11. PTS Ranking Criteria Scenario : Eight sailors are competing for two PTS Quotas Sailor A MAY12 Sailor F JAN12 Sailor B FEB12 Sailor C MAR12 Sailor D JAN12 Sailor E MAY12 Sailor G MAY12 Sailor H APR12 Sailor A All Pass Sailor F 2 Fail Sailor B All Pass Sailor C All Pass Sailor D 1 Fail Sailor E All Pass Sailor G All Pass Sailor H 1 Fail Sailor A E6 Sailor F Frocked E6 Sailor B E6 Sailor C E6 Sailor D E6 Sailor E E6 Sailor G E5 Sailor H E5 Sailor A Yes Sailor F Yes Sailor B Yes Sailor C Yes Sailor D Yes Sailor E No Sailor G No Sailor H Yes Sailor A 25 Sailor F 20 Sailor B 23 Sailor C 23 Sailor D 23 Sailor E 23 Sailor G 25 Sailor H 20
12. Zones D&E 15-30 years Zone C 11-14 years Zone B 7-10 years Zone A 0-6 years 271,235 Sailors Every FY, Only 18% (~49K) of population are PTS decision makers Perform-to-Serve Population and ERB Impact Cohort available for Force Shaping via PTS in FY12 Limited Force Shaping Options PTS pressure relieved by ERB in FY12 PTS is inefficient when timing overtakes quality
33. Navy Manpower Trends More Ships, Fewer People, Higher Costs Until FY07, the Number of People in the Navy was Driven by the Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY03, the Number of People in the Navy has Decreased but Cost of People has Increased The rising cost of manpower has… necessitated the reallocation of resources from “Tail to Tooth” and… created a divergence between force structure and personnel in the Navy
34. Operational Realit y Manpower-vs-Manning Faces Authorization Requirements Manning Navy Manning Plan Current On-board COB NMP Endstrength RQMT … manpower requirements are only a part of the overall picture… Spaces Readiness Gap “ Risk” Funding Authorization Manpower Places Controls Root Source
35. Fit and Fill In a Perfect World Manpower Domain Jobs* Positions KSA* Certifications* NECs Competencies* Rate/Desig Paygrade Tasks* Jobs Held** KSA** Certifications** NECs Competencies** Rate/Desig Paygrade **-Requires data & development on Supply Side Potential Matching Criteria Position Demand Signal Supply Chain *-Requires data on the Demand Side Input Community Management & Hire Plan & Place Develop Total Force Inventory ROC/ POE MFT
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40. Sea / Shore Flow Comparison of Ratings CNO directed resolution in POM 13 Time at Sea Over 30-yr Career (months) More Shore-Intensive Ratings More Sea-Intensive Ratings Sea Tour Length Limit – 18 yrs ABEs would need to spend 25 yrs at sea to man all sea-duty billets 3236 billets needed ashore (FY13) - 1428 billets available to shift from shore to sea-intensive = 1808 billets required to balance (FY13)* *assumes no additional Student IA required and that POM 13 shore RMC and ATG Instructor billets funded (increasing shore duty opportunities)
53. PACT Manning Projections Surface Total Inventory includes Individual Account (IA) inventory 99% Force Structure INV to Force Structure BA: NOV 11 End FY11 INV/EPA: 106% End FY11 Force Structure INV/BA: 87% Fleet Attrition: 7% Non-Distributable Inventory: 7% Enlisted Planning Authorization Force Structure Billets Authorized Force Structure Inventory Total Inventory Original INV line Original FS line Accessions Reclass FY10 FY11 FY10 FY11 687 2709 (+2022) 1072 1391 (+319) E1 E2 E3 228 891 2264
54. PACT Manning Projections Aviation Total Inventory includes Individual Account (IA) inventory 100% Force Structure INV to Force Structure BA: NOV 11 End FY11 INV/EPA: 113% End FY11 Force Structure INV/BA: 87% Fleet Attrition: 7% Non-Distributable Inventory: 13% Enlisted Planning Authorization Force Structure Billets Authorized Total Inventory Force Structure Inventory Original INV line Original FS line E1 E2 E3 103 464 1477 Accessions Reclass FY10 FY11 FY10 FY11 583 1172 (+589) 565 788 (+223)
55. PACT Manning Projections Engineering Total Inventory includes Individual Account (IA) inventory 100% Force Structure INV to Force Structure BA: SEP 11 End FY11 INV/EPA: 116% End FY11 Force Structure INV/BA: 100% Fleet Attrition: 7% Non-Distributable Inventory: 18% Enlisted Planning Authorization Force Structure Billets Authorized Force Structure Inventory Total Inventory Original INV line Original FS line Accessions Reclass FY10 FY11 FY10 FY11 81 248 (+167) 85 110 (+25) E1 E2 E3 28 62 176
Notas del editor
The challenge we face is that at the same time that we are reducing end strength, we are experiencing increased retention and decreased attrition. Additionally, the behavior trend we’ve seen, and encouraged through policy change, is that Sailors are committing to stay in the Navy earlier, and for longer periods of time.
PTS is our primary force shaping tool. Other tools we can employ are changing the number of new accessions we recruit, the amount and skills we offer reenlistment bonuses to, and the voluntary separation programs we offer. PTS: Helps manage End Strength with the opposing forces of fiscal pressure and sailor behavior. It is critical to our ability to reduce Navy End Strength, which is required over the next two fiscal years. Primary tool used to help balance the force by reducing manning in overmanned ratings, and converting Sailors from overmanned ratings to undermanned ratings that they qualify for.
PTS will continue as Navy’s principal force shaping tool, but it is currently at its effective limit. We should not impose additional Navy-wide end strength pressure on the narrow cohort of Sailors facing a reenlistment decision through the PTS program. High performing Sailors in overmanned ratings are disadvantaged at EAOS if we continue to rely on PTS as our only tool to reduce E/S. All options for rebalancing the force and meeting our Congressional end strength ceilings have been carefully considered. We have reduced new accessions to the minimum sustainable levels consistent with the future health of the force. New and enhanced Navy policies to facilitate voluntary Sailor transition prior to EAOS, such as the Enlisted Early Transition and Early Career Transition programs, have been instituted. Additionally, we are staffing a new MILPERSMAN to separate Sailors in their initial training pipeline if they fail their initial A/C-school training or are a disciplinary problem, and there are no openings in other ratings that they qualify for. The ERB is a force shaping tool that will focus on individual ratings to achieve a rebalanced force.
PTS is used for various reasons: It is primarily a performance based quota reservation system to control continuation behavior. It allows the Sailor to apply for three main types of quotas to continue their Naval Servie: In-Rate (stay in current rate), Conversion (to undermanned Rating or FTS), SELRES (affiliate in SELRES). It balances ratings by facilitating conversions from overmanned ratings into undermanned It helps control Zone manning and continuation across the various year groups It helps control end strength The PTS Algorithm ranks Sailors based on performance (see algorithm slide 8). On a micro-level, this is how a PTS Application Timeline looks for the Sailor: The Sailor’s end of obligated service (to include any extensions) determines when the Sailor enters the PTS window. Note: There are other reasons why the Sailor could enter PTS (see slide 7), but this is the primary reason. All Sailors must enter into PTS, even if they intend to separate. If they intend to separate, they do not compete for a quota. Commands conduct a career development board up to two years prior to a Sailors end of obligated service. The RIDE service can be used to support this counseling session, and offer insight into what the competition is like within the Sailors current rating and to identify what other ratings a Sailor is eligible for or interested in. Commands can provide opportunity to retake the ASVAB to increase the number of other ratings a Sailor is eligible for. Sailors can apply up to 6 times for a quota. They can begin their application up to 3 months in advance of their first competitive cycle which happens at the 12 month mark. If they do not receive approval during a competitive cycle, but still have time remaining prior to the 6 month mark, they receive a denied status, but can re-apply. Sailors may be negotiating orders during the same window, which will not be approved until/unless they receive PTS approval. If Sailors rank highly based on the PTS algorithm, they may receive a quota after their first or second look. Every Sailor will know if they received a quota at the six month mark. If they are not approved, they will receive a “final denied” status, and separation letter. Sailors who are not approved to reenlist have an additional three months to compete for an opportunity to affiliate in the SELRES. If not, they will be directed to separate at the end of their obligated service.
On a macro-level, this is how the PTS cycle works: On an annual basis, we approve a PTS quota plan by rating and years of service. However, in order to respond to actual behavior trends, it is reconciled monthly to remain relevant, and not over or under-shoot the mark. Monthly, PTS quotas are loaded into the system and made visible to the Navy. Sailors can see what their competitive opportunity is for the month they are applying. Applications are submitted throughout the month, and accepted until the final day of the month. Most applications are for a Sailor’s end of obligated service (to include any extensions). However, there are some special circumstance applications that are also required, typically to obtain enough obligated service to negotiate PCS orders, or for a program requirement such as reenlistment bonuses, or Post 911 GI Bill transferability. All applications are ranked using a performance based algorithm (see slide 8) and decisions are made on who will and won’t receive quotas (Rack-N-Stack process). Sailors compete for in-rate quotas first, and then for up to 3 ratings with conversion opportunity in series based on the Sailor’s stated preference. Based on quota utilization and reenlistment rates the Quota Plan is reconciled for the next month’s available quotas.
PTS is an important tool for the Navy to review Sailor’s enlistment contract for performance quality and end strength limits prior to renewal. This slides illustrates the small cohort (18%) of the enlisted population that PTS reviews annually. ERB has relieved some of that pressure by expanding the population of Sailors who may be released from service. If the conditions continue as they are, and behavior remains the same, we may have increased PTS pressure again in FY13 because of E/S reductions, requiring another ERB to balance the force.
The ERB will require an total Navy leadership effort to communicate the plan and guarantee smooth transitions for our Sailors. Timing the board to be conducted in August/September 2011 allows us to develop the board process, membership, etc., while avoiding disrupting other planned boards scheduled in the COMNAVPERSCOM board spaces before/after that timeframe. An August/September board, with results released in October/November and a mandatory separation date of 30 June 2012, allows Sailors not chosen for retention sufficient time to prepare for transition from active duty in FY12.
Analysis of Navy suicides has shown a common pattern that includes one (or often multiple) life stressors, conditions around the time of the event where social network was disrupted in some way, and in which judgment was impaired at the time of the event by alcohol, sleep deprivation, or acute anger. Easy access to lethal means in states of impaired judgment increases the likelihood of impulsive suicide – an important percentage of Navy suicides could be avoided if the person had to delay more than 30 minutes before acting. Note: very few suicides occur on shipboard deployment where social support is often strong and access to means more difficult. When clear warning signs are shown to command members, intervention almost always takes place (these instances are found in SITREPS). In many of the deaths, no clear warning signs were seen by fellow Sailors or command. It is common for a significant precipitating factor to occur on liberty and the Sailor dies before seeing the command again - leaving no time for intervention once in crisis. When someone was aware a Sailor was having problems or thoughts of suicide, this was most often a family member or significant other. Prevention must move upstream before thoughts of suicide even occur and families need to learn to recognize warning signs and access assistance. Although there are many pathways leading to psychological pain and suicide, Thomas Joiner’s evidence based theory suggests that all lead to a common cluster of distorted thinking and beliefs. The individual feels they do not belong or have become a burden to others and that they are no longer effective. People work up to the capacity for lethal harm through means such as vicarious exposure to pain, mental rehearsal, learned pain tolerance in training, sports, of habitual self-injury, or progressive risky behaviors. Most Sailors never got in the door to professional help before taking their lives, but 23% of 2009 deaths had received some type of counseling or mental health treatment within the year of their death. One focus area is making sure mental health providers have the state of the art tools for assessing and managing suicide risk and that effective processes are put in place related to communication between leaders and medical providers to balance privacy and safety and best support the Sailor to heal and reintegrate.
Next SA study to be conducted Fall 2011. Will give us insight into actual incidents of SA. Blue on blue attacks are 72% for incidents that involve at least on Servicemember. 450 final dispositions for all completed investigations in FY10 61% (274) could not be prosecuted: lack of jurisdiction – 13, offender unknown – 16, allegation unfounded – 44, probable cause for non-sexual offense – 18, insufficient evidence – 70, victim declined to cooperate with investigation/prosecution – 113. 34% (155) presented for disposition 5% civilian jurisdiction 155 subjects presented to commands for disposition decision 46% (70) courts martial preferred 23% (36) NJP 19% (30) CDRS declined action pursuant to RCM 306(c)(1) 9% (14) Admin discharge 3% (5) Admin action
Opening: Today’s Navy needs more ships, but will be working with fewer people at higher costs – Navy’s costing trends(current situation) is similar to America’s largest corporations and many of our state/local governments – i.e., manpower costs continue to rise, budgets are essentially flat, trending downward On the right - People vs. Costs (BLUF) Costs of people (in Blue) rising despite having fewer sailors (in Red) - why, retirement, healthcare, wage and benefit increases have outpaced savings associated with Navy’s downsizing efforts! Don’t get me wrong, these benefits are part of our Navy’s commitment to our Sailors – this is good for the Nation, Navy and our Navy family, but very expensive at the macro level and has/will continue to make for funding decisions at the strategic level challenging. On the left – Sailor vs. Ships (BLUF) Navy’s ship count is estimated to grow in the near-term, but cost of manpower will limit Navy’s ability to grow the manpower account. Most recently, to mitigate afloat growth, Navy moved manpower from ashore to afloat units, i.e., supporting increased surface force manning and new construction requirements within POM-12. These factors have created a divergence between force structure and personnel in the Navy - the left chart shows the relationship between manpower and force structure. With exception of the post 9/11 ramp-up (highlighted in YELLOW), the Navy manpower reductions from FY96 to FY01 and again from FY03 to FY07 (highlighted in BLUE) have near perfect correlation with force structure reductions. - Beginning in FY07 (highlighted in RED), Navy manpower begins to diverge from force structure - this manpower divergence may be a contributing factor to the perceived personnel readiness degradation reported by the Fleet. Overall, Navy faces increased manpower cost which cannot be over-stated – these factors are significant. These issues are being addressed at the strategic level as the Navy attempt to balance force structure, operational readiness and the cost of manpower.
Now lets take a look at the process of determining a requirement and how that translates to Sailors onboard at COB. Three elements are used in determining manpower requirements: requirements (places), endstrength (controls), and authrorizations (root source). Then the Navy Manning Plan is applied. This is the fair share distribution of the PERSONNEL that are assignable. Current on Board is the result = Today's muster THE MINIMUM requirements and the Current on Board are different. This difference leads can lead to a readiness gap...we have less people on board to meet the defined workload requirements.
In order to effectively use the inventory to meet the defined workload requirements. The Navy must FILL its billets with the right FIT . “ Fit” is having the right skills for specific fills. FIT to FILL, as you are aware, isn’t an easy process. There are factors that can affect FIT TO FILL such as: Inventory gaps Budget constraints / reductions School quotas Ready rollers Additional Information: The left side of the slide explains how we as a Navy work to quantitize and qualitize the billets needed to meet the mission and workload. Right side displays the flow of personnel to those billets (the demand signal for people). Ideally, in the accession, training and placement of the personnel we arrive at Fill.
What is the EPA and why is it important in this discussion of manpower? The EPA is our billet base and is controlled by to the actual end strength authorization. The EPA is broken down by fiscal years and summarized by Enlisted Manning Codes, rates and rating. It is produced for active duty and reserve components (one in the Spring and Fall of each year). Semi-annually publication allows for programming changes that have occurred during the year to be reflected in the billet base. This document is important to both Community Managers and Strength Planners. It is primarily used in promotion and strength plans. Bottom line is that the EPA allows us to bring billets authorized and end strength in balance.
Now let’s talk about a specific initiative that had broad impact on the enlisted billet base – the Top Six Alignment. When we began looking at this several years ago, there was a large gap between what we say we needed at the senior “Top Six” paygrades (the billets authorized) and what we could afford in terms of personnel cost. Closing that gap required either increasing personnel seniority (which costs more money) or reducing the billet authorizations. Personnel seniority has been limited to 73.25% due to limited manpower funding. Top Six was an effort to close that gap and send a better demand signal by reducing the billet authorizations. Phase I was implemented in 2007 and rolled down over 17,000 billets (reducing the Top Six percentage to 75.1%) Phase II was implemented in 2009 and rolled down an additional 7,000 billets (reducing the Top Six percentage to 74.24%) Further POM-12 actions have reduced the Top Six billet percentage to 73.89%
CNP Guidance for Phase II of the Top Six Alignment was clear - preserve personnel readiness for our ships, submarines, squadrons and other operational units. To do that in Phase II, we focused on shore activities and enlisted communities that were shore-centric and shore-intensive when looking for billets for paygrade reductions. Billets chosen for roll down were carefully selected to minimize the impact to Fleet readiness, while factoring in community health, career progression, and sea shore flow. I understand your community is concerned about Strike Fighter Wing NCC billets that were rolled down to NC1 and are now junior to the NCC billets at VFA squadrons. If the billet requires an E7 fill, then the Wing can petition their BSO to reinstate the higher paygrade through a Billet Change Request (BCR). The BSO will have to identify billet compensation in the form of an alternate E7 billet to lower to E6.
WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT, UNLESS SEA/SHORE FLOW POLICIES CHANGE, WE WILL HAVE PLENTY OF FUNDED BILLETS AT SEA TO FILL, BUT MANY OF THE SAILORS THAT WOULD FILL THEM REMAIN ASHORE COMPLETING THEIR ENTITLED 36 MONTH SHORE TOUR. THIS DISCONNECT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR IN FY 12. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Aviation billets, between FY10 and FY16, average billets are at 54,000. 66% of those billets are at sea and 33% at shore. This does not include FAC-G billets and non aviation production billets (recruiter, RDC, TPU staff, etc.). Currently there are 59,680 aviation rated Sailors in the Navy. On average, 10% of those Sailors are non distributable due to LIMDU/Pregnancy/TPP&H. Total distributable is 53,572; approximately 400 personnel short to fill all aviation specific billets. Average Sea/Shore rotation for first tour Aviation billets is 48 months at sea and 39 months shore. With 66% of the billets at sea and 400 personnel short to fill aviation rated billets, there are great difficulties in manning fleet commands while still supporting Sailor’s sea/shore rotations. Both ABs and AOs are at 60 months for first sea tour and 36 months shore. To fill ABE billets, Sailors need to actually do up to 96 months sea and 26 months shore. For AOs sea needs to be at 60 months, but shore needs to be only 26 months.
AN INTERESTING REALITY FROM THE POM 12 DECISIONS IS THAT WE HAVE BROKEN SEA /SHORE FLOW. THE NUMBER OF RATINGS THAT ARE MAXED OUT HAS GROWN. NOTE THE COMMENT ON THE ABE RATING.
Now let’s shift over to one of my favorite CNO special programs…The Navy and Coast Guard’s wounded, ill and injured program which we refer to as Navy Safe Harbor. Safe Harbor is the Navy’s lead organization for coordinating non-medical support of seriously wounded, ill, and injured Sailors, Coast Guardsmen, and their families. Safe Harbor non-medical care managers provide a lifetime of individually tailored assistance designed to optimize the success of the service member’s recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration activities. Safe Harbor’s goal is to return Sailors to duty and, when not possible, work collaboratively with federal agencies including Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Labor, state, and local organizations to ensure successful reintegration of Sailors back into their local communities. The Navy Safe Harbor program was originally developed in October 2005, to be an organization that focused on advocacy for the Sailors and their families who were seriously injured as a result of OEF/OIF operations. The program’s mission has been expanded in 2008 to cover any “Seriously ill/injured (SI) and Very seriously ill/injured (VSI)” Sailors and their families. Safe Harbor extends support beyond separation or retirement, by providing mentoring during reintegration to the community through the Anchor Program, a partnership of Navy Reserve and Retired member volunteers. In April 2009, the CNO and Commandant of the Coast Guard signed a MOA to align all serious wounded, ill and injured Coast Guardsmen under Safe Harbor, due to the smaller Coast Guard population, making it easier and more cost effective to leverage the Navy’s already existing wounded warrior program.
Now when speaking of organization structure and alignment, Navy Safe Harbor is currently aligned under OPNAV N1 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) in the N12 (Navy Total Force Requirements Division) Directorate. Additionally, the Director Navy Safe Harbor reports directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on matters concerning wounded warrior care. Navy Safe Harbor staff consists of a Headquarters element of 20 personnel and 18 field personnel. The headquarters staff is located in the Navy Annex in Washington DC and consists of 20 personnel assigned in two distinct departments. Strategic Support Department contains 11 personnel assigned as subject matter experts on all phases of wounded warrior care. The Operations Department consists of 4 personnel who manage and lead the 18 Non-medical Care Managers (Field Personnel) who are assigned to 12 Military Treatment Facilities and VA Hospitals Nationwide. Non-Medical Care Managers support and assist seriously wounded, ill, and injured service members and their families, identify needs, and work towards achieving recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration goals. The non-medical care manager works closely with the medical team, hospital patient administration, casualty affairs office, and the service member’s command. In doing this the non-medical care managers helps in resolving non-medical issues and aids in the preparation for a transition back to active service or civilian life. Safe Harbor assists with issues pertaining to legal and guardianship, invitational travel orders, lodging and housing adaption, child and youth care along with transportation needs, to name a few.
Safe Harbor enrollment eligibility includes combat-related wounds or injuries and ship board accidents, off duty accidents, (motor vehicles, sporting, etc.), serious medical and psychological conditions (cancer, severe PTSD, etc). The majority of enrollees are either seriously ill or injured however, the Navy does have 81 combat wounded service members that the program takes care of. Enrollment in Safe Harbor is voluntary. Sailors and Coast Guardsmen may be referred to Safe Harbor by self-referral, family referral, their command leadership, or their medical team to name a few. Navy Safe Harbor support does not end at the medical treatment facilities’ door. Once you are enrolled in the program, you are enrolled for life and anytime a non-medical issue arises, your Navy Safe Harbor team will be there to help you overcome that obstacle, allowing each service member to reach their recovery goals.
Currently, Safe Harbor manages a Wounded Warrior population of 674 service members. Out of this figure 100 cases are currently in progress and being aggressively managed by the field non-medical care managers. Also, 336 have either transitioned out of the Navy by separation or retiring from active duty service. A snapshot of Safe Harbor’s enrolled Sailor is an active duty, E-5 Male with an average age of 34 and married. This means that 87% of the enrolled population are male and 13% are females. As you can see from the chart, 90% are enlisted and 10% are officers. 79% are active duty and 21% are reservists. Only a small portion of the Navy is aware of this program, 12% to be exact! Please continue to spread the word about the Navy’s Wounded Warrior program to your fellow Shipmates. It is everyone’s duty to promote the program and know about the resources available to our shipmates. We are on Facebook and Twitter! Also, the program will launch a new website on during the month of July.
Navy Safe Harbor has established an enduring organization that has been responsive to the needs of all seriously wounded, ill or injured Sailors and family members. The Navy’s commitment is to provide superior quality, life-long non-medical care management and individually tailored support plans, ensuring sustained engagement in providing for the health and welfare of seriously wounded, ill, or injured Sailors, Coast Guardsmen and their families. If you have any additional questions please feel free to contact the Director CAPT Bernie Carter or the Operations Officer LT David Noriega. Navy Safe Harbor – the Navy’s Wounded Warrior Program.
The guiding principle for this quota-based enlisted retention board is performance, with the objective of balancing the force in terms of seniority, experience and skills to meet Fleet and Joint Requirements. The board will examine the records of all eligible Sailors for performance indicators. Recent documented misconduct and substandard performance will indicate that retention may not be in the best interests of the Navy.
We have waived conversion eligibility requirements so that all ERB eligible Sailors are also eligible to apply for rating conversion to an identified undermanned rating prior to the board. Those selected for conversion will be exempt from the board.