1. Flying Lessons:
or what aviation can tell other
disciplines about user interfaces.
Blay Whitby
blaywhitby.org

2. 2

3. In other words:
 Aviation has a rather clear way of
exposing false assumptions and
outdated work practices.
 Other areas of human activity might be
wise to take notice.
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6. What I'm not saying…
 Aviation always got it right.
 Aviation has all the answers.
 Other fields should simply imitate
aviation.
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7. On the other hand…
 Aviation has some hard-won knowledge
from which other fields might learn.
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8. The Aviation Model – some key features
 Blame doesn't help fix anything.
 Stopping it happening again is the goal.
 Technical and human factors are usually
combined.
 Chains of events; not single causes
 Management (and even national culture) is
part of the problem.
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9. So:



Don‟t assume, no really, DON‟T
ASSUME!
Blaming the user is worthless – it‟s not
the user‟s fault.
Gather data - data shows where the
problems are.
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10. “Pilot Error”




Now never used in aviation
Why?
It won‟t stop the same set of events
happening again.
We need to know why people make
errors – in particular this error.
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11. “Pilot Error”
 Tiredness…
 Lack of attention…
 Lack of training…
 Lack of adequate information…
 Loss of situational awareness
 CRM
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12. Data collection



Find out why people made a particular
error.
Improve displays, communication,
training.
Examine the psychology of decision
making.
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13. Psychology of Decision
Making

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The „risky shift‟
The domineering captain and compliant
co-pilot
CRM
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17. Current research topics in
aviation human factors



Cultural variations
Situational awareness
Mode confusion
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18. Cultural variation

KAL 801
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19. Cultural variation
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
KAL 801
“Captain, the weather radar has helped
us a lot.”
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20. Situational awareness

AA695
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21. Situational awareness
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AA695
FMS logic that dropped all intermediate fixes
from the display(s) in the event of execution
of a direct routing.
FMS-generated navigational information that
used a different naming convention from that
published in navigational charts.
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22. Mode Confusion

AF 447
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23. Mode Confusion
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AF 447
Not one cause but a chain of events:
Tropical storm – turbulence
At 02.10.06 in cruise;
Pitot tubes blocked; ADCs lost input;
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24. Mode Confusion

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Handover to humans, „the startle effect‟;
Alternate law; (suddenly it‟s a different
aircraft)
At 02.11.30 PF declares the a/c out of
control
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25. Mode Confusion

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
In alternate law stall protection is
inoperative.
An aural warning “stall, stall” sounded.
When the airspeed drops below about
60kts the stall warning stops!
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26. Mode Confusion

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The CRM was also not quite right.
The Captain and PNF may not have
fully realised what control inputs that the
PF was making.
None of the crew realized in time that
the a/c was completely stalled.
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27. The problem of mode
confusion will be solved
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28. The problem of mode
confusion will be solved
Learn from the mistakes of others: you
won’t live long enough to make all of them
for yourself.
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