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TRANSITION OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING MISSION: THE
       REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO SOLOMON ISLANDS

                                     Nicholas Coppel
                              Special Coordinator, RAMSI
            Paper delivered to 8th International Lessons Learned Conference
                           Sofitel Sydney, 3-6 December 2012

How do we know when the time is right for transition? And how sure can we be that the
circumstances that led to the intervention will not re-emerge? The Regional Assistance
Mission to Solomon Islands - most commonly referred to as RAMSI – is now officially in
‗transition‘. In reality, RAMSI has been adapting and changing since its arrival in Solomon
Islands almost a decade ago.

In other locations, transition refers to the conclusion of the military component of a mission
and the handing over to others, the responsibility for the next phase of returning a country to
normalcy. In the case of RAMSI, transition refers to the changes that are planned to take
place in the mission‘s three component parts. Each of the civil, military and policing
components of RAMSI will change in different ways.

TRANSITION — DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

RAMSI‘s civilian development program is in three areas (referred to as ‗pillars‘): Economic
Governance, Machinery of Government, and Law and Justice. The pillars support the core
functions of central agencies in the Solomon Islands Government, including the Ministry of
Finance and Treasury, the Ministry of Public Service, the Auditor General, the Solomon
Islands Electoral Commission, the National Judiciary, Correctional Services Solomon
Islands, the Public Solicitor and the Director of Public Prosecutions.

From 1 July 2013 this development assistance will be absorbed into Australia‘s growing
bilateral aid program and the development assistance programs of other donors, including
New Zealand, the EU, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Assistance will
support SIG-defined strategies in mutually-agreed areas of assistance; and will involve a
smooth transition from RAMSI to longer-term development support mechanisms.

There are several reasons for making changes to RAMSI‘s development assistance program.
RAMSI has always been a short term intervention, and yet assistance in areas such as law and
justice and economic governance will be required for the medium to long term.

Moving the management of these programs to long term development partners enables longer
term planning and commitment. It also signals that the programs have changed from those
appropriate in a post-conflict stabilisation intervention to those found in a more normal
development assistance environment.

The change is a clear statement of the progress that has been made, it helps build the nation‘s
confidence in itself and it signals to foreign investors and visitors that Solomon Islands is a
safe place in which to do business and visit.

TRANSITION — POLICING


                                                                                                  1
The Solomon Islands security environment has changed dramatically for the better since
RAMSI arrived in 2003. Today, the security challenges faced by the Solomon Islands are the
same as those faced in other countries in the region. They require a well-run, modern police
force capable of a strong policing response governed by a contemporary Police Act.

Consistent with the changed security environment, the policing support provided by
RAMSI‘s Participating Police Force also has been transitioning for some time. RAMSI police
have stepped back from front-line or ‗everyday‘ policing.

Between August 2011 and May 2012, they withdrew from ten provincial police posts and are
now concentrated in Honiara with a presence in Auki (Malaita Province), Gizo (Western
Province) and Lofung (Shortland Island, Western Province).

RAMSI police continue to support provincial police posts through the provision of leadership
and mentoring programs, communications and logistics support, and station refurbishments.

In Honiara RAMSI police no longer patrol the streets or respond to calls for assistance —
these are tasks for the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. Instead, the role of RAMSI
police is to train the RSIPF and provide support to their senior leadership.

They also maintain a public order management capability and can be called to back up the
RSIPF if management of a major incident requires their assistance. This transition strategy
was developed jointly by RAMSI and the RSIPF, and agreed in November 2011.

Current planning is that RAMSI‘s Participating Police Force (PPF), including police from
throughout the Pacific, will stay in Solomon Islands and continue to support the RSIPF for at
least another four years.

TRANSITION — THE MILITARY

RAMSI‘s military component includes soldiers from Australia, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea and Tonga and, accordingly, is referred to within RAMSI as the
Combined Task Force.

The military strength has varied over the years, but since the elections in 2010 it has been
around 170 personnel, comprised of a company (three platoons) and a headquarters element.

On 25 April 2012 Australia‘s Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, visited
Solomon Islands and met Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo.

Mr Smith said the time had come to start a conversation about the drawdown of RAMSI‘s
military component. He said they had come to a shared analysis that RAMSI‘s focus had
shifted to police, law and justice and public order, with a heavy emphasis on the training and
capability of the RSIPF.

They had come to the conclusion that it was now time to start talking about the orderly
withdrawal of the military while committing to support policing for the foreseeable future.

Subject to final decisions to be made by governments, it is planned that RAMSI‘s military
contingent will withdraw in the second half of 2013.

                                                                                                 2
SOLOMON ISLANDS TODAY

Can we be sure that the circumstances that led to the intervention will not re-emerge?

Some of the causes of, or factors contributing to, the tensions have been addressed.

With assistance from RAMSI and its Participating Police Force, the Royal Solomon Islands
Police Force has been cleaned out and rebuilt, and law and justice — certainly for the more
serious offences — is being delivered.

The widespread demanding of compensation with menace has stopped and the breakdown of
government systems and processes has been rectified. And, also with the benefit of
considerable assistance from RAMSI, the country‘s finances are now back in shape, much
debt has been paid off and the economy is growing strongly.

Reforms in telecommunications, state owned enterprises and public finance management are
seeing improved service delivery.

Some reconciliation among former tension militants and between militants and victims has
taken place and more is continuing.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has completed its five volume, 1,389 page report.
However it is yet to be released and it remains to be seen what will become of it and whether
it will achieve widespread and true reconciliation.

The removal of weapons from the community is one of RAMSI‘s early and most significant
achievements. During its first year, RAMSI collected and destroyed some 3,700 weapons and
over 300,000 ammunition rounds.

This represents between 90 and 95 per cent of all the weapons stolen from police armouries.
We will never be able to account for every missing weapon, but we can say Solomon Islands
today is close to weapons-free compared with the Tensions period when weapons were the
lingua franca of those possessed by greed or grievance.

In both relative and real terms, Solomon Islands has an extremely low rate of crime involving
the use of firearms. In the nine years since RAMSI‘s arrival, there have been only ten
confirmed reports of incidents involving firearmsi.

This is highly unusual for a post-conflict society. In other post-conflict jurisdictions, one of
the major challenges is that large quantities of weapons typically remain in communities, and
in use.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

While my overall assessment is that the time is right for RAMSI to transition, like all
assessments, this involves a weighing up of many facts, circumstances, personalities and
considerations.



                                                                                               3
It doesn‘t mean that all the problems facing Solomon Islands have been solved and that there
is nothing to worry about.

Clearly, some of the factors that some commentators say contributed to the tensions remain
present. For example the system of government, which has been described as a ‗super-
imposed and colonial-bequeathed state‘, hasn‘t changed. From what I can see, the system of
government introduced in 1978 is not driving people to once again take up arms.

Inequitable economic development is cited as a cause of the tensions and it, too, remains and
seems stronger than ever.

Honiara and its environs are booming and Gizo, Munda and Noro are doing well.

However there is little evidence of broad-based economic development, including on the
isolated Weather Coast of Guadalcanal and other remote areas of the country.

Unequal economic growth is likely to be an enduring feature of Solomon Islands. But this
doesn‘t mean militancy will return. Unequal economic development is a fact of life in all
economies.

What‘s most important is continued strong national income growth. It provides the means for
people to move out of poverty and for the government to achieve millennium development
goals.

Provided, that is, that the government captures a share of the rising national income, and uses
its enhanced resources to deliver services throughout the country.

The efficient and effective delivery of services throughout the country will help alleviate
feelings of social injustice and exclusion that, throughout the world, are the root cause of
most conflicts.

THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

The movement of people primarily from Malaita Province to Guadalcanal Province in search
of employment is often identified as one of the causes of the tensions, and has led many to
label them as ‗ethnic tensions‘.

Since the arrival of RAMSI and the restoration of peace, many Solomon Islanders have
returned or moved to Honiara and its population has grown sharply.

It is both a movement from the land and a movement to the city. The question we need to ask
is whether this will again be exploited and lead to violence?

For the most part, Solomon Islanders from different provinces (and different parts of a
province) live and work together amicably.

This is especially evident in Honiara and among politicians and senior public servants, most
of whom have married women from another province.



                                                                                                4
While linguistic and ethnic diversity are permanent features of Solomon Islands, today they
are not manifesting themselves in serious ethnic divisions.

  The significance of provincial identity is that it creates a prism through which events are
viewed, increasing the risk of discrimination and the misinterpretation, manipulation and
escalation of events.

The growth of Honiara and its peri-urban settlements present their own set of challenges. The
settlements, where much of the population growth is concentrated, have limited or uneven
access to town water, sanitation, grid power and sealed roads.

Land tenure arrangements are mixed, although most settlement communities have either
settled illegally on alienated lands, or on Crown land reserved for common use. Many
Honiara settlement residents are Malaitan migrants.

People in most rural areas exist through subsistence agriculture and make a small cash
income on the side, sufficient only for basic needs.

The lack of services, remoteness, and limited economic and social opportunities result in
people choosing to move to Honiara to have better access to health and education services,
more skilled and better paid work and economic opportunity.

The movement of outsiders onto Guale land, resentment at their success and presence, and
the manipulation of those feelings for political or personal gain were among the main strands
in the tangle of causes of the tensions.

However, measures to stop the movement of people are unlikely to be successful (unless
draconian) and this makes the management of urbanisation an essential ingredient in efforts
to minimise the possibility of a return to tensions.

Acceptance and management of urbanisation distinguishes those cities that have prospered
from the influx of people from those that become breeding grounds for violence and
revolution.ii

SECURITY OUTLOOK

In the future, Solomon Islands is likely to experience further stress from the eventual decline
in logging, continued unequal economic development, further urban drift, high levels of
youth unemployment, and the proliferation of settlements in and around Honiara.

These stresses are not dissimilar to the stresses experienced in many developed and
developing countries and are not, in themselves, reasons to pause or halt RAMSI‘s transition.

They alone do not signal the return to militancy and the civil unrest of the kind experienced
in 1998–2003. Today, there is no evidence of subversive ideology or ideologues, martyrs or
militias, training camps or markets for weapons, and no organised mobilisation of people or
resources intent on challenging the state.

Nor are there large heroin or other illicit drug markets, illicit gambling or prostitution markets
that have attracted organised crime groupsiii.

                                                                                                  5
The absence today of militant intent and capability and of organised crime is mostly a
reflection of the state of Solomon‘s society and the improved strength of its institutions.

There is a significant difference between militant conflict and civil disorder, which can occur
in the most civilised and ordered of countries as exampled in Paris and Sydney in 2005, last
year in London and Rome and this year in Athens.

Today‘s security challenges in Solomon Islands are not about militancy they are about law
and order. These include petty crime born out of poverty, corrupt practices born out of greed,
violence (including sexual violence) against women, and civil disorder that involves the easy
mobilisation of vigorous, young, unemployed, urban males.

In Solomon Islands there is an everyday policing task, and a potential for occasional civil
disorder, especially at times of political change.

Both challenges call for a capable local police force, a force as capable as others in the
Pacific.

The recent performance of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force in handling major events
has been very good. In 2012, Solomon Islands hosted the Oceania Football Confederation
Nations Cup, the highly acclaimed Festival of Pacific Arts, the 70th Anniversary of the Battle
of Guadalcanal, as well as the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, all without a
major or even a minor security incident.

The RSIPF took the lead in planning and providing security during these events and
performed very well.

However there is a difference between local and national level police performance.

Honiara is the key to maintaining security and external confidence in Solomon Islands, but
improving police performance in the provinces will be key to building community confidence
as measured in national surveys.

MAINTAINING THE PEACE

RAMSI has restored law and order, but has it also improved the chances of lasting peace?

The experience from other peacekeeping missions is that they do work to keep the peace.
RAMSI has certainly increased both the economic and political incentives for peace.

The restoration of government functions, government finances and governance arrangements
were good in themselves and also boosted economic growth. This ‗peace dividend‘ has
created business opportunities for Solomon Islanders but in particular it has helped keep
former militant leaders of trouble.

Political leaders have been able to capitalise on the improved economic performance. Peace
has provided a number of former militant leaders the opportunity to become legitimate
political actors.


                                                                                              6
Several are currently Members of Parliament, and this valued status has given them a
considerable incentive to maintain peace and not return to violence.

RAMSI, as a legitimate outside party, was able to provide the neutral force required to
convince the criminals and belligerents that the time for violence was over — a view held by
the majority of Solomon Islanders.

It was also able to remove and destroy most weapons, and to reassure each side that the other
was acting in good faith.

This reduced fear, mistrust and uncertainty in communities. This — as much as the removal
of the weapons themselves — has contributed to the sustainability of the peace and avoidance
of a perceived need for weapons re-emerging.

RAMSI‘s presence and sizable development assistance program has helped to shift power
from those who held weapons to those who uphold good governance and the rule of law.

RAMSI has also made the resumption of conflict less likely by dealing with serious offences
through the Solomon Islands law and justice sector and, through its strong presence, by
preventing criminal elements from intimidating and menacing government, businesses and
communities in a way that might otherwise escalate back to the Tensions period.

By rebuilding the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force and effective institutions in the law
and justice, economic governance and machinery of government sectors, RAMSI has helped
reduce the opportunity for state power to be systematically abused or manipulated in ways
that make the resumption of conflict more likely.

These civilian tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping — law and justice, good governance,
economic management — are all aimed at establishing a system in which political conflict
can be managed peacefullyiv.

RAMSI‘s presence has helped prevent misbehaviour that could become the spark for a more
serious outbreak of violence.

The longer peace lasts the more likely it is to continue. When peacekeepers help belligerents
get over the early, most difficult stages of avoiding conflict, peace takes on some momentum
and becomes easier to maintain over time.v

Solomon Islands experienced a low-intensity conflict (an estimated 200 fatalities over a five
year period) which suggests that the prospects for the peace of the past nine years continuing
are good.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUCCESSFUL MISSION

There are five principal factors or characteristics that have contributed to RAMSI‘s success.
Most important among these is that RAMSI was welcomed by the people and government of
Solomon Islands.

Indeed, it was invited in with the unanimous support of the Parliament and it has consistently
had the support of around 85 per cent of the peoplevi.

                                                                                                 7
Secondly, and related to the first factor, RAMSI is a partnership with Solomon Islands
Government.

The third factor contributing to RAMSI‘s success has been the fact that it is a regional
mission with regional endorsement and participation.

RAMSI was endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum under the ―Biketawa‖ Declaration of
2000 and throughout the life of RAMSI the Forum has played an important oversight role,
carrying out regular reviews of the Mission.

This has contributed to the acceptance of a foreign presence in the country and helped ensure
that any perception of an intervention by a strong neighbour driven by its own agenda is not
sustained, even though the Mission is led and overwhelmingly funded by the Australian
Government.

The regional make-up of the Mission has also improved RAMSI‘s understanding of, and
ability to work with, the people and cultures of Solomon Islands.

The fourth factor contributing to the success of RAMSI is the clear legal framework
provided by the 2003 RAMSI Treaty and the Facilitation of International Assistance Act
2003.

Fifthly, the strong emphasis on consultation and coordination – internally, bilaterally and
regionally – with a senior diplomat as Special Coordinator, has contributed to understanding
(by all parties) and acceptance of the Mission.

RAMSI‘s well-resourced and active community outreach program has also been a
contributing factor.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION

While RAMSI is generally considered to have been a successful mission, the Mission is still
in the process of transition and it is too soon to say that transition itself has been a success.

However, as the Special Coordinator of RAMSI in this time of transition, I want to ensure
that it will be a success. I offer here my thoughts on the factors that I believe are critical to
successful transition.

        Timing – task bound, not time bound, and informed by rigorous risk assessment

The two principal risks of transition are leaving too soon and staying too long. Too soon
would be characterised by a return to violence or at least, in the case of Solomon Islands, to
the systematic demanding of compensation with menace.

Too late would be characterised by a dependency on donors, a lack of national self-
confidence and self-interested political elite operating on the basis that responsibility for the
core functions of government – law and justice, economic management, and the machinery of
government – had been conveniently subcontracted to outsiders.


                                                                                                    8
In an ideal world, the timing of the withdrawal of the military component would be based
largely on an objective and rigorous assessment of the security risk.

Not all risk can be eliminated, but the mission needs to be convinced that the factors and
circumstances that led to the intervention will not re-emerge.

Assessments of the future are inherently difficult – we cannot foresee the future – but
assessments must be made. In other environments where peacekeepers have incurred heavy
casualties, there is sometimes a push to get out as soon as one can, while in a benign security
environment there can be a temptation to keep peacekeepers longer than necessary.

In a parliamentary democracy, the withdrawal of troops is a decision for political leaders and
they will have regard to many valid considerations, risk assessment being only one of them.

It is important in this context that the risk assessment be independent, and not seek to
anticipate policy directions.

       Customisation –transition of the component parts of the mission needs to be assessed
       and decided upon separately.

The civilian, police and military components of a multidimensional mission have different
time-lines and a decision on one component of the mission should not drive the timing of
transition for all other components.

That is, decisions on the transition of the military, police and civilian components need to
have regard to progress within their respective jurisdictions.

To be sure, the mission is a whole-of-government mission, but that does not mean it must
move in unison.

         Maintenance of confidence
The maintenance of confidence in both the security environment and economic outlook is
critical to the success of transition.

A successful transition is dependent on government, business, the community and
international donors and investors feeling that both now and in the future they will be safe
and able to operate free from intimidation.

The pace and nature of transition must not undermine confidence.

       Gradualism – transition is a process, and not a binary decision on whether to stay or to
       go.

Downsizing and making changes one step at a time means all parties can see and assess how
transition is progressing while there remains time to adjust the path or speed of transition.

       Succession planning – what comes next?
To be successful, the withdrawal of civilians, police or military should not leave a vacuum.
Some tasks, such as an end to hostilities or militancy, might be completed (to be the best of
our assessments) enabling the withdrawal of peacekeepers.

                                                                                                  9
Other tasks, such as policing and economic management, are continuing and the capability of
local agencies needs to be built to enable the withdrawal of police and civilians.

A concerted effort to build local capacities and capabilities is needed to prepare the ground
for a successful transition.

        Consultation
All stakeholders should be aware of the changes underway in a mission, the reasons for the
changes and the arrangements for the post-withdrawal period.

Missions that have been successful, such as RAMSI, will find that governments and
communities will not want them to leave. The aim of consultation is not to persuade them to
agree to a withdrawal timetable or exit strategy.

This is unlikely to be possible. The aim, instead, is to acknowledge that the mission is
operating in partnership with a host government and local communities and they have a right
to understand what is being planned and be given an opportunity to voice any concerns.

This is important for the maintenance of confidence, and to build local ownership of and
support for successor arrangements.

CONCLUSION

Many things in Solomon Islands have changed for the better over the past nine years, but it is
also true that it is not possible to eliminate all the factors that contributed to the tensions.

Many of them require longterm measures and commitment from the Solomon Islands
Government and civil society. A functioning law and justice sector, including a strongly
performing RSIPF, and better planning and management of Honiara‘s urbanisation are
essential.

Improved access to other government services is also important to alleviate feelings of social
injustice and exclusion that are the common drivers of conflict, worldwide.

Particularly important will be access to universal basic education that gives every citizen a
chance to escape the social, economic and political limitations of village life.

These ongoing tasks are matters to be addressed by the Solomon Islands government and
donors. While they will help ensure a peaceful society over time, they are not tasks best
managed by a peacekeeping mission.

In the face of RAMSI‘s transition and drawdown the key question is not whether all the
proximate and underlying causes have been addressed, but are there incentives to maintain
peace and oppose the resumption of violence, and how robust are the critical institutions of
the state, especially the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force?

Support from RAMSI for the development of capacity and capability in the Royal Solomon
Islands Police Force will continue for at least the next four years.


                                                                                                10
And other donors will continue to support sound economic management and further reform.
The proposed withdrawal of the military would also help restore a positive image of the
security outlook among overseas investors and visitors, and help restore self-confidence
among Solomon Islanders.

The transition of RAMSI is based on thorough risk assessments, a realistic appreciation of the
improvements and further work required in the RSIPF, and the progress made in economic
management and governance in Solomon Islands.

In the next four year phase, to start on 1 July 2013, RAMSI will remain a partnership with the
people and government of Solomon Islands, and a regional mission drawing police from all
Pacific Island Forum countries.

Close consultation with Solomon Islands Government, the Pacific Islands Forum and all
other stakeholders will remain central to the way RAMSI operates.

These factors will remain as important in the next phase of RAMSI as they were at the outset.




i
 These incidents do not include occasions on which either PPF or CTF have discharged weapons in the course
of duty. In addition to these incidents, there have also been numerous unconfirmed reports of weapons being
sighted or gunshots being heard. Rumours of weapons stockpiles also circulate from time to time.
ii
 Saunders, Doug 2010 Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping our World, London:
William Heinemann.
iii
      Braithwaite 2010:128.
iv
     Fortna 2008:101.
v
    Fortna 2008:117–119.
vi
      ANU Enterprise 2012: 93.




                                                                                                          11

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Nicholas Coppel speech at international lessons Conference 5 December 2012

  • 1. TRANSITION OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING MISSION: THE REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO SOLOMON ISLANDS Nicholas Coppel Special Coordinator, RAMSI Paper delivered to 8th International Lessons Learned Conference Sofitel Sydney, 3-6 December 2012 How do we know when the time is right for transition? And how sure can we be that the circumstances that led to the intervention will not re-emerge? The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands - most commonly referred to as RAMSI – is now officially in ‗transition‘. In reality, RAMSI has been adapting and changing since its arrival in Solomon Islands almost a decade ago. In other locations, transition refers to the conclusion of the military component of a mission and the handing over to others, the responsibility for the next phase of returning a country to normalcy. In the case of RAMSI, transition refers to the changes that are planned to take place in the mission‘s three component parts. Each of the civil, military and policing components of RAMSI will change in different ways. TRANSITION — DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE RAMSI‘s civilian development program is in three areas (referred to as ‗pillars‘): Economic Governance, Machinery of Government, and Law and Justice. The pillars support the core functions of central agencies in the Solomon Islands Government, including the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, the Ministry of Public Service, the Auditor General, the Solomon Islands Electoral Commission, the National Judiciary, Correctional Services Solomon Islands, the Public Solicitor and the Director of Public Prosecutions. From 1 July 2013 this development assistance will be absorbed into Australia‘s growing bilateral aid program and the development assistance programs of other donors, including New Zealand, the EU, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Assistance will support SIG-defined strategies in mutually-agreed areas of assistance; and will involve a smooth transition from RAMSI to longer-term development support mechanisms. There are several reasons for making changes to RAMSI‘s development assistance program. RAMSI has always been a short term intervention, and yet assistance in areas such as law and justice and economic governance will be required for the medium to long term. Moving the management of these programs to long term development partners enables longer term planning and commitment. It also signals that the programs have changed from those appropriate in a post-conflict stabilisation intervention to those found in a more normal development assistance environment. The change is a clear statement of the progress that has been made, it helps build the nation‘s confidence in itself and it signals to foreign investors and visitors that Solomon Islands is a safe place in which to do business and visit. TRANSITION — POLICING 1
  • 2. The Solomon Islands security environment has changed dramatically for the better since RAMSI arrived in 2003. Today, the security challenges faced by the Solomon Islands are the same as those faced in other countries in the region. They require a well-run, modern police force capable of a strong policing response governed by a contemporary Police Act. Consistent with the changed security environment, the policing support provided by RAMSI‘s Participating Police Force also has been transitioning for some time. RAMSI police have stepped back from front-line or ‗everyday‘ policing. Between August 2011 and May 2012, they withdrew from ten provincial police posts and are now concentrated in Honiara with a presence in Auki (Malaita Province), Gizo (Western Province) and Lofung (Shortland Island, Western Province). RAMSI police continue to support provincial police posts through the provision of leadership and mentoring programs, communications and logistics support, and station refurbishments. In Honiara RAMSI police no longer patrol the streets or respond to calls for assistance — these are tasks for the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. Instead, the role of RAMSI police is to train the RSIPF and provide support to their senior leadership. They also maintain a public order management capability and can be called to back up the RSIPF if management of a major incident requires their assistance. This transition strategy was developed jointly by RAMSI and the RSIPF, and agreed in November 2011. Current planning is that RAMSI‘s Participating Police Force (PPF), including police from throughout the Pacific, will stay in Solomon Islands and continue to support the RSIPF for at least another four years. TRANSITION — THE MILITARY RAMSI‘s military component includes soldiers from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga and, accordingly, is referred to within RAMSI as the Combined Task Force. The military strength has varied over the years, but since the elections in 2010 it has been around 170 personnel, comprised of a company (three platoons) and a headquarters element. On 25 April 2012 Australia‘s Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, visited Solomon Islands and met Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo. Mr Smith said the time had come to start a conversation about the drawdown of RAMSI‘s military component. He said they had come to a shared analysis that RAMSI‘s focus had shifted to police, law and justice and public order, with a heavy emphasis on the training and capability of the RSIPF. They had come to the conclusion that it was now time to start talking about the orderly withdrawal of the military while committing to support policing for the foreseeable future. Subject to final decisions to be made by governments, it is planned that RAMSI‘s military contingent will withdraw in the second half of 2013. 2
  • 3. SOLOMON ISLANDS TODAY Can we be sure that the circumstances that led to the intervention will not re-emerge? Some of the causes of, or factors contributing to, the tensions have been addressed. With assistance from RAMSI and its Participating Police Force, the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force has been cleaned out and rebuilt, and law and justice — certainly for the more serious offences — is being delivered. The widespread demanding of compensation with menace has stopped and the breakdown of government systems and processes has been rectified. And, also with the benefit of considerable assistance from RAMSI, the country‘s finances are now back in shape, much debt has been paid off and the economy is growing strongly. Reforms in telecommunications, state owned enterprises and public finance management are seeing improved service delivery. Some reconciliation among former tension militants and between militants and victims has taken place and more is continuing. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has completed its five volume, 1,389 page report. However it is yet to be released and it remains to be seen what will become of it and whether it will achieve widespread and true reconciliation. The removal of weapons from the community is one of RAMSI‘s early and most significant achievements. During its first year, RAMSI collected and destroyed some 3,700 weapons and over 300,000 ammunition rounds. This represents between 90 and 95 per cent of all the weapons stolen from police armouries. We will never be able to account for every missing weapon, but we can say Solomon Islands today is close to weapons-free compared with the Tensions period when weapons were the lingua franca of those possessed by greed or grievance. In both relative and real terms, Solomon Islands has an extremely low rate of crime involving the use of firearms. In the nine years since RAMSI‘s arrival, there have been only ten confirmed reports of incidents involving firearmsi. This is highly unusual for a post-conflict society. In other post-conflict jurisdictions, one of the major challenges is that large quantities of weapons typically remain in communities, and in use. UNFINISHED BUSINESS While my overall assessment is that the time is right for RAMSI to transition, like all assessments, this involves a weighing up of many facts, circumstances, personalities and considerations. 3
  • 4. It doesn‘t mean that all the problems facing Solomon Islands have been solved and that there is nothing to worry about. Clearly, some of the factors that some commentators say contributed to the tensions remain present. For example the system of government, which has been described as a ‗super- imposed and colonial-bequeathed state‘, hasn‘t changed. From what I can see, the system of government introduced in 1978 is not driving people to once again take up arms. Inequitable economic development is cited as a cause of the tensions and it, too, remains and seems stronger than ever. Honiara and its environs are booming and Gizo, Munda and Noro are doing well. However there is little evidence of broad-based economic development, including on the isolated Weather Coast of Guadalcanal and other remote areas of the country. Unequal economic growth is likely to be an enduring feature of Solomon Islands. But this doesn‘t mean militancy will return. Unequal economic development is a fact of life in all economies. What‘s most important is continued strong national income growth. It provides the means for people to move out of poverty and for the government to achieve millennium development goals. Provided, that is, that the government captures a share of the rising national income, and uses its enhanced resources to deliver services throughout the country. The efficient and effective delivery of services throughout the country will help alleviate feelings of social injustice and exclusion that, throughout the world, are the root cause of most conflicts. THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE The movement of people primarily from Malaita Province to Guadalcanal Province in search of employment is often identified as one of the causes of the tensions, and has led many to label them as ‗ethnic tensions‘. Since the arrival of RAMSI and the restoration of peace, many Solomon Islanders have returned or moved to Honiara and its population has grown sharply. It is both a movement from the land and a movement to the city. The question we need to ask is whether this will again be exploited and lead to violence? For the most part, Solomon Islanders from different provinces (and different parts of a province) live and work together amicably. This is especially evident in Honiara and among politicians and senior public servants, most of whom have married women from another province. 4
  • 5. While linguistic and ethnic diversity are permanent features of Solomon Islands, today they are not manifesting themselves in serious ethnic divisions. The significance of provincial identity is that it creates a prism through which events are viewed, increasing the risk of discrimination and the misinterpretation, manipulation and escalation of events. The growth of Honiara and its peri-urban settlements present their own set of challenges. The settlements, where much of the population growth is concentrated, have limited or uneven access to town water, sanitation, grid power and sealed roads. Land tenure arrangements are mixed, although most settlement communities have either settled illegally on alienated lands, or on Crown land reserved for common use. Many Honiara settlement residents are Malaitan migrants. People in most rural areas exist through subsistence agriculture and make a small cash income on the side, sufficient only for basic needs. The lack of services, remoteness, and limited economic and social opportunities result in people choosing to move to Honiara to have better access to health and education services, more skilled and better paid work and economic opportunity. The movement of outsiders onto Guale land, resentment at their success and presence, and the manipulation of those feelings for political or personal gain were among the main strands in the tangle of causes of the tensions. However, measures to stop the movement of people are unlikely to be successful (unless draconian) and this makes the management of urbanisation an essential ingredient in efforts to minimise the possibility of a return to tensions. Acceptance and management of urbanisation distinguishes those cities that have prospered from the influx of people from those that become breeding grounds for violence and revolution.ii SECURITY OUTLOOK In the future, Solomon Islands is likely to experience further stress from the eventual decline in logging, continued unequal economic development, further urban drift, high levels of youth unemployment, and the proliferation of settlements in and around Honiara. These stresses are not dissimilar to the stresses experienced in many developed and developing countries and are not, in themselves, reasons to pause or halt RAMSI‘s transition. They alone do not signal the return to militancy and the civil unrest of the kind experienced in 1998–2003. Today, there is no evidence of subversive ideology or ideologues, martyrs or militias, training camps or markets for weapons, and no organised mobilisation of people or resources intent on challenging the state. Nor are there large heroin or other illicit drug markets, illicit gambling or prostitution markets that have attracted organised crime groupsiii. 5
  • 6. The absence today of militant intent and capability and of organised crime is mostly a reflection of the state of Solomon‘s society and the improved strength of its institutions. There is a significant difference between militant conflict and civil disorder, which can occur in the most civilised and ordered of countries as exampled in Paris and Sydney in 2005, last year in London and Rome and this year in Athens. Today‘s security challenges in Solomon Islands are not about militancy they are about law and order. These include petty crime born out of poverty, corrupt practices born out of greed, violence (including sexual violence) against women, and civil disorder that involves the easy mobilisation of vigorous, young, unemployed, urban males. In Solomon Islands there is an everyday policing task, and a potential for occasional civil disorder, especially at times of political change. Both challenges call for a capable local police force, a force as capable as others in the Pacific. The recent performance of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force in handling major events has been very good. In 2012, Solomon Islands hosted the Oceania Football Confederation Nations Cup, the highly acclaimed Festival of Pacific Arts, the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Guadalcanal, as well as the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, all without a major or even a minor security incident. The RSIPF took the lead in planning and providing security during these events and performed very well. However there is a difference between local and national level police performance. Honiara is the key to maintaining security and external confidence in Solomon Islands, but improving police performance in the provinces will be key to building community confidence as measured in national surveys. MAINTAINING THE PEACE RAMSI has restored law and order, but has it also improved the chances of lasting peace? The experience from other peacekeeping missions is that they do work to keep the peace. RAMSI has certainly increased both the economic and political incentives for peace. The restoration of government functions, government finances and governance arrangements were good in themselves and also boosted economic growth. This ‗peace dividend‘ has created business opportunities for Solomon Islanders but in particular it has helped keep former militant leaders of trouble. Political leaders have been able to capitalise on the improved economic performance. Peace has provided a number of former militant leaders the opportunity to become legitimate political actors. 6
  • 7. Several are currently Members of Parliament, and this valued status has given them a considerable incentive to maintain peace and not return to violence. RAMSI, as a legitimate outside party, was able to provide the neutral force required to convince the criminals and belligerents that the time for violence was over — a view held by the majority of Solomon Islanders. It was also able to remove and destroy most weapons, and to reassure each side that the other was acting in good faith. This reduced fear, mistrust and uncertainty in communities. This — as much as the removal of the weapons themselves — has contributed to the sustainability of the peace and avoidance of a perceived need for weapons re-emerging. RAMSI‘s presence and sizable development assistance program has helped to shift power from those who held weapons to those who uphold good governance and the rule of law. RAMSI has also made the resumption of conflict less likely by dealing with serious offences through the Solomon Islands law and justice sector and, through its strong presence, by preventing criminal elements from intimidating and menacing government, businesses and communities in a way that might otherwise escalate back to the Tensions period. By rebuilding the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force and effective institutions in the law and justice, economic governance and machinery of government sectors, RAMSI has helped reduce the opportunity for state power to be systematically abused or manipulated in ways that make the resumption of conflict more likely. These civilian tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping — law and justice, good governance, economic management — are all aimed at establishing a system in which political conflict can be managed peacefullyiv. RAMSI‘s presence has helped prevent misbehaviour that could become the spark for a more serious outbreak of violence. The longer peace lasts the more likely it is to continue. When peacekeepers help belligerents get over the early, most difficult stages of avoiding conflict, peace takes on some momentum and becomes easier to maintain over time.v Solomon Islands experienced a low-intensity conflict (an estimated 200 fatalities over a five year period) which suggests that the prospects for the peace of the past nine years continuing are good. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUCCESSFUL MISSION There are five principal factors or characteristics that have contributed to RAMSI‘s success. Most important among these is that RAMSI was welcomed by the people and government of Solomon Islands. Indeed, it was invited in with the unanimous support of the Parliament and it has consistently had the support of around 85 per cent of the peoplevi. 7
  • 8. Secondly, and related to the first factor, RAMSI is a partnership with Solomon Islands Government. The third factor contributing to RAMSI‘s success has been the fact that it is a regional mission with regional endorsement and participation. RAMSI was endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum under the ―Biketawa‖ Declaration of 2000 and throughout the life of RAMSI the Forum has played an important oversight role, carrying out regular reviews of the Mission. This has contributed to the acceptance of a foreign presence in the country and helped ensure that any perception of an intervention by a strong neighbour driven by its own agenda is not sustained, even though the Mission is led and overwhelmingly funded by the Australian Government. The regional make-up of the Mission has also improved RAMSI‘s understanding of, and ability to work with, the people and cultures of Solomon Islands. The fourth factor contributing to the success of RAMSI is the clear legal framework provided by the 2003 RAMSI Treaty and the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003. Fifthly, the strong emphasis on consultation and coordination – internally, bilaterally and regionally – with a senior diplomat as Special Coordinator, has contributed to understanding (by all parties) and acceptance of the Mission. RAMSI‘s well-resourced and active community outreach program has also been a contributing factor. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION While RAMSI is generally considered to have been a successful mission, the Mission is still in the process of transition and it is too soon to say that transition itself has been a success. However, as the Special Coordinator of RAMSI in this time of transition, I want to ensure that it will be a success. I offer here my thoughts on the factors that I believe are critical to successful transition. Timing – task bound, not time bound, and informed by rigorous risk assessment The two principal risks of transition are leaving too soon and staying too long. Too soon would be characterised by a return to violence or at least, in the case of Solomon Islands, to the systematic demanding of compensation with menace. Too late would be characterised by a dependency on donors, a lack of national self- confidence and self-interested political elite operating on the basis that responsibility for the core functions of government – law and justice, economic management, and the machinery of government – had been conveniently subcontracted to outsiders. 8
  • 9. In an ideal world, the timing of the withdrawal of the military component would be based largely on an objective and rigorous assessment of the security risk. Not all risk can be eliminated, but the mission needs to be convinced that the factors and circumstances that led to the intervention will not re-emerge. Assessments of the future are inherently difficult – we cannot foresee the future – but assessments must be made. In other environments where peacekeepers have incurred heavy casualties, there is sometimes a push to get out as soon as one can, while in a benign security environment there can be a temptation to keep peacekeepers longer than necessary. In a parliamentary democracy, the withdrawal of troops is a decision for political leaders and they will have regard to many valid considerations, risk assessment being only one of them. It is important in this context that the risk assessment be independent, and not seek to anticipate policy directions. Customisation –transition of the component parts of the mission needs to be assessed and decided upon separately. The civilian, police and military components of a multidimensional mission have different time-lines and a decision on one component of the mission should not drive the timing of transition for all other components. That is, decisions on the transition of the military, police and civilian components need to have regard to progress within their respective jurisdictions. To be sure, the mission is a whole-of-government mission, but that does not mean it must move in unison. Maintenance of confidence The maintenance of confidence in both the security environment and economic outlook is critical to the success of transition. A successful transition is dependent on government, business, the community and international donors and investors feeling that both now and in the future they will be safe and able to operate free from intimidation. The pace and nature of transition must not undermine confidence. Gradualism – transition is a process, and not a binary decision on whether to stay or to go. Downsizing and making changes one step at a time means all parties can see and assess how transition is progressing while there remains time to adjust the path or speed of transition. Succession planning – what comes next? To be successful, the withdrawal of civilians, police or military should not leave a vacuum. Some tasks, such as an end to hostilities or militancy, might be completed (to be the best of our assessments) enabling the withdrawal of peacekeepers. 9
  • 10. Other tasks, such as policing and economic management, are continuing and the capability of local agencies needs to be built to enable the withdrawal of police and civilians. A concerted effort to build local capacities and capabilities is needed to prepare the ground for a successful transition. Consultation All stakeholders should be aware of the changes underway in a mission, the reasons for the changes and the arrangements for the post-withdrawal period. Missions that have been successful, such as RAMSI, will find that governments and communities will not want them to leave. The aim of consultation is not to persuade them to agree to a withdrawal timetable or exit strategy. This is unlikely to be possible. The aim, instead, is to acknowledge that the mission is operating in partnership with a host government and local communities and they have a right to understand what is being planned and be given an opportunity to voice any concerns. This is important for the maintenance of confidence, and to build local ownership of and support for successor arrangements. CONCLUSION Many things in Solomon Islands have changed for the better over the past nine years, but it is also true that it is not possible to eliminate all the factors that contributed to the tensions. Many of them require longterm measures and commitment from the Solomon Islands Government and civil society. A functioning law and justice sector, including a strongly performing RSIPF, and better planning and management of Honiara‘s urbanisation are essential. Improved access to other government services is also important to alleviate feelings of social injustice and exclusion that are the common drivers of conflict, worldwide. Particularly important will be access to universal basic education that gives every citizen a chance to escape the social, economic and political limitations of village life. These ongoing tasks are matters to be addressed by the Solomon Islands government and donors. While they will help ensure a peaceful society over time, they are not tasks best managed by a peacekeeping mission. In the face of RAMSI‘s transition and drawdown the key question is not whether all the proximate and underlying causes have been addressed, but are there incentives to maintain peace and oppose the resumption of violence, and how robust are the critical institutions of the state, especially the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force? Support from RAMSI for the development of capacity and capability in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force will continue for at least the next four years. 10
  • 11. And other donors will continue to support sound economic management and further reform. The proposed withdrawal of the military would also help restore a positive image of the security outlook among overseas investors and visitors, and help restore self-confidence among Solomon Islanders. The transition of RAMSI is based on thorough risk assessments, a realistic appreciation of the improvements and further work required in the RSIPF, and the progress made in economic management and governance in Solomon Islands. In the next four year phase, to start on 1 July 2013, RAMSI will remain a partnership with the people and government of Solomon Islands, and a regional mission drawing police from all Pacific Island Forum countries. Close consultation with Solomon Islands Government, the Pacific Islands Forum and all other stakeholders will remain central to the way RAMSI operates. These factors will remain as important in the next phase of RAMSI as they were at the outset. i These incidents do not include occasions on which either PPF or CTF have discharged weapons in the course of duty. In addition to these incidents, there have also been numerous unconfirmed reports of weapons being sighted or gunshots being heard. Rumours of weapons stockpiles also circulate from time to time. ii Saunders, Doug 2010 Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping our World, London: William Heinemann. iii Braithwaite 2010:128. iv Fortna 2008:101. v Fortna 2008:117–119. vi ANU Enterprise 2012: 93. 11