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Daniel Kefer, Information Security, 1&1 Internet AG
SECURE SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE
 Who Am I, Who Is 1&1
 Motivation For Secure SDLC
 What the World Does
 What 1&1 Does
 Future Plans
1&1 Internet AG2
Agenda
26.01.2015
 Who Am I, Who Is 1&1
 Motivation For Secure SDLC
 What the World Does
 What 1&1 Does
 Future Plans
1&1 Internet AG3
Agenda
26.01.2015
Who Am I
26.01.20154 1&1 Internet AG
 Daniel Kefer
 Originally from the Czech Republic
 Working in IT-Security since 2005
 Security in development since 2008
 2011 moved to Germany to work for 1&1
 Focus on application security
1&1 – Member of United Internet AG
5 1&1 Group
1&1
Telecommunication
AG
100 %
United Internet
Ventures AG
100 %
5
Goldbach 14.96 %
Hi-media 10.50 %
fun 49 %
Virtual Minds 48.65 %
ProfitBricks 30.02 %
Open-Xchange 28.36 %
ePages 25.10 %
Uberall 25 %
Rocket Internet 8.18 %
Stand: 27. März 2014
SEDO
Holding GmbH
100 %
1&1
Internet AG
100 %
100 %
26/01/15
Locations
6 1&1 Group26/01/15
Motivated team
 Around 7,800 employees, thereof approx.
2,000 in product management, development
and data centers
Sales strength
 Approx. 3 million new customer contracts
p.a.
 50,000 registrations for free services on a
daily basis
Operational excellence
 46 million accounts in 11 countries
7 data centers
 70,000 servers in Europe and USA
1&1: Internet services of United Internet AG
7 1&1 Group
Access Applications
Networks
User
equipment
Content
Standard
software
7
Stand: 19. November 2013
26/01/15
 Who Am I, Who Is 1&1
 Motivation For Secure SDLC
 What the World Does
 What 1&1 Does
 Future Plans
1&1 Internet AG8
Agenda
26.01.2015
Three Common Approaches to Develop Applications (Security View)
26.01.20159 1&1 Internet AG
 Intuitive approach
 Reactive approach
 Proactive approach
Intuitive Approach
26.01.201510 1&1 Internet AG
 Pure best-effort approach
 Relying on individual knowledge and experience of the team members
 No security gates during the development
 Typically leads to higher occurence of security incidents and negative PR
Reactive Approach
26.01.201511 1&1 Internet AG
 Typically one security gate before the application rollout
 Penetration test
 Code review
 Infrastructure configuration audit
 A big step forward from the security point of view, but…
 How effective it is to say „you‘ve done it wrong“ when the development is finished?
 Typically increases the project costs and length
 Security bugs: mistakes in the source code, „quite easy“ to fix
 Security flaws: mistakes in the application design, very expensive to fix
 The world gets more agile all the time… at what point should you test?
 You don‘t usually find everything during a security audit!
Proactive Approach (Secure SDLC)
26.01.201512 1&1 Internet AG
 You try to prevent security bugs before they‘re created
 Cost of a bug during the development lifecycle:
 Who Am I, Who Is 1&1
 Motivation For Secure SDLC
 What the World Does
 What 1&1 Does
 Future Plans
1&1 Internet AG13
Agenda
26.01.2015
What the World Does
26.01.201514 1&1 Internet AG
 Overall Concepts
 Process models: What should I do what at which point?
 Maturity models: Do I do enough for security in the development?
 Supportive Methodologies and Tooling
 How do I perform architecture review?
 Penetration testing tools
 Checklists, cheat sheets
 Development guides, testing guides
 …
Process Models - Example
26.01.201515 1&1 Internet AG
 Microsoft SDL
 Development divided into 7 phases
 Within every phase you should perform a couple of security-related
activities
2004: Microsoft SDL 1.0 Launch
26.01.201516 1&1 Internet AG
 2005 Microsoft published first results they achieved using their SDL
Methodology
Maturity Models - Example
26.01.201517 1&1 Internet AG
 Building Security Into Maturity Model (www.bsimm.com)
 Project comparing regularly companies from different verticals and
measuring their security activities in software development in 112
activities
 2013 (5th version) results – out of 67 firms:
 44 have internal secure SDLC officially published
 57 track results reached at previously defined security gates
 36 require owner‘s security sign-off before deployment
 31 enforce security gates (project not continuing until security requirements are met)
Supportive Methodologies and Tooling
26.01.201518 1&1 Internet AG
 OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) – www.owasp.org
 The biggest resource regarding application security nowadays
 Everything is open-source
 Everybody can start his/her own security project
 Examples:
 OWASP Top Ten: The most widespread application vulnerabilities
 OWASP Testing Guide: Methodology for penetration testing of applications
 OWASP ASVS: Application Security Verification Standard
 OWASP ESAPI: Security Library for JAVA, .NET, PHP…
 OWASP Zed Attack Proxy: Testing tool
 Who Am I, Who Is 1&1
 Motivation For Secure SDLC
 What the World Does
 What 1&1 Does
 Future Plans
1&1 Internet AG19
Agenda
26.01.2015
Main Goals
26.01.201520 1&1 Internet AG
 We spend budget for security according to the real risk
 Project teams shall have a trusted contact person guiding them through
security challenges
 We actively learn from our mistakes steadily and also give the
opportunity to others to learn from our mistakes
 KISS (Keep it simple stupid)! – build on currently lived processes and
tools as much as possible
System Classification – 3 Security Levels
26.01.201521 1&1 Internet AG
 Low:
 Systems not likely to be target of professional attackers
 Mainly reputation risk in case of finding vulnerabilities
 Requirements should target mainly quality of code and be aimed at quick wins
 Medium:
 Possible abuse of client personal data (incidents have to be reported to authorities)
 We should have a solid confidence that security has been addressed and assessed
consistently and reasonably
 High:
 Systems essential for 1&1’s business and the ones with high compliance requirements
 These systems should be ready to withstand also sophisticated attacks
 Most focus on architectural and functional security
SDLC Requirements
 Two types of requirements:
 Lifecycle: Activities to be done during the lifecycle (e.g. penetration test)
 Technical: Properties of the target system (e.g. login brute-force protection)
 The concept:
 Ever higher category inherits requirements from the lower one and adds new ones
 Total counts of requirements:
Lifecycle req. Technical req.
Low 6 42
Medium 12 72
High 16 84
Lifecycle Requirements (vs. The 1&1 Project Lifecycle)
Low
Medium
High
The 1&1
Project
Lifecycle
Secure
SDLC
Classification
Security
guide
Security
trainings
Select
requirements
Automated
scan
Yellow Pages
Record
Security
workshop
Doc. review
3rd party
code
Penetration
test
Vulnerability
management
Lessons
learned
Threat model
Tailor
requirements
Code review
Configuration
review
Technical Requirements - Categories
26.01.201524 1&1 Internet AG
 Based on OWASP Application Security Verification Standard
Authentication
Session
Management
Access Control
Input Validation
Output
Encoding
Cryptography
Error Handling
and Logging
Data Protection
Communication
Security
Technical Requirements – Example (Brute-Force Protection)
ID AU-07
Criticality Low
Category Authentication
Technology Web Applications, Web Services
Description Brute force protection is provided after a system configurable number of invalid
login attempts occur against an account within a configurable period of time.
Specification
/Best Practise
More information on best practise:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Blocking_Brute_Force_Attacks
Reasoning Preventing successful brute force attacks on user credentials.
Functional Yes
Responsible Requirement Engineer
Deadline T2 (end of the design phase)
QA Responsible Test Manager
QA Activity Black box
QA Scenario https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Brute_Force_(OWASP-AT-004)
QA Deadline T3 (before rollout)
Requirement States
26.01.201526 1&1 Internet AG
 Relevant:
 Yes/No
 Does it make sense to implement the particular requirement?
 In Scope:
 Yes: The development team has to (or mustn‘t) do something
 3rd party: The application relies on another service (e.g. authentication service)
 Refused: It was decided not to implement the requirement
 No: If not relevant.
 Who Am I, Who Is 1&1
 Motivation For Secure SDLC
 What the World Does
 What 1&1 Does
 Future Plans
1&1 Internet AG27
Agenda
26.01.2015
Future Plans
26.01.201528 1&1 Internet AG
 Continue increasing the coverage of SDLC-guided projects
 Train and establish a satellite of Security Guides
 Continuous enhancement of the methodology
 Agile methodologies, continuous integration/continuous delivery
 Lessons learned from projects
 Creation of an SDLC Tool
 Department-specific project management methodologies
 Different technologies
 Transparency of common security measures
Thank You For Your Attention!
26.01.201529 1&1 Internet AG
daniel.kefer@1und1.de

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Secure Software Development Lifecycle

  • 1. Daniel Kefer, Information Security, 1&1 Internet AG SECURE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE
  • 2.  Who Am I, Who Is 1&1  Motivation For Secure SDLC  What the World Does  What 1&1 Does  Future Plans 1&1 Internet AG2 Agenda 26.01.2015
  • 3.  Who Am I, Who Is 1&1  Motivation For Secure SDLC  What the World Does  What 1&1 Does  Future Plans 1&1 Internet AG3 Agenda 26.01.2015
  • 4. Who Am I 26.01.20154 1&1 Internet AG  Daniel Kefer  Originally from the Czech Republic  Working in IT-Security since 2005  Security in development since 2008  2011 moved to Germany to work for 1&1  Focus on application security
  • 5. 1&1 – Member of United Internet AG 5 1&1 Group 1&1 Telecommunication AG 100 % United Internet Ventures AG 100 % 5 Goldbach 14.96 % Hi-media 10.50 % fun 49 % Virtual Minds 48.65 % ProfitBricks 30.02 % Open-Xchange 28.36 % ePages 25.10 % Uberall 25 % Rocket Internet 8.18 % Stand: 27. März 2014 SEDO Holding GmbH 100 % 1&1 Internet AG 100 % 100 % 26/01/15
  • 7. Motivated team  Around 7,800 employees, thereof approx. 2,000 in product management, development and data centers Sales strength  Approx. 3 million new customer contracts p.a.  50,000 registrations for free services on a daily basis Operational excellence  46 million accounts in 11 countries 7 data centers  70,000 servers in Europe and USA 1&1: Internet services of United Internet AG 7 1&1 Group Access Applications Networks User equipment Content Standard software 7 Stand: 19. November 2013 26/01/15
  • 8.  Who Am I, Who Is 1&1  Motivation For Secure SDLC  What the World Does  What 1&1 Does  Future Plans 1&1 Internet AG8 Agenda 26.01.2015
  • 9. Three Common Approaches to Develop Applications (Security View) 26.01.20159 1&1 Internet AG  Intuitive approach  Reactive approach  Proactive approach
  • 10. Intuitive Approach 26.01.201510 1&1 Internet AG  Pure best-effort approach  Relying on individual knowledge and experience of the team members  No security gates during the development  Typically leads to higher occurence of security incidents and negative PR
  • 11. Reactive Approach 26.01.201511 1&1 Internet AG  Typically one security gate before the application rollout  Penetration test  Code review  Infrastructure configuration audit  A big step forward from the security point of view, but…  How effective it is to say „you‘ve done it wrong“ when the development is finished?  Typically increases the project costs and length  Security bugs: mistakes in the source code, „quite easy“ to fix  Security flaws: mistakes in the application design, very expensive to fix  The world gets more agile all the time… at what point should you test?  You don‘t usually find everything during a security audit!
  • 12. Proactive Approach (Secure SDLC) 26.01.201512 1&1 Internet AG  You try to prevent security bugs before they‘re created  Cost of a bug during the development lifecycle:
  • 13.  Who Am I, Who Is 1&1  Motivation For Secure SDLC  What the World Does  What 1&1 Does  Future Plans 1&1 Internet AG13 Agenda 26.01.2015
  • 14. What the World Does 26.01.201514 1&1 Internet AG  Overall Concepts  Process models: What should I do what at which point?  Maturity models: Do I do enough for security in the development?  Supportive Methodologies and Tooling  How do I perform architecture review?  Penetration testing tools  Checklists, cheat sheets  Development guides, testing guides  …
  • 15. Process Models - Example 26.01.201515 1&1 Internet AG  Microsoft SDL  Development divided into 7 phases  Within every phase you should perform a couple of security-related activities
  • 16. 2004: Microsoft SDL 1.0 Launch 26.01.201516 1&1 Internet AG  2005 Microsoft published first results they achieved using their SDL Methodology
  • 17. Maturity Models - Example 26.01.201517 1&1 Internet AG  Building Security Into Maturity Model (www.bsimm.com)  Project comparing regularly companies from different verticals and measuring their security activities in software development in 112 activities  2013 (5th version) results – out of 67 firms:  44 have internal secure SDLC officially published  57 track results reached at previously defined security gates  36 require owner‘s security sign-off before deployment  31 enforce security gates (project not continuing until security requirements are met)
  • 18. Supportive Methodologies and Tooling 26.01.201518 1&1 Internet AG  OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) – www.owasp.org  The biggest resource regarding application security nowadays  Everything is open-source  Everybody can start his/her own security project  Examples:  OWASP Top Ten: The most widespread application vulnerabilities  OWASP Testing Guide: Methodology for penetration testing of applications  OWASP ASVS: Application Security Verification Standard  OWASP ESAPI: Security Library for JAVA, .NET, PHP…  OWASP Zed Attack Proxy: Testing tool
  • 19.  Who Am I, Who Is 1&1  Motivation For Secure SDLC  What the World Does  What 1&1 Does  Future Plans 1&1 Internet AG19 Agenda 26.01.2015
  • 20. Main Goals 26.01.201520 1&1 Internet AG  We spend budget for security according to the real risk  Project teams shall have a trusted contact person guiding them through security challenges  We actively learn from our mistakes steadily and also give the opportunity to others to learn from our mistakes  KISS (Keep it simple stupid)! – build on currently lived processes and tools as much as possible
  • 21. System Classification – 3 Security Levels 26.01.201521 1&1 Internet AG  Low:  Systems not likely to be target of professional attackers  Mainly reputation risk in case of finding vulnerabilities  Requirements should target mainly quality of code and be aimed at quick wins  Medium:  Possible abuse of client personal data (incidents have to be reported to authorities)  We should have a solid confidence that security has been addressed and assessed consistently and reasonably  High:  Systems essential for 1&1’s business and the ones with high compliance requirements  These systems should be ready to withstand also sophisticated attacks  Most focus on architectural and functional security
  • 22. SDLC Requirements  Two types of requirements:  Lifecycle: Activities to be done during the lifecycle (e.g. penetration test)  Technical: Properties of the target system (e.g. login brute-force protection)  The concept:  Ever higher category inherits requirements from the lower one and adds new ones  Total counts of requirements: Lifecycle req. Technical req. Low 6 42 Medium 12 72 High 16 84
  • 23. Lifecycle Requirements (vs. The 1&1 Project Lifecycle) Low Medium High The 1&1 Project Lifecycle Secure SDLC Classification Security guide Security trainings Select requirements Automated scan Yellow Pages Record Security workshop Doc. review 3rd party code Penetration test Vulnerability management Lessons learned Threat model Tailor requirements Code review Configuration review
  • 24. Technical Requirements - Categories 26.01.201524 1&1 Internet AG  Based on OWASP Application Security Verification Standard Authentication Session Management Access Control Input Validation Output Encoding Cryptography Error Handling and Logging Data Protection Communication Security
  • 25. Technical Requirements – Example (Brute-Force Protection) ID AU-07 Criticality Low Category Authentication Technology Web Applications, Web Services Description Brute force protection is provided after a system configurable number of invalid login attempts occur against an account within a configurable period of time. Specification /Best Practise More information on best practise: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Blocking_Brute_Force_Attacks Reasoning Preventing successful brute force attacks on user credentials. Functional Yes Responsible Requirement Engineer Deadline T2 (end of the design phase) QA Responsible Test Manager QA Activity Black box QA Scenario https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Brute_Force_(OWASP-AT-004) QA Deadline T3 (before rollout)
  • 26. Requirement States 26.01.201526 1&1 Internet AG  Relevant:  Yes/No  Does it make sense to implement the particular requirement?  In Scope:  Yes: The development team has to (or mustn‘t) do something  3rd party: The application relies on another service (e.g. authentication service)  Refused: It was decided not to implement the requirement  No: If not relevant.
  • 27.  Who Am I, Who Is 1&1  Motivation For Secure SDLC  What the World Does  What 1&1 Does  Future Plans 1&1 Internet AG27 Agenda 26.01.2015
  • 28. Future Plans 26.01.201528 1&1 Internet AG  Continue increasing the coverage of SDLC-guided projects  Train and establish a satellite of Security Guides  Continuous enhancement of the methodology  Agile methodologies, continuous integration/continuous delivery  Lessons learned from projects  Creation of an SDLC Tool  Department-specific project management methodologies  Different technologies  Transparency of common security measures
  • 29. Thank You For Your Attention! 26.01.201529 1&1 Internet AG daniel.kefer@1und1.de

Notas del editor

  1. Number of employees UI: 6,700