1.
Optimizing ModSecurity on
NGINX and NGINX Plus
Christian Folini
January 9, 2018

2.
Christian Folini
 PhD in Medieval History
 Program chair Swiss Cyber Storm Conf
 Working with ModSecurity since 2006
 Co-Lead of
OWASP ModSec Core Rule Set Project
 Author of “ModSecurity Handbook” 2ed
2
Replace box with
photo then send to
back

3.
Program
 Introduction to ModSecurity
 Introduction to the OWASP ModSec Core Rule Set
 How to get this up an running on NGINX
 First steps at optimizing your setup
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4.
Introduction to ModSecurity
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5.
ModSecurity – Brief History

Started in 2002 by Ivan Ristić

Apache license since 2010

V3.0 in December 2017

Originally: Apache Module

Now: Server independent

Small dev team: Trustwave
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6.
“ModSecurity is not a high-flying, cloud-
enabled, machine-learning mastermind.
It is better to think of ModSecurity as of a
mechanical watch. ”
– Christian Folini
6

7.
ModSecurity – Key Features
 Above all: Rule language
 XML Schema validation
 GeoIP Lookup
 Remote Blacklist Support
 CSRF Token Injection
 ...
7

8.
ModSecurity – Domain Specific Language
Over 100 Variables
 REQUEST_URI
 ARGS_POST
 REMOTE_USER
 RESPONSE_STATUS
 Persistent Session Variables
 ...
Over 30 Operators
 @rx
 @eq, @gt, @lt, ...
 @containsWord
 @ipMatchFromFile
 @validateByteRange
 ...
8

9.
ModSecurity – Domain Specific Language
About 70 Actions
 deny
 drop
 pass
 pause
 redirect
 chain
 setenv
 setvar
 expirevar
 skipAfter
 multiMatch
 ...
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10.
ModSecurity – Rule Example I
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Whitelisting rule allowing only parameter “firstname” matching a
predefined pattern:
SecRule ARGS:firstname "!@rx ^[a-zA-Z-]*$" "id:1000,deny"

11.
ModSecurity – Rule Example II
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Blacklisting rule making sure parameters are submitted only once
per request (HTTP Parameter Pollution):
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@unconditionalMatch" "id:1001,pass,
setvar:'TX.counter_%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=+1'"
SecRule TX:/counter_.*/ "@gt 1" "id:1002,deny"

12.
Introduction to the
OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set
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13.
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14.
CRS – Brief History

Started in 2006 by Ofer Shezaf

Apache license

Team of 10 developers

v3.0 / CRS3 in November 2016
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15.
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“The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is the
standard rule set used with ModSecurity.
It is the 1st
line of defense against attacks as
those described by the OWASP Top Ten.”
– Christian Folini
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17.
CRS – Key Features

Generic Blacklisting rule set

Scoring Mechanism

Variable Anomaly Thresholds

Paranoia Levels to adjust
aggressiveness of rules

Low rate of False Positives per
default
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18.
CRS – Rule Example: SQL Injection

920273 : Invalid character in request (outside of very strict set)

942100 : SQL Injection Attack Detected via libinjection

942130 : SQL Injection Attack: SQL Tautology Detected.

942180 : Detects basic SQL authentication bypass attempts 1/3

942390 : SQL Injection Attack

942432 : Restricted SQL Character Anomaly Detection (args)
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19.
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Anomaly Scoring is like
challenging attacking
Storm Troopers to do a
Limbo Dance.
CRS – Anomaly Scoring

20.
CRS – Overview Over Rule Groups
Incoming Requests
 Scanner detection
 Protocol enforcement
 Local File Inclusion attacks
 Remote Command Execution
 Cross Site Scripting attacks
 SQL Injection attacks
 ...
Outgoing Responses
Not Supported by NGINX
 SQL Data leakages
 Java data leakages
 PHP data leakages
 IIS data leakages
 …
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21.
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Redir.:
RFI:
LFI:
XSS:
SQLi:
CRS3
Default Install
Redir.:
RFI:
LFI:
XSS:
SQLi:
0%
0%
-100%
-82%
-100%
Research based on
4.5M Burp requests.

22.
CRS – Paranoia Level Overview
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
Paranoia Level 1: Basic security
Minimal amount of False Positives

Paranoia Level 2: Elevated security level
More rules, fair amount of FPs

Paranoia Level 3: Online banking level security
Specialised rules, more FPs

Paranoia Level 4: Nuclear power plant level security
Insane rules, lots of FPs

23.
Summary
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
ModSecurity is the ENGINE.

CRS is the default RULE SET that runs on top
of the engine. By default, it blocks over 80%.

With 3.0, ModSecurity / NGINX is ready for PRIME TIME.

24.
How to get this up and running on
NGINX
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25.
ModSec on NGINX: Installation
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
ModSecurity 2.x was never really stable on NGINX

ModSecurity 3.0 only came out in December 2017

3.0 is not yet packaged by distributions

Compile it yourself

Get a precompiled binary with your
NGINX Plus WAF subscription

26.
ModSec on NGINX: Basic Architecture
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NGINX Server
ModSecurity Connector
libModSecurity 3.0
(standalone)
API

27.
ModSec on NGINX: Compilation Overview
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
Compile ModSecurity 3.0

Create connector config file

Compile NGINX together with connector module

28.
ModSec on NGINX: Compilation ModSec 3.0
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
Download from
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/
releases/download/v3.0.0/

./configure --prefix=/opt/modsecurity-3.0.0
--enable-mutex-on-pm

make

make install

29.
ModSec on NGINX: Connector Configuration
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
Download from
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity-
nginx/releases/download/v1.0.0/

Adopt paths in file “config”
Watch out for the following variables:
ngx_feature_path
ngx_feature_libs

30.
ModSec: Compile NGINX with Connector
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
./configure --prefix=/opt/nginx-1.13.8
…
--add-module=/usr/src/modsecurity/modsecurity-
nginx-v1.0.0
...

31.
ModSec on NGINX: Download Binaries
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
Download and Installation Guides for NGINX Plus at
https://www.nginx.com/resources/admin-guide/

32.
ModSec on NGINX: Advantages of NGINX Plus WAF
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
Binaries guaranteed to work with your OS

LoadBalancer included

Content Cache preconfigured (includes Purging API)

Session Persistence

JWT / OpenID Connect authentication

Additional products fitting the environment

33.
ModSec on NGINX: CRS Quick Installation
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Please follow the INSTALL file or NGINX Admin Guide
for proper CRS installation. This here is a quick demo.

Download from
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-
modsecurity-crs/releases/tag/v3.0.2

Untar

Copy crs-setup.conf.example to crs-setup.conf

34.
ModSec on NGINX: CRS Inclusion in nginx.conf
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# Include OWASP ModSec CRS3
Include /path-to-crs/crs-setup.conf
Include /path-to-crs/rules/*.conf

35.
ModSec on NGINX: Test Attack
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36.
First Steps at Optimizing Your Setup
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37.
Example Rule Alert – Right out of Sysadmin Hell
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2018/01/09 14:55:50 [info] 1167#1167: *1 ModSecurity: Warning. Matched
"Operator `PmFromFile' with parameter `lfi-os-files.data' against variable
`ARGS:test' (Value: `/etc/passwd' ) [file "/tmp/nginx-crs/rules/REQUEST-930-
APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf"] [line "71"] [id "930120"] [rev "4"] [msg "OS File
Access Attempt"] [data "Matched Data: etc/passwd found within ARGS:test:
/etc/passwd"] [severity "2"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "0"] [accuracy
"0"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag
"attack-lfi"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/FILE_INJECTION"] [tag
"WASCTC/WASC-33"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A4"] [tag "PCI/6.5.4"] [hostname
"127.0.0.1"] [uri "/index.html"] [unique_id "151550615052.381887"] [ref
"o1,10v21,11t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalizePathWin,t:lowercase"],
client: 127.0.0.1, server: localhost, request: "GET /index.html?test=/etc/passwd
HTTP/1.1", host: "localhost"

38.
Optimization: Learn to read the logs I
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 ModSecurity Alerts very hard to read. Aliases to the rescue!
 Go to: https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorials/
 Download .apache-modsec.alias
Nevermind this was written for Apache.
The aliases work on NGINX too.

39.
Optimization: Learn to read the logs II
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 $> cat error.log | melidmsg
920273 Invalid character in request (outside of very strict set)
942100 SQL Injection Attack Detected via libinjection
942130 SQL Injection Attack: SQL Tautology Detected.
942180 Detects basic SQL authentication bypass attempts 1/3
...

40.
Optimization: More aliases in the collection
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 meldata
 melidmsg
 melline
 melmsg
 meltags
 melunique_id
 ...
 sucs
 greppl[1-4]
 mappl
 pathsegs[1-5]
 col[1-20]
 Swapcolumns
 ...

41.
Let NGINX Amplify help you monitor the logs
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 Visualize Alerts / Logs
 Get notified in realtime
 Keep an eye on performance

42.
Optimization : Adjust Anomaly Threshold

Always work in Blocking Mode

Start with a high anomaly
threshold

Handle False Positives

Lower threshold step by step

Run over 3 – 5 iterations
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43.
Optimization: Adjust Anomaly Threshold
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File crs-setup.conf
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
#
SecAction
"id:900110,
phase:1,
nolog,
pass,
t:none,
setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=1000,
setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=1000"

44.
Optimization : Learn to handle False Positives

Remove Rule at Startup

Remove arg for rule at startup

Remove rule for rule at
runtime for given path

Remove arg for rule at
runtime for given path 44
Four basic ways to handle a
False Positive

45.
Photos and other resources
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
Watch: https://www.flickr.com/photos/billadler/391674817

Limbo: https://www.flickr.com/photos/jdhancock/3605011903

CRS Release Poster: https://coreruleset.org/poster/

ModSecurity Cheatsheet:
https://netnea.com/cms/rule-exclusion-cheatsheet-download/

Aliases: https://netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorials/

Tutorials for Handling False Positives:
https://netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorials/
All Resources with exception of the Cheatsheet are released under a
Creative Commons license.

46.
More from Christian Folini
 Follow me on twitter at @ChrFolini
 ModSecurity / CRS courses
in Frankfurt and Zurich, Switzerland
https://www.feistyduck.com
 ModSecurity Handbook
https://www.feistyduck.com
 Blogging at https://netnea.com and
https://coreruleset.org
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47.
Future ModSecurity Course Sites
 New York
 San Francisco Please get in touch via
 Amsterdam folini@netnea.com
 Geneva or @ChrFolini on twitter
 Barcelona
 Milano
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If there is interest, we will do future
courses in:

48.
And now on to the Q & A!
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