securities regulation, world bank governance and reform

1. 1 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
The WorldBank Governance at its Crossroads:
My lastposttitled“LawsRelated toVoice Reformatthe World BankGroup” didattemptto empoweruswith
more toolsinorder to complementknowledgeinthe fieldof votingpowerandvotingpowerrealignment. We
didnavigate complex formulasandlawsusedtodesignthis2010 votingpoweroffering. Itwasdifficultfor
everyone todigestall these formulasandunderstandhow financialcontributionswere creditedtocountries
members. Goodor bad credits,Ido notknow. But what I know isthat 6 yearslaternow,no change nearthe
White House. Developingandtransitioncountries still thinkthattheiropinionsdonotcountwhenthe World
Bank ismakingitsdecision. The huge gaininadditional shareholdingpercentage andvotingpowerfree of
charge because coveredbyaTrust fundand the WorldBank Special Capital Increase isnotthe magictool to
helpthemcontrol mattersbefore the WorldBankboardand theiroutcomes.
The World Bankgroup needstodo somethingdifferentafter72yearsdoingthingsthiswayin orderto
increase accessto opinion of certaincountrieswhoseagreementsare neededforfairandundisputeddecisions
and ensure thatsupportfromdevelopingandtransitioncountriesand/ormaybe all borrowercountriesis
there forspecificdecisionsrelatedtocertainglobal loanapproval (orapprovedloan) andglobal projects. We
needtoholdthese consultationswithbothclassesparticipatingseparatelyinordertoascertaintheir
willingnesstoconsidersupportingthese motions. There isnodoubtin mymindthat thisway isthe right way
to serve bothsidesbetter,bothclasses,borrowercountriesasshareholdersandclientsinneedforgrants,
unlimited global loanandfundingfromthe WorldBank’s limitedfundingandcommitmentswithnodesireto
allocate fundstocertaintypesof projects.[notionof prioritizationapplied] Atthistime,72 yearslater,we
mustrecognize thatsharesdonations,votingpowerwithall itsvotingdecisionsystemincludingconsensus,
simple majorityandspecial majority(onlyMIGA definesit) are not fixingthissystemanditsgoals.
CurrentPrincipal DecisionsRequiringsingle anddouble majority of votesof the WorldBank Groupboard
Decisions IBRD IFC IDA MIGA
UnanimousVote
Other
Amendment
(right to
members to
withdraw, to
exercise pre-
emptive right
in
subscription,…)
Article VIII (b)-
“…acceptance by all
membersisrequiredin
the case of any
amendmentmodifying
(i)-the righttowithdraw
fromthe Bankprovided
inArticle VI,Section1,
(ii)-therightsecuredby
Article II,section3(c)
(rightto exercise pre-
Article VII (b)-
“…acceptance by all
membersisrequiredin
the case of any
amendmentmodifying
(i) the rightto withdraw
fromthe Corporation
providedinArticle V,
Section1; (ii) the right
securedbythe Article II,
Section2(d) (rightto
Article IX (b)-
“…acceptance by all
membersisrequiredin
the case of any
amendmentmodifying
(i)-the righttowithdraw
fromthe Association
providedinArticle VII,
section1; (ii) right
securedbythe Article
III,section1 (c)(rightto
Article 59, a (i)- “any
amendmentmodifyingthe
rightto withdrawfromthe
AgencyprovidedinArticle
51 or the limitationon
liabilityprovidedinArticle
Section(d) of Article 8 shall
require affirmative vote of
all Governors”
Article 59 a (ii)-“any
amendmentmodifyingthe

2. 2 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
emptiverights in
subscription to
shares);(iii)the
limitationonliability
providedinArticle II
Section6 (limitationon
liabilityonsharestothe
unpaidportionof the
issue price)”
exercise pre-emptive
rightsinsubscriptionto
shares);(iii)the
limitationonliability
providedinArticle II
section4 (limitationon
liabilityonsharestothe
unpaidportionof the
issue price)”
exercise securedpre-
emptive rightsin
subscriptiontoshares);
(iii)-the limitationon
liabilityprovidedin
Article II,section,
section 3 (limitationon
liabilityonsharestothe
unpaidportionof the
issue price)”
losssharingarrangement
providedinArticle 1and 3
of Annex tothisConvention
whichwill resultinan
increase inanymember’s
liabilitythereundershall
require the affirmative vote
of the Governorof each
such member.”
Single MajorityVotes
Capital
increase
Article II, Section2,b
“the capital stock may
be increasedwhenthe
Bank deemsitadvisable
by a three fourths(3/4)
majority of the total
votingpower”
Article II, section2,(c) (i)
“by a majorityof the
votescast, incase such
increase isnecessaryfor
the purpose of issuing
sharesof capital stock….
(ii)-inanyothercase,by
a four-fifths(4/5)
majorityof the total
votingpower.”
Article III, section1, (d)-
“All decisionsunderthis
Sectionshall be made
by a two-thirds(2/3)
majorityof the total
votingpower.”
Article 5, c “ the Council,by
special majority,mayat any
time increase the capital
stock of the Agency”
*Special majoritymeaning
Article 3,d “a ‘special
majority’meansan
affirmative vote of notless
than twothirds [2/3] of the
total voting power
representingnotlessthan
fifty-fivepercent[55%]of
the subscribedshares of
the capital stock of the
Agency” [*multiple]
Issuance of
share stock
Article II, section4- “…
Othersharesshall be
issuedatpar unlessthe
Bank bya majority of
the total votingpower
decidesinspecial
circumstancestoissue
themon otherterms.”
Article II, section2, (e)-
“issuance of sharesof
stock,otherthan those
subscribedeitheron
initial subscriptionor
pursuantto paragraph
(d) above,shall require a
three-fourths (3/4)
majorityof the total
votingpower.”
Silent??? Article 6 “eachoriginal
memberof the Agencyshall
subscribe atpar to the
numberof sharesof capital
stock setforth…,The
Council mayprescribe rules
by whichmembersmay
subscribe toadditional
sharesof the authorized
capital stock.”Majority
vote
Increase in
Board seats
Article V, section4, b-
“…Whengovernments
of othercountries
become members,the
Board of Governors
may,by four-fifths
(4/5) majorityof the
total votingpower,
increase the total
numberof directorsby
increasingthe number
of directorstobe
Silent Silent Article 32, b “the board
shall consistof notlessthan
twelve Directors. The
numberof Directorsmay be
adjustedbythe Council to
take intoaccount changes
inmembership….”Means
Majorityvote cast

3. 3 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
elected.”
President
Selection
Maintenance
of membership
after cessation
of the
IMF[Bank]
membership
Article VI, section3-
“Anymemberwhich
ceasesto be a member
of the IMF shall
automaticallycease
afterthree monthsto
be a memberof the
Bank unlessthe Bankby
three-fourths(3/4) of
the total votingpower
has agreedtoallowitto
remaina member.”
Article V Section 3 is
silent
Article VIIsection3is
silent
Article 52, d – “The
suspendedmembershall
automaticallycease tobe a
memberone yearfromthe
date of itssuspension
unlessthe Council decides
to extend the periodof
suspensiontorestore the
membertogood standing.”
Termination of
operations
Article VI, section5 (e)
ii-“amajorityof the
Governors,exercisinga
majorityof the total
votingpower,have
decidedtomake a
distribution.”
Article V, section5, (a)-
“The corporationmay
permanentlysuspendits
operationsbyvote of a
majorityof the
Governorsexercisinga
majorityof the total
votingpower.”
Article VII, section5,
(a)- “the Association
may permanently
suspenditsoperations
by vote of a majority of
the Governors
exercisingamajorityof
the total votingpower.”
Article 55, a “the Council,
by special majority,may
decide tocease operations
and to liquidate the Agency.
Thereuponthe Agencyshall
forthwithcease all
activities….”Means 2/3
votingpower and
Governorsrepresenting
55% of subscribedshares
Distribution of
assets after
termination of
operations
Article VI, section5 (f)-
“Aftera decisionto
make a distributionhas
beentakenunder(e)
above,the Executive
Directorsmay by a two-
thirds(2/3) majority
vote make successive
distributionsof the
assetsof the Bankto
membersuntil all of the
assetshave been
distributed.”
Article V, section5, (b)-
“No distributionshall be
made to memberson
account of their
subscriptionstothe
capital stock of the
Corporationuntil all
liabilitiestocreditors
shall have been
dischargedorprovided
for anduntil the Board
of Governors,byvote of
a majorityof the
Governors exercisinga
majorityof the total
votingpower,…”
Article VII, section5,
(b)- “Nodistribution
shall be made to
membersonaccount of
theirsubscriptionsuntil
all liabilitiestocreditors
shall have been
dischargedorprovided
for anduntil the Board
of Governors,byvote of
a majorityof the
Governors,exercisinga
majorityof the total
votingpower,…”
Article 55,b “No
distributionof assets….or
providedforanduntil the
Council shall have decided
to make such distribution”
meansmajorityof votes
cast
Global Loan or
Projects
Approval
Article V, section3, (b)-
“Exceptas otherwise
specificallyprovided,
all mattersbefore the
Bank shall be decided
by a majority of the
votescast.”
Article IV, section3 (b)-
“Exceptas otherwise
specificallyprovided,all
mattersbefore the
Corporationshall be
decidedbya majority of
the vote cast.”
Article VI, section3,
(b)- “Exceptas
otherwise specifically
provided,all matters
before the Association
shall be decidedbya
majority of the votes
cast.”
Article 42 (a)- “…Exceptas
otherwise specifiedinthis
Convention,decisionsof
the Board shall be takenby
majority of the votescast.”
Buying and Article IV, 8 (iv) –“ To Article III, Section6 (iv)- Article V, section5 (iii)- silent

4. 4 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
selling of
certain
securities
buyor sell suchother
securitiesasthe
Directorsby a three-
fourth(3/4) majorityof
the total votingpower
may deemproperfor
the investmentof all or
part of the special
reserve under
Section…”
“buy or sell securitiesit
has issuedorguaranteed
or in whichithas
invested”
“buy andsell securities
it hasissuedor
guaranteedorin which
it hasinvested”
Selection of
currency
where
repayments
are not made
in the currency
loaned
Article IV, section4
(b)(i)-“…These
payments,subjectto
the provisionsof Article
II,Section9 (c), shall be
equivalenttothe value
of suchcontractual
paymentsatthe time
the loanswere made,in
termsof a currency
specifiedforthe
purpose bythe Bank by
a three-fourths (3/4)
majorityof the total
votingpower.”
silent Silent silent
Other
amendments
(Schedule A
and B)
silent silent silent Article 59, b “Schedule A
and B to thisConvention
may be amendedbythe
Council by special
majority”
Single or Double majority
Requesting
Governors
meetings
Article V, section2, (c)-
“…Meetingsof the
Board shall be calledby
the Directorswhenever
requestedbyfive (5)
membersorby
membershavingone
quarter(25%) of the
total votingpower.”
silent silent Article 31, (c)-“The Board
shall call a meetingof the
Council whenever
requestedby five members
or by membershaving 25
percentof the total voting
power”means5 members
or 25% votingpower
Multiple Majority Votes (weighed voting)
Amendment of
Charter
Article VIII,(a)-“…when
three-fifths(3/5) of the
members,having
eighty-fivepercent
(85%) of the total
votingpower,have
acceptedthe proposed
amendments,the Bank
Article VII, (a)-this
Agreementmaybe
amendedbyvote of
three-fifths(3/5) of the
Governorsexercising
eighty-fivepercent
(85%) of the total voting
power.”
Article IX, (a)- “…
Whenthree-fifths(3/5)
of the members,having
four-fifths(4/5) of the
total votingpower,
have acceptedthe
proposedamendments,
the Associationshall
Article 59 (a)-“this
ConventionanditsAnnexes
may be amendedbyvote of
three- fifthsof the
Governors exercisingfour-
fifthsof the total voting
power,..” means4/5 of
voting powerand 3/5 of

5. 5 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
shall certifythe factby
formal communication
addressedtoall
members.”
certifythe fact by
formal communication
addressedtoall
members.”
Governors
Quorum:
Governors
Article V, section2, (d)-
“a quorum forany
meetingof the Boardof
Governorsshall be a
majority of the
Governors,exercising
not lessthantwo-thirds
(2/3) of the total voting
power.”
Article IV, section2, (f)-
“A quorumfor any
meetingof the Boardof
Governorsshall be a
majority of the
Governors,exercising
not lessthantwo-thirds
(2/3) of the total voting
power.”
Article VI, section2, (f)-
“A quorumfor any
meetingof the Boardof
Governorsshall be a
majority of the
Governors,exercising
not lessthantwo-thirds
(2/3) of the total voting
power.”
Article 40 (b)- “A quorum
for anymeetingof the
Council shall be constituted
by a majorityof the
Governors exercisingnot
lessthan two-thirdsof the
total votingpower”means
majorityof the Governors
and 2/3 of votingpower
Suspension
and
restoration of
members
Article VI, section2- “If
a memberfailstofulfill
any itsobligationsto
the Bank, the Bank may
suspendits
membershipby
decisionof a majority
of the Governors,
exercisingamajority of
the total voting
power….”
Restoration: silence
Article V, Section2, (a)-
“If a memberfailsto
fulfillanyof its
obligationinthe
corporation,the
Corporationmay
suspenditsmembership
by decisionof amajority
of the Governors,
exercisingamajority of
the total voting
power….”
Restoration: silence
Article VII, section2,
(a)-“if amemberfailsto
fulfillanyof its
obligationstothe
Association,the
Associationmay
suspendits
membershipby
decisionof amajority of
the Governors,
exercisingamajority of
the total votingpower.”
Restoration: silence
Article 52, a “If a member
failstofulfill anyof its
obligationunderthis
Convention,the Council
may,by a majorityof its
members exercisinga
majorityof the total voting
power, suspendits
membership.”
Restoration: majorityof
vote cast
Quorum:
Executive
Directors
Article V, section4, (f)-
“A quorumfor any
meetingof the
Executive Directors
shall be a majority of
the Directors,exercising
not lessthanone-half
(1/2) of the total voting
power.”
Article IV, section4 (e)-
“A quorumfor any
meetingof the Boardof
Directorsshall be a
majority of the Directors
exercisingnotlessthan
one-half (1/2) of the
total votingpower.”
Article VI, section4, (e)-
“A quorumfor any
meetingof the
Executive Directors
shall be a majority of
the Directorsexercising
not lessthanone half
(1/2) of the total voting
power.”
Article 42, (b)-“the quorum
for a meetingof the Board
shall be constitutedbya
majorityof the Directors
exercisingnotlessthan
one-half the total voting
power”means½ of voting
power and majorityof
directors
Permanent
suspension of
operations
Article VI, section5 (b)-
“The Bank maysuspend
permanentlyits
operationsinrespectof
newloansand
guaranteesbya vote of
a majority of the
Governors,exercisinga
majority of the total
votingpower….”
Article V,5(a)-“the
Corporationmay
permanentlysuspendits
operationsbyvote of a
majority of the
Governorsexercisinga
majority of the total
votingpower….”
Article VII,5(a)-“the
Associationmay
permanentlysuspend
itsoperationsbyvote of
a majority of Governors
exercisingamajority of
the total voting
power…”
Article 55, a-“The Council,
by special majority,may
decide tocease operations
and to liquidate the Agency.
Thereuponthe Agencyshall
forthwithcease all
activities,…”means2/3of
total votingpower
representing not lessthan
55% of subscribedsharesof
the capital stock of the
Agency

6. 6 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
I believewe needanewsysteminordertomaximize inputfromdeveloped,developingandemerging
economies. We needasystemallowingustogetfeed-backfromourclientsandshareholders, borrowing
membersof ourWorld Bank. We needa system helpingbothsidestocommunicate,cooperate and
compromise inordertoserve our clients anddonors better. We needto designproductstargetingourclients’
needsandhelpingthemtoachieve theirtargetgoal indevelopmentandhappiness. We are in competition
againstour missionandothers,anygroupwiththe bestdata and bestanalysiswill winthiscompetition.
A paperauthoredbyProf Dr Cord Jakobeit,paidandcirculatedbythe GermanMinistryforEconomic
CooperationandDevelopment,“Enhancingthe Voiceof DevelopingCountriesinthe WorldBank’proposedthe
introductionof double majorityvotinginthe decisionsof some WorldBankaffairsfora pilotprogram. Truly,a
one or two yearsprogramshouldrequire anapproval butnot an amendment. Decisionlike change of rate of
charge (interestpaidbyborrowers) orthe rate of remuneration(interestpaidtocreditors) will stillrequire this
supermajorityapproval vote. Butafterreviewing8documentsincludingBy-lawsandArticlesof Agreements,I
have to argue that hisproposedpilotprogrammayhave requiredalot of amendments. Thatsaid,my
proposedpilotprogramisjustlike anysurveyorfeed-backbecause thereisnoWorldBankBy-lawsor Article
of Agreementsregulatingsurveysorfeed-backfromExecutiveDirectors. On topof that votingruleshere
allow subsequentvotes afterconsensusagreement. Havingsaidthatthispilotprogramwill startafter
Executive Directorsloan/projectagreement andclosedmotion,theywill be handedasurveywith24 hours’
notice,time forthemtoconsultcountriesandbuildcoalitionforapossible classresponse. ElectedExecutive
Directorscan eithervote forhisconstituent(EDS) orpercountry. At the end,resultwill be computedbasedon
shareholdingorpercountry. Frankly,because of myrootsas a SEC expert,Ibelieve inBJR(BusinessJudgment
Rules),thatmeansImay choose shareholdingoverpercountry, mostlyusedbysome international
institutions. Imade thischoice notbecause thisisa Bank but alsobecause 2 divisionsof the WorldBank,IBRD
and IFCare regularlyanalyzedandratedbythe marketratinggroup calledMoodyService. Atthe endof this
informal pilotprogram,we will analyze dataandsentthemtothe Board of Governance forpossible
amendmentandimplementationof anewsystemof vote.
Status of the Decision Making Votes vis a vis the World Bank

7. 7 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
Voting process Definitions Main Characteristics Background at the World Bank Suggestions I made
Consensus A system which requires
a collaborationto
negotiate until
agreements of the
participants withno
need for a vote
 Requiredendless
negotiation
 Increase backlogs
 Well-connected
negotiators prevail
 Squeeze out new
representatives
 Mayleadto
unacceptable
agreement just to
end the
postponement and
endless delays
Meetings ofthe Executive Directors
Board are guided bya consensus
decisionmakingculture. Their Bylaws
allowconsensus agreements unless
formal votes are requested. There are
claims relatedto powerful directors
who are allowedto negotiate the
outcome ofproject proposals or loan
requests behindclosed doors.
Decisionare made bythe waythey
argue, theyundermine other ideas,
their friendships withinsiders and each
others, their seniorityinthat
WashingtonDCbuildingor howsorry
others will feel for the requested
countrydevelopment status or need.
At the same time, thisconsensus
systemclaims a lot of backlogs and
rerun votes behind anyself-imposed
timelines while increasing coalitions
and costs.
It is true that Boardmembers get
more experience while aging
with the company. Thistheory
can helpthe companyif use
properlyduring anynegotiations
includingconsensus. All
consensus agreements should be
followed bya double majority
just as feed-back to serve better
these clients andinvesting
donors or to rate the project
vote viabilityamong twoclasses
of members withor without
coalition.
Majority A voting system which
requiresthe decision
rule to be achieved or
adoptedwhenit is favor
bymore than 50 % of
votes cast
 Conservative
decisionmaking
 More acceptable
 One vote can leadto
a huge crowdof
discontents
A lot of decisions require such a simple
majorityof votes (50+%) cast for their
approval at the WorldBankGroup.
 Issuance of shares stock
 Loan and projects approval
 Suspensionandrestoration of
members
Let reduce the number of this
voting system. It is not as
democratic as it seems because
of the needto increase the voice
of the borrowers whoneed to be
helped to developthemselves.
One or two should remainto
approve appointment and
meetingrequests.
Super Majority A voting systemwhich
requiresthe decision
rule to be achieved or
adopted whenit is favor
bya huge percentage of
votes cast, something
aroundtwo-thirds or
75+% votes cast.
 Difficult to reachthis
target vote.
 Mayclose goodvotes
for failure of
reaching the
requiredvotes
 Slim minoritywith
adverse interest may
be ignored
Certaindecisionat the World Bank
Group requires approval of special
majorityincluding:
 Capital increase andmaintenance
of Bank membershipafter
cessation ofIMF membership
(75%)
 Increases inthe number of
electedExecutive Directors (80%)
 Distribution of assets after
terminationof operation(2/3)
World BankGrouphas enough of
super majorityrequirements in
its voting book including
weighted voting which requires
super or simplemajoritycoupled
with proportionof total voting
power. We cankeep some in
order to seek a huge percentage
to approve some veryimportant
decisionof the WorldBank
group
Unanimous
vote
A voting systemwhich
requiresthe decision
rule to be achieved or
adoptedwhenit is favor
byall participants that
means 100% votes cast.
 Veryinclusive
 Fullyparticipatory
 Difficult to reachthe
requiredvotes
Certaindecisions at the WorldBank
Group require approval ofallmembers
including
 Amendments to the Articles that
wouldmodifythe right of
members to withdraw, to exercise
preemptive right insubscription
to shares or the limitation on
liabilityon shares to the unpaid
portionof the issue price. (100%)
It shouldbe kept thisway
without anyexpansion
Weighted
voting
A weightedsystemis
ruled bya combination
of the majority(simple
or supermajority) anda
voting power, that
means a complicated
self- made formulato
assigna voting weight to
 Increase contribution
for voting power
 Prioritize members
with highvoting
power
 Requiredendless
voting realignment
and allthe costs
Certaindecisions at the WorldBank
Group require both a numerical
majority(simple andspecial) of
members anda proportion oftotal
voting power including
 Amendment of Charters
 Quorum for Governors meeting
 Quorum Executive Directors
Weighted voting system has
served the WBGfor decades
with either simple or super
majority, now it is time for a
change. The elimination of
voting power withits complex
and manipulative voting rights
tied to a veryhuge fundingand

8. 8 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
each member also called
voting right. It is
adoptedwhenboth
majorities are achieved.
involvedwith the
process
 Can stealcontrol
power from very
important members
(majority
shareholder or
borrowers)
Meeting
 Suspensionandrestoration of
members
 Permanent suspension
 Distributionof assets to members
Trust funds andfailingto
increase voice andhappiness of
the developing countries. It is
time to increase satisfactionto
both borrowers and donors
because we need this donation
to helpthe needy(endextreme
poverty, grants to poor
countries,…) and development of
MICand poor countries.
Multiple
Majority
A voting systemwhich
requiresthe decision
rule to be achieved by
two separated majorities
for the resolution to be
accepted
 Give greater voice to
both parties
 Mayrequire coalition
to be taken seriously
 Distribute control
power to bothsides
with veto power
 Require diplomatic
and deal making
skills to fullyvoice
their control and
concerns
The WorldBank Groupdoesnot have
anysuch type of multiple Majority
(double majority) which requires two
(or more) specifiedclasses of members
to achieve two separated majorities
votes for the projects proposals or
resolution to be acceptedor approved
bythe board. It couldhave facilitated
borrowing countries to form coalition
and inform non borrower countries
about their feedback (approval or
disapproval) about anyloanrequests
or projects proposal before the board.
Do we trulywant to increase the
voice of developing countries
while increasing donationOR do
we want to shift control from
developedcountries to
developing countries while
reducing donations? This is a
crucial questionwe must answer
clearlywithout lying to
ourselves. Ifit is about
increasingvoice ofthe borrowing
countries, a double majorityof
the borrowing countries and
borrowers can help. We can also
use it as surveywe needto
analyze and improve services,
segmentationof products,…
without anytrust fund andfight
about the voting power constant
realignment, reliabilityand costs
and failure to reach target goals
In sum,internationalorganizationshave alotof challengesdesigningtheirorganizational structure because
theyare ownedbytoomany countrieswithdiversifiedstylesof managementandtransparencyrules. Itiswhy
whenyourproposal isto reformtheirglobal governance,youwill make more enemiesthanallyfromthe
establishmentalthoughtheyare aware of the problemsintheirsystemof governing. The failure of the
consensussystemisdifficultandpainful forpeoplewholove thisglobalwelfare Bank. Myhope isthat this
informal pilotprogramheldafterthe consensusagreementwill produce amore favorable resultbutIdoubt
that. We needthe WorldBankto be a legitimate, noncompetitive andrespectedglobalfinancial institution
again. It is whywe must thinkclearlyandfindbetterwayto reformthissysteminorderto empowervoices
that have beenunhappyaboutshareholdingfreegiveawayandthose voicesthathave beensilencedbythis
global ‘bribery’. Thus,a goodshare versusvoice analysis willexpose anegative synergyof that2010 voting
powerrealignment,amergerbetweenshareholdinggiveawayandvotingpoweradjustment. Idonot think
that there isa needforfuture researchto investigateanduncovernew shortcomingof thatculture of voting
power,consensusandvotingpowerrealignment,itistime tobringa new dynamictothe WorldBank
governance. Itistime to try whatwe have beenavoidingforyears,adouble majoritysystem. Thisdouble
majorityshouldgive opportunityforbothsides torepresenttheirdivergentinterestsandincrease their
privilegeandabilityto compromise and influence decision. The righttime isNOW,firstwe muststart inserting
thisinformal pilotprograminthe systembecause we shouldnotsettleforless.Toclose, aweak and
reputational challenged WorldBankGroupmay notsurvive thisincomingcompetitive environment.