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CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 1 of 24
PowerPoint Lectures for
Principles of Economics,
9e
By
Karl E. Case,
Ray C. Fair &
Sharon M. Oster
; ;
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 2 of 24
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster
14
PART III MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Oligopoly
Fernando & Yvonn Quijano
Prepared by:
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 4 of 24
14
Market Structure in an Oligopoly
Oligopoly Models
The Collusion Model
The Price-Leadership Model
The Cournot Model
Game Theory
Repeated Games
A Game with Many Players:
Collective Action Can Be Blocked
by a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Oligopoly and Economic
Performance
Industrial Concentration and
Technological Change
The Role of Government
Regulation of Mergers
A Proper Role?
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Oligopoly
PART III MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 5 of 24
Oligopoly
oligopoly A form of industry (market) structure
characterized by a few dominant firms. Products
may be homogenous or differentiated.
Market Structure in an Oligopoly
Five Forces model A model developed by
Michael Porter that helps us understand the five
competitive forces that determine the level of
competition and profitability in an industry.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 6 of 24
Market Structure in an Oligopoly
 FIGURE 14.1 Forces
Driving Industry Competition
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 7 of 24
Market Structure in an Oligopoly
TABLE 14.1 Percentage of Value of Shipments Accounted for by the Largest Firms in
High-Concentration Industries, 2002
Industry Designation
Four
Largest Firms
Eight
Largest Firms
Number
Of Firms
Primary copper 99 100 10
Cigarettes 95 99 15
Household laundry equipment 93 100 13
Cellulosic man-made fiber 93 100 8
Breweries 90 94 344
Electric lamp bulbs 89 94 57
Household refrigerators and freezers 85 95 18
Small arms ammunition 83 89 109
Cereal breakfast foods 82 93 45
Motor vehicles 81 91 308
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002 Economic Census, Concentration Ratios: 2002 ECO2-315R-1, May 2006.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 8 of 24
Market Structure in an Oligopoly
concentration ratio The share of industry output
in sales or employment accounted for by the top
firms.
contestable markets Markets in which entry and
exit are easy.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 9 of 24
Market Structure in an Oligopoly
Why are Record Labels
Losing Key Stars like
Madonna?
Madonna (and the Internet)
Disrupts Another Business
Wall Street Journal
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 10 of 24
Oligopoly Models
The Collusion Model
cartel A group of firms that gets together and
makes joint price and output decisions to maximize
joint profits.
tacit collusion Collusion occurs when price- and
quantity-fixing agreements among producers are
explicit. Tacit collusion occurs when such
agreements are implicit.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 11 of 24
Oligopoly Models
The Price-Leadership Model
price leadership A form of oligopoly in which one
dominant firm sets prices and all the smaller firms
in the industry follow its pricing policy.
The Cournot Model
duopoly A two-firm oligopoly.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 12 of 24
Oligopoly Models
The Cournot Model
 FIGURE 14.2 Graphical Depiction of the Cournot Model
The left graph shows a profit-maximizing output of 2,000 units for a monopolist with marginal cost of $2.
The right graph shows output of 1,333.33 units each for two duopolists with the same marginal cost of $2, facing
the same demand curve.
Total industry output increases as we go from the monopolist to the Cournot duopolists, but it does not rise as
high as the competitive output (here 4,000 units).
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 13 of 24
Game Theory
game theory Analyzes the choices made by rival
firms, people, and even governments when they
are trying to maximize their own well-being while
anticipating and reacting to the actions of others in
their environment.
dominant strategy In game theory, a strategy
that is best no matter what the opposition does.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 14 of 24
Game Theory
 FIGURE 14.3 Payoff Matrix for Advertising Game
Both players have a dominant strategy. If B does not advertise, A will because $75,000 beats $50,000. If B
does advertise, A will also advertise because a profit of $10,000 beats a loss of $25,000. A will advertise
regardless of what B does. Similarly, B will advertise regardless of what A does. If A does not advertise, B
will because $75,000 beats $50,000. If A does advertise, B will too because a $10,000 profit beats a loss of
$25,000.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 15 of 24
Game Theory
prisoners’ dilemma A game in which the players
are prevented from cooperating and in which each
has a dominant strategy that leaves them both
worse off than if they could cooperate.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 16 of 24
Game Theory
 FIGURE 14.4 The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Both players have a dominant strategy and will confess. If Rocky does not confess, Ginger will because
going free beats a year in jail. Similarly, if Rocky does confess, Ginger will confess because 5 years in the
slammer is better than 7. Rocky has the same set of choices. If Ginger does not confess, Rocky will
because going free beats a year in jail. Similarly, if Ginger does confess, Rocky also will confess because 5
years in the slammer is better than 7. Both will confess regardless of what the other does.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 17 of 24
Game Theory
Nash equilibrium In game theory, the result of all
players’ playing their best strategy given what their
competitors are doing.
maximin strategy In game theory, a strategy
chosen to maximize the minimum gain that can be
earned.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 18 of 24
Game Theory
 FIGURE 14.5 Payoff Matrixes for Left/Right–Top/Bottom Strategies
In the original game (a), C does not have a dominant strategy. If D plays left, C plays top; if D plays right, C
plays bottom. D, on the other hand, does have a dominant strategy: D will play right regardless of what C
does. If C believes that D is rational, C will predict that D will play right. If C concludes that D will play right,
C will play bottom. The result is a Nash equilibrium because each player is doing the best that it can given
what the other is doing.
In the new game (b), C had better be very sure that D will play right because if D plays left and C plays
bottom, C is in big trouble, losing $10,000. C will probably play top to minimize the potential loss if the
probability of D’s choosing left is at all significant.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 19 of 24
Game Theory
 FIGURE 14.6 Payoff Matrix for Airline Game
In a single play, both British Airways (BA) and Lufthansa Airlines (LA) have dominant strategies. If LA prices
at $600, BA will price at $400 because $1.6 million beats $1.2 million. If, on the other hand, LA prices at
$400, BA will again choose to price at $400 because $800,000 beats zero. Similarly, LA will choose to price
at $400 regardless of which strategy BA Chooses.
Repeated Games
tit-for-tat strategy A repeated game strategy in
which a player responds in kind to an opponent’s play.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 20 of 24
Game Theory
A Game with Many Players: Collective Action Can Be Blocked by a
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Price Fixing or Price
Competition?
Suit Accuses Car Rental
Firms of Price-Fixing
Los Angeles Times
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 21 of 24
Oligopoly and Economic Performance
Industrial Concentration and Technological Change
With the exception of the contestable-markets
model, all the models of oligopoly we have
examined lead us to conclude that concentration in
a market leads to pricing above marginal cost and
output below the efficient level.
One of the major sources of economic growth and
progress throughout history has been
technological advance.
Several economists, notably Joseph Schumpeter
and John Kenneth Galbraith, argued in works now
considered classics that industrial concentration,
where a relatively small number of firms control the
marketplace, actually increases the rate of
technological advance.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 22 of 24
The Role of Government
Regulation of Mergers
Celler-Kefauver Act Extended the government’s
authority to control mergers.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) An index of
market concentration found by summing the
square of percentage shares of firms in the
market.
TABLE 14.2 Calculation of a Simple Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Four Hypothetical
Industries, Each with No More Than Four Firms
Percentage Share Of:
Herfindahl- Hirschman IndexFirm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Industry A 50 50 − − 502
+ 502
= 5,000
Industry B 80 10 10 − 802
+ 102
+ 102
= 6,600
Industry C 25 25 25 25 252
+ 252
+ 252
+ 252
= 2,500
Industry D 40 20 20 20 402
+ 202
+ 202
+ 202
= 2,800
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 23 of 24
The Role of Government
Regulation of Mergers
 FIGURE 14.7 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines
(revised 1984)
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 24 of 24
The Role of Government
Regulation of Mergers
TABLE 14.3
Industry Definition Some Sample HHIs
Beer 3,525
Ethanol 326
Las Vegas gaming 1,497
Critical care patient monitors 2,661
actions by a group of firms that are profitable for each
of them only as the result of the accommodating
reactions of others. This behavior includes tacit or
express collusion, and may or may not be lawful in
and of itself.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 25 of 24
The Role of Government
A Proper Role?
Certainly, there is much to guard against in the
behavior of large, concentrated industries.
Barriers to entry, large size, and product
differentiation all lead to market power and to
potential inefficiency. Barriers to entry and
collusive behavior stop the market from working
toward an efficient allocation of resources.
CHAOligopoly
© 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 26 of 24
cartel
Celler-Kefauver Act
concentration ratio
contestable markets
dominant strategy
duopoly
Five Forces model
game theory
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)
maximin strategy
Nash equilibrium
oligopoly
price leadership
prisoners’ dilemma
tacit collusion
tit-for-tat strategy
REVIEW TERMS AND CONCEPTS

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Ppt econ 9e_one_click_ch14

  • 1. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 1 of 24 PowerPoint Lectures for Principles of Economics, 9e By Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair & Sharon M. Oster ; ;
  • 2. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 2 of 24
  • 3. © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 14 PART III MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT Oligopoly Fernando & Yvonn Quijano Prepared by:
  • 4. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 4 of 24 14 Market Structure in an Oligopoly Oligopoly Models The Collusion Model The Price-Leadership Model The Cournot Model Game Theory Repeated Games A Game with Many Players: Collective Action Can Be Blocked by a Prisoner’s Dilemma Oligopoly and Economic Performance Industrial Concentration and Technological Change The Role of Government Regulation of Mergers A Proper Role? CHAPTER OUTLINE Oligopoly PART III MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
  • 5. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 5 of 24 Oligopoly oligopoly A form of industry (market) structure characterized by a few dominant firms. Products may be homogenous or differentiated. Market Structure in an Oligopoly Five Forces model A model developed by Michael Porter that helps us understand the five competitive forces that determine the level of competition and profitability in an industry.
  • 6. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 6 of 24 Market Structure in an Oligopoly  FIGURE 14.1 Forces Driving Industry Competition
  • 7. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 7 of 24 Market Structure in an Oligopoly TABLE 14.1 Percentage of Value of Shipments Accounted for by the Largest Firms in High-Concentration Industries, 2002 Industry Designation Four Largest Firms Eight Largest Firms Number Of Firms Primary copper 99 100 10 Cigarettes 95 99 15 Household laundry equipment 93 100 13 Cellulosic man-made fiber 93 100 8 Breweries 90 94 344 Electric lamp bulbs 89 94 57 Household refrigerators and freezers 85 95 18 Small arms ammunition 83 89 109 Cereal breakfast foods 82 93 45 Motor vehicles 81 91 308 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002 Economic Census, Concentration Ratios: 2002 ECO2-315R-1, May 2006.
  • 8. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 8 of 24 Market Structure in an Oligopoly concentration ratio The share of industry output in sales or employment accounted for by the top firms. contestable markets Markets in which entry and exit are easy.
  • 9. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 9 of 24 Market Structure in an Oligopoly Why are Record Labels Losing Key Stars like Madonna? Madonna (and the Internet) Disrupts Another Business Wall Street Journal
  • 10. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 10 of 24 Oligopoly Models The Collusion Model cartel A group of firms that gets together and makes joint price and output decisions to maximize joint profits. tacit collusion Collusion occurs when price- and quantity-fixing agreements among producers are explicit. Tacit collusion occurs when such agreements are implicit.
  • 11. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 11 of 24 Oligopoly Models The Price-Leadership Model price leadership A form of oligopoly in which one dominant firm sets prices and all the smaller firms in the industry follow its pricing policy. The Cournot Model duopoly A two-firm oligopoly.
  • 12. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 12 of 24 Oligopoly Models The Cournot Model  FIGURE 14.2 Graphical Depiction of the Cournot Model The left graph shows a profit-maximizing output of 2,000 units for a monopolist with marginal cost of $2. The right graph shows output of 1,333.33 units each for two duopolists with the same marginal cost of $2, facing the same demand curve. Total industry output increases as we go from the monopolist to the Cournot duopolists, but it does not rise as high as the competitive output (here 4,000 units).
  • 13. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 13 of 24 Game Theory game theory Analyzes the choices made by rival firms, people, and even governments when they are trying to maximize their own well-being while anticipating and reacting to the actions of others in their environment. dominant strategy In game theory, a strategy that is best no matter what the opposition does.
  • 14. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 14 of 24 Game Theory  FIGURE 14.3 Payoff Matrix for Advertising Game Both players have a dominant strategy. If B does not advertise, A will because $75,000 beats $50,000. If B does advertise, A will also advertise because a profit of $10,000 beats a loss of $25,000. A will advertise regardless of what B does. Similarly, B will advertise regardless of what A does. If A does not advertise, B will because $75,000 beats $50,000. If A does advertise, B will too because a $10,000 profit beats a loss of $25,000.
  • 15. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 15 of 24 Game Theory prisoners’ dilemma A game in which the players are prevented from cooperating and in which each has a dominant strategy that leaves them both worse off than if they could cooperate.
  • 16. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 16 of 24 Game Theory  FIGURE 14.4 The Prisoners’ Dilemma Both players have a dominant strategy and will confess. If Rocky does not confess, Ginger will because going free beats a year in jail. Similarly, if Rocky does confess, Ginger will confess because 5 years in the slammer is better than 7. Rocky has the same set of choices. If Ginger does not confess, Rocky will because going free beats a year in jail. Similarly, if Ginger does confess, Rocky also will confess because 5 years in the slammer is better than 7. Both will confess regardless of what the other does.
  • 17. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 17 of 24 Game Theory Nash equilibrium In game theory, the result of all players’ playing their best strategy given what their competitors are doing. maximin strategy In game theory, a strategy chosen to maximize the minimum gain that can be earned.
  • 18. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 18 of 24 Game Theory  FIGURE 14.5 Payoff Matrixes for Left/Right–Top/Bottom Strategies In the original game (a), C does not have a dominant strategy. If D plays left, C plays top; if D plays right, C plays bottom. D, on the other hand, does have a dominant strategy: D will play right regardless of what C does. If C believes that D is rational, C will predict that D will play right. If C concludes that D will play right, C will play bottom. The result is a Nash equilibrium because each player is doing the best that it can given what the other is doing. In the new game (b), C had better be very sure that D will play right because if D plays left and C plays bottom, C is in big trouble, losing $10,000. C will probably play top to minimize the potential loss if the probability of D’s choosing left is at all significant.
  • 19. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 19 of 24 Game Theory  FIGURE 14.6 Payoff Matrix for Airline Game In a single play, both British Airways (BA) and Lufthansa Airlines (LA) have dominant strategies. If LA prices at $600, BA will price at $400 because $1.6 million beats $1.2 million. If, on the other hand, LA prices at $400, BA will again choose to price at $400 because $800,000 beats zero. Similarly, LA will choose to price at $400 regardless of which strategy BA Chooses. Repeated Games tit-for-tat strategy A repeated game strategy in which a player responds in kind to an opponent’s play.
  • 20. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 20 of 24 Game Theory A Game with Many Players: Collective Action Can Be Blocked by a Prisoner’s Dilemma Price Fixing or Price Competition? Suit Accuses Car Rental Firms of Price-Fixing Los Angeles Times
  • 21. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 21 of 24 Oligopoly and Economic Performance Industrial Concentration and Technological Change With the exception of the contestable-markets model, all the models of oligopoly we have examined lead us to conclude that concentration in a market leads to pricing above marginal cost and output below the efficient level. One of the major sources of economic growth and progress throughout history has been technological advance. Several economists, notably Joseph Schumpeter and John Kenneth Galbraith, argued in works now considered classics that industrial concentration, where a relatively small number of firms control the marketplace, actually increases the rate of technological advance.
  • 22. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 22 of 24 The Role of Government Regulation of Mergers Celler-Kefauver Act Extended the government’s authority to control mergers. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) An index of market concentration found by summing the square of percentage shares of firms in the market. TABLE 14.2 Calculation of a Simple Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Four Hypothetical Industries, Each with No More Than Four Firms Percentage Share Of: Herfindahl- Hirschman IndexFirm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Industry A 50 50 − − 502 + 502 = 5,000 Industry B 80 10 10 − 802 + 102 + 102 = 6,600 Industry C 25 25 25 25 252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 2,500 Industry D 40 20 20 20 402 + 202 + 202 + 202 = 2,800
  • 23. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 23 of 24 The Role of Government Regulation of Mergers  FIGURE 14.7 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (revised 1984)
  • 24. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 24 of 24 The Role of Government Regulation of Mergers TABLE 14.3 Industry Definition Some Sample HHIs Beer 3,525 Ethanol 326 Las Vegas gaming 1,497 Critical care patient monitors 2,661 actions by a group of firms that are profitable for each of them only as the result of the accommodating reactions of others. This behavior includes tacit or express collusion, and may or may not be lawful in and of itself.
  • 25. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 25 of 24 The Role of Government A Proper Role? Certainly, there is much to guard against in the behavior of large, concentrated industries. Barriers to entry, large size, and product differentiation all lead to market power and to potential inefficiency. Barriers to entry and collusive behavior stop the market from working toward an efficient allocation of resources.
  • 26. CHAOligopoly © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Economics 9e by Case, Fair and Oster 26 of 24 cartel Celler-Kefauver Act concentration ratio contestable markets dominant strategy duopoly Five Forces model game theory Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) maximin strategy Nash equilibrium oligopoly price leadership prisoners’ dilemma tacit collusion tit-for-tat strategy REVIEW TERMS AND CONCEPTS