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Visual Security Event Analysis
DefCon 13 Las Vegas

Raffael Marty, GCIA, CISSP
Senior Security Engineer @ ArcSight

July 29, 2005

         *
Raffael Marty
    ► Enterprise      Security Management (ESM) specialist
    ► OVAL      Advisory Board
          (Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language)
    ► ArcSight      Research & Development
    ► IBM       Research
          • Thor - http://thor.cryptojail.net
          • Log analysis and event correlation research
          • Tivoli Risk Manager




Raffael Marty                     Defcon 2005 Las Vegas      2
Table Of Contents
    ► Introduction

    ► Related   Work
    ► Basics

    ► Situational   Awareness
    ► Forensic   and Historical Analysis
    ► AfterGlow




Raffael Marty               Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   3
Introduction




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   4
Disclaimer

                  IP addresses and host names showing
                up in event graphs and descriptions were
                 obfuscated/changed. The addresses are
                completely random and any resemblance
                with well-known addresses or host names
                          are purely coincidental.




Raffael Marty                  Defcon 2005 Las Vegas       5
Text or Visuals?
  ► What                               would you rather look at?
     Jun   17   09:42:30   rmarty   ifup: Determining IP information for eth0...
     Jun   17   09:42:35   rmarty   ifup: failed; no link present. Check cable?
     Jun   17   09:42:35   rmarty   network: Bringing up interface eth0: failed
     Jun   17   09:42:38   rmarty   sendmail: sendmail shutdown succeeded
     Jun   17   09:42:38   rmarty   sendmail: sm-client shutdown succeeded
     Jun   17   09:42:39   rmarty   sendmail: sendmail startup succeeded
     Jun   17   09:42:39   rmarty   sendmail: sm-client startup succeeded
     Jun   17   09:43:39   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
     Jun   17   09:45:42   rmarty   last message repeated 2 times
     Jun   17   09:45:47   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
     Jun   17   09:56:02   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   09:56:03   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   09:56:03   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 172.16.48.128 from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   09:56:03   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPACK on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:00:03   rmarty   crond(pam_unix)[30534]: session opened for user root by (uid=0)
     Jun   17   10:00:10   rmarty   crond(pam_unix)[30534]: session closed for user root
     Jun   17   10:01:02   rmarty   crond(pam_unix)[30551]: session opened for user root by (uid=0)
     Jun   17   10:01:07   rmarty   crond(pam_unix)[30551]: session closed for user root
     Jun   17   10:05:02   rmarty   crond(pam_unix)[30567]: session opened for user idabench by (uid=0)
     Jun   17   10:05:05   rmarty   crond(pam_unix)[30567]: session closed for user idabench
     Jun   17   10:13:05   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.19/192.168.80.19 to UDP port: 192
     Jun   17   10:13:05   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.19/192.168.80.19 is already blocked Ignoring
     Jun   17   10:14:09   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68
     Jun   17   10:14:09   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring
     Jun   17   10:14:09   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68
     Jun   17   10:14:09   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring
     Jun   17   10:21:30   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68
     Jun   17   10:21:30   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring
     Jun   17   10:28:40   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:28:41   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:28:41   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 172.16.48.128 from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:28:45   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPACK on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:30:47   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68
     Jun   17   10:30:47   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring
     Jun   17   10:30:47   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68
     Jun   17   10:30:47   rmarty   portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring
     Jun   17   10:35:28   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
     Jun   17   10:35:31   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
     Jun   17   10:38:51   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 172.16.48.128 from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:38:52   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPACK on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
     Jun   17   10:42:35   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
     Jun   17   10:42:38   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128




Raffael Marty                                                                                         Defcon 2005 Las Vegas           6
Why Using Event Graphs?
  ► Visual  representation of textual information (logs and
    events)
  ► Visual display of most important properties

  ► Reduce analysis and response times
    • Quickly visualize thousands of events
    • A picture tells more than a thousand log lines
  ► Situational awareness
    • Visualize status of business posture
  ► Facilitate communication
    • Use graphs to communicate with other teams
    • Graphs are easier to understand than textual events
Raffael Marty             Defcon 2005 Las Vegas               7
When To Use Event Graphs
  ► Real-time      monitoring
        • What is happening in a specific business area
          (e.g., compliance monitoring)
        • What is happening on a specific network
        • What are certain servers doing
        • Look at specific aspects of events
  ► Forensics      and Investigations
        • Selecting arbitrary set of events for investigation
        • Understanding big picture
        • Analyzing relationships

Raffael Marty                   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas           8
Related Work




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   9
Related Work

  ► Classics
        • Girardin Luc, “A visual Approach for Monitoring Logs” , 12th USENIX System Administration
          Conference
        • Erbacher: “Intrusion and Misuse Detection in Large Scale Systems”, IEEE Computer
          Graphics and Applications
        • Sheng Ma, et al. “EventMiner: An integrated mining tool for Scalable Analysis of Event Data”

  ► Tools
        • Greg Conti, “Network Attack Visualization”,
          Defcon 2004.
        • NVisionIP from SIFT (Security Incident Fusion
          Tools), http://www.ncassr.org/projects/sift/.
        • Stephen P. Berry, “The Shoki Packet
          Hustler”, http://shoki.sourceforge.net.




Raffael Marty                                Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                                  10
Basics




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   11
How To Draw An Event Graph?



                                                                                      ... | Normalization | ...

                               Device                                                                    Parser              Event Analyzer / Visualizer


         Jun   17   09:42:30   rmarty   ifup: Determining IP information for eth0...
         Jun   17   09:42:35   rmarty   ifup: failed; no link present. Check cable?
         Jun   17   09:42:35   rmarty   network: Bringing up interface eth0: failed
         Jun   17   09:42:38   rmarty   sendmail: sendmail shutdown succeeded
         Jun   17   09:42:38   rmarty   sendmail: sm-client shutdown succeeded
         Jun   17   09:42:39   rmarty   sendmail: sendmail startup succeeded
         Jun   17   09:42:39   rmarty   sendmail: sm-client startup succeeded
         Jun   17   09:43:39   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
         Jun   17   09:45:42   rmarty   last message repeated 2 times
         Jun   17   09:45:47   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128
         Jun   17   09:56:02   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
         Jun   17   09:56:03   rmarty   vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8
         NH




                                        Log File                                                                                Event Graph




Raffael Marty                                                                                        Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                                 12
Different Node Configurations
     Raw Event:
     [**] [1:1923:2] RPC portmap UDP proxy attempt [**]
     [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2]
     06/04-15:56:28.219753 192.168.10.90:32859 ->
     192.168.10.255:111
     UDP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:148 DF
     Len: 120

     Different node configurations:

                SIP   Name      DIP                             SIP      DIP        DPort


 192.168.10.90 RPC portmap    192.168.10.255             192.168.10.90 192.168.10.255    111

                SIP   SPort     DPort                           Name     SIP            DIP


 192.168.10.90        32859     111                   RPC portmap 192.168.10.90 192.168.10.255

Raffael Marty                           Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                                  13
AfterGlow – Peak Preview

  ► AfterGlow    is not a SIM - there are no parsers (well,
        tcpdump and sendmail are there).

                Parser              AfterGlow                       Grapher
                                                        Graph
                         CSV File                    LanguageFile

                         color.properties:
  ► Demo         of the tool for use at home and in the Jacuzzi.
                    color.source="red"
        cat input.csv | ./afterglow.pl –c color.properties
                    color.event="green"
        | neato –Tgif –o output.gif
                    color.target="blue"

            Thanks to Christian @ ArcSight!
Raffael Marty                         Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                   14
Situational Awareness




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas    15
Real-time Monitoring With A Dashboard




Raffael Marty        Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   16
Forensic and Historical
                 Analysis




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas      17
A 3D Example

  ► An          LGL example:




Raffael Marty                  Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   18
Monitoring Web Servers

                                            assetCategory(DestIP)=
                                                  WebServer




Raffael Marty       Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                      19
Network Scan




Raffael Marty     Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   20
Suspicious Activity?




Raffael Marty        Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   21
Port Scan
    ► Port      scan or something else?




Raffael Marty                  Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   22
Firewall Activity
                                                          External Machine
                                                          Internal Machine
                                                          Rule#

                Next Steps:                              Outgoing
                                                         Incoming
                1. Visualize “FW Blocks” of outgoing traffic
                   -> Why do internal machines trigger blocks?
                2. Visualize “FW Blocks” of incoming traffic
                   -> Who and what tries to enter my network?
                3. Visualize “FW Passes” of outgoing traffic
                   -> What is leaving the network?
                                               SIP    Rule#       DIP




Raffael Marty                     Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                      23
Firewall Rule-set Analysis




                pass                           block



Raffael Marty          Defcon 2005 Las Vegas           24
Load Balancer




Raffael Marty      Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   25
Worms




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   26
DefCon 2004 Capture The Flag
                                                     DstPort < 1024
                                                     DstPort > 1024
                                                     Source Of Evil
                                                     Internal Target
                                                     Other Team's Target
                                                     Internal Source
                                                     Internet Target

                                            Exposed Services
                                            Our Servers



                                              SIP   DIP      DPort

Raffael Marty       Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                              27
DefCon 2004 Capture The Flag – TTL Games
                                                   TTL
                                                   Source Of Evil
                                                   Internal Target
                                                   Internal Source




                                            SIP   DIP      TTL

Raffael Marty       Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                            28
DefCon 2004 Capture The Flag – The Solution


                                             DPort   Flags   TTL


                                             Show Node Counts


                                             Only show SYNs




Raffael Marty        Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                         29
Email Cliques
                                              From: My Domain
                                              From: Other Domain
                                              To: My Domain
                                              To: Other Domain




                                           From       To

Raffael Marty      Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                         30
Email Relays

                  Grey out “my domain” invisible My Domain
                    Make emails to            From:
                                              From: Other Domain
                  and from “my domain”
                                                          To: My Domain
                                                          To: Other Domain



                                             Do you run an open relay?




                                                      From        To

Raffael Marty        Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                                   31
Email SPAM?


                                         Size > 10.000
                                         Omit threshold = 1




                                              To      Size
                         Multiple recipients with
                         same-size messages

Raffael Marty    Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                        32
Email SPAM?

                                         nrcpt => 2
                                         Omit threshold = 1




                                                From      nrcpt




Raffael Marty    Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                            33
BIG Emails

                                        Size > 100.000
                                        Omit Threshold = 2




                                         Documents leaving the
                                         network?



                                           From      To      Size




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                               34
Email Server Problems?

                                                 2:00 < Delay < 10:00
                                                 Delay > 10:00
                                                 To




                                            To           Delay




Raffael Marty       Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                          35
AfterGlow
                 afterglow.sourceforge.net




Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas        36
AfterGlow

  ► http://afterglow.sourceforge.net

  ► Supported       graphing tools:
        • GraphViz from AT&T (dot and neato)
          http://www.research.att.com/sw/tools/graphviz/
        • LGL (Large Graph Layout) by Alex Adai
          http://bioinformatics.icmb.utexas.edu/lgl/




Raffael Marty                  Defcon 2005 Las Vegas       37
AfterGlow – Command Line Parameters

  ●     Some command line parameters:
        -h            : help
        -t            : two node mode
        -d            : print count on nodes
        -e            : edge length
        -n            : no node labels
        -o threshold : omit threshold (fan-out for nodes to be displayed)
        -c configfile : color configuration file




Raffael Marty                      Defcon 2005 Las Vegas                    38
AfterGlow – color.properties

        color.[source|event|target|edge]=
           <perl expression returning a color name>
  ●     Array @fields contains input-line, split into tokens:
        color.event=“red” if ($fields[1] =~ /^192..*)

  ●     Special color “invisible”:

        color.target=“invisible” if ($fields[0] eq
           “IIS Action”)

  ●     Edge color
        color.edge=“blue”
Raffael Marty                  Defcon 2005 Las Vegas            39
AfterGlow – color.properties - Example
  color.source="olivedrab"
    if ($fields[0]=~/191.141.69.4/);
  color.source="olivedrab"
    if ($fields[0]=~/211.254.110./);
  color.source="orangered1"
  color.event="slateblue4"
  color.target="olivedrab"
    if ($fields[2]=~/191.141.69.4/);
  color.target="olivedrab"
    if ($fields[2]=~/211.254.110./);
  color.target="orangered1"
  color.edge="firebrick"
    if (($fields[0]=~/191.141.69..4/) or
    ($fields[2]=~/191.141.69.4/))
  color.edge="cyan4"

Raffael Marty         Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   40
THANKS!
                     raffy@cryptojail.net

Raffael Marty   Defcon 2005 Las Vegas   41

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Visual Security Event Analysis - DefCon 13 - 2005

  • 1. Visual Security Event Analysis DefCon 13 Las Vegas Raffael Marty, GCIA, CISSP Senior Security Engineer @ ArcSight July 29, 2005 *
  • 2. Raffael Marty ► Enterprise Security Management (ESM) specialist ► OVAL Advisory Board (Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language) ► ArcSight Research & Development ► IBM Research • Thor - http://thor.cryptojail.net • Log analysis and event correlation research • Tivoli Risk Manager Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 2
  • 3. Table Of Contents ► Introduction ► Related Work ► Basics ► Situational Awareness ► Forensic and Historical Analysis ► AfterGlow Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 3
  • 4. Introduction Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 4
  • 5. Disclaimer IP addresses and host names showing up in event graphs and descriptions were obfuscated/changed. The addresses are completely random and any resemblance with well-known addresses or host names are purely coincidental. Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 5
  • 6. Text or Visuals? ► What would you rather look at? Jun 17 09:42:30 rmarty ifup: Determining IP information for eth0... Jun 17 09:42:35 rmarty ifup: failed; no link present. Check cable? Jun 17 09:42:35 rmarty network: Bringing up interface eth0: failed Jun 17 09:42:38 rmarty sendmail: sendmail shutdown succeeded Jun 17 09:42:38 rmarty sendmail: sm-client shutdown succeeded Jun 17 09:42:39 rmarty sendmail: sendmail startup succeeded Jun 17 09:42:39 rmarty sendmail: sm-client startup succeeded Jun 17 09:43:39 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 09:45:42 rmarty last message repeated 2 times Jun 17 09:45:47 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 09:56:02 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 09:56:03 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 09:56:03 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 172.16.48.128 from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 09:56:03 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPACK on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:00:03 rmarty crond(pam_unix)[30534]: session opened for user root by (uid=0) Jun 17 10:00:10 rmarty crond(pam_unix)[30534]: session closed for user root Jun 17 10:01:02 rmarty crond(pam_unix)[30551]: session opened for user root by (uid=0) Jun 17 10:01:07 rmarty crond(pam_unix)[30551]: session closed for user root Jun 17 10:05:02 rmarty crond(pam_unix)[30567]: session opened for user idabench by (uid=0) Jun 17 10:05:05 rmarty crond(pam_unix)[30567]: session closed for user idabench Jun 17 10:13:05 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.19/192.168.80.19 to UDP port: 192 Jun 17 10:13:05 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.19/192.168.80.19 is already blocked Ignoring Jun 17 10:14:09 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68 Jun 17 10:14:09 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring Jun 17 10:14:09 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68 Jun 17 10:14:09 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring Jun 17 10:21:30 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68 Jun 17 10:21:30 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring Jun 17 10:28:40 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:28:41 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:28:41 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 172.16.48.128 from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:28:45 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPACK on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:30:47 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68 Jun 17 10:30:47 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring Jun 17 10:30:47 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: UDP scan from host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 to UDP port: 68 Jun 17 10:30:47 rmarty portsentry[4797]: attackalert: Host: 192.168.80.8/192.168.80.8 is already blocked Ignoring Jun 17 10:35:28 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 10:35:31 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 10:38:51 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 172.16.48.128 from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:38:52 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPACK on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 10:42:35 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 10:42:38 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 6
  • 7. Why Using Event Graphs? ► Visual representation of textual information (logs and events) ► Visual display of most important properties ► Reduce analysis and response times • Quickly visualize thousands of events • A picture tells more than a thousand log lines ► Situational awareness • Visualize status of business posture ► Facilitate communication • Use graphs to communicate with other teams • Graphs are easier to understand than textual events Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 7
  • 8. When To Use Event Graphs ► Real-time monitoring • What is happening in a specific business area (e.g., compliance monitoring) • What is happening on a specific network • What are certain servers doing • Look at specific aspects of events ► Forensics and Investigations • Selecting arbitrary set of events for investigation • Understanding big picture • Analyzing relationships Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 8
  • 9. Related Work Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 9
  • 10. Related Work ► Classics • Girardin Luc, “A visual Approach for Monitoring Logs” , 12th USENIX System Administration Conference • Erbacher: “Intrusion and Misuse Detection in Large Scale Systems”, IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications • Sheng Ma, et al. “EventMiner: An integrated mining tool for Scalable Analysis of Event Data” ► Tools • Greg Conti, “Network Attack Visualization”, Defcon 2004. • NVisionIP from SIFT (Security Incident Fusion Tools), http://www.ncassr.org/projects/sift/. • Stephen P. Berry, “The Shoki Packet Hustler”, http://shoki.sourceforge.net. Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 10
  • 11. Basics Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 11
  • 12. How To Draw An Event Graph? ... | Normalization | ... Device Parser Event Analyzer / Visualizer Jun 17 09:42:30 rmarty ifup: Determining IP information for eth0... Jun 17 09:42:35 rmarty ifup: failed; no link present. Check cable? Jun 17 09:42:35 rmarty network: Bringing up interface eth0: failed Jun 17 09:42:38 rmarty sendmail: sendmail shutdown succeeded Jun 17 09:42:38 rmarty sendmail: sm-client shutdown succeeded Jun 17 09:42:39 rmarty sendmail: sendmail startup succeeded Jun 17 09:42:39 rmarty sendmail: sm-client startup succeeded Jun 17 09:43:39 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 09:45:42 rmarty last message repeated 2 times Jun 17 09:45:47 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPINFORM from 172.16.48.128 Jun 17 09:56:02 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPDISCOVER from 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 Jun 17 09:56:03 rmarty vmnet-dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 172.16.48.128 to 00:0c:29:b7:b2:47 via vmnet8 NH Log File Event Graph Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 12
  • 13. Different Node Configurations Raw Event: [**] [1:1923:2] RPC portmap UDP proxy attempt [**] [Classification: Decode of an RPC Query] [Priority: 2] 06/04-15:56:28.219753 192.168.10.90:32859 -> 192.168.10.255:111 UDP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:148 DF Len: 120 Different node configurations: SIP Name DIP SIP DIP DPort 192.168.10.90 RPC portmap 192.168.10.255 192.168.10.90 192.168.10.255 111 SIP SPort DPort Name SIP DIP 192.168.10.90 32859 111 RPC portmap 192.168.10.90 192.168.10.255 Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 13
  • 14. AfterGlow – Peak Preview ► AfterGlow is not a SIM - there are no parsers (well, tcpdump and sendmail are there). Parser AfterGlow Grapher Graph CSV File LanguageFile color.properties: ► Demo of the tool for use at home and in the Jacuzzi. color.source="red" cat input.csv | ./afterglow.pl –c color.properties color.event="green" | neato –Tgif –o output.gif color.target="blue" Thanks to Christian @ ArcSight! Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 14
  • 15. Situational Awareness Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 15
  • 16. Real-time Monitoring With A Dashboard Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 16
  • 17. Forensic and Historical Analysis Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 17
  • 18. A 3D Example ► An LGL example: Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 18
  • 19. Monitoring Web Servers assetCategory(DestIP)= WebServer Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 19
  • 20. Network Scan Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 20
  • 21. Suspicious Activity? Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 21
  • 22. Port Scan ► Port scan or something else? Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 22
  • 23. Firewall Activity External Machine Internal Machine Rule# Next Steps: Outgoing Incoming 1. Visualize “FW Blocks” of outgoing traffic -> Why do internal machines trigger blocks? 2. Visualize “FW Blocks” of incoming traffic -> Who and what tries to enter my network? 3. Visualize “FW Passes” of outgoing traffic -> What is leaving the network? SIP Rule# DIP Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 23
  • 24. Firewall Rule-set Analysis pass block Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 24
  • 25. Load Balancer Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 25
  • 26. Worms Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 26
  • 27. DefCon 2004 Capture The Flag DstPort < 1024 DstPort > 1024 Source Of Evil Internal Target Other Team's Target Internal Source Internet Target Exposed Services Our Servers SIP DIP DPort Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 27
  • 28. DefCon 2004 Capture The Flag – TTL Games TTL Source Of Evil Internal Target Internal Source SIP DIP TTL Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 28
  • 29. DefCon 2004 Capture The Flag – The Solution DPort Flags TTL Show Node Counts Only show SYNs Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 29
  • 30. Email Cliques From: My Domain From: Other Domain To: My Domain To: Other Domain From To Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 30
  • 31. Email Relays Grey out “my domain” invisible My Domain Make emails to From: From: Other Domain and from “my domain” To: My Domain To: Other Domain Do you run an open relay? From To Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 31
  • 32. Email SPAM? Size > 10.000 Omit threshold = 1 To Size Multiple recipients with same-size messages Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 32
  • 33. Email SPAM? nrcpt => 2 Omit threshold = 1 From nrcpt Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 33
  • 34. BIG Emails Size > 100.000 Omit Threshold = 2 Documents leaving the network? From To Size Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 34
  • 35. Email Server Problems? 2:00 < Delay < 10:00 Delay > 10:00 To To Delay Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 35
  • 36. AfterGlow afterglow.sourceforge.net Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 36
  • 37. AfterGlow ► http://afterglow.sourceforge.net ► Supported graphing tools: • GraphViz from AT&T (dot and neato) http://www.research.att.com/sw/tools/graphviz/ • LGL (Large Graph Layout) by Alex Adai http://bioinformatics.icmb.utexas.edu/lgl/ Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 37
  • 38. AfterGlow – Command Line Parameters ● Some command line parameters: -h : help -t : two node mode -d : print count on nodes -e : edge length -n : no node labels -o threshold : omit threshold (fan-out for nodes to be displayed) -c configfile : color configuration file Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 38
  • 39. AfterGlow – color.properties color.[source|event|target|edge]= <perl expression returning a color name> ● Array @fields contains input-line, split into tokens: color.event=“red” if ($fields[1] =~ /^192..*) ● Special color “invisible”: color.target=“invisible” if ($fields[0] eq “IIS Action”) ● Edge color color.edge=“blue” Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 39
  • 40. AfterGlow – color.properties - Example color.source="olivedrab" if ($fields[0]=~/191.141.69.4/); color.source="olivedrab" if ($fields[0]=~/211.254.110./); color.source="orangered1" color.event="slateblue4" color.target="olivedrab" if ($fields[2]=~/191.141.69.4/); color.target="olivedrab" if ($fields[2]=~/211.254.110./); color.target="orangered1" color.edge="firebrick" if (($fields[0]=~/191.141.69..4/) or ($fields[2]=~/191.141.69.4/)) color.edge="cyan4" Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 40
  • 41. THANKS! raffy@cryptojail.net Raffael Marty Defcon 2005 Las Vegas 41