1. History and Philosophy of Media
22 May, 2012
All facets of the cultural industries have been irreparably altered by the imperatives of
neoliberalism. A globalised economy and time poor populous has produced a commercial
media unwilling or unable to challenge the institutions that define this “new” modernity. As
Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno record; “culture today is infecting everything with
sameness” (Horkheimer et al, 2002); creating an uncreative, apathetic populous and ensuring
the continued dominance of established economic and political paradigms (Herman et al, 1988).
As the “Information Age” dawns, there is a sense that the hegemonic conceptions of reality that
define the present coupled with the biopolitical forms of control and domination that define the
network (Galloway, 2004, Beer, 2009) will create a society in which deviation from the norm is
intrinsically accompanied by exclusion. Thus in the “Networked Society”:
“The ruler no longer says: “Either you think as I do or you die.” He says: “You are free
not to think as I do; your life, your property - all that you shall keep. But from this day
on you will be a stranger among us.” Anyone who does not conform is condemned to
an economic impotence which is prolonged in the intellectual powerlessness of the
eccentric loner” (Horkheimer et al, 2002)
As the internet and other forms of networked communication revolutionise the media sphere,
the biopolitical forms of control intrinsic to such technologies threaten to limit the potential of
new media to “liberate”. The lack of individual agency that defines postmodernity crystallises
the similarities that exist between contemporary Western civilization the societies of the
Enlightenment. The democratisation of information and development of a self-perceived public
sphere (the Republic of Letters) that defined the 15th Century served only to establish new
forms of control; political authority replaced with the authority of the rationalism and the printed
word (Burchell, 2003). The same is true in the Network Society; despite the fervid optimism
surrounding the popularization of the internet, a “moral legislator” (in the form of protocol and
algorithm) continues to permeate cyberspace inhibiting truly “free” communications (Burchell,
2003). The internet is thus simultaneously liberator and overlord;
“All technologies can be used for oppression as much as for liberation... networks can
connect and disconnect, include and exclude, depending on their programs and on their
configuration” (Castells, 2009)
Given new technologies tendency to reiterate existing paradigms, as Information Age dawns,
it seems unlikely that the contemporary citizen will witness an extension of personal liberties.
However, the acceleration of communication processes will irreparably alter the political
process, as liberal democracy adapts to the increasingly dynamic and pragmatic public sphere.
As an era of automated, mechanised control dawns, media content is transitioned
into commodity; created efficiently with the explicit purpose of being consumed promptly.
The centralisation of ownership of established media forms coupled with the expansion of
capitalism into ‘cyberspace’ has resulted in an altered media landscape where the spectacular,
sensationalist and graphic reign (Debord, 1967). Replacing political consciousness with apathy
(Adorno, 1963) the contemporary commercial media no longer function as the Fourth Estate of
Democracy. Rather, “enlightenment” (the triumph of rationality and the scientific method) and
the expansion of the cultural industries has eroded society’s moral basis, creating a vacuous
and amoral populous (Adorno, 1963). Such a trend is reflected in the nature of media content;
the Golden Era of Journalism defined by a commitment to the public interest, replaced with a

2. History and Philosophy of Media
22 May, 2012
predominantly commercial media that seeks to maximise profits.
As the nature of media content evolves with imperatives of postmodernity, the role of journalism
in the democratic process is significantly altered. Criticism of this trend pervades the political
and academic establishments of contemporary western nation states. Malcolm Turnbull,
shadow Minister of Communications, recently reiterated that in future journalism will be
described as “infotainment” (Turnbull, 2011); coverage of politics reduced to what former
Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner was to term the “sideshow” (Tanner, 2011). There is relative
consensus that in a hypercommercialised media environment quality investigative journalism
(and perhaps quality journalism more generally) will become an unsustainable endeavor
(Birnbauer, 2011).
The “crisis of credibility” that plagues contemporary print media (Carlson, 2011),
especially within the United Kingdom, is in part the product of journalism’s increasing reliance
on the anonymous source. As Matt Carlson records, the use of the anonymous source extends
the level of responsibility assigned to journalist and news organisation (Carlson, 2011). As the
views are unattributed a particular individual or public figure, the journalist, as author, takes
accountability for the opinions articulated in the relevant media content. Thus in the new media
environment, the journalist is no longer the passive conveyer of information; transformed
into quasi source (Carlson, 2011), a problematic transition given the profession’s evangelical
commitment to the problematic ethic of “objectivity”. The use of anonymous sources inherently
compromises the credibility and integrity of coverage (Kimball, 2011), yet the vast majority of
journalists maintain their commitment to this ethically fraught practice; a consequence of the
media industries prevailing belief that if source anonymity was discontinued, “good journalism”
would cease to exist.
“Journalism that goes beyond the media release and spin would all but die if the
countless background and off-the-record conversations had by journalists each day were
at risk of being made public” (Simons, 2012)
The use of the anonymous/unattributed/unnamed/confidential source does not occur within a
political vacuum. Thus the cultural and media trends described above, generated predominantly
by the economic reform which defined the Reagan/Thatcher era, illuminate the some of the
complex contextual conditions that nurture the continued use of the anonymous source in
contemporary media content.
The imperatives of the commercial environment and an increasingly globalised
media sphere have resulted in the intensification of existing conflicts between media, judiciary
and government. The paradoxical relationship between journalism and the institutional
structures of the nation state (journalism dependent upon government information whilst
simultaneously acting as government “watchdog”) contributes to the perception that the ethical
imperatives of the media, judiciary and government are inconsolable. A 2010 policy document
from the Australian Press Council typifies this tendency, highlighting not only the cause of
conflict between press and government but also the apparent link between such conflict and the
use of anonymous sources.
“Governments are not always cooperative in providing the press with information that
gives an objective and complete picture of government activity, free from distortion.
There are instances when such a complete picture can only be ascertained by relying
on confidential sources. Such sources usually have unique knowledge of the internal

3. History and Philosophy of Media
22 May, 2012
workings of organisations, knowledge which is invaluable to journalists seeking to keep
these organisations accountable” (Disney, 2010)
This policy document equates the use of anonymous sources with inept government, political
instability and corruption. Reporting methods thus become symbolic of the vitality of the
democratic process within the nation state. Michael Sheehy’s analysis of the use of unnamed
sources by the Washington Post between 1970 and 2000 (Sheehy, 2008) conforms to such
trend, periods of public insecurity, government secrecy (such as the Cold War Period) and
political instability (the Monica Lewinsky Scandal) paralleled by a marked increase in the use of
anonymous sources. Political culture and the modes of investigation favored by journalists are
intrinsically linked;
“The ups and downs [in the use of unnamed sources are much more a reflection of
changing cultures of the various administrations particularly that we cover, and in
the context of Congress, the changing culture of Congress” (Charles Kaiser, 2005 in
Sheehy, 2008)
Consequently, fluctuation in the frequency of reporting that uses anonymous sources must be
viewed as politically significant; the media/source relationship of a particular era signifying the
nature of a particular political administration.
A number of high profile American court cases have sought to define the legal
obligations associated with modern journalism’s use of anonymous sources. Throughout the
1970s a number of important cases redefined the relationship between the press and judiciary.
Two significant rulings by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s systematically restricted the
ability of journalists to protect confidential sources; Branzburg vs. Hayes and Zurcher vs.
Stanford Daily (Time, 1978). The case laws created by these rulings (that journalists could be
compelled to testify in front of grand juries and news rooms could be searched by police)
resulted in the relationship between judiciary and press becoming increasingly hostile (Time,
1978). Shield laws were tested again in the late 1970s when Myron Farber, a reporter for The
New York Times was jailed for forty days for refusing to surrender interview tapes and notes
relevant to the now notorious “Dr. X” case.
The “Dr. X” Case (the trial of Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich) remains an important example of the way
in which the ethic of press freedom can be subjugated in favour of the individual’s right to justice
and a fair trial. However this case cannot simply be reduced to a collision of the First and Sixth
Amendments (Griffith, 1978); a sentiment reiterated by Richard Harris in his 1982 article entitled
“The (Mis) Trials of Myron Farber” (Harris, 1982). Harris’ suggests that the constitutional rights
of Farber were repeatedly violated over the course of Jascalevich’s trial, Jascalevich’s defense
repeatedly issuing Farber with “fishing subpoenas”:
“No competent court in this country would uphold subpoenas like those served on
Farber and The Times. Under the law, subpoenas must be reasonably specific, and the
items sought must be shown to be relevant and material to the case at hand; equally
important, anyone subpoenaed has a legal right to a court hearing to determine whether
the subpoena meets these standards” (Harris, 1982)
For Harris, Farber’s profession contributed to the Supreme Court’s willingness to grant illegal
subpoenas (Harris, 1982). The judiciaries’ willingness to abandon constitutional norms in
this case is symptomatic of the institutionalised perception that any information provided to
the media is “public information”. Thus, in the eyes of the law Myron Farber ceased to be

4. History and Philosophy of Media
22 May, 2012
an individual, instead transitioned into a quasi media organization; and was investigated,
questioned and subpoenaed as such.
However, as Jeffrey Olen records, despite having the support of the public (Time, 1978), Myron
Farber was incapable of demonstrating that the maintenance of source confidentiality was
necessary:
“Farber’s adamance provoked much controversy, but given the facts of the case, normal
moral reasoning supports him. Having promised confidentiality he was obliged to protect
his sources from what is often called “a fishing expedition” – even during a criminal trial.
On the other hand, had there been a showing of necessity, the situation would
have been different. A man on trial for murder cannot be denied evidence required for
his defense” (Olen, 1988, emphasis added)
Farber’s failure to substantiate claims that the confidential sources featured in The Times
articles would be significantly affected by identification, resulted in the rights of Dr. Mario E.
Jascalevich favoured over those of Farber’s confidential sources. Exemplifying the way in
which ethical imperatives can occasionally conflict, the “Dr. X” case exhibits the tendency of
the judiciary to favour the rights of the individual (Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich) over those of the
collective (Myron Farber’s confidential sources). Olen suggests that this is a consequence of
the fact that the individual (most frequently the defendant) has the most at stake in criminal
proceedings; their agency, freedom and occasionally, life (Olen, 1988). The ethical standpoint
of the judiciary is crystallized by the “Dr. X” Case; the right of media organizations to protect
anonymous sources secondary to the right of the individual to a fair trial.
Following the imprisonment of Myron Farber, politically moderate media organizations
attempted to create an alternative cultural paradigm in which the ethical imperatives of the
judiciary and the media could coexist in relative harmony. There was a genuine belief that if
the commercial media altered sourcing practices (relying less on unattributed sources) and the
judiciary displayed improved flexibility, the imperatives of journalism and justice would no longer
conflict. As New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis records:
“I happen to believe that the press’s need to protect its sources and editorial process
has to be balanced against the constitutional right to a fair trial. A defendant has an
especially strong claim to evidence from a reporter when, as in this case, stories led to
his prosecution.
But at a minimum a reporter and his notes should not be subpoenaed casually. Before
evidence is compelled, there should be a showing that it is likely to be relevant,
necessary, and unobtainable by other means” (Anthony Lewis in Olen, 1988)
However the compromises envisioned by Lewis have never eventuated; and thus conflict
between the press and the legal institutions of the nationstate continue into the present.
At present, the existing moral ethos of the Australian media is being reassessed;
the consequence of a recent judgment by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Liu v
The Age judgment has altered the legal status of confidential sources in the modern Australian
nationstate, with Justice J. McCallum ruling that journalists Richard Baker, Nick McKenzie and
Philip Dorling must reveal the confidential source behind the 2010 article “Fitzgibbon’s $150,000
from Chinese developer” (McKenzie et al, 2010). Although The Age has since appealed the
decision (Simons, 2012), the verdict has set a precedent; namely that journalistic anonymity is
inherently fragile, vulnerable to the demands of the powerful legal and political institutions of the

5. History and Philosophy of Media
22 May, 2012
nation state.
Justice J. McCallum’s judgment, infused with Kantian ideology, exhibits a belief that the law is
the sublime ethic. Therefore, the law, in this case the Australian Constitution, must be upheld,
despite the fact that it violates many of the ethical principles endorsed by the mainstream media
of Australia. Thus the Liu v The Age case exemplifies the ethics of journalism being subjugated
in favour of the entrenched socio-cultural ethic of the law. Indeed, Justice McCallum suggests
that the journalisms commitment to, and protection of, unattributed sources may itself be
“unethical”:
“… in my view an absolute and immutable protection of confidentiality wherever
demanded by a journalist’s source (in cases of political discussion) would itself be
inimical to the maintenance of the system of government required by the constitution.
It would expose politicians and others involved in government and politics to the risk
of false and malicious attack from their detractors without recourse or remedy. To
allow such sources to shield themselves under the respectable cloak of investigative
journalism would be contrary to the high ideals of a free press.” (McCallum, 2012)
The claims made by anonymous sources are often difficult to qualify, a reality that can result in
the distribution of misinformation to the public (Carlson, 2011). Justice McCallum rationalizes
the Liu v The Age judgment as a victory for “good”, “objective” journalism
Paul Routledge, a political journalist in the United Kingdom suggests that anonymous sources
are frequently used to manipulate the media
In many ways, the Liu vs. The Age case epitomizes the tendency of Western societies to favour
the rights of the individual over those of the collective.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Liu v. The Age case has occurred at a time when the
political onus is on the protection of journalists sources.