunction of timer 2 2 2 8
Low LOD High due-point 3 3 3 27
Non-uniformity of
LOD
Uneven temperature
distribution
3 5 3 45
RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
Take action when RPN is over 100
Take action when severity is over 5
Remaining critical parameters after taking action; further controls required
Drying Process
Process Potential Cause RPN Recommended Action S P D RPN
1. Set up Disheveled gown of
operator
120 Use long gloves and
goggles
3 2 8 48
Insufficient cleaning of
equipment
112 Change cleaning procedure 7 2 4 56
2. Start
drying
Damage of inlet-air filter 126 Change maintenance
period
7 2 6 84
Damage of thermometer 63 Change calibration period 7 2 3 42
3.Maintain
temperature
Unstable supply-air
volume
40 ― 2 4 5 40
Malfunction of timer 8 ― 2 2 2 8
High dew-point 27 ― 3 3 3 27
Uneven temperature
distribution
45 ― 3 5 3 45
RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
409/17/2015
 Analyse a granulation process step because only a
few parameters are adjustable and many problems can
occur by manual operations
Severity (Consequences):
3: high Predicted to cause significant impact to quality (failure to meet specifications)
2: moderate Predicted to cause minor impact to quality (failure to meet specifications)
1: minor Predicted to could have minor impact on quality of the product (quality within specifications)
Probability
4: regular failures Expected to happen frequently
3: repeated failures Could happen occasionally
2: occasional failures Expected to happen infrequently
1: failure is unlikely Unlikely to happen
Detectability
3: probably not detected May overlook a fault or failture possibly can not be detected (no technical solution up to now)
2: occasionaly not detected Failture may be missed (manual control, routinely work with statistical control)
1: detectable Failture can and will be detected (e.g. using statistical tools)
419/17/2015
Risk Assessment Risk Reduction
Sub-Step
Event
(Failure mode)
Effect
Severity(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability(D)
[1<2<3]
Riskfactor
(S*P*D)
Actions:
Risk reduction strategy
Severity(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability(D)
[1<2<3]
Riskfactor
(S*P*D)
Riskreduction
Comments
Wet seving Drying Temperature
not meet specification of
degradation
2 4 1 8 implement 2 temperature measures 1 1 1 1 7
automatically interruption
by not meeting range;
Temperatur monitoring in
batch record
Granulation Drying water content
not meet specification of
degradation
2 3 1 6 introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment
introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2
direct measurement; time
consuming
humidity measurement in the exausting
air
2 1 2 4 2
indirect measurment;
unspecifoc
Granulation kneeding time
not meet specification of
dissolution
3 3 1 9 reduce personnal fluctuation 3 3 1 9 0
operator knowledge;
depending on power
consumption;
automatisation not possible
at that time
Granulation power consumption
not meet specification of
dissolution
3 2 1 6
try to get to a minumum an optimum of
kneeding time
3 2 1 6 0
depending on kneeding
time depending on materia
properties
Pre-mixing mixing time
not meet specification of
content uniformity
3 2 3 18 IPC measure on content uniformity 3 2 1 6 12 influence on efficacy
Pre-mixing Granulation speed of adding water
not meet specification of
disolution and
desintegration
3 3 3 27
Analyse (seeving of granulate sieve
analysis); use of dosage pumps
3 2 1 6 21
to get fine appropriate
granulate
Pre-mixing Granulation manner of adding water
not meet specification of
disolution and
desintegration
3 1 1 3 install spray nozzles 1 1 1 1 2
to get fine appropriate
granulate
Granulation Quality of Excipients
all parameters have to be
re-evaluated
3 4 3 36
Adapt internal specification of physical
parameters (e.g. density, metability
wetability)
1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier
Granulation Quality of API
all parameters have to be
re-evaluated
3 4 3 36
Adapt internal specification of physical
parameters (e.g. density, metability
wetatility)
1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier
Overview Risk before cotrol Max 36 Risk after control Max 9 32
Average 17 Average 4 10
Min 3 Min 1 0
429/17/2015
Risk Assessment
Sub-Step
Event
(Failure mode)
Effect
Severity(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability(D)
[1<2<3]
Riskfactor
(S*P*D)
Granulation Drying water content
not meet specification of
degradation
2 3 1 6
Risk Reduction
Actions:
Risk reduction strategy
Severity(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability(D)
[1<2<3]
Riskfactor
(S*P*D)
Riskreduction
Comments
introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment
introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2
direct measurement; time
consuming
humidity measurement in the exaust air 2 1 2 4 2
indirect measurment;
unspecific
S. Rönninger, Roche
439/17/2015
S. Rönninger, Roche
449/17/2015
 Prepare a risk profile
Severity / Consequences
i negligible
ii marginal
iii critical
iv catastrophic
Probability
A frequent
B moderate
C occasional
D rare
E unlikely
F very unlikely
Consequences
Risk
protection
level
459/17/2015
 Prepare a risk profile: Probability
9/17/2015. 469/17/2015
 Risk Evaluation
◦ Prepare a risk profile: Consequences
9/17/2015. 479/17/2015
 Risk Evaluation
◦ Prepare a risk profile: Consequences
9/17/2015. 489/17/2015
 Risk Evaluation: Risk Profile
◦ For high risks, which are not acceptable, risk
reduction measures have to be taken as a high
priority
9/17/2015. 499/17/2015
Summary (Risk Evaluation)
 The effects are rated in terms of their consequences
and the causes are assessed in terms of their
probabilities
a) qualitative or b) quantitative
 Based on these results a risk profile is completed.
 In this profile the risks are compared with the risk
protection level, which determines the accepted
probability for defined consequences
 Use as an aid to prioritise actions!
9/17/2015. 509/17/2015
Failure Mode
Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
Presentation complied by Drug Regulations – a
not for profit organization from publicly available
material form FDA , EMA, EDQM . WHO and
similar organizations.
Visit www.drugregulations.org for the latest in
Pharmaceuticals
519/17/20159/17/2015.

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FMEA Presentation Analyzes Failure Modes and Effects

  • 1. Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Presentation complied by Drug Regulations – a not for profit organization from publicly available material form FDA , EMA, EDQM . WHO and similar organizations. Visit www.drugregulations.org for the latest in Pharmaceuticals 19/17/20159/17/2015.
  • 2.  Introduction  History  Purpose  Objective  Failure Modes  Risk Priority Number  FEMA Team , Process, Boundaries, Scope  Ten Steps for FEMA  Examples of Ranking  FEMA for a Drying Process  FEMA for a Granulation Process  Preparation of a RISK Profile 29/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 3.  Systematic Method for Identification and Prevention of  Product & Process Problems before they occur  Focused on Preventing Defects  Ideally conducted in Product & Process Design Stage  Conducting on existing products & processes yields substantial results. 39/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 4.  First formal FEMA was conducted in Aerospace Industry in 1960’s  Became key tool for improving safety of chemical processes  Safety FMEA today is a key tool to prevent safety accidents & incidents  Engineers have always used FMEA to identify potential failures of product & processes  Automotive Industry used FMEA for Quality Improvement 49/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 5.  Preventing Product & Process problems before they occur.  Used both in Design of Product and Manufacturing Processes  Reduces cost by identifying product & process improvements early in the development process  Results in a robust Product & Process  Formal FMEA process should be part of Quality System 59/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 6.  Essential to have documented Data and Information about Product & Process  Otherwise it becomes a guessing game based on opinions.  FMEA will then focus on wrong failure modes  FMEA should be based on facts : on DATA 69/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 7.  To look for all ways in which a product or process can fail  Failures are not limited products  Failures can occur when the user makes a mistake  These failures should also be included in FMEA 79/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 8.  Ways in which a product or process can fail are called FAILURE MODES  Each FAILURE MODE has a potential effect  Some effects are more likely to occur than others – each failure mode has a probability  Each FAILURE MODE has relative RISK associated with it. 89/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 9.  FMEA process is way to identify the failures, effects, and risks within a process or product and then eliminate or reduce them. 99/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 10.  The relative risk of a failure and its effects is determined by three factors  Severity: The consequences of the failure should it occur  Occurrence: The probability or the frequency of the failure occurring  Detection : The probability of the failure being detected before the impact if the effect is realized. 109/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 11.  Each Potential Failure Mode is rated in each of the three factors on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 , low to high.  Risk Priority Number( RPN) is determined by multiplying the ranking of the three factors ( severity X occurrence X detection )  The RPN is determined for each potential failure and each effect. 119/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 12.  The RPN is used to rank the need for corrective action to eliminate or reduce the potential failure modes.  Failure modes with highest RPN should be attended first  Special attention should be given when the severity ranking is high : 9 or 10  RPN will range from 1 to 1000 for each failure mode. 129/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 13.  Once corrective action is taken , a new RPN is determined by re-evaluating the severity , occurrence and detection.  The new RPN is called “ Resulting RPN”  Improvements and corrective actions must continue until the “ Resulting RPN is at an acceptable level for all potential failure modes. 139/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 14. Potential Areas of Use(s)  Prioritize risks  Monitor the effectiveness of risk control activities  Equipment and facilities  Analyse a manufacturing process to identify high-risk steps or critical parameters RNP: Risk Priority Number 149/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 15.  All FMEA projects are team based  Bring Variety of perspectives & experiences to the project  Teams are formed when needed and disbanded once the project is complete  Best size of team is around 4 to 6 ◦ Manufacturing, Engineering, Maintenance, Materials , Quality , Development  Customers , Internal as well as external to the organization can give a unique perspective  Some Team members should be familiar with the product and process 159/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 16.  Members who are not familiar will bring unbiased objective ideas to the table.  Team leader should be appointed by the Management or selected by the team  Team leader should not dominate the team and does not normally have the final word  Team leaders role is like a facilitator  A scribe should be appointed for taking minutes  Process expert in the team will paly a key role ◦ Design Engineers in Design FEMA or Process Engineer in Process FEMA 169/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 17.  FMEA is a critical look at a Product or a Process  Team members have a stake in product or the process  Members can not allow egos to come in the way of FMEA  It should be understood that the objective is to find issues with the Product and the Process and not the person  Team members should have some knowledge of the FEMA process  A formal training though not essential could help  However team members should be familiar with Data analysis tools like Statistical Quality Control , Flow charting and other similar techniques. 179/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 18.  Important to clearly define the scope and boundaries for the team to function  Responsibility : ◦ Conduct analysis ◦ Make recommendations ◦ Implement recommendations  Spending Budget  Resources available  Deadline & other constraints  Communication process to convey results 189/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 19.  The scope of the FEMA must be well defined  Specific and a clear definition of the process and product should be written and understood  Team member should have scope to clarify doubts  Specific and clear definition is more important for a process FEMA  Start UP FEMA Worksheet will always help ◦ See next slides for sample worksheets 199/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 20. 209/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 21. 1. Review the Process or Product 2. Brainstorm potential failure modes 3. List Potential effects of each failure mode 4. Assign a Severity Ranking for each failure mode 5. Assign Occurrence Ranking for each failure mode 6. Assign detection ranking for each failure mode or effect 7. Calculate the RPN for each effect 8. Prioritize the Failure Modes for Action 9. Take action to eliminate or reduce high risk failure modes 10. Calculate the RPN again as the failure modes are reduced or eliminated. 219/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 22.  Document the FEMA process in a FEMA worksheet  Form captures all important information  Serves as an excellent tool for communication  See subsequent slides for examples of Worksheet 229/17/2015 Drug Regulations : Online Resource for Latest Information
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 27. • 10 Extreme • Predicted to cause severe impact to quality (Product out of specifications, no Expert Statement possible) • 7 High • Predicted to cause significant impact on quality (Failure to meet specifications, no Stability data, Expert Statement possible) • 3 Moderate • Predicted to cause minor impact on quality (Failure to meet specifications, Stability data available) • 1 Low • Predicted to have no/minor impact on quality of the product (Quality within specifications) 9/17/2015. 279/17/2015
  • 28. • 8 Regular failures • Expected to happen regularly • 4 Repeated failures • Expected to happen in a low frequency • 2 Occasional failures • Expected to happen infrequently • 1 Unlikely failures • Unlikely to happen 9/17/2015. 289/17/2015
  • 29. • 4 Normally not detected • Failure very likely to be overlooked, hence not detected (no technical solution, no manual control) • 3 Likely not detected • Failure may be overseen (manual control, spot checks) • 2 Regularly detected • Failure will normally be detected (manual control, routine work with statistical control) • 1 Always detected • Failure can and will be detected in all cases (monitoring, technical solution available) 299/17/2015
  • 30. 10 Dangerously High Failure could lead to death or permanent injury to the customer. Financial: >$1,000,000 9 Extremely high Failure could lead to injury to the customer. Failure would create non- compliance with registered specifications. Failure likely to lead to recall. Financial: $1,000,000 8 Very High Failure could lead to adverse reaction for customer. Failure would create noncompliance with GMP regulations or product registrations. Failure possible to lead to recall. Financial: $500,000 7 High Failure leads to customer percept ion of safety issue. Failure renders individual unit(s) unusable. Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction. Recall for business reasons possible but Authority required recall unlikely. Financial: $100,000 6 Moderate Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction and numerous complaints. Failure unlikely to lead to recall. Financial: $50,000 5 Low Failure likely to cause isolated customer complaints. Financial: $10,000 4 Very Low Failure relates to non-dosage form issues (like minor packaging problems) and can be easily overcome by the customer. Financial: $5,000 3 Minor Failure could be noticed by the customer but is unlikely to be perceived as significant enough to warrant a complaint. 2 Very Minor Failure not readily apparent to the customer. Financial: <$1,000 1 None Failure would not be noticeable to the customer. Financial: none
  • 31. 10 Very High: Failure is almost inevitable More than one occurrence per day or a probability of more than three occurrences in 10 units (Cpk < 0.33 or <1σ). 9 One occurrence every three to four days or a probability of three occurrences in 10 units (Cpk ~ 0.33 or ~1 σ). 8 High: Repeated failures One occurrence per week or a probability of 5 occurrences in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.67 or ~2 σ). 7 One occurrence every month or one occurrence in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.83 ~2.5 σ). 6 Moderate: Occasional Failures One occurrence every three months or three occurrences in 1,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.00 or ~ 3 σ). 5 One occurrence every six months to one year or one occurrence in 10,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.17 or ~ 3.5 σ). 4 One occurrence per year or six occurrences in 100,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.33 or ~ 4 σ). 3 Low: Relatively few Failures One occurrence every one to three years or six occurrences in 10,000,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.67 or ~5 σ). 2 One occurrence every three to five years or 2 occurrences in 1,000,000,000 units (Cpk ~ 2.00 OR ~6 σ). 1 Remote: Failure is unlikely One occurrence in greater than five years or less than two occurrences in 1,000,000,000 units (Cpk > 2.00 OR >6 σ). For batch failures use the time scale for unit failures use the unit scale.
  • 32. 10 Absolute Uncertainty The product is not inspected or the defect caused by the failure is not detectable. 9 Very Remote Product is sampled, inspected, and released based on Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) sampling plans. 8 Remote Product is accepted based on no defects in a sample. 7 Very Low Product is 100% manually inspected in the process. 6 Low Product is 100% manually inspected using go/no-go or other mistake-proofing gauges. 5 Moderate Some Statistical Process Control (SPC) is used in the process and product is final inspected off-line. 4 Moderately High SPC is used and there is immediate reaction to out-of-control conditions. 3 High An effective SPC program is in place with process capabilities (Cpk) greater than 1.33. 2 Very High All product is 100% automatically inspected. 1 Almost Certain The defect is obvious and there is 100% automatic inspection with regular calibration and preventive maintenance of the inspection equipment.
  • 35.  Severity (S) ◦ Link to end product functional failure ◦ Medical Department involvement  Probability (P) ◦ Use historical data ◦ Similar processes products  Detection ◦ Method validation studies ◦ Historical data Drying Process 359/17/2015
  • 36. Rankin g Severity (S) Probability (P) Detection (D) 10 Death More than once a day Impossible to detect 9 ↓ 3 – 4 times a day Remote 8 Permanent injury Once a week Very slight 7 ↓ Once a month Slight 6 Temporary injury Once in three month Low 5 ↓ Once in half – one year Medium 4 Reported/ dissatisfied Once a year Moderately high 3 ↓ Once in 1 – 3 years High 2 Notice/ no report Once in 3 – 5 years Very High 1 ↓ Less than once in 5 years Virtually certain Drying Process 9/17/2015. 36
  • 37. Process Potential Failure Mode Potential Cause S P D RPN 1. Set up Contamination Disheveled gown of operator Insufficient cleaning of equipment 2. Start drying Contamination Damage of inlet-air filter Degradation of product Damage of thermometer 3. Maintain temperature Long drying time Unstable supply-air volume High Loss On Drying (LOD) Damage of timer Low LOD High dew-point Non-uniformity of LOD Uneven temperature distribution Drying Process RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
  • 38. Existing controls: IPC of LOD and degradation product after drying process Drying Process Process Potential Failure Mode Potential Cause S P D RPN 1. Set up Contamination Disheveled gown of operator 3 5 8 120 Insufficient cleaning of equipment 7 2 8 112 2. Start drying Contamination Damage of inlet-air filter 7 3 6 126 Degradation of product Damage of thermometer 7 3 3 63 3. Maintain temperature Long drying time Unstable supply-air volume 2 4 5 40 High LOD Malfunction of timer 2 2 2 8 Low LOD High due-point 3 3 3 27 Non-uniformity of LOD Uneven temperature distribution 3 5 3 45 RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
  • 39. Take action when RPN is over 100 Take action when severity is over 5 Remaining critical parameters after taking action; further controls required Drying Process Process Potential Cause RPN Recommended Action S P D RPN 1. Set up Disheveled gown of operator 120 Use long gloves and goggles 3 2 8 48 Insufficient cleaning of equipment 112 Change cleaning procedure 7 2 4 56 2. Start drying Damage of inlet-air filter 126 Change maintenance period 7 2 6 84 Damage of thermometer 63 Change calibration period 7 2 3 42 3.Maintain temperature Unstable supply-air volume 40 ― 2 4 5 40 Malfunction of timer 8 ― 2 2 2 8 High dew-point 27 ― 3 3 3 27 Uneven temperature distribution 45 ― 3 5 3 45 RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
  • 41.  Analyse a granulation process step because only a few parameters are adjustable and many problems can occur by manual operations Severity (Consequences): 3: high Predicted to cause significant impact to quality (failure to meet specifications) 2: moderate Predicted to cause minor impact to quality (failure to meet specifications) 1: minor Predicted to could have minor impact on quality of the product (quality within specifications) Probability 4: regular failures Expected to happen frequently 3: repeated failures Could happen occasionally 2: occasional failures Expected to happen infrequently 1: failure is unlikely Unlikely to happen Detectability 3: probably not detected May overlook a fault or failture possibly can not be detected (no technical solution up to now) 2: occasionaly not detected Failture may be missed (manual control, routinely work with statistical control) 1: detectable Failture can and will be detected (e.g. using statistical tools) 419/17/2015
  • 42. Risk Assessment Risk Reduction Sub-Step Event (Failure mode) Effect Severity(S) [1<2<3] Probability(P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability(D) [1<2<3] Riskfactor (S*P*D) Actions: Risk reduction strategy Severity(S) [1<2<3] Probability(P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability(D) [1<2<3] Riskfactor (S*P*D) Riskreduction Comments Wet seving Drying Temperature not meet specification of degradation 2 4 1 8 implement 2 temperature measures 1 1 1 1 7 automatically interruption by not meeting range; Temperatur monitoring in batch record Granulation Drying water content not meet specification of degradation 2 3 1 6 introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2 direct measurement; time consuming humidity measurement in the exausting air 2 1 2 4 2 indirect measurment; unspecifoc Granulation kneeding time not meet specification of dissolution 3 3 1 9 reduce personnal fluctuation 3 3 1 9 0 operator knowledge; depending on power consumption; automatisation not possible at that time Granulation power consumption not meet specification of dissolution 3 2 1 6 try to get to a minumum an optimum of kneeding time 3 2 1 6 0 depending on kneeding time depending on materia properties Pre-mixing mixing time not meet specification of content uniformity 3 2 3 18 IPC measure on content uniformity 3 2 1 6 12 influence on efficacy Pre-mixing Granulation speed of adding water not meet specification of disolution and desintegration 3 3 3 27 Analyse (seeving of granulate sieve analysis); use of dosage pumps 3 2 1 6 21 to get fine appropriate granulate Pre-mixing Granulation manner of adding water not meet specification of disolution and desintegration 3 1 1 3 install spray nozzles 1 1 1 1 2 to get fine appropriate granulate Granulation Quality of Excipients all parameters have to be re-evaluated 3 4 3 36 Adapt internal specification of physical parameters (e.g. density, metability wetability) 1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier Granulation Quality of API all parameters have to be re-evaluated 3 4 3 36 Adapt internal specification of physical parameters (e.g. density, metability wetatility) 1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier Overview Risk before cotrol Max 36 Risk after control Max 9 32 Average 17 Average 4 10 Min 3 Min 1 0 429/17/2015
  • 43. Risk Assessment Sub-Step Event (Failure mode) Effect Severity(S) [1<2<3] Probability(P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability(D) [1<2<3] Riskfactor (S*P*D) Granulation Drying water content not meet specification of degradation 2 3 1 6 Risk Reduction Actions: Risk reduction strategy Severity(S) [1<2<3] Probability(P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability(D) [1<2<3] Riskfactor (S*P*D) Riskreduction Comments introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2 direct measurement; time consuming humidity measurement in the exaust air 2 1 2 4 2 indirect measurment; unspecific S. Rönninger, Roche 439/17/2015
  • 45.  Prepare a risk profile Severity / Consequences i negligible ii marginal iii critical iv catastrophic Probability A frequent B moderate C occasional D rare E unlikely F very unlikely Consequences Risk protection level 459/17/2015
  • 46.  Prepare a risk profile: Probability 9/17/2015. 469/17/2015
  • 47.  Risk Evaluation ◦ Prepare a risk profile: Consequences 9/17/2015. 479/17/2015
  • 48.  Risk Evaluation ◦ Prepare a risk profile: Consequences 9/17/2015. 489/17/2015
  • 49.  Risk Evaluation: Risk Profile ◦ For high risks, which are not acceptable, risk reduction measures have to be taken as a high priority 9/17/2015. 499/17/2015
  • 50. Summary (Risk Evaluation)  The effects are rated in terms of their consequences and the causes are assessed in terms of their probabilities a) qualitative or b) quantitative  Based on these results a risk profile is completed.  In this profile the risks are compared with the risk protection level, which determines the accepted probability for defined consequences  Use as an aid to prioritise actions! 9/17/2015. 509/17/2015
  • 51. Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Presentation complied by Drug Regulations – a not for profit organization from publicly available material form FDA , EMA, EDQM . WHO and similar organizations. Visit www.drugregulations.org for the latest in Pharmaceuticals 519/17/20159/17/2015.

Notas del editor

  1. Self made scale
  2. Self made scale