3. THE SIPRI YEARBOOK
SIPRI Yearbook 2012 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts
and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms
control, peace and international security. The SIPRI Yearbook, which was first published in
1969, is written by both SIPRI researchers and invited outside experts.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2012 and gives samples of the
data and analysis that it contains.
CONTENTS
Introduction 2
1. Responding to atrocities: the new geopolitics of intervention 3
Part I. Security and conflicts, 2011
2. Armed conflict 4
3. Peace operations and conflict management 6
Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2011
4. Military expenditure 8
5. Arms production and military services 10
6. International arms transfers 12
7. World nuclear forces 14
Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2011
8. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation 16
9. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials 18
10. Conventional arms control 20
Annexes 22
4. INTRODUCTION capacity to affect regional and, in some
cases, global security developments.
bates gill In-depth tracking of armed violence
around the world also reveals the
SIPRI Yearbook 2012 includes contributions destabilizing role of non-state actors in
from 39 experts from 17 countries who prosecuting conflicts and engaging in
chronicle and analyse important trends and violence against civilians.
developments in international security, Unfortunately, the global community has
armaments and disarmament. Their yet to fully grapple with the ongoing
analysis points to three persistent structural changes that define today’s
contemporary trends that underpin a more security landscape—changes that often
dynamic and complex global security order. outpace the ability of established
institutions and mechanisms to cope with
Constraints on established powers
them. It will certainly take time for
In 2011 established powers in the world established and newly emergent powers to
system—especially the United States and its reach an effective consensus on the most
major transatlantic allies—continued to important requirements for international
face constraints on their economic, political order, stability and peace, and on how to
and military capacities to address global realize and defend them.
and regional security challenges. These
Struggling norms and institutions
constraints were primarily imposed by
budget austerity measures in the wake of Multilateral organizations tasked with
the crisis in public finances experienced promoting and enforcing norms for
throughout most of the developed world. stability and security continue to face
At the same time, uprisings and regime difficulties in generating the political will
changes in the Arab world drew and financial resources needed to meet
international attention and responses, their mandates, and gaps remain which
including the United Nations-mandated require new or more effective mechanisms.
and NATO-led intervention in Libya. The A far greater focus will need to be placed
widespread support for and expansion of on less militarized solutions to the security
traditional peace operations over the past challenges ahead. Perhaps most crucially,
decade are also facing constraints in the many of the most important security
years ahead. Moreover, the world’s major challenges in the years ahead will not
donors to peace operations are largely readily lend themselves to traditional
looking to cut support to multilateral military solutions. Instead, what will be
institutions and to focus on smaller and needed is an innovative integration of
quicker missions. preventive diplomacy, pre-emptive and
early-warning technologies, and
Continuing emergence of new powers and
non-state actors
cooperative transnational partnerships. •
States around the world outside the
traditional US alliance system are building
greater economic, diplomatic and military Dr Bates Gill is Director of SIPRI.
2 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
5. 1. RESPONDING TO ATROCITIES: set a new benchmark against which all
THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF future arguments for such intervention
INTERVENTION might be measured. However, the
subsequent implementation of that
gareth evans mandate led to the reappearance of
significant geopolitical divisions.
Our age has confronted no greater ethical, The Security Council’s paralysis over
political and institutional challenge than Syria during the course of 2011,
ensuring the protection of civilians, as culminating in the veto by Russia and
victims of both war and of mass atrocity China of a cautiously drafted condemnatory
crimes. Awareness of the problem of resolution, has raised the question, in
civilian protection is growing and has been relation to the sharp-end implementation of
accompanied by a much greater evident R2P, of whether Resolution 1973 would
willingness—at least in principle—to do prove to be the high-water mark from
something about it. which the tide will now retreat.
New paradigms for a new century The future for civilian protection
Two normative advances in this area are, The crucial question is whether the new
first, the dramatically upgraded attention geopolitics of intervention that appeared to
given since 1999 to the law and practice have emerged with Resolution 1973 is in
relating to the protection of civilians (POC) fact sustainable, or whether, as suggested
in armed conflict; and, second, the by the subsequent response to the situation
emergence in 2001, and far-reaching global in Syria, a more familiar, and more cynical,
embrace since 2005, of the concept of the geopolitics will in fact reassert itself.
responsibility to protect (R2P). This author takes the optimistic view
There is now more or less universal that the new normative commitment to
acceptance of the principles that state civilian protection is alive and well, and
sovereignty is not a licence to kill but that, in the aftermath of the intervention in
entails a responsibility not to do or allow Libya, the world has been witnessing not so
grievous harm to one’s own people. The much a major setback for a new cooperative
international community also bears a approach as the inevitable teething troubles
responsibility to assist those states that associated with the evolution of any major
need and want help in meeting that new international norm. The Brazilian
obligation, and a responsibility to take ‘responsibility while protecting’ initiative,
timely and decisive collective action in focusing on clearer criteria for and more
accordance with the UN Charter. effective monitoring of the use of force,
Libya and its aftermath
offers a constructive way forward. •
UN Security Council Resolution 1973,
Gareth Evans was Australian minister for foreign
authorizing military intervention in Libya affairs (1988–96) and president of the
to halt what was seen as an imminent International Crisis Group (2000–2009). He is
massacre, was a resounding demonstration currently Chancellor of the Australian National
of these principles at work, and seemed to University.
introduction 3
6. 2. ARMED CONFLICT n u m b e r s o f c o n f l ic t s , 2 0 01–10
50
During 2011 the sudden and dramatic
40
popular uprisings in parts of the Middle
No. of conflicts
30
East and North Africa, which together
constituted the Arab Spring, produced 20
diverse patterns of conflict. The events of 10
the Arab Spring were not, however, isolated
0
in terms of contemporary conflict trends. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Rather, developments across the region
Armed Non-state One-sided
served to underline some of the long-term
conflict conflict violence
changes that have occurred in armed
conflict over recent decades. This has
involved important shifts in the scale,
n u m b e r s o f fata l i t i e s i n
intensity and duration of armed conflict
o r g a n i z e d v io l e nc e , 2 0 01–10
around the world, and in the principal
35 000
actors involved in violence. Together these
30 000
changes point to the emergence of a
25 000
No. of fatalities
significantly different conflict environment
20 000
than that which prevailed for much of the
15 000
20th century. 10 000
5 000
The first year of the Arab Spring
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
The uprisings of the Arab Spring spread
rapidly from country to country and soon Armed Non-state One-sided
affected large parts of North Africa and the conflict conflict violence
Middle East. While they shared a number
of traits—including large demonstrations,
non-violent actions, the absence of single Western powers, notably France and the
leaders and the use of central squares in USA, initially supported governments in
major cities—they also differed in certain Egypt and Tunisia but then began to push
respects. The extent of the demands made for change. In the case of Libya, they
by the protesters varied, ranging from quickly took an active stand against the
improved economic situations to regime regime, with the UN’s approval and NATO
change, as did the level of violence. as the instrument. Over conflict in Syria,
While there were comparatively few China and Russia, both of which had
fatalities in Algeria and Morocco, other become increasingly critical of the
countries—including Bahrain, Egypt, international use of force, opposed
Tunisia and Yemen—were much more Western-led efforts to sanction the ruling
severely affected. The highest levels of regime. The scope for third-party
violence were in Libya and Syria. involvement in solving these crises was
International reactions varied, with remarkably limited, and serious
external support limited to a few cases. negotiations only occurred in Yemen.
4 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
7. The outcomes of the first year of the Arab Over the period 2001–10 there were
Spring were mixed. There were examples of 69 armed conflicts and 221 non-state
regime change but also cases where conflicts and 127 actors were involved in
popular resistance was repressed. one-sided violence. Thus, in total, there
Nevertheless, Arab politics has been were more than 400 violent actions that
changed by this historically unique series each resulted in the deaths of more than
of events. 25 people in a particular year.
The extent of organized violence at the
Organized violence in the Horn of Africa
end of the decade was lower than at its
For decades, the countries in the Horn of beginning, although the decline was not
Africa—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya dramatic. Moreover, while in the 1990s
and Somalia—have been plagued by there were wide fluctuations in the number
organized violence. While all these of conflicts, this pattern was not repeated in
countries experienced state-based armed the 2000s, indicating that the downward
conflict, non-state conflict or one-sided trend may be a promising sign of future
violence against civilians during the decade developments. •
2001–10, non-state conflicts were by far the
most common. There were 77 non-state
conflicts (35 per cent of the global total) in
the Horn of Africa. State-based armed
conflict was less common: only 5 were t h e g l o b a l p e a c e i n d e x 2 01 2
recorded in 2001–10. Acts of one-sided The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced by
violence were committed by 6 actors. the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses
States in the region have demonstrated a 23 indicators to rank 158 countries by their
growing tendency to become militarily relative states of peace.
engaged in neighbouring countries. For There were improvements in the overall
instance, both Ethiopia and Kenya have at scores of all regions apart from the Middle
East and North Africa in the 2012 GPI. For the
times sent troops in support of the Somali
first time since the GPI was launched, in 2007,
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in
sub-Saharan Africa was not the least peaceful
its conflict with al-Shabab, which has in region. The events of the Arab Spring made
turn received arms and training from the Middle East and North Africa the least
Eritrea. peaceful region.
Patterns of organized violence, 2001–10 Rank Country Score Change
In previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook, 1 Iceland 1.113 –0.037
2 Denmark 1.239 –0.041
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
2 New Zealand 1.239 –0.034
presented information on patterns of ‘major
4 Canada 1.317 –0.033
armed conflicts’. To provide a broader 5 Japan 1.326 +0.032
perspective on organized violence, the 154 Congo, DRC 3.073 +0.057
focus has now expanded to include three 155 Iraq 3.192 –0.107
types of organized violence: (state-based) 156 Sudan 3.193 –0.038
armed conflicts, non-state conflicts and 157 Afghanistan 3.252 +0.043
one-sided violence (against civilians). 158 Somalia 3.392 +0.021
security and conflicts 5
8. 3. PEACE OPERATIONS AND of whether a heavy (and long-term) military
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT footprint in peace operations is necessary.
Global trends
The year 2011 was in many respects a year
of contradiction for peacekeeping. On the A total of 52 peace operations were
one hand, after nearly a decade of record conducted in 2011, the same number as in
expansion in the numbers of operations and 2010 and the second lowest in the period
personnel deployed and the costs of 2002–11, confirming a downward trend that
financing these operations, peacekeeping started in 2009. However, the number of
showed initial signs of slowing down in personnel deployed on peace operations in
2010 and there were further indications in 2011 was the second highest of the period,
2011 that military-heavy, multidimensional at 262 129, just 700 fewer than in 2010.
peace operations have reached a plateau. The UN, with 20 operations, remained
On the other hand, 2011 saw the possible the main conducting organization. In terms
beginnings of an actionable commitment by of personnel deployed, the North Atlantic
the international community to the Treaty Organization (NATO) was the
concepts of the responsibility to protect largest conducting organization for the
(R2P) and protection of civilians (POC) in third consecutive year: 137 463 personnel
relation to the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, (52 per cent of the total) were deployed to
Libya and Syria. operations conducted by NATO, mainly the
Several factors explain the consolidation International Security Assistance Force
trend of recent years. First and foremost is (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
the global military overstretch: during the
New peace operations
years of expansion the United Nations and
other organizations had difficulty in Four new peace operations were deployed
persuading countries to contribute in 2011: two in South Sudan, one in Libya
sufficient troops and force enablers such as and one in Syria.
helicopters. The emergence of new
contributors such as Brazil, China and
Indonesia, while a positive development, n u m b e r o f p e ac e o p e r at io n s ,
did not significantly fill the demand gap. A 2 0 0 2 –1 1
second factor is the ongoing global financial 60
downturn, which had a more discernable 50
No. of operations
impact on peacekeeping in 2011 as 40
governments outlined budget cuts for their 30
militaries and advocated leaner operations 20
and quicker exits in multilateral 10
frameworks such as the UN. Third, over the 0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
past decade contemporary peace operations
have faced ‘mission creep’ in terms of the Conducting organization:
explosion of mandated tasks, which often Ad hoc Regional United
require civilian expertise and open-ended coalition organization Nations
time frames. This has led to a questioning or alliance
6 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
9. p e r s o n n e l d e p l oy e d , b y p e r s on n e l de p l oy e d, b y
o r g a n i z at io n t y p e , 2 01 1 l o c at io n , 2 01 1
Ad hoc coalition, 3179 personnel Middle East, 16 627 personnel
(6 operations) (11 operations)
United Nations Europe, 11 932 personnel Africa
105 347 personnel (15 operations) 86 642 personnel
(20 operations) (16 operations)
Regional
organization
or alliance Asia and Oceania Americas
153 603 personnel 134 727 personnel 12 201 personnel
(26 operations) (8 operations) (2 operations)
The independence of South Sudan led to unable to effectively carry out its mandate
a significant reconfiguration of the UN and quickly became mired in controversy
presence in the former territory of Sudan. and criticism.
After much discussion on the future of the
Regional developments
UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the
mission closed in July, after Sudan As in preceding years, the largest
indicated that it would not consent to an concentration of peace operations in 2011
extension of its mandate. The majority of was in Africa. Personnel numbers rose in
the personnel were redeployed to the new Africa due to the expansion of the African
UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and
(UNMISS) and to the new border- the temporary reinforcement of the UN
monitoring mission, the UN Interim Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in the
Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). run-up to the deposition and arrest of
Although NATO’s Operation Unified President Laurent Gbagbo.
Protector falls outside the definition of In Asia and Oceania the UN Mission in
peace operation, it was nonetheless Nepal (UNMIN) closed in January 2011 and
significant as it encapsulated the global the first steps were taken towards the
debate on how to demarcate the boundaries planned withdrawal of two operations:
of peacekeeping. It was the first military ISAF and the UN Integrated Mission in
intervention to be launched in the R2P Timor-Leste (UNMIT). •
framework and was mandated by the UN
Security Council with no permanent
member objecting. However, towards the
end of the operation, whatever tentative
consensus there had been disintegrated
over the extent of the responsibility. Later
in the year, the UN deployed the UN
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a
small political mission.
In late 2011, the Arab League deployed its
first ever mission, the Arab League
Observer Mission to Syria. The mission was
security and conflicts 7
10. 4. MILITARY EXPENDITURE w o r l d m i l i ta r y e x p e n di t u r e ,
2 0 0 2 –1 1
World military expenditure did not 2.0
increase in 2011, for the first time since
Spending (US$ trillion)
1.5
1998. The world total for 2011 is estimated
to have been $1738 billion, representing 1.0
2.5 per cent of global gross domestic
product or $249 for each person. Compared 0.5
with the total in 2010, military spending
0
remained virtually unchanged in real 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
terms. However, it is still too early to say
United States Rest of the world
whether this means that world military
Spending figures are in constant (2010) US$.
expenditure has finally peaked.
The main cause of the halt in military
spending growth was the economic policies
The impact of austerity on military
adopted in most Western countries in the
expenditure in Europe
aftermath of the global financial and
economic crisis that started in 2008. These In Western and Central Europe in
policies prioritized the swift reduction of particular, governments enacted austerity
budget deficits that increased sharply measures, including military spending cuts.
following the crisis. In countries such as Greece, Italy and
Spain, deficit reduction was given added
urgency by acute debt crises where these
w o r l d m i l i ta r y s p e n di ng , 2 01 1
countries faced being unable to meet their
Spending Change
debt obligations, in some cases requiring
Region ($ b.) (%)
bailouts from the European Union and the
Africa 34.3 8.6
International Monetary Fund.
North Africa 13.9 25
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.4 –0.1
The falls in military expenditure brought
Americas 809 –1.4 other policy debates into focus, including
Central America 7.0 2.7 long-standing accusations from both sides
and the Caribbean of the Atlantic that European countries are
North America 736 –1.2 failing to ‘pull their weight’ in military
South America 66.0 –3.9 affairs, and renewed efforts to promote
Asia and Oceania 364 2.2
greater European military cooperation as a
Central and South Asia 61.7 –2.7
way to reduce costs while preserving
East Asia 243 4.1
Oceania 28.6 –1.2 capabilities.
South East Asia 31.0 2.7
US military spending and the 2011 budget
Europe 407 0.2
Eastern Europe 80.5 10.2 crisis
Western and Central 326 –1.9 The US administration and the Congress
Middle East 123 4.6
attempted to agree measures to reduce the
World total 1 738 0.3 soaring US budget deficit. While these
Spending figures are in current (2011) US$. attempts did not lead to substantive cuts in
8 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
11. military expenditure, delays in agreeing a t h e r e p o r t i n g o f m i l i ta r y
budget for 2011 contributed to spending e x p e n di t u r e data t o t h e u n
being lower than planned and resulted in a The number of states reporting to the UN
small real-terms fall in US military Standardized Instrument for Reporting
expenditure. Military Expenditures has dropped from a
The rapid decade-long increase in US high of 81 in 2002 to 51 in 2011.
military spending appears to be ending. European states had the highest reporting
rate in 2011 (31 of 48 states). The worst rates
This is the result both of the ending of the
were in Africa (2 of 54 states) and the Middle
Iraq War and the winding down of the
East (1 of 14 states).
Afghanistan War and of budget deficit-
reduction measures.
costs of military forces; destruction of
The economic cost of the Afghanistan and
capital and infrastructure; disruption of
Iraq wars
normal economic activity; loss of human
One of the dominating factors of the global capital through death, injury, displacement
security environment over the past and disruption to education; and loss of
10 years, and a key factor influencing foreign investment and tourism. Full
military spending in many countries, was estimates for these costs are not currently
the ‘global war on terrorism’ following the available.
terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September
Military expenditure in Africa
2001. The highly militarized policy
response to these attacks chosen by the Africa was the region with the largest
USA, which included invasions of increase in military spending in 2011—
Afghanistan and Iraq, had cost the USA 8.6 per cent. This was dominated by a
over $1.2 trillion in additional military massive 44 per cent increase by Algeria, the
expenditure alone by the end of 2011, and continent’s largest spender. Algeria’s
may result in total long-term costs of as continuous increases in recent years were
much as $4 trillion. Much lower, although fuelled by increasing oil revenues and were
still substantial, costs had also been provided a ready justification by the
incurred by other participants in these activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic
wars. Maghreb (AQIM), although Algeria’s
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have regional ambitions may be a more
also led to huge economic costs, including important motive.
The terrorist activities of Boko Haram
t h e 1 0 l a r g e s t m i l i ta r y were also a major security concern for
s p e n de r s , 2 01 1 Nigeria and the military-led response to
these appears to have been one factor in
Nigeria’s military spending increases.
However, the role of other factors,
USA China Russia UK France especially oil revenues, should not be
$711 b. $143 b. $71.9 b. $62.7 b. $62.5 b.
ignored. •
Japan India Saudi Arabia Germany Brazil
$59.3 b. $48.9 b. $48.5 b. $46.7 $35.4 b.
military spending and armaments 9
12. 5. ARMS PRODUCTION AND in Western Europe, although these
MILITARY SERVICES discussions have not yet resulted in
widespread increased cooperation.
The public spending crisis in the Global West European countries have discussed
North has not yet had a large overall impact and begun to implement cooperative
on the major companies in the arms development and production strategies for
production and military services industry unmanned aerial systems (UASs) and in
(‘the arms industry’). The most likely June 2011 the European Commission
reason for this lack of major change is that initiated a process for developing and
the impact of the world financial slowdown producing UASs. However, these projects
is being delayed by the structure of the have not yet come to fruition, as seen in the
arms industry. stagnation of the Talarion project.
The economic and spending
The military services industry
uncertainties in both the USA and Western
Europe will have general implications for Some key military services sectors—such as
the way in which weapon programmes are maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO),
developed and implemented, and so have systems support, logistics, and training of
contributed to uncertainty as to whether foreign militaries—have been more
arms sales will be maintained or increase at resistant to the impact of the drawdown
the same rate as in the past. from Iraq and to the global financial
instability. Their long-term growth can be
The US National Defense Authorization Act
attributed to a variety of post-cold war
The National Defense Authorization Act for changes, including structural
financial year 2012 has sent a mixed transformation of military needs and the
message about the US arms industry. On decrease of in-house capabilities for ever
the one hand, it maintains many of the more complex systems. It seems that
USA’s largest and most costly weapon pressure on public spending, which has
programmes, such as the F-35 (Joint Strike raised the possibility that military spending
Fighter). Authorization to continue will fall, will contribute to an increase in
spending on these programmes indicates demand for outsourced services such as
that arms sales in the US market are likely weapon systems MRO.
to continue largely unchanged from current
Diversification into cybersecurity
levels. On the other hand, new contract
rules on risk sharing between the US In addition to an increased focus on
Government and the companies winning military services, companies are relying on
arms contracts mean that a potentially other business strategies in an effort to
heavier burden will fall on the industry as maintain their bottom lines. A notable
these programmes develop. development has been the growth in
acquisitions of specialist cybersecurity
Arms industry production cooperation in
firms as the largest arms-producing
Western Europe
companies attempt to shield themselves
The financial crisis has seeped into the from potential cuts in military spending
discussions on arms industry cooperation and move into adjacent markets.
10 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
13. The Indian arms industry
c o m pa n i e s i n t h e si p r i t o p 10 0
Many countries outside the Global North f o r 2 010 , b y c ou n t r y
are attempting to develop a self-sustaining Other non-OECD, 6 companies
Russia, 8 companies
national arms industry. India’s efforts to
modernize, upgrade and maintain the Other OECD,
12 companies United States,
equipment of its armed forces and to 44 companies
expand its military capabilities have made
it the largest importer of major arms. Western Europe,
30 companies
Its domestic arms industry is also
attempting to meet this demand—for Country or region refers to the location of the
example by increasing levels of technology company headquarters, not necessarily the
through technology transfer—but the location of production. China is excluded due
Indian defence industrial policy requires to lack of data.
major reform.
in 2009. Between 2002 and 2010 Top 100
The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and
arms sales rose by 60 per cent.
military services companies
Companies based in the USA remained at
The SIPRI Top 100 list ranks the largest the top of the SIPRI Top 100 and were
arms-producing and military services responsible for over 60 per cent of the arms
companies in the world (outside China) sales in the SIPRI Top 100. The number of
according to their arms sales. Sales of arms West European companies in the Top 100
and military services by the SIPRI Top 100 declined to 30, while the Brazilian company
continued to increase in 2010 to reach Embraer re-entered the Top 100. Russia’s
$411.1 billion, although at 1 per cent in real continued arms industry consolidation
terms the rate of increase was slower than added another parent corporation to its top
arms producers—United Shipbuilding
the 10 l a rgest a r ms- Corporation. •
p r oduc i ng c o m pa n i e s , 2 010
Arms sales Profit
Company ($ m.) ($ m.)
1 Lockheed Martin 35 730 2 926
2 BAE Systems (UK) 32 880 –1 671
3 Boeing 31 360 3 307
4 Northrop Grumman 28 150 2 053
5 General Dynamics 23 940 2 624
6 Raytheon 22 980 1 879
7 EADS (trans-Europe) 16 360 732
8 Finmeccanica (Italy) 14 410 738
9 L-3 Communications 13 070 955
10 United Technologies 11 410 4 711
Companies are US-based, unless indicated
otherwise. The profit figures are from all
company activities, including non-military
sales.
military spending and armaments 11
14. 6. INTERNATIONAL ARMS arrangements and the transfer of
TRANSFERS technology. India, which received 10 per
cent of all imports in 2007–11, is likely to
The volume of international transfers of remain the largest recipient of major
major conventional weapons grew by conventional weapons in the coming years.
24 per cent between 2002–2006 and
The impact of the Arab Spring on
2007–11. The five largest suppliers in
arms export policies
2007–11—the USA, Russia, Germany,
France and the UK—accounted for three- The first year of the Arab Spring provoked
quarters of the volume of exports. Outside debate about the policies of major arms
the five largest arms suppliers, China and suppliers on exports to states in the Middle
Spain recorded significant increases in the East and North Africa. Russian officials saw
volume of deliveries during 2007–11. While no reason to halt deliveries to any state in
China’s exports are likely to continue to the region not subject to a UN arms
grow, Spain’s order book for ships—which embargo. In contrast, the USA and several
account for the bulk of its exports— major European suppliers to the region
indicates that it will not maintain its revoked or suspended some export licences
volume of exports. to the region and in certain cases undertook
States in Asia and Oceania received reviews of their arms export policies.
nearly half of all imports of major However, strategic and economic concerns
conventional weapons in 2007–11. continued to play a central role in all states’
Moreover, the five largest recipients of decision-making on arms exports to the
major conventional weapons—India, South region, and the impact of the Arab Spring
Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore— on arms export policies appears to have
were all located in the region. Major been limited.
importers are taking advantage of the
Arms transfers to South East Asia
competitive arms market to seek attractive
deals in terms of financing, offset The volume of arms transfers to South East
Asia increased threefold between 2002–
2006 and 2007–11. Naval equipment and
the tr end in tr a nsfers of aircraft with maritime roles accounted for
m a j o r a r m s , 2 0 0 2 –1 1 a significant share of deliveries and
30 outstanding orders by Brunei Darussalam,
(billions of trend-indicator values)
25 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Volume of arms transfers
20
Singapore and Viet Nam.
15
Determinants of the types and volumes
10
of weapons sought by these six states
include piracy, illegal fishing and terrorism.
5
However, territorial disputes in the South
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 China Sea probably play the most important
Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: five-year role in their procurement decisions. This is
moving average (plotted at the last year of borne out by defence white papers, the
each five-year period). types of weapons acquired in 2007–11 and,
12 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
15. the m ain importers a nd r e c i p i e n t r e gio n s o f m a jo r
ex porter s of m a jor a r ms, a r m s i m p o r t s , 2 0 0 7–1 1
2 010 Africa, 9%
Global Global Americas, 11%
Exporter share (%) Importer share (%)
1. USA 30 1. India 10 Asia and
Oceania, 44%
2. Russia 24 2. South Korea 6 Middle East, 17%
3. Germany 9 3. Pakistan 5
4. France 8 4. China 5 Europe, 19%
5. UK 4 5. Singapore 4
6. China 4 6. Australia 4
7. Spain 3 7. Algeria 4 connection with Azerbaijan’s procurement
8. Netherlands 3 8. USA 3 drive.
9. Italy 3 9. UAE 3 While a voluntary Organization for
10. Israel 2 10. Greece 3 Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) arms embargo is in force, there are
in particular, a recent series of low-level different interpretations of its status by
maritime confrontations in disputed OSCE participating states and arms
waters. continue to be supplied to both sides. Russia
States in South East Asia are also making is a major supplier to both parties. Armenia
efforts to secure transfers of technology has a limited range of potential suppliers
and diversify their sources of supply. and is overly reliant on Russia as an arms
Suppliers are increasingly willing to meet supplier. In contrast, Azerbaijan has
the demands of states in the region for recently concluded significant licensed
extensive technology transfers in arms production arrangements and deals with
deals or partnerships to develop new Israel, South Africa and Turkey as it seeks
weapon systems. to use foreign technology to develop an
Arms transfers to Armenia and Azerbaijan
indigenous arms industry. •
Recent acquisitions, orders and
procurement plans by Armenia and
Azerbaijan have the potential to increase t r a n s pa r e nc y i n a r m s
the risk of renewed conflict over the tr ansfers
disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The number of states reporting their arms
Armenia and Azerbaijan accuse each other imports and exports to the United Nations
of pursuing an arms race. Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
Azerbaijan has significantly increased its increased in 2011 to 85, from an all-time low of
volume of arms imports against a backdrop 72 states in 2010. There was a notable increase
in the Americas, but only one African state
of bellicose rhetoric on the use of force to
reported, the lowest number since UNROCA
settle the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
was created.
There is limited public information on An increasing number of governments have
Armenia’s arms imports in recent years but published national reports on arms exports,
during 2010 and 2011 it announced plans to including Poland, which published its first
procure more advanced weapon systems in reports in 2011.
military spending and armaments 13
16. 7. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES w o r l d n u c l e a r f o r c e s , 2 01 2
Deployed Other Total
At the start of 2012, eight states possessed Country warheads warheads inventory
approximately 4400 operational nuclear USA 2 150 5 850 ~8 000
weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a Russia 1 800 8 200 10 000
state of high operational alert. If all nuclear UK 160 65 225
warheads are counted—operational France 290 10 ~300
China .. 200 ~240
warheads, spares, those in both active and
India .. 80–100 80–100
inactive storage, and intact warheads
Pakistan .. 90–110 90–110
scheduled for dismantlement—the USA, Israel .. ~80 ~80
Russia, the UK, France, China, India, North Korea .. .. ?
Pakistan and Israel together possess a total Total ~4 400 ~14 600 ~19 000
of approximately 19 000 nuclear weapons. All estimates are approximate and are as of
The availability of reliable information January 2012.
about the nuclear weapon states’ arsenals
varies considerably. France, the UK and the
USA have recently disclosed important France, Russia, the UK and the USA—
information about their nuclear appear determined to remain nuclear
capabilities. In contrast, transparency in powers for the indefinite future.
Russia has decreased as a result of its Russia and the USA have major
decision not to publicly release detailed modernization programmes under way for
data about its strategic nuclear forces under nuclear delivery systems, warheads and
the 2010 Russia–USA New START treaty, production facilities. At the same time, they
even though it shares the information with continue to reduce their nuclear forces
the USA. China remains highly non- through the implementation of New
transparent as part of its long-standing START, which entered into force in 2011, as
deterrence strategy, and little information well as through unilateral force cuts. Since
is publicly available about its nuclear forces Russia and the USA possess by far the two
and weapon production complex. largest nuclear weapon arsenals, one result
Reliable information on the operational has been that the total number of nuclear
status of the nuclear arsenals and weapons in the world continues to decline.
capabilities of the three states that have The nuclear arsenals of China, France
never been party to the 1968 Non- and the UK are considerably smaller, but all
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—India, Israel are either developing new weapons or have
and Pakistan—is especially difficult to find. plans to do so. China is the only one of these
In the absence of official declarations, the states that appears to be expanding the size
publicly available information is often of its nuclear forces, albeit slowly.
contradictory or incorrect.
Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces
The legally recognized nuclear weapon
India and Pakistan are increasing the size
states
and sophistication of their nuclear
All five legally recognized nuclear weapon arsenals. Both countries are developing
states, as defined by the NPT—China, and deploying new types of nuclear-capable
14 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
17. s t o c k s o f f i s s i l e m at e r i a l s superiority in conventional arms and
Materials that can sustain an explosive fission manpower.
chain reaction are essential for all types of Pakistan’s development of new short-
nuclear explosives, from first-generation range ballistic missiles suggests that its
fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear military planning has evolved to include
weapons. The most common of these fissile
contingencies for the use of ‘battlefield
materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU)
nuclear weapons’. This may lead to nuclear
and plutonium.
For their nuclear weapons, China, France, warheads being deployed on a more launch-
Russia, the UK and the USA have produced ready posture.
both HEU and plutonium; India, Israel and
Israeli nuclear forces
North Korea have produced mainly
plutonium; and Pakistan mainly HEU. All Israel continues to maintain its long-
states with a civilian nuclear industry have standing policy of nuclear opacity, neither
some capability to produce fissile materials.
officially confirming nor denying that it
Global stocks, 2011 possesses nuclear weapons. However, it is
Highly enriched uranium ~1270 tonnes* widely believed to have produced
Separated plutonium plutonium for a nuclear weapon arsenal.
Military stocks ~237 tonnes Israel may have produced non-strategic
Civilian stocks ~250 tonnes nuclear weapons, including artillery shells
* Not including 171 tonnes to be blended down. and atomic demolition munitions, but this
has never been confirmed.
North Korea’s military nuclear capabilities
ballistic and cruise missiles and both are
increasing their military fissile material North Korea has demonstrated a military
production capabilities. nuclear capability. However, there is no
India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the public information to verify that it
principle of a minimum credible deterrent possesses operational nuclear weapons.
and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. There At the end of 2011 North Korea was
have been no official statements specifying estimated to have separated roughly
the required size and composition of the 30 kilograms of plutonium. This would be
arsenal but, according to the Ministry of sufficient to construct up to eight nuclear
Defence, it involves ‘a mix of land-based, weapons, depending on North Korea’s
maritime and air capabilities’ (a ‘triad’). design and engineering skills.
In May 2011 the Indian Prime Minister, According to a leaked report prepared in
Manmohan Singh, convened a meeting of 2011 by the UN Security Council’s panel of
the Nuclear Command Authority—the body experts on North Korea, the country has
responsible for overseeing the country’s pursued a uranium-enrichment
nuclear arsenal—to assess progress towards programme ‘for several years or even
the goal of achieving an operational triad. decades’. It is not known whether North
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is also based Korea has produced HEU for use in nuclear
on the principle of minimum deterrence but weapons. •
does not specifically rule out the first-use of
nuclear weapons to offset India’s
military spending and armaments 15
18. 8. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND warheads as well as broader strategic
NON-PROLIFERATION stability issues. The most prominent of the
latter related to ballistic missile defence,
Russian–US nuclear arms control
which was the focus of an intensifying
The momentum behind treaty-based dispute in 2011. There was also recognition
approaches to nuclear arms control and that deeper cuts in their respective
disarmament was highlighted in 2011 by strategic nuclear arsenals would require
the entry into force of the 2010 Russia–USA bringing the three other nuclear weapon
Treaty on Measures for the Further states recognized by the 1968 Non-
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into a
Offensive Arms (New START), which multilateral nuclear arms-reduction
mandated additional reductions in the two process.
parties’ strategic offensive nuclear forces.
Nuclear proliferation concerns in Iran and
The parties implemented on schedule the
Syria
inspections, data exchanges, notifications
and other measures set out in the treaty’s International efforts to prevent the spread
cooperative monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons remained a top priority
regime. In establishing this regime—one of in 2011. Two states—Iran and Syria—came
the treaty’s main achievements—New under intensified scrutiny during the year
START continued an arms control process for allegedly concealing military nuclear
through which Russia and the USA have activities, in contravention of their
redefined their strategic relationship. commitments under the NPT.
There were questions about the next A three-year investigation by the
steps in Russian–US arms control. Both International Atomic Energy Agency
sides acknowledged that making further (IAEA) concluded that a building in Syria
cuts in their nuclear arsenals would require destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 2007
expanding the bilateral agenda to address was ‘very likely’ to have been a nuclear
tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed reactor that should have been declared to
the agency. The IAEA also reported that it
had credible evidence that Iran had
a g gr e g at e s t r at e g ic
pursued nuclear weapon-related activities
o f f e n s i v e a r m s u n de r n e w
in the past and said that some of the
s ta r t, 1 s e p t e m b e r 2 01 1
activities might still be continuing. The
Russia USA
difficulties encountered by inspectors in
Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and 516 822 both countries led to renewed calls to
heavy bombers
expand the IAEA’s legal powers to
Warheads on deployed ICBMs 1 566 1 790
and SLBMs, and warheads
investigate NPT states parties suspected of
counted for heavy bombers violating their treaty-mandated safeguards
Deployed and non-deployed 871 1 043 agreements, even beyond those set out in
launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs the Model Additional Protocol.
and heavy bombers The unresolved Iranian and Syrian
ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; nuclear controversies raised further doubt
SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile. about the efficacy of international legal
16 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
19. approaches, in particular the role of the UN reprocessing (ENR) equipment and
Security Council, in dealing with suspected technology. The NSG states could not agree
or known cases of states violating on language for the imposition of certain
important arms control treaty obligations subjective criteria; instead, they settled on
and norms. During 2011 Iran continued to conditioning the transfer of nuclear
defy five Security Council resolutions, technology on signing an additional
adopted since 2006, demanding that it safeguards protocol with the IAEA and on
suspend all uranium enrichment and other the importing state being in full compliance
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. A with its IAEA obligations.
divided Security Council failed to take An issue at the very heart of nuclear non-
action on Syria’s nuclear file after the IAEA proliferation is the relationship between
Board of Governors had declared the the NSG suppliers and those states with
country to be non-compliant with its nuclear weapons that are outside of the
safeguards agreement. In the view of some framework of the NPT and the NSG. The
observers, the lack of action set the stage 2011 NSG plenary discussed whether the
for future controversies about the revised guidelines affected India’s
suitability of extra-legal measures, eligibility to receive ENR transfers and its
including the pre-emptive use of military possible membership of the NSG.
force, in addressing proliferation concerns.
Cooperation on non-proliferation, arms
North Korea’s nuclear programme control and nuclear security
The diplomatic impasse over the fate of the The risks of nuclear terrorism and the illicit
nuclear programme of North Korea diversion of nuclear materials continued to
remained unresolved in 2011. Preliminary be the focus of high-level political attention
discussions aimed at restarting the around the globe in 2011.
suspended Six-Party Talks on the The Group of Eight (G8) agreed to extend
denuclearization of North Korea made little the 2002 Global Partnership against the
progress, despite renewed contacts Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
between North Korean and US diplomats. Destruction—an initiative which has
The legal and normative challenges posed supported cooperative projects aimed at
by North Korea to the global non- addressing non-proliferation, disarmament
proliferation regime were underscored by and nuclear security issues. In addition, the
reports that the country had been involved UN Security Council adopted Resolution
in covert transfers of nuclear and ballistic 1977, which extended by 10 years the
technologies to third countries on a larger mandate of the committee established
scale than previously suspected. under Resolution 1540 to monitor and
facilitate states’ compliance with their
Developments in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group
obligations under the resolution. •
In June 2011 the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) reached a controversial consensus
agreement to tighten its transfer guidelines
for uranium-enrichment and plutonium-
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17
20. 9. REDUCING SECURITY THREATS deadline of 29 April 2012 but would
FROM CHEMICAL AND nevertheless undertake to complete the
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS destruction expeditiously. In the case of
Iraq, the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Biological weapon arms control and
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded that
disarmament
progress has been made in razing chemical
The Seventh Review Conference of the weapon production facilities.
States Parties to the 1972 Biological and An advisory panel to the OPCW’s
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Director-General submitted its final report
agreed to conduct a third intersessional after reviewing the implementation of the
meeting process that will ‘discuss, and CWC with a focus on how the convention’s
promote common understanding and activities should be structured after the
effective action’ on cooperation and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles
assistance, the review of relevant ends, sometime after 2012. The Director-
developments in science and technology, General, together with the states parties
and the strengthening of, among other and the OPCW Executive Council, used the
things, national implementation of the process of formulating the report as a
convention. means to develop agreed policy guidance
Despite the expectations of many states for future OPCW priorities and
and analysts that the BTWC would programmes in the lead-up to the Third
somehow be ‘bolstered’ (e.g. by taking Review Conference, which will be held in
additional steps with respect to 2013. The report therefore presented
institutional strengthening and various options and activities that had been
operational-level or ‘practical’ measures), subjected to political and technical review,
the political conditions at the conference which the Director-General may use to
inhibited taking decisions to establish an inform the balance and focus of future
intersessional process that is more action- activities by the OPCW Technical
and decision-oriented. Thus, the regime is
evolving incrementally and is focused on d e s t r u c t io n o f c h e m ic a l
process. w e a pons
As of 30 November 2011,
Chemical weapon arms control and
• Iraq, Libya, Russia and the USA had yet to
disarmament
complete destruction of their chemical
The 16th Conference of the States Parties to weapon stockpiles
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention • 50 619 agent tonnes (71 per cent) of the
(CWC) witnessed exchanges between Iran declared chemical weapons had been
verifiably destroyed
and the USA that partly reflected wider
• 3.95 million (46 per cent) declared items
international tension regarding the nature
and chemical weapon containers had been
and purpose of Iran’s nuclear activities. destroyed
Russia and the USA confirmed that they • 13 states had declared 70 former chemical
would be unable to complete the weapon production facilities
destruction of their chemical weapon • 43 of these facilities had been destroyed
stockpiles by the final CWC-mandated and 21 converted to peaceful purposes
18 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
21. o l d a n d a b a n d o n e d c h e m ic a l although little discussion occurred on how
w e a pons to link this problem to the convention’s
As of December 2011, challenge inspection request provisions.
• 4 countries had declared that abandoned
chemical weapons (ACWs) were present Future implications of science and
on their territories technology
• 15 countries had declared that they have
Science and technology and related
possessed old chemical weapons (OCWs)
since the CWC’s entry-into-force
research can strongly affect chemical and
• OCW destruction operations in 2011 were biological warfare prevention, response
carried out in Belgium, Italy, Japan, and remediation efforts. Research on avian
Germany, Switzerland and the UK influenza in particular has raised a number
• Destruction operations for ACWs in China of policy implications, such as whether it is
continued preferable to describe scientific research on
its merits for peaceful purposes and to
Secretariat. The report also reflects the avoid characterizing it in terms of potential
CWC regime’s continuing transition security threats. The debate also affects
towards other priorities that will become research funding, publication policies,
more apparent once chemical weapon agreed principles in research oversight, and
stockpiles are eliminated. differences in approach on agreeing and
implementing appropriate safety and
Allegations of chemical and biological
security standards.
weapon programmes
Despite the inherently subjective
During the Libyan civil war concern was (qualitative) nature of such assessments,
expressed that the regime of Muammar scientists and technical experts working
Gaddafi would employ a stock of residual for states, in principle, understand such
sulphur mustard against anti-government threats—provided their national structures
protestors and armed rebel groups. Similar are oriented to take such threats into
concerns were expressed regarding the account. Non-state actors—‘terrorists’ and
nature and fate of possible chemical and the proverbial garage science operators—
biological weapons in Syria over the course lack institutional depth and capacity to
of the country’s civil unrest and tension. achieve similar levels of sophistication or
The OPCW sent a special inspection output. Another key conundrum is whether
team to Libya in November to investigate threat pronouncements—often made by
reports of undeclared chemical weapons those who are not conducting scientific
and it was confirmed that the Gaddafi research and development—prompt
regime had not declared a secret chemical al-Qaeda affiliates (or their equivalent) to
weapon stockpile. The fact that the OPCW consider or to pursue the acquisition of
did not uncover Libya’s deceptive chemical and biological weapons. •
declarations prior to the 2011 overthrow of
Gaddafi raised questions about the
organization’s ability to detect violations
more generally and prompted calls to
review the CWC’s verification regime,
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19
22. 10. CONVENTIONAL ARMS international community is now polarized
CONTROL between a group of states that have
committed themselves to a total ban on
With the exception of some promising cluster munitions through a separate
progress in South America and in South convention negotiated among themselves—
Eastern Europe, in 2011 most developments the CCM—and a group of states that are not
in conventional arms control were bound by any shared rules at all, apart from
discouraging as states were not willing to the laws of war.
modify national positions in order to
Developments in arms export control
facilitate agreement, either globally or
regionally. Efforts to improve the technical efficiency
Three factors have contributed to the of export control continued in 2011 in global
difficulty of developing conventional arms and regional organizations and in the
control. First, the huge and sustained informal regimes of the Missile Technology
investment that the USA has made in its Control Regime and the Wassenaar
military power has made it impossible to Arrangement. However, a common
find solutions based on balance. Second, approach to assessing acceptable risk
technological developments have blurred remains elusive, beyond general guidelines
the picture of which capabilities will confer agreed in the 1990s.
military power now and in the future. Discussions continued in the UN on the
Third, the lack of agreed rules about the use creation of a legally binding arms trade
of force—which may be for ostensibly treaty (ATT), prior to the negotiating
constructive purposes and not only a conference to be held in July 2012. Hopes
defensive response to aggression—makes were raised that China and Russia were
countries reluctant to give up military becoming more engaged in the process.
capabilities even if there is a humanitarian Nonetheless, there are significant
argument in favour of restraint. differences between states over the content
and purpose of a future treaty.
Cluster munitions
Multilateral arms embargoes
The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
(CCM) is an example of an agreement based The only new embargo imposed by the UN
on the principle that, even if a given weapon Security Council in 2011 was that on Libya.
delivers some military advantage, it should States subsequently disagreed about
still be limited or banned because the whether or not it permitted the supply of
humanitarian consequences of use arms to rebel forces. The Security Council
outweigh any military benefit. was not able to agree on imposing an arms
While the CCM’s parties continued their embargo on Syria despite lengthy
implementation in 2011, the parties to the discussion.
1981 Certain Conventional Weapons The Arab League imposed its first ever
Convention failed to agree on a protocol arms embargo in 2011, on Syria. ECOWAS’s
defining rules for the use of cluster arms embargo on Guinea, imposed in 2009,
munitions and banning those with was lifted in 2011. The European Union, in
particularly harmful effects. The addition to its implementation of the new
20 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
23. m u lt i l at e r a l a r m s 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
e m b a r g o e s i n f o r c e , 2 01 1 in Europe (CFE Treaty) with Russia (which
United Nations (13 embargoes) had suspended its participation in 2007).
• Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and Conventional arms control in Europe has
entities • Democratic Republic of the Congo reached a dead end, even though the need
(NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iran • Iraq for it is largely undisputed. Unresolved
(NGF) • North Korea • Lebanon (NGF) territorial conflicts play a key role in
• Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia
blocking progress, but there is no current
• Sudan (Darfur) • Taliban
consensus on its specific objectives,
European Union (19 embargoes)
subjects and instruments.
Implementations of UN embargoes (9):
• Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated Confidence- and security-building
individuals and entities • Democratic measures
Republic of the Congo (NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire
• Eritrea • Iraq (NGF) • Lebanon (NGF) In most regions confidence- and security-
• Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia building measures (CSBMs) have been
(NGF) elaborated as part of a broader discussion of
Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): • Iran a security regime in which the behaviour of
• North Korea • Sudan states is rendered understandable and
Embargoes with no UN counterpart (7): predictable.
• Belarus • China • Guinea • Myanmar In Europe, the Vienna Document is the
• South Sudan • Syria • Zimbabwe most important element of the CSBM
ECOWAS (1 embargo) regime, complemented by the 1992 Treaty
• Guinea on Open Skies. In 2011 the OSCE
Arab League (1 embargo) participating states adopted a revised
version of the Vienna Document. However,
• Syria
it represents at best minimal progress over
NGF = non-governmental forces.
the Vienna Document 1999. If this trend is
not reversed, the Vienna Document regime
UN embargo on Libya, imposed three new will continue to lose military and political
arms embargoes during 2011, on Belarus, relevance.
on South Sudan and on Syria. In South America, members of UNASUR
Several significant violations of arms agreed to a series of CSBMs intended to
embargoes were reported during 2011, support their wider objective of building a
primarily by the UN panels of experts common and cooperative security system
tasked with monitoring the embargoes. •
in the region.
Conventional arms control in Europe
The renewed interest in conventional arms
control in Europe that was in evidence in
2010 could not be translated into
substantial progress in 2011. By the end of
the year, NATO member states had decided
to stop sharing information related to the
non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21
24. ANNEXES (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on their Destruction (Biological and
Arms control and disarmament
Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)
agreements in force, 1 January 2012
1974 Treaty on the Limitation of
1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests
Use in War of Asphyxiating, (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, TTBT)
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare Explosions for Peaceful Purposes
(1925 Geneva Protocol) (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
1948 Convention on the Prevention and PNET)
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of
(Genocide Convention) Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to Environmental Modification
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Techniques (Enmod Convention)
Time of War; and 1977 Protocols I and 1980 Convention on the Physical
II Relating to the Protection of Protection of Nuclear Material
Victims of International and 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or
Non-International Armed Conflicts Restrictions on the Use of Certain
1959 Antarctic Treaty Conventional Weapons which may be
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer or to have Indiscriminate Effects
Space and Under Water (Partial Test- (CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane
Ban Treaty, PTBT) Weapons’ Convention)
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Activities of States in the Exploration Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
and Use of Outer Space, Including the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
(Outer Space Treaty) Range Missiles (INF Treaty)
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed
Weapons in Latin America and the Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 1992 Treaty on Open Skies
1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Development, Production, Stock-
Treaty, NPT) piling and Use of Chemical Weapons
1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the and on their Destruction (Chemical
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons Weapons Convention, CWC)
and other Weapons of Mass 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Destruction on the Seabed and the Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Bangkok)
thereof (Seabed Treaty) 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
Development, Production and 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Stockpiling of Bacteriological Control (Florence Agreement)
22 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
25. 1997 Inter-American Convention Against 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms,
the Illicit Manufacturing of and Light Weapons, their Ammunition
Trafficking in Firearms, and Other Related Materials
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Related Materials (CIFTA) Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Semipalatinsk)
Use, Stockpiling, Production and 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
and on their Destruction (APM Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Convention) Offensive Arms (New START)
1999 Inter-American Convention on 2011 Vienna Document 2011 on
Transparency in Conventional Confidence- and Security-Building
Weapons Acquisitions Measures
c h r o n o l o g y 2 01 1 , s e l e c t e d Agreements not yet in force, 1 January
events 2012
14 Jan. President Zine-Al Abidine Ben Ali is 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
forced to leave Tunisia Treaty (CTBT)
5 Feb. New START enters into force 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE
12 Mar. The Arab League asks the UN to Treaty
impose a no-fly zone over Libya 2010 Central African Convention for the
11 Apr. Forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara,
Control of Small Arms and Light
and supported by French and UN
Weapons, Their Ammunition and All
forces, capture and arrest Ivorian
President Laurent Gbagbo Parts and Components That Can Be
27 May The leaders of the G8 agree to extend Used for Their Manufacture, Repair
its 2002 Global Partnership against and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)
the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction Security cooperation bodies
20 June The EU imposes an arms embargo on Notable changes in 2011 include the
Belarus
admittance of South Sudan as the
18 July The International Court of Justice
decides that the disputed temple area
193rd member of the United Nations, the
Preah Vihear belongs to Cambodia, entry into force of the Constitutive Treaty
not Thailand of UNASUR, the closure of the Western
6 Aug. Al-Shabab announces a ‘tactical’ European Union and the suspension of
withdrawal from Mogadishu, Syria from the Arab League.
Somalia Three states acceded to the Hague Code
22 Sep. The IAEA endorses an action plan on
of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
nuclear safety
Proliferation and one to the Zangger
20 Oct. The Libyan National Transitional
Council announces the capture and Committee. No new members joined the
killing of Muammar Gaddafi other strategic trade control regimes—the
14–25 The Fourth Review Conference of Australia Group, the Missile Technology
Nov. the CCW Convention is held Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers
18 Dec. The last US soldiers leave Iraq Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. •
annexes 23
26. SIPRI’S DATABASES
SIPRI’s databases provide the foundation for much of its research and analysis and are an
unrivalled source of basic data on armaments, disarmament and international security.
Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST)
Provides a federated system of databases on topics related to international relations and
security, accessible through a single integrated user interface.
www.sipri.org/databases/first/
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database
Offers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, including
location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of
personnel, costs and fatalities.
www.sipri.org/databases/pko/
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Gives consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988, allowing
comparison of countries’ military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in US
dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of GDP.
www.sipri.org/databases/milex/
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Shows all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms since 1950,
the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms
transfers.
www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/
SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database
Provides information on all multilateral arms embargoes implemented since 1988.
www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/
24 sipri yearbook 2012 , summary
27. HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2012
SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Published in July 2012 by Oxford University Press on behalf of SIPRI
ISBN 978-0-19-965058-3, hardback, xx+560 pp., £100/$185
SIPRI Yearbook 2012 can be ordered from book shops, from most online booksellers or
directly from Oxford University Press:
www.oup.com/localecatalogue/cls_academic/?i=9780199650583
Further details are available at www.sipri.org/yearbook/
sipr i y e a r book online
Access the SIPRI Yearbook online is included in purchase of the print edition. Benefits of the online
edition include
• The complete text of the SIPRI Yearbook
• Simple but powerful search across editions since 2010
• Copious deep linking to authoritative Internet resources
• The authority of the SIPRI Yearbook whenever and wherever you are online
www.sipriyearbook.org
TRANSLATIONS
SIPRI Yearbook 2012 will be translated into
• Arabic by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), Beirut
www.caus.org.lb
• Chinese by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), Beijing
www.cacda.org.cn
• Russian by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Moscow
www.imemo.ru
• Ukrainian by the Razumkov Centre (Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political
Studies, UCEPS), Kyiv
www.razumkov.org.ua
These translations are funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection
and Sport. Contact the publishing organizations for further details.
28. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SIPRI YEARBOOK 2012
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of data and analysis in the areas of
• Security and conflicts
• Military spending and armaments
• Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament
This booklet summarizes the 43nd edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which includes
coverage of developments during 2011 in
• Armed conflict, with features on the first year of the Arab Spring and conflicts in the
Horn of Africa and a broad look at organized violence
• Peace operations and conflict management, including accounts of new operations in
South Sudan, Libya and Syria
• Military expenditure, highlighting the effects of government cuts in Europe and the
United States and examining the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
• Arms production and military services, with features on military services and the
Indian arms industry
• International arms transfers, highlighting exports to states affected by the Arab Spring
and transfers to South East Asia and to Armenia and Azerbaijan
• World nuclear forces, including stocks and production of fissile materials
• Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, including implementation of New START
and revision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines
• Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials, highlighting the
impact of advances in science and technology
• Conventional arms control, including multilateral arms embargoes and a feature on
cluster munitions
as well as a lead essay by Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, on the new
geopolitics of intervention and extensive annexes on arms control and disarmament
agreements, international security cooperation bodies, and events during 2011.
