1. 4216620
M14118
1
Strategy and Security
M14118
4216620
Tutors: Bettina Renz and Luca Trenta

2. 4216620
M14118
2
How has Poland adapted in terms of strategic culture
and security to events since the end of the Cold War?
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, over the course of several arduous and
confusing months, left Poland and its other formerly Eastern Bloc neighbours with a
difficult and tenuous security situation (Mastny and Byrne 2005: 72). The
counterbalancing of security between NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the
Warsaw Pact had defined the military situation in Europe for most of the Cold War, and
the relatively sudden end of this necessitated a strategic rethinking and rebalancing for
countries which found themselves both freed from Soviet control and simultaneously
alone in the international realm. In the complex arena of security in the post-Soviet
1990s and the post-9/11 era Poland makes a fascinating and prescient case study due to
its size and therefore strategic regional importance, as well as its relatively Western-
leaning perspective compared to other post-Communist European states. Indeed even in
Soviet times the lack of a Soviet military response to the 1981 unrest is notable due to
both Poland’s strategic importance to central Europe and the fact it was already the most
anti-Soviet of the Eastern Bloc states (Ibid: 50).
The integration of Poland into NATO and the Western fold in general military and
security terms has largely been a success. However the transformation of both the
infrastructure and, more importantly, the military and strategic culture of Poland in order
to achieve this have been tremendous and often fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless,
NATO’s extension of an invitation to join the alliance in 1997, which was subsequently
completed in 1999, was a reflection of the excellent work done by Poland to reform its
political and economic institutions since the end of Communism in the country (Michta
1999: 40). Nevertheless, the tasks facing Poland at the start of the 20th Century to
continue modernising its armed forces and forging its diplomatic tools into effective tools
of engagement between East and West – a key factor making Poland strategically useful
to NATO – were very daunting (Ibid).

3. 4216620
M14118
3
This essay seeks to explore the process of transformation and what may be
termed ‘westernisation’ of Poland in military-security terms since the end of the Cold
War, and the subsequent effects this has had on Poland’s strategic culture and its
relations with neighbouring countries. The political relations of Poland, especially with
Germany, the United States and to a certain extent Russia, have drastically shaped the
path Polish security policy has been able to follow. Theoretically the essay will focus on
the mixture of realist and liberal tenets Poland has adopted, due to both its recognition
of the necessity of belonging to an alliance system as well as a general antipathy
towards multilateral security institutions due to the perception that both the League of
Nations and UN had failed it in the past (Zaborowsky and Longhurst 2003: 1014).
The essay will therefore examine Poland’s path to joining NATO and the internal
upheavals and reforms this necessitated, as well as the less quantifiably definable effec ts
it had on Polish thinking on security strategy and political-military relations. Next it will
look at Poland’s role in NATO and a wider European security community through the
eyes of both Polish leaders and their new allies, using Polish commitments to NATO
operations and EU defence measures to indicate the authenticity of Poland’s
determination to be a key player in regional security and broader Western grand
strategy in the early 21st century. Finally the essay will conclude with an appraisal of the
changes Polish strategic security practice has undergone in the post -Communist era and
where it is likely to go next.
A new sheriff in town: The end of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe
When the Warsaw Pact ended ‘with a whimper rather than a bang’ all of its
former members, while simultaneously grappling with the wider end of the Cold War,
recognized that they needed a new guarantor of security without the ‘protection’ of the
Soviet Union, the fact this had often been unwanted in the past notwithstanding (Mastny
and Byrne: 1). However in 1997 NATO extended an invitation to Poland to join the

4. 4216620
M14118
4
alliance in recognition of the steps it had taken to reform its political and economic
institutions since 1989. Poland’s membership was subsequently confirmed in 1999, and
it was undoubtedly the most crucial of the three new entrants to the alliance that year
thanks largely to its size and geostrategic location (Michta: 40).
The path Poland took through the previous decade to get to this position was
politically and strategically complex, necessitating a very broad reappraisal and
reorganization of Polish strategic culture and military thinking. However the possibility of
NATO acceptance – soon to become a reality – played a large role in accelerating the
pace of the democratic reform of Polish civil-military relations. Rachel Epstein argues
that NATO integration accelerated this practice by removing both the rhetoric and
practice of Polish military tradition from public policy (Epstein 2006: 255).
Polish tradition in this respect was problematic to integrated functioning with a
Western alliance for several reasons, chief among which was that the three ‘pillars’ of
Polish military tradition – protecting Polish autonomy, performing ‘the duties of a
patriotic Polish soldier’, and remaining loyal to military rather than civilian leaders – were
not compatible with NATO values, just as they had not been with the Warsaw Pact (Ibid:
265). These ideals of the military tradition were sharply realist, reflecting Poland’s
historic security dilemma of being a ‘mid-size, relatively weak’ state caught precariously
between Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other (Michta: 42). However
Poland quickly seized the opportunity to begin to negate this historic quandary,
successfully agreeing with Germany in the 1990s to the permanence of Poland’s western
border and a commitment to mutually good relations – by reconciling in this manner with
Germany, Poland opened the door to active engagement with the United States in
Europe through NATO, due to Bonn remaining with the alliance through the process of
German reunification (Ibid: 43).
Poland’s relationship with the US, begun in this period and largely continued to
the present day, has been particularly favourable, not just compared to other former
Eastern Bloc states but even, increasingly, to Western European countries such as
France and Germany. Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003: 1010) argue that there is an

5. 4216620
M14118
5
‘instinctive Atlanticism’ in Polish strategic culture, and that this combined with
recognition by NATO of Poland’s strategic significance and Warsaw’s vigorous support of
almost every major foreign policy initiative from Washington since 9/11, including over
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, have made it a key US ally, preferred even over Paris and
Berlin. The effect of this positive relationship with the US should not be understated
when trying to chart the course of future Polish security and foreign policy.
Despite the primacy of the United States, as the undisputed global superpower at
the end of the 20th Century, Poland had begun taking extensive measures itself in the
1990s to ensure its own security in the absence of a functioning alliance framework,
being at the time a member of neither NATO nor the European Union (EU). Apart from
the aforementioned agreements with Germany, which ultimately paved the way to
resolving key historical security dilemmas and ensuring crucial German support for
Poland’s accession to NATO, it also continued to look Eastward towards its Slavic
neighbours. Between 1991 and 1997, while relations with Russia remained tense, Poland
secured security agreements with both Lithuania and Ukraine – similar attempts with
Belarus failed due to President Lukashenka re-establishing Soviet authoritarian control of
the country (Michta: 47).
Polish security policy in this period was not therefore simply a case of Warsaw
bending over backwards to get into NATO, as Poland also articulated its own
understanding of what it needed to feel secure in its own territory. Neither is this desire
one-sided, as Polish membership of NATO held the possibility of doing away with the
age-old dilemma of Russo-German competition for dominance in Central Europe due to
Warsaw’s ability to engage directly with Moscow and Poland, by 1999, having established
constructive relationships with both countries (Ibid: 62 – 3).

6. 4216620
M14118
6
New games and new toys: The evolution of Polish military structure and culture
As has already been mentioned, the strategic and military culture of Poland did
not initially fit well with the NATO ethos. Poland’s focus on defending its own territory
was deeply ingrained in the old officer corps, as historically this was where the country
had suffered the most. This emerged into a distinct split between what may be termed
‘old’ and ‘new’ thinkers on strategic security issues in Poland, focused respectively on
protection of territorial integrity and aspiration to join NATO, and the attendant military
adaptations necessary for this (Zaborowski and Longhurst: 1025).
In terms of membership of NATO, while the strategic importance of Poland due to
size, population, location and being arguably the most westward-oriented of the Slavic
countries could not be denied, Poland also needed to prove it was able to work
effectively with other NATO members and commit to NATO deployments when called
upon. To this end, the 1995 NATO Study of Enlargement was a watershed as it clearly
laid out what the alliance expected of new prospective members before they would be
permitted to join (Epstein: 266). This included a minimum level of interoperability with
other NATO forces (Ibid). To this end, Poland embarked on several modernisation
initiatives with its armed forces both before and after the Study was published, including
large cuts in personnel, several attempts at equipment modernisation and the
establishment of a NATO-compatible air traffic control system (Michta: 50 – 51).
In addition the US Congress granted Warsaw a $3.8 billion loan to purchase 48
American-built F-16 fighter aircraft. This was an important gesture as, aside from the
obvious financial magnitude of such a move, the Polish decision to purchase US rather
than European aircraft signalled both its desire to be a significant partner of the US in
Europe and also its aspirations to be a ‘mature member’ of NATO (Zaborowski and
Longhurst: 1011). Despite the huge financial outlay upgrades like this represent for the
country, much more recently the Polish military has again embarked on a massive
equipment upgrade programme, seemingly showing a reversal of the trend towards less
unilateral focus on territorial defence and a greater reliance on NATO support in the

7. 4216620
M14118
7
event of a conventional threat to Polish territory (Swierczynski 2013). Whether this has
been in part precipitated by increased Russian aggression in its own ‘near abroad’,
including the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, is entirely possible.
Under its NATO membership Poland is assured of the defence of all other NATO
member states under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack
against one member is an attack against all (Reiter 2001: 43). Polish fears of Russia
being a realistic threat dropped off in the late 1990s as then-President Kwasniewski
visited Moscow, and Yeltsin reciprocated by publicly declaring a visit to Warsaw – this
newfound assertiveness in Poland’s Eastern policy stemming in part from the renewed
sense of security it felt from its imminent, later actual, membership of NATO (Michta:
48-9). However given the changes of the previous fifteen years it is entirely possible
Poland no longer feels as secure without its own unilateral ability to defend its territory
being stronger.
The ‘favourite European’: Polish-American relations since 9/11
The final section of this paper looks at the relationship between Poland and the
US, arguably by far its most important ally in NATO, since 9/11, and the Polish attitude
to European security initiatives outside NATO itself. When compared to its European
allies in NATO, with the notable exception of the UK Poland is often a vociferous
supporter of US foreign policy initiatives. In sharp contrast to its historic obsession in
security policy with defending its own territory, Poland not only took an active part in
NATO operations in Bosnia, it also contributed to the later NATO missions in Kosovo and
Afghanistan (Michta: 51; Zaborowski and Longhurst: 1010). Poland also marked itself
out as part of what Donald Rumsfeld termed the ‘new Europe’, supporting the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003, albeit less enthusiastically than it had done over previous US
foreign deployments (Ibid: 1027). In the case of Iraq, Poland was one of the key US
allies who contributed troops from the first day, admittedly a small number but

8. 4216620
M14118
8
significantly including 54 members of the elite special forces unit GROM (Hummel 2007:
22).
Poland’s accession first to NATO in 1999 and then as a member of the EU in 2004
have brought the country firmly into the fold as a key player in European and
transatlantic affairs (Ibid). However Poland was initially reticent to engage too deeply
with European defence efforts, such as the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), and has shown a more ‘American-style’ thought process where security is
concerned, believing for instance that in Kosovo it was more important to intervene
quickly to prevent further destabilisation than it was to adhere to international law by
awaiting a UN mandate (Zaborowski and Longhurst: 1014). Recently it has shown more
of a willingness to engage in European defence activities, taking command of an EU
battle group in the first half of 2010 (Terlikowski 2010).
Conclusions: The road ahead
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland’s
security and defence establishment has, to put it mildly, been through a lot. From
aspiring to NATO membership, catering for its own security while simultaneously
overhauling its own strategic culture and finally acceding to NATO and later also EU
membership, it has since deployed forces abroad on a variety of NATO missions and
become an integral member of the European security community while also updating its
force structure and armaments. The Polish military establishment realized from 1997
that in order to meet standards for NATO membership it needed to improve training and
increase its cadres of non-commissioned officers while reducing numbers of
commissioned officers (Michta: 54).
The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland published in 2009 opens by
recognizing that the post-Cold War world has become increasingly multi-polar and it is
now harder to predict threats, as well as non-state actors having a much greater

9. 4216620
M14118
9
potential to disrupt security (Polish Ministry of National Defence 2009). This is broadly in
line with the threats being emphasized by many Western countries, which mostly focus
on non-state and terrorist actors. However recent events in Ukraine, where Russia has
demonstrated its willingness to use political belligerence along with alleged covert
military action to manipulate events in its favour, may force Poland to steer its security
policy back towards a path more considerate of the need for traditional territorial
defence (BBC 2014).
Poland ended conscription in 2009, in line with NATO expectations that it will
have a leaner and more professional fighting force like other members of the alliance
(New York Times 2008). However concerns over increasing Russian belligerence in
Ukraine may serve to make Poland, along with many other central and Eastern European
states, increasingly wary of relying too heavily on NATO or the EU, large and
bureaucratic organisations, for any immediate response to military aggressions from
Russia.
Poland has come a long way from a post-Soviet Warsaw Pact member to a full-
fledged NATO and EU participant, as well as a European ally Washington can generally
count on for backing in security matters. The Polish military and strategic cultures have
had to endure much change in order to settle into a multi-polar world based on collective
security institutions, and have generally dealt with it admirably. However with an
ongoing crisis in the Crimea as well as continuing commitments in Afghanistan and to
NATO Poland will need to maintain a flexible strategic culture to be as ready as possible
for future challenges and commitments.

10. 4216620
M14118
10
Bibliography
BBC (2014) ‘Ukraine Crisis: Why did Putin intervene in referendum?’
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27324637> [Accessed 11/5/2014]
New York Times (2009) ‘As Draft Ends, Polish Military Faces Struggle to Modernize’
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/world/europe/12poland.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0> [Accessed 11/5/2014]
Epstein, Rachel A. (2006) ‘When Legacies Meet Policies: NATO and the Refashioning of
Polish Military Tradition’ East European Politics and Societies 20, 254 – 285
Hummel, Hartwig, ‘A Survey of Involvement of 10 European States in the Iraq War 2003’
Paks Working Paper 9 2007
<http://paks.uniduesseldorf.de/Dokumente/paks_working_paper_9_rev.pdf > [Accessed
on 10/5/2014]
Mastny, Vojtech and Byrne, Malcolm (2005) Cardboard Castle?: An Inside History of the
Warsaw Pact, 1955 – 1991 Herndon: Central European University Press)
Michta, Andrew A. ‘Poland: A linchpin of regional security’ in Michta, Andrew A. (ed.)
(1999) America’s New Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO (London:
University of Washington Press)
Polish Ministry of National Defence (2009) Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-
be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=156791> [Accessed 11/5/2014]
Reiter, Dan (2001) ‘Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy’ International
Security 25:4 41 – 67
Swierczynski, Marek (2013) ‘Poland Takes a U-Turn Towards Increased National
Security’
<http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/poland-takes-a-u-turn-towards-increased-
national-security> [Accessed on 11/5/2014]
Terlikowski, Marcin (2010) ‘Polish-led EU Battle Group’ The Polish Institute of
International Affairs
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-
be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=112281> [Accessed on 11/5/2014]
Wągrowska, Maria ‘Polish Involvement in the Armed Intervention and Stabilization
Mission in Iraq’
<http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00004787/01/rap_i_an_0804a.pdf > [Accessed on
11/5/2014]
Zaborowski, Marcin and Longhurst, Kerry ‘America’s protégé in the East? The emergence
of Poland as a regional leader’ International Affairs 2003 79:5 1009 – 1028