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Into The Droid
Gaining Access to Android User Data



                                      DEF CON 20
Introduction
• Why this talk is useful

  • Defend access / gain access

  • Device seizure, loss, border crossing, stop and search, espionage...

• The company

  • viaForensics - Mobile security and digital forensics, strong R&D
    team, government agencies and corporations

• The speaker

  • Thomas Cannon - Director of Breaking Things
Challenges
• ADB off by default

• Screen lock

• Code signing for updates
  and boot images

• Encryption

• Variety of device hardware,
  software and configuration
Bootloader Essentials

• How we use the bootloader

• Accessing bootloader mode

• Bootloader protocols

• Bootloader protection
Defeat The Bootloader
• S-ON vs S-OFF

• @secuflag controlled in radio firmware

• Gold Card - specially formatted MicroSD card
  can bypass carrier ID check when flashing ROMs

• White Card - special SIM card used as an
  authentication token to control access to
  diagnostic mode
                                                HTC
                                              Example
Defeat The Bootloader




• Emulate White Card with hardware, combine with
  Gold Card to enter diagnostics and clear S-ON
                                                HTC
                                              Example
Defeat The Bootloader
• White Card not needed for CDMA phones

• Once S-OFF, can RAM load a custom boot image

• This technique wipes most devices! But not all.

• Successfully used this technique to gain access to
  some locked stock HTC devices such as HTC
  Desire

• Try it yourself with an XTC Clip
                                                       HTC
                                                     Example
Forensic Boot Image
• Start early in the boot chain before the
  system loads

• Provide ADB root shell over USB which
  can be used to image the device

• Do not mount anything, including
  cache, to prevent any writes to
  partitions

• Devices with raw NAND flash and wear
  levelling implemented in software
  (YAFFS2) can be prevented from
  overwriting deleted data
Build Boot Image

$ abootimg -x stock-recovery.img
$ abootimg-unpack-initrd
$ cd ramdisk
(edit ramdisk contents)
$ cd ..
$ abootimg-pack-initrd -f
$ abootimg -u stock-recovery.img -r initrd.img
RAM Disk Contents
/dev
/proc
/sbin
   adbd
   busybox (+ symlinks)
   nanddump (to dump partitions)
/sys
init
default.prop (enable root shell, ro.secure=0)
init.rc (do not mount partitions, just start adbd)
ueventd.rc
Flash and RAM Load
• Samsung
  • Dump partitions with ODIN <= 1.52 or Heimdall. Maybe.
  • Flashing with ODIN or Heimdall
    • heimdall flash --recovery recovery.bin (Epic 4G)
    • heimdall flash --kernel zImage (Galaxy S)
• HTC
  • fastboot boot recovery.img (RAM Loading)
  • fastboot flash recovery recovery.img (flash partition)
• Motorola
  • sbf_flash image name.sbf (make sure it only contains recovery)
JTAG Primer
• How it works

• Flasher Box

 • ORT

 • RiffBox

 • Medusa Box
Serial Debug Cable
• Some devices have debug access
  via serial cables which can be used
  to gain access to data

• On Samsung Galaxy SII / Galaxy
  Note this is activated by grounding ID
  pin of USB with a 523K ohm resistor

• TTL serial access provided on D+
  and D- pins of USB connector

• Use a Bus Pirate and MicroUSB
  breakout board to connect
                                           Galaxy
                                            SII
Crack PIN or Password
• Salt

  • /data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases/
    settings.db

  • SELECT * FROM secure WHERE name =
    'lockscreen.password_salt'

• PIN / password

  • /data/system/password.key

  • Salted SHA1 of password concatenated with salted MD5
Crack PIN or Password
• Calculate the value of the salt in lowercase hex with no padding

$ python -c "print '%x' % 720624377925219614"

a002c0dbeb8351e

• Copy the last 32 bytes of password.key (MD5 hash in hex), add
  a colon and then add the salt

5D8EC41CB1812AC0BD9CB6C4F2CD0122:a002c0dbeb8351e

• Crack with software such as oclHashcat-lite 
HID Brute Force?




       Video
HID Brute Force

• AVR ATMEGA32U4 emulates
  USB keyboard typing PINs

• USB OTG cable for USB host

• Devices usually rate limit
  attempts and wipe after too
  many incorrect passcodes
Android Encryption
Android Encryption

• Supported since Android 3.0

• Based on dm-crypt

• AES 128 CBC

• Implementations may vary,
  e.g. Samsung has their own
  key management module
Android Encryption
                         keylen=32


                         PBKDF2
Password/PIN                                 Key+IV (32 bytes)
                          x2000

                                        Key (128 bit)   IV (128 bit)

/dev/urandom           Salt (128 bit)


                                                   AES 128
Master Key (128 bit)
                                                    CBC


                                           Encrypted Master Key
                                                 (128 bit)
Android Encryption

                       IV (ESSIV:SHA256)


                             dm-crypt
Master Key (128 bit)                         Encrypted userdata partition
                           AES 128 CBC


                        userdata partition
Cracking Encryption
• Encrypted Master Key +
  Salt stored in footer

• Footer stored at end of
  partition or in a footer file on
  another partition or as a
  partition itself

• Image device and locate
  footer + encrypted
  userdata partition
Cracking Encryption
• Parse footer

• Locate Salt and Encrypted Master Key

• Run a password guess through
  PBKDF2 with salt, use resulting key
  and IV to decrypt master key, use
  resulting master key to decrypt first
  sector of encrypted image.

• If password is correct, plain text will
  be revealed
• Cracking PINs takes seconds. Passwords
  are usually short or follow patterns due to
  being the same as the lock screen password
Evil Maid Attack

• Load app onto system partition, wait for user
  to boot phone, get remote access to
  decrypted user data

• Rootkits - easy to compile for Android

• Evil USB charger
Reverse Shell




• App with no permissions can create a reverse shell,
  giving remote access to attacker
Desperate Techniques
• Hard reset - some
  devices prior to 3.0
  did not wipe data
  properly. Wipe, boot,
  root and recover

• Chip-off - de-solder
  NAND chips

• Screen smudges
More Techniques!
• Custom update.zip - can you get one signed?

• Race condition on updates via SD cards - fixed

• Own a CA? Who doesn't these days? MITM
  connection, push app, update or exploit

• Entry via Google Play, if credentials cached on
  desktop
Santoku Linux
• Free and open bootable Linux
  distribution full of tools

• Project is a collaboration with
  other mobile security pros

• Mobile Forensics

• Mobile App Security Testing

• Mobile Malware Analysis


       Check out the Alpha release at https://santoku-linux.com
k yo u!
Th an
                  Thomas Cannon
                               
               @thomas_cannon
          github.com/thomascannon
          tcannon@viaforensics.com




      For the latest versions of our presentations visit: 
      https://viaforensics.com/resources/presentations

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DefCon 2012 - Gaining Access to User Android Data

  • 1. Into The Droid Gaining Access to Android User Data DEF CON 20
  • 2. Introduction • Why this talk is useful • Defend access / gain access • Device seizure, loss, border crossing, stop and search, espionage... • The company • viaForensics - Mobile security and digital forensics, strong R&D team, government agencies and corporations • The speaker • Thomas Cannon - Director of Breaking Things
  • 3. Challenges • ADB off by default • Screen lock • Code signing for updates and boot images • Encryption • Variety of device hardware, software and configuration
  • 4. Bootloader Essentials • How we use the bootloader • Accessing bootloader mode • Bootloader protocols • Bootloader protection
  • 5. Defeat The Bootloader • S-ON vs S-OFF • @secuflag controlled in radio firmware • Gold Card - specially formatted MicroSD card can bypass carrier ID check when flashing ROMs • White Card - special SIM card used as an authentication token to control access to diagnostic mode HTC Example
  • 6. Defeat The Bootloader • Emulate White Card with hardware, combine with Gold Card to enter diagnostics and clear S-ON HTC Example
  • 7. Defeat The Bootloader • White Card not needed for CDMA phones • Once S-OFF, can RAM load a custom boot image • This technique wipes most devices! But not all. • Successfully used this technique to gain access to some locked stock HTC devices such as HTC Desire • Try it yourself with an XTC Clip HTC Example
  • 8. Forensic Boot Image • Start early in the boot chain before the system loads • Provide ADB root shell over USB which can be used to image the device • Do not mount anything, including cache, to prevent any writes to partitions • Devices with raw NAND flash and wear levelling implemented in software (YAFFS2) can be prevented from overwriting deleted data
  • 9. Build Boot Image $ abootimg -x stock-recovery.img $ abootimg-unpack-initrd $ cd ramdisk (edit ramdisk contents) $ cd .. $ abootimg-pack-initrd -f $ abootimg -u stock-recovery.img -r initrd.img
  • 10. RAM Disk Contents /dev /proc /sbin adbd busybox (+ symlinks) nanddump (to dump partitions) /sys init default.prop (enable root shell, ro.secure=0) init.rc (do not mount partitions, just start adbd) ueventd.rc
  • 11. Flash and RAM Load • Samsung • Dump partitions with ODIN <= 1.52 or Heimdall. Maybe. • Flashing with ODIN or Heimdall • heimdall flash --recovery recovery.bin (Epic 4G) • heimdall flash --kernel zImage (Galaxy S) • HTC • fastboot boot recovery.img (RAM Loading) • fastboot flash recovery recovery.img (flash partition) • Motorola • sbf_flash image name.sbf (make sure it only contains recovery)
  • 12. JTAG Primer • How it works • Flasher Box • ORT • RiffBox • Medusa Box
  • 13. Serial Debug Cable • Some devices have debug access via serial cables which can be used to gain access to data • On Samsung Galaxy SII / Galaxy Note this is activated by grounding ID pin of USB with a 523K ohm resistor • TTL serial access provided on D+ and D- pins of USB connector • Use a Bus Pirate and MicroUSB breakout board to connect Galaxy SII
  • 14. Crack PIN or Password • Salt • /data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases/ settings.db • SELECT * FROM secure WHERE name = 'lockscreen.password_salt' • PIN / password • /data/system/password.key • Salted SHA1 of password concatenated with salted MD5
  • 15. Crack PIN or Password • Calculate the value of the salt in lowercase hex with no padding $ python -c "print '%x' % 720624377925219614" a002c0dbeb8351e • Copy the last 32 bytes of password.key (MD5 hash in hex), add a colon and then add the salt 5D8EC41CB1812AC0BD9CB6C4F2CD0122:a002c0dbeb8351e • Crack with software such as oclHashcat-lite 
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 19. HID Brute Force • AVR ATMEGA32U4 emulates USB keyboard typing PINs • USB OTG cable for USB host • Devices usually rate limit attempts and wipe after too many incorrect passcodes
  • 21. Android Encryption • Supported since Android 3.0 • Based on dm-crypt • AES 128 CBC • Implementations may vary, e.g. Samsung has their own key management module
  • 22. Android Encryption keylen=32 PBKDF2 Password/PIN Key+IV (32 bytes) x2000 Key (128 bit) IV (128 bit) /dev/urandom Salt (128 bit) AES 128 Master Key (128 bit) CBC Encrypted Master Key (128 bit)
  • 23. Android Encryption IV (ESSIV:SHA256) dm-crypt Master Key (128 bit) Encrypted userdata partition AES 128 CBC userdata partition
  • 24. Cracking Encryption • Encrypted Master Key + Salt stored in footer • Footer stored at end of partition or in a footer file on another partition or as a partition itself • Image device and locate footer + encrypted userdata partition
  • 25. Cracking Encryption • Parse footer • Locate Salt and Encrypted Master Key • Run a password guess through PBKDF2 with salt, use resulting key and IV to decrypt master key, use resulting master key to decrypt first sector of encrypted image. • If password is correct, plain text will be revealed
  • 26. • Cracking PINs takes seconds. Passwords are usually short or follow patterns due to being the same as the lock screen password
  • 27. Evil Maid Attack • Load app onto system partition, wait for user to boot phone, get remote access to decrypted user data • Rootkits - easy to compile for Android • Evil USB charger
  • 28. Reverse Shell • App with no permissions can create a reverse shell, giving remote access to attacker
  • 29. Desperate Techniques • Hard reset - some devices prior to 3.0 did not wipe data properly. Wipe, boot, root and recover • Chip-off - de-solder NAND chips • Screen smudges
  • 30. More Techniques! • Custom update.zip - can you get one signed? • Race condition on updates via SD cards - fixed • Own a CA? Who doesn't these days? MITM connection, push app, update or exploit • Entry via Google Play, if credentials cached on desktop
  • 31. Santoku Linux • Free and open bootable Linux distribution full of tools • Project is a collaboration with other mobile security pros • Mobile Forensics • Mobile App Security Testing • Mobile Malware Analysis Check out the Alpha release at https://santoku-linux.com
  • 32. k yo u! Th an Thomas Cannon @thomas_cannon github.com/thomascannon tcannon@viaforensics.com For the latest versions of our presentations visit: https://viaforensics.com/resources/presentations