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Your Blacklist is Dead. Airgap
Everything
The Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
$whoami
Erick Galinkin
Threat Researcher at Netskope
Better looking in selfies where I wear Lib tshirts
but I don’t have a real headshot
Applied Mathematics at Johns Hopkins
Sweet title. Why are you here?
Malware authors don’t like to get caught.
Blending in with the crowd is a good way to avoid detection.
What if malware used a whitelisted domain instead of talking to an
obviously sketchy server in Ukraine?
It’s notoriously difficult to detect malicious services that look like normal
traffic.
SaaS - What is it good for?
Software as a Service applications are everywhere in business today and there’s no end of growth
in sight.
SaaS is becoming progressively more common in the enterprise. (Salesforce, Dropbox, Box, G
Suite, Office 365, Slack, AWS, DocuSign, Github, Atlassian Suite, Tableau, etc.)
Cheaper than managing physical infrastructure, patched for you, users can access from
anywhere.
Ok then - to the cloud!
Digression: Is Social Media SaaS?
From SalesForce: “Software as a service (or SaaS; pronounced /sæs/) is a way of delivering centrally
hosted applications over the Internet—as a service”
Is Reddit SaaS? Is Facebook SaaS?
● You can share data over it and it’s centrally hosted so for our purposes, yes.
● It requires a login, so for our purposes, yes.
Is SaaS Good for Security?
Uhhhhh maybe.
Offloading of risk to a third party can be good. Their
patching is probably better than your business
Decreased attack surface within your network
Capitalism incentivizes protecting your stuff (but doesn’t
always work)
Does having a bunch of whitelisted services decrease
visibility?
SaaS Usage by Attackers: a
Blue Team Perspective
Other People Here Are Better At This
This topic could be a talk all to itself. This has been a caveat.
If you’re blue team - you absolutely need to think about SaaS services the
way that you would think about exposed ports.
A Brief History of Malware Using the Cloud
Source for graphic: A forthcoming paperby the Netskope Threat Research Team where you might actually be able to read the text
Domain Generation Algorithms
est. 2008
● Kraken
● Conficker
● Necurs
● GameOver (Zeus)
Case Study: SLUB
The SLUB authors removed Github from the most
recent version of the backdoor - leveraging Slack
far more extensively.
It continues to use file.io for file uploads
Why was it effective?
Variety of SaaS services in use (Anonymous services in particular are great!)
Built-in TLS helps evade IDS
Very sneaky - doesn’t look like command and control traffic
None of these domains or IPs are likely to be blacklisted
IDS signatures depend on easily changed API keys and URI paths
Defending against SaaSy malware
● DLP solutions
● Careful monitoring
● Aggressive User Education
● Endpoint Detection
There is No New Thing Under the Sun
Treat your cloud services with the same rigor as your on-
prem services.
SaaS Usage by Attackers: a
Red Team Perspective
The Breaching is the Hardest Part
● Abusing lax IAM permissions
● Brute forcing logins
● Social Engineering
● Good Old Fashioned Endpoint Exploitation
● BlueKeep EternalBlue who knows what other Blues we’ll see
Get by (your IDS) With a Little Help From my
Friends
Downloading tools from trusted sources instead of your sketchy-ass OVH server
● Dropbox
● S3
● Pastebin
● Github
Make ‘em like Carole King
Tried and true techniques:
● Drafts with attachments in email
● Slack
● Twitter
● Dropbox
One more thing
Paying Homage
Using SaaS as command and control is not new.
● Gcat (https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/gcat)
● Twittor (https://github.com/PaulSec/twittor)
● Slackor (https://github.com/Coalfire-Research/Slackor)
● SLUB (Real malware! Shout out to Cedric Pernet, Daniel Lunghi, Jaromir Horejsi, and Joseph C. Chen at Trend
Micro. No shoutout to the malware authors.)
● But a little bit of a shoutout to the SLUB authors because I basically jacked their program flow.
Demo of the SaaSy boi
Code for SaaSy_Boi is Available!
https://github.com/erickgalinkin/saas_cnc
What Have We Learned?
SaaS applications can increase your attack surface
SaaS applications move data surreptitiously
APIs make it easy to use one (or 8) services for doing bad stuff.
Props/Slops
Props:
● Slack for having a super easy-to-use REST
API
● Facebook for making it very difficult to
have a chat bot that abuses their TOS
● PaulSec, Coalfire, Trend Micro, and
basically anyone who says “duh” to this
whole presentation.
● Jenko Hwong, who made the timeline
graphic for this and our paper far nicer.
Slops:
● Slack for having a super easy-to-abuse
REST API
● Facebook for making it very difficult for me
to have a chat bot that abuses their TOS
● My cat Dasha, who spilled my coffee and
made me lose like an hour drying out my
laptop.
Thanks for listening to my
Talk!
Twitter: @erickgalinkin
Blog: galinked.in

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Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the Cloud

  • 1. Your Blacklist is Dead. Airgap Everything The Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
  • 2. $whoami Erick Galinkin Threat Researcher at Netskope Better looking in selfies where I wear Lib tshirts but I don’t have a real headshot Applied Mathematics at Johns Hopkins
  • 3. Sweet title. Why are you here? Malware authors don’t like to get caught. Blending in with the crowd is a good way to avoid detection. What if malware used a whitelisted domain instead of talking to an obviously sketchy server in Ukraine? It’s notoriously difficult to detect malicious services that look like normal traffic.
  • 4. SaaS - What is it good for? Software as a Service applications are everywhere in business today and there’s no end of growth in sight. SaaS is becoming progressively more common in the enterprise. (Salesforce, Dropbox, Box, G Suite, Office 365, Slack, AWS, DocuSign, Github, Atlassian Suite, Tableau, etc.) Cheaper than managing physical infrastructure, patched for you, users can access from anywhere. Ok then - to the cloud!
  • 5. Digression: Is Social Media SaaS? From SalesForce: “Software as a service (or SaaS; pronounced /sæs/) is a way of delivering centrally hosted applications over the Internet—as a service” Is Reddit SaaS? Is Facebook SaaS? ● You can share data over it and it’s centrally hosted so for our purposes, yes. ● It requires a login, so for our purposes, yes.
  • 6. Is SaaS Good for Security? Uhhhhh maybe. Offloading of risk to a third party can be good. Their patching is probably better than your business Decreased attack surface within your network Capitalism incentivizes protecting your stuff (but doesn’t always work) Does having a bunch of whitelisted services decrease visibility?
  • 7. SaaS Usage by Attackers: a Blue Team Perspective
  • 8. Other People Here Are Better At This This topic could be a talk all to itself. This has been a caveat. If you’re blue team - you absolutely need to think about SaaS services the way that you would think about exposed ports.
  • 9. A Brief History of Malware Using the Cloud Source for graphic: A forthcoming paperby the Netskope Threat Research Team where you might actually be able to read the text
  • 10. Domain Generation Algorithms est. 2008 ● Kraken ● Conficker ● Necurs ● GameOver (Zeus)
  • 11. Case Study: SLUB The SLUB authors removed Github from the most recent version of the backdoor - leveraging Slack far more extensively. It continues to use file.io for file uploads
  • 12. Why was it effective? Variety of SaaS services in use (Anonymous services in particular are great!) Built-in TLS helps evade IDS Very sneaky - doesn’t look like command and control traffic None of these domains or IPs are likely to be blacklisted IDS signatures depend on easily changed API keys and URI paths
  • 13. Defending against SaaSy malware ● DLP solutions ● Careful monitoring ● Aggressive User Education ● Endpoint Detection
  • 14. There is No New Thing Under the Sun Treat your cloud services with the same rigor as your on- prem services.
  • 15. SaaS Usage by Attackers: a Red Team Perspective
  • 16. The Breaching is the Hardest Part ● Abusing lax IAM permissions ● Brute forcing logins ● Social Engineering ● Good Old Fashioned Endpoint Exploitation ● BlueKeep EternalBlue who knows what other Blues we’ll see
  • 17. Get by (your IDS) With a Little Help From my Friends Downloading tools from trusted sources instead of your sketchy-ass OVH server ● Dropbox ● S3 ● Pastebin ● Github
  • 18. Make ‘em like Carole King Tried and true techniques: ● Drafts with attachments in email ● Slack ● Twitter ● Dropbox
  • 20. Paying Homage Using SaaS as command and control is not new. ● Gcat (https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/gcat) ● Twittor (https://github.com/PaulSec/twittor) ● Slackor (https://github.com/Coalfire-Research/Slackor) ● SLUB (Real malware! Shout out to Cedric Pernet, Daniel Lunghi, Jaromir Horejsi, and Joseph C. Chen at Trend Micro. No shoutout to the malware authors.) ● But a little bit of a shoutout to the SLUB authors because I basically jacked their program flow.
  • 21. Demo of the SaaSy boi
  • 22. Code for SaaSy_Boi is Available! https://github.com/erickgalinkin/saas_cnc
  • 23. What Have We Learned? SaaS applications can increase your attack surface SaaS applications move data surreptitiously APIs make it easy to use one (or 8) services for doing bad stuff.
  • 24. Props/Slops Props: ● Slack for having a super easy-to-use REST API ● Facebook for making it very difficult to have a chat bot that abuses their TOS ● PaulSec, Coalfire, Trend Micro, and basically anyone who says “duh” to this whole presentation. ● Jenko Hwong, who made the timeline graphic for this and our paper far nicer. Slops: ● Slack for having a super easy-to-abuse REST API ● Facebook for making it very difficult for me to have a chat bot that abuses their TOS ● My cat Dasha, who spilled my coffee and made me lose like an hour drying out my laptop.
  • 25. Thanks for listening to my Talk! Twitter: @erickgalinkin Blog: galinked.in