1. Re-Framing Transboundary Water Politics:
What Really Matters for effective diplomacy
Building the Water Agenda:
Policy responses to scarcity and shock
Chatham House, 9-10 July 2012
Mark Zeitoun
Water Security Research Centre
University of East Anglia
m.zeitoun@uea.ac.uk

2. What Matters?
POWER matters
 good analysis must incorporate
 interventions must confront
NORMS matter
 interventions require a benchmark
1. Some helpful theory
2. Tigris and Euprhrates
3. Policy responses

3. 1
Some helpful theory
a) Politics driving water interaction
b) Cooperation & Power
c) Levelling

4. 1a) Politics driving water interaction
‘Environmental Determinism’: - Western-centric
Water can lead to peace - ignores / wishes away politics
We can learn from North America and Europe - liberal assumptions about
power and equality
 environmental peacemaking - little evidence of success
 supposedly apolitical interventions, in very political contexts
‘Political Economy / Ecology’:
Water and society co-produced (Physical and Social water scarcity)
Water is subordinate to larger forces (ideological, political, economic)
 enhancement of classic politics, diplomacy, international relations
 + look ‘outside the box’ at economics, finance, food trade (i.e. the nexus)
 learn from mistakes made in other basins

5. 1b) Cooperation Cooperation is poorly theorised, or understood
either Conflict or Cooperation
Wolf (2007)

6. 1b) Cooperation
BUT
 Dataset quality and interpretation issues…
Kalbhenn (forthcoming)
‘TWINS’
 Conflict and cooperation co-exist
Mirumachi (2007)
 Liberal interpretation of ‘cooperation’
Cooperative efforts can be part of the problem
(teaties on Jordan and Ganges) – because of power

7. 1b) Power
Power asymmetry is … but can be used to lead
a fact of life… or to dominate.
a ‘fact of life’
Forms of Power:
Hard Power (upstream position, military, economy)
Soft Power (ideology, allies, discourse, etc)

8. 1b) Power + Cooperation Not all cooperation is pretty [link]
‘Hegemon’s prerogative’:
 Selective policy engagement (‘cherry-picking’ responsibilities)
 Emphasise conflictive or cooperative face of interaction
 Agenda of basin hegemon (bully or
leader) followed… while alternatives
offered by non-hegemons are ignored
as not ‘pragmatic’ or ‘realistic’
(e.g. Bangladesh, Palestine… )
… hurried diplomacy can lead to perpetuation of conflict
Zeitoun, Mirumachi, Warner (2011)

9. 1b) Power + Cooperation Effective diplomacy requires:
 ‘Cooperation’to be evaluated in the specific political context
 Confronting power and power asymmetry
a) Influencing Power (moving from basin bully to basin leader)
 Positive-sum outcomes, benefit-sharing, etc Sadoff and Grey (2002)
 seek standards, not just political pragmatism Phillips and Woodhouse (2010)
b) Challenging Power
 Level the players
 Level the playing field
Zeitoun and Jägerskog (2011)

10. 1c) Levelling
 Level the players
e.g. Capacity-building
 especially negotiations and lawyers
(not just techno-managerial capacity)
 Level the playing field
Objective Standards (to inform treaties):
International Water Law
 1997 UN Watercourses Convention
‘no significant harm’;
‘prior notification’;
‘equitable and reasonable use’
In absence of agreed standards and principles, space for effective diplomacy is
closed down

11. 2
Tigris & Euphrates

12. Tigris and Euphrates
Turkey
Syria
Development context:
- Abstractions upstream Iran
- effect on livelihoods (&ecosystems)
With uncoordinated upstream ‘development’:
Political context: is this the future also of Cambodia, Egypt, Bangladesh?
- Turkey as Basin Leader or Basin Bully?
- Tri-lateral committee… often bi-lateral
- talk of benefit-sharing, ‘oil for water’,
joint training, etc (soft power)
- How effective is the cooperation?
Interventions by UNDP, UNESCO, others:
- Levelling the players without levelling the
playing field? Iraq UN-IWTFI 2011 (Walther Case
- What standards are brought to the table
(along with inducements)?

13. 3
Policy Responses

14. Policy Responses (last slide!)
1. Ask who says Power and Norms do NOT matter (i.e. who benefits from status quo)?
POWER matters  look for evidence of and interpret
 good analysis must incorporate soft power
 interventions must confront a) Influencing Power
 moving from basin bully to
basin leader
NORMS matter
 interventions require a benchmark b) Challenging Power
 Level the players
 Level the playing field
m.zeitoun@uea.ac.uk

15. References
Kalbhenn A and Bernaeur T forthcoming International Water Cooperation and Conflict: A New Events Dataset.
Mirumachi N and Allan J A 2007 Revisiting transboundary water governance: power, conflict cooperation and the political
economy. Proceedings from CAIWA International Conference on Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with
Scarcity, 12 - 15 November 2007. Basel, Switzerland.
Phillips D and Woodhouse M 2010 Benefit Sharing in the Nile River Basin: Emerging Strategies for Fresh Water Use at the
Country and Selected Sub-basin Levels, as Revealed by the Trans-boundary Waters Opportunity Analysis. Nile Basin Initiative,
Socio-economic Development and Benefit Sharing component, Windhoek.
Sadoff C W and Grey D 2002 Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international rivers. Water Policy 4 389-403.
UN-IWTFI 2011 Managing Change in the Marshlands: Iraq's Critical Challenge. United Nations White Paper. United Nations
Integrated Water Task Force for Iraq.
Wolf A T 2007 Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation. Annual Review of Environmental Resources 241-269.
Zeitoun M and Warner J 2006 Hydro-Hegemony: A Framework for Analysis of Transboundary Water Conflicts. Water Policy 8
435-460.
Zeitoun M and Mirumachi N 2008 Transboundary water interaction I: Reconsidering conflict and cooperation. International
Environmental Agreements 8 297 - 316.
Zeitoun M and Jägerskog A 2011 Addressing Power Asymmetry: How Transboundary Water Management May Serve to Reduce
Poverty. Report No. 29. Stockholm International Water Institute., Stockholm.
Zeitoun M, Mirumachi N and Warner J 2011 Transboundary water interaction II: Soft power underlying conflict and cooperation.
International Environmental Agreements 11 159 - 178.