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2D Coordinating Draft FM 3-20.9711
Field Manual HEADQUARTERS2
No 3-20.971 US ARMY ARMOR CENTER3
Fort Knox, KY 1 May 20014
...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
ii
Chapter 5 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS ....................................... 5-11
Direct Fi...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
iii
PREFACE1
2
3
FM 3-20.971 describes the tactical employment and operations of4
reconnaissa...
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1-1
CHAPTER 11
2
INTRODUCTION3
4
5
The significance of reconnaissance cannot be overstated. H...
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1-2
Additionally, higher headquarters and the troop endeavor to link the1
purpose of reconnai...
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1-3
SECTION l. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT1
2
DIMENSIONS3
Reconnaissance troops support brigade o...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
1-4
usually involves destroying or defeating threat forces or taking land objectives1
that re...
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1-5
Offensive operations aim at
destroying or defeating a threat.
Their purpose is to impose ...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
1-6
possess advanced fixed-/rotary-wing aviation assets. Most threats capable of1
initiating ...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
1-7
Asymmetric threats seek and
strike weaknesses, attack in
areas in which they are strong,
...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
1-8
Support operations employ Army
forces to assist civil authorities,
foreign or domestic, a...
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1-9
strategic objectives, or they may support a commander’s forward-presence1
operations or a...
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1-10
Relevant information is all
information of importance to the
troop/squadron/ brigade
com...
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1-11
Situational awareness is the ability
to maintain a constant, clear mental
picture of rel...
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1-12
Situational understanding is the product
of applying analysis and judgments to the
unit’...
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1-13
Information superiority is a
significant information advantage
gained by collecting, pro...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
1-14
systems fuse standard threat information (location, composition, and1
disposition) but a...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
1-15
The troop does not have any organic maintenance assets or personnel other1
than the two ...
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1-16
activities. The CP continuously monitors the situational awareness picture to1
alert ele...
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1-17
Human Intelligence is the
intelligence derived from the analysis
of information obtained...
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1-18
initial questioning of a HUMINT source directed toward the collection of1
priority tacti...
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1-19
THE BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP1
The BRT consists of four officers and 45 enlisted sold...
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1-20
Headquarters Section1
The BRT headquarters section is organized and equipped to perform2...
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1-21
The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by the1
troop operations se...
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1-22
1
Figure 1-14. BRT scout platoon organization.2
3
4
5
Strike Recon (STRIKER) Platoon6
Th...
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1-23
1
Figure 1-15. STRIKER platoon organization.2
3
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1-24
SECTION III. MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND1
LIMITATIONS2
Cavalry troops perform reconnaiss...
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1-25
SECTION IV. RESPONSIBILITIES1
TROOP COMMANDER2
The troop commander is responsible to his...
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1-26
The 1SG’s specific duties include the following:1
• Execute and supervise routine operat...
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1-27
• Brief the fire support plan to the troop commander and the squadron1
FSO.2
• Refine an...
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1-28
MORTAR SECTION SERGEANT1
The mortar section sergeant is responsible for providing respon...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
2-1
Battle command is the exercise of
command in operations against a hostile,
thinking oppon...
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2-2
control operations and to motivate soldiers and their organizations into action1
to accom...
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2-3
Command and control is the
exercise of authority and direction
by a properly designated
c...
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2-4
The troop commander’s responsibilities in the tactical environment are—1
• Serving as the...
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2-5
Troop Command Post1
The troop CP serves as the net control station for the troop and is a...
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2-6
• To preserve the reconnaissance capability of the platoon, and inform1
the commander and...
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2-7
− Screening.1
− Suppression.2
− Disengagement.3
• Engagement/attack criteria. How many ro...
FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
2-8
established checkpoint data, he leads the LOGPAC to the linkup point, or if1
the situatio...
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2-9
Mission-Oriented Command and Control1
This method of directing military operations encour...
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2-10
unnecessary limits on their soldiers’ freedom of action. The leader at the1
point of dec...
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2-11
orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs) used by the commander. It is important for1
the troop comman...
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2-12
for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise1
or when ...
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2-13
occur through the final phases of execution. These basic tools are absolutely1
critical ...
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elements included in each warning order, with the right-hand column1
outlining the comma...
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2-15
Operation Order (OPORD). When time and information are available,1
the troop commander w...
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2-16
1
TYPE/PURPOSE
OF ORDER
RADIO TRANSMISSION
Alert “GUIDONS, THIS IS BLACK 6; FRAGO FOLLOW...
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Fm 3-20.97 the-recce_and_brt_troop_draft

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Fm 3-20.97 the-recce_and_brt_troop_draft

  1. 1. 2D Coordinating Draft FM 3-20.9711 Field Manual HEADQUARTERS2 No 3-20.971 US ARMY ARMOR CENTER3 Fort Knox, KY 1 May 20014 5 6 RECONNAISSANCE TROOP7 Recce Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop8 9 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS11 12 Page13 14 Preface ......................................................................................................... iii15 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 1-116 Operational Environment........................................................ 1-317 Organizations ....................................................................... 1-1418 Missions, Capabilities, and Limitations ................................... 1-2419 Responsibilities .................................................................... 1-2520 Chapter 2 BATTLE COMMAND............................................................. 2-121 Command and Control........................................................... 2-322 Command, Control, Communications, Computers,23 and Intelligence Architectures ............................................. 2-4624 Techniques of Tactical Control................................................ 2-5725 Command Guidance and Organizational Control ...................... 2-5726 Tactical Movement ................................................................ 2-6927 Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE ................................... 3-128 Fundamentals....................................................................... 3-229 Reconnaissance Planning...................................................... 3-1330 Area Reconnaissance ........................................................... 3-3831 Route Reconnaissance.......................................................... 3-5332 Zone Reconnaissance........................................................... 3-5933 Surveillance Fundamentals, Capabilities,34 and Limitations .................................................................. 3-7035 Surveillance Planning, Methods, and36 Considerations................................................................... 3-7237 Chapter 4 SECURITY ........................................................................... 4-138 Fundamentals and Capabilities............................................... 4-239 Screen................................................................................. 4-840 Area and High-Value Asset Security....................................... 4-3541 Convoy Security.................................................................... 4-4042 43 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and44 their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official45 government use. This determination was made on 12 March 2001. Other requests for this46 document will be referred to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C,47 Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5000.48 49 DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will protect disclosure of contents or50 reconstruction of the document.51
  2. 2. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) ii Chapter 5 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS ....................................... 5-11 Direct Fire Planning............................................................ 5-12 Offense............................................................................. 5-123 Defend as an Economy of Force.......................................... 5-214 Tactical Road Marches....................................................... 5-455 Assembly Areas ................................................................ 5-496 Reconnaissance Handover.................................................. 5-537 Linkup Operations.............................................................. 5-568 Battle Handover and Passage of Lines ................................. 5-639 Covert Breach Operations ................................................... 5-7010 Target Acquisition .............................................................. 5-7111 NBC Defensive Operations.................................................. 5-7612 13 Chapter 6 COMBAT SUPPORT.......................................................... 6-114 Intelligence........................................................................ 6-115 Fire Support/Target Acquisition ........................................... 6-1616 Army Aviation .................................................................... 6-3617 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platoon ........................... 6-6318 Multi-Sensor Platoon.......................................................... 6-6719 IBCT Infantry Rifle Company................................................ 6-7320 Mobile Gun System Platoon ............................................... 6-8321 Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon........................... 6-8622 Antitank Platoon/Company ................................................. 6-8823 NBC Reconnaissance ........................................................ 6-9224 IBCT Engineer Company..................................................... 6-9325 Air Defense ....................................................................... 6-9826 27 Chapter 7 URBAN OPERATIONS....................................................... 7-128 Understanding the Urban Environment.................................. 7-229 Planning............................................................................ 7-830 Execution.......................................................................... 7-1931 32 Chapter 8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT........................................... 8-133 Fundamentals.................................................................... 8-134 Organization...................................................................... 8-635 Logistics ........................................................................... 8-1536 Personnel Service Support.................................................. 8-2837 Enemy Prisoners of War..................................................... 8-3238 39 Appendix A OPORD GUIDE ............................................................... A-140 Appendix B NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL41 OPERATIONS .............................................................. B-142 Appendix C FORCE PROTECTION ..................................................... C-143 Appendix D RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE44 PLAN........................................................................... D-145 Appendix E STABILITY OPERATIONS AND46 SUPPORT OPERATIONS.............................................. E-147 Appendix F AIRLIFT OPERATIONS..................................................... F-148 Appendix G COMMAND POST OPERATIONS ..................................... G-149 Glossary............................................................................................ Glossary-150 51 52
  3. 3. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) iii PREFACE1 2 3 FM 3-20.971 describes the tactical employment and operations of4 reconnaissance troops of armored and mechanized infantry brigades (BRTs)5 and the recce troops of the Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target6 Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons. It specifically addresses operations for7 brigades organized under the Army of Excellence, the Limited Conversion8 Division force designs, and the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). FM 3-9 20.971 is the doctrinal foundation that governs the development of equipment,10 training, and structure for both types of reconnaissance troops.11 12 Because not all units are digitally equipped, this manual addresses analog13 and digital operations, technology applications, and equipment. Tactical14 fundamentals do not change with the fielding of new equipment; however, the15 integration of new equipment and organizations may require changes in16 related techniques and procedures. This manual provides guidance in the17 form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army18 and Joint capabilities.19 20 FM 3-20.971 is written for the recon troop commander and his key leaders21 within the troop. The manual reflects and supports the Army operations22 doctrine as stated in FM 3-0. Readers should be familiar with FM 3-91.3 [FM23 71-3], FM 3-20-97 [FM 17-97], FM 3-100.40 [FM 100-40], FM 3-71 [FM 71-24 100], FM 3-55 [FM 100-55], FM 102 [FM 101-5-1], and FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-25 98]. Examples and graphics are provided to illustrate principles and concepts,26 not to serve as prescriptive responses to tactical situations. This publication27 provides units with the doctrinal foundation to train leaders, guide tactical28 planning, and develop standing operating procedures (SOP). The publication29 applies to all reconnaissance troops in the active component (AC) and reserve30 component (NG/RC) force.31 32 Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer33 exclusively to men.34 35 US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Submit36 comments and recommended changes and the rational for those changes on37 DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to:38 Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY39 40121-5000, or e-mail the DA Form 2028 to Chief, Cavalry Branch, from the40 Doctrine Division web site at41 http://147.238.100.101/center/dtdd/doctrine/armordoc.htm. (After accessing42 the web site, select “Organization” from the menu on the left side of the43 screen to reach the Cavalry Branch site.)44 45
  4. 4. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-1 CHAPTER 11 2 INTRODUCTION3 4 5 The significance of reconnaissance cannot be overstated. History and6 training show that the winner of the reconnaissance fight will usually be the7 winner of the subsequent battle. The maneuver commander requires accurate,8 complete, and timely reconnaissance for success. The degree to which he9 correctly understands the threat situation, his own force’s situation, and the10 terrain heavily influences his battlefield success. This issue has been11 characterized as see the terrain, see the threat, and see yourself. Emerging12 command and control systems do a great deal to help a commander know his13 own forces situation, but the burden of obtaining real time information about14 the threat and terrain falls on his tactical reconnaissance units.15 The need for reconnaissance in Army operations remains unchanged.16 The fundamentals of reconnaissance and security are unaltered; however, the17 organization, equipment and techniques of the troop are now based on the unit18 it supports. While the troop’s primary missions are reconnaissance and19 security, the reconnaissance troop may be called upon to execute a myriad of20 additional missions. These missions range from route and area security to21 convoy escort and checkpoint duties. A reconnaissance troop’s operational22 environment spans the full spectrum of operations—from smaller-scale23 contingency to major theater of war operations. Regardless of the24 environment or mission, the troop’s primary function is always the same: Be25 the eyes and ear of the maneuver commander and provide the necessary26 information to allow him to make timely and accurate decisions.27 CONTENTS28 Page29 SECTION I. Operational Environment.........................................1-330 SECTION II. Organizations...........................................................1-1431 SECTION III. Missions, Capabilities, and Limitations....................1-2432 SECTION IV. Responsibilities........................................................1-2533 34 35 Based on its commander’s intent and guidance, the troop conducts36 reconnaissance in support of other friendly forces to provide current, accurate37 information about the threat, terrain, weather, society, physical resources, and38 the infrastructure within a specified area of operations. This provides the39 follow-on forces with an opportunity to maneuver freely and rapidly to their40 objective. Reconnaissance troops perform three types of reconnaissance:41 route, zone, and area.42
  5. 5. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-2 Additionally, higher headquarters and the troop endeavor to link the1 purpose of reconnaissance to—2 • Answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR),3 and/or4 • Answer voids in the unit’s IPB through intelligence requirements (IR),5 and/or6 • Support targeting through target acquisition.7 8 As a part of the Army’s transformation process, the brigade9 reconnaissance troop (BRT) and the recce troop of the reconnaissance,10 surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron have filled the historic11 gap in reconnaissance. Both organizations are designed to provide their12 respective commanders an increased number of tools for executing13 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Tactical14 unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), artillery radars and observers, air defense15 radars, and satellite tracking systems all contribute to the effort. However, the16 brigade’s primary source of intelligence remains its organic reconnaissance17 units. Successful reconnaissance operations permit the brigade commander18 freedom of maneuver in order to concentrate combat power and apply assets19 deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Only through20 reconnaissance can he determine which routes are suitable for maneuver,21 where the threat is strong and weak, and where gaps exist.22 The purpose of this chapter is—23 • To depict the operational environment of the troop and its supported24 brigade.25 • To depict organizations of the reconnaissance troop.26 – Recce Troop: The Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target27 Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron (IAV and TUAV equipped).28 – Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT): The Limited Conversion29 Division (LCD) XXI Brigade (HMMWV equipped).30 • To outline missions each troop performs.31 • To establish responsibilities of key personnel in combat.32 33
  6. 6. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-3 SECTION l. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT1 2 DIMENSIONS3 Reconnaissance troops support brigade operations by conducting4 reconnaissance and security missions in5 an operational environment consisting of6 six dimensions. Each dimension affects7 how the brigade combines, sequences,8 and conducts military operations.9 Commanders tailor forces, employ10 diverse capabilities, and support11 different missions to succeed in this12 environment.13 14 Threat Dimension. Multiple threats to US interests exist. Adversaries15 will continue to seek every opportunity to gain an advantage over US and16 multinational forces. When countered, they will adapt to the changing17 conditions and pursue all available options to avoid destruction or defeat.18 This environment and its wide array of threats present significant challenges.19 Army forces must simultaneously defeat an adversary while protecting20 noncombatants and the infrastructure on which they depend.21 Political Dimension. Successful military operations in any form require22 that commanders have a clear sense of strategic policy goals and objectives.23 They must understand how the use of military force fits into the national24 security strategy and the desired military conditions required to meet policy25 objectives. In addition, commanders must be able to articulate this26 understanding in a clear, concise way to the US and international media. Each27 political decision during the conduct of operations has strategic, operational,28 and tactical implications. Likewise, each strategic, operational, and tactical29 action directly or indirectly impacts the political dimension.30 Unified Action Dimension. Combatant commanders synchronize air,31 land, sea, space, and special operations forces to accomplish missions.32 Brigades can expect to operate in a unified command structure both in a major33 theater of war (MTW) and more commonly in smaller-scale contingencies34 (SSC). The brigade may work with multinational and interagency partners in35 order to accomplish the full spectrum of missions assigned to them. Brigades36 committed to SSCs can expect to protect American lives and interests, support37 political initiatives, facilitate diplomacy, promote fundamental ideals, and38 disrupt illegal activities. Close coordination is the foundation of successful39 unified action.40 Land Combat Operations Dimension. Land combat continues to be the41 salient feature of combat and is the brigades’ primary function. Land combat42 Dimensions of the Operational Environment • Threat • Political • Unified Action • Land Combat Operations • Information • Technology
  7. 7. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-4 usually involves destroying or defeating threat forces or taking land objectives1 that reduce the threat’s will to fight. Four characteristics distinguish land2 combat:3 • Scope. Land combat involves direct and indirect combat with a threat4 throughout the depth of an operational area. Commanders maneuver5 forces to seize and retain key and decisive terrain. They use maneuver,6 fires, and other elements of combat power to defeat or destroy threat7 forces.8 • Duration. Land combat is repetitive and continuous. This involves9 rendering a threat incapable or unwilling to conduct further action. It10 may require destroying it.11 • Terrain. Land combat takes place among a complex variety of natural12 and manmade features. Plans for land combat must account for the13 visibility and clutter provided by the terrain and the effects of weather14 and climate.15 • Permanence. Land combat frequently requires seizing or securing16 terrain. With control of terrain comes control of populations and17 productive capacity. Thus, land combat makes the temporary effects18 of other operations permanent.19 Information Dimension. Decisive operations historically have been20 enabled by information superiority. Information superiority provides21 commanders with accurate, timely information that enables them to make22 superior decisions and act faster than their adversaries. Information23 superiority, derived from ISR; information management; and information24 operations (IO), provide one common framework on how to plan, task, and25 control assets; how and where to report information; and how to use26 information. The information environment also includes information derived27 from nongovernmental individuals and organizations, such as the media, who28 produce and disseminate information that affects public opinion, which can29 alter the conduct of and perceived legitimacy of military operations.30 Technology Dimension. Technology enhances leader, unit, and soldier31 performance and impacts how Army forces plan, prepare, and execute full32 spectrum operations in peace, conflict, and war. Technology has significantly33 increased the ability to conduct ISR operations. It greatly enhances the ability34 to conduct battle command through modern telecommunications and micro35 processing. Munitions are increasingly lethal and target acquisition systems36 are more precise. The proliferation of advanced technology systems requires37 commanders to integrate the capabilities of highly modernized organizations38 and less-modernized and multinational units. Commanders must also realize39 that they do not have a monopoly on advanced technology. Even adversaries40 lacking any research and development program can purchase sophisticated41 systems in the global marketplace, and gain selected parity or superiority to42 US systems.43
  8. 8. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-5 Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating a threat. Their purpose is to impose the will of the US on the threat for decisive victory. Defensive operations defeat a threat attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that regains the initiative. FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS1 Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability operations,2 and support operations. Offensive and defensive missions normally dominate3 MTWs and some SSCs. Stability and support missions are conducted in SSC4 operations and to a lesser extent in MTW. Missions in any environment5 require brigades to conduct or be prepared to conduct any combination of6 these primary operations. Reconnaissance troops assigned to brigades are7 trained and equipped to support these operations. While the Army’s heavy8 brigades are optimized for operations in an MTW, they retain the ability to9 conduct SSC operations. The interim brigade combat team (IBCT) is10 organized and equipped to rapidly deploy to SSC operations, but is capable of11 conducting MTW operations if reinforced.12 Characteristics of Major Theater of War13 Major theaters of war have the greatest potential of occurring in regions14 containing moderate to well-developed infrastructure (especially roads, rail,15 and bridges), complex and urban terrain with large urban areas, and diverse16 weather patterns. Humanitarian issues, such as overpopulation; resource17 shortages; natural disasters; and inadequate local, regional, and global18 response capabilities, complicate these operations in much the same way as19 they do in smaller-scale contingencies.20 Brigades will usually conduct only one21 type of operation at a time, and then transition22 to another type as the strategic and operational23 requirements change. The recce troop and the24 BRT conduct reconnaissance and security25 operations in support of their assigned26 brigade’s offensive or defensive operations. The type of mission will depend27 on the commander’s requirements. For example, the troop will be assigned a28 reconnaissance mission if the brigade needs information on the terrain and29 threat in the AO to set the conditions for an attack. The troop may be30 assigned a security mission if the brigade wants to ensure their mission31 preparations are not observed by the threat’s reconnaissance.32 Military threats in MTW usually contain33 advanced industrial-age forces, with some34 high technology niches, characterized by both35 heavy and mechanized forces as well as36 motorized/light infantry. These forces are37 mostly equipped with newer generation tanks38 and infantry fighting vehicles, and have39 significant numbers of MANPADs, ATGMs,40 missiles, rockets, artillery mortars, and mines.41 They possess an integrated air defense system42 and a robust military and civilian communications capability. In addition, they43
  9. 9. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-6 possess advanced fixed-/rotary-wing aviation assets. Most threats capable of1 initiating an MTW possess weapons capable of mass destruction. These2 threats are capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo brigade/division-level3 operations. They can also conduct sustained unconventional combat4 operations and limited duration/objective attacks.5 The ability to conduct information operations is increasing among the6 various threat forces in MTW. Our opponents of the future will first read our7 doctrine and then engage us in areas we identify as our pillars and combat8 multipliers. They will seek ways to manipulate the commanders’ trust in the9 veracity of data, information, and knowledge. They will attempt to take away10 the collaboration that leads to situational understanding (a key component of11 information superiority). They will seek to disrupt just-in-time logistics by12 attacking knowledge workers and disrupting the time-phased force13 deployment synchronization, which will affect the operation’s lines of14 communications and aerial ports and seaports of debarkation. Present and15 future trends indicate the acquisition of more sophisticated and advanced16 technology; greater, more capable and secure C3; and increased use of urban17 areas for operating bases and for sanctuary. See Figure 1-1.18 19 Figure 1-1. Characteristics of war.20 21 22
  10. 10. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-7 Asymmetric threats seek and strike weaknesses, attack in areas in which they are strong, count on intelligence and deception, and work the fine lines of psychological operations (PSYOPS) and deception. Asymmetric operations are nonlinear and cellular in an organizational sense. Asymmetric operations involve information operations, weapons of mass destruction, and indirect attacks against soldiers, knowledge workers and their families. Characteristics of Smaller-Scale Contingencies1 Historically, smaller-scale contingencies3 like those in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo have5 occurred in regions with weak infrastructure7 (especially roads, rail, bridges), complex9 terrain with large urban areas, and diverse11 weather patterns. Humanitarian issues, such as13 overpopulation; resource shortages; natural15 disasters; and inadequate local, regional, and17 global response capabilities, complicate19 operations in these areas. Threats in these21 environments usually contain mid- to low-end23 industrial-age forces characterized by limited25 heavy forces, mainly equipped with small27 numbers of early generation tanks, and some29 mechanized but mostly motorized infantry.31 There is a pervasive presence of guerilla,33 terrorist, paramilitary, special purpose forces, special police, and militia34 organizations. These forces are equipped with MANPADs, ATGMs, mortars,35 mines, explosives, and machine guns. There are limited fixed- and rotary-36 wing aviation assets. These forces can be expected, however, to have robust37 communications utilizing conventional military devices augmented by38 commercial equipment such as cell phones. Asymmetric warfare is a perfect39 strategy for operating in this environment due to its operations, which are40 nonlinear and cellular in an organizational sense. Asymmetric foes will seek41 and strike weaknesses, attack in areas in which they are strong, count on42 intelligence and deception, en route and in the objective area. Asymmetric43 foes are weaker than US forces and seek off-sets against our military and44 technical prowess by using indirect approaches, attacking or manipulating our45 vulnerabilities, and often making use of low-tech strategies, techniques, and46 procedures to obtain temporary advantages.47 Threats that use an asymmetric strategy include terrorists, Serbian-type48 paramilitary forces, drug gangs, and criminal groups. These groups are not49 capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo combat operations. They are50 capable of limited duration and limited objective brigade- and division-level51 operations; i.e., destruction of a weaker force, seizure of an area or region, or52 seizure of an urban center, often emphasizing the use of decentralized and53 distributed operations. They are also capable of conducting defensive operations54 in complex and urban terrain. Forces in this environment are adept at conducting55 long-term, sustained, unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations. Present56 and future trends indicate the presence of more sophisticated and advanced57 technology; greater, more capable, and secure C3; increased use of urban areas as58 sanctuary for conventional capability and as operating bases; and tactics oriented59 on sophisticated ambush as a key operating focus. See Figure 1-2.60 61
  11. 11. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-8 Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering. Domestically, Army forces respond only when directed by the National Command Authority. Army forces operate under the lead federal agency, and comply with provisions of US law. Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the diplomatic, civil, and military environments. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment. 1 The characteristics of SSC, and to a lesser extent MTW, require the2 execution of stability operations and support operations. The troop’s primary3 responsibility is reconnaissance, but it must be prepared to conduct other4 missions in support of stability operations and support operations (see5 Appendix E).6 It is essential that stability operations not be confused with support7 operations, as these two actions have different and distinct types of missions8 and tasks. While the tasks are unique,9 they are not mutually exclusive and will10 often overlap. The one stability11 operation the brigade will most probably12 perform is peace operations. It is13 probable that many other types of14 stability missions will be integrated into15 peace operations, to include combat16 missions and nontraditional tasks (see17 Figure 1-3).18 19 Stability operations and support20 operations may precede and/or follow21 war, or occur simultaneously in the same22 theater. These actions may be conducted23 in conjunction with wartime operations24 to complement the achievement of25 Figure 1-2. Urban areas can become operational bases for guerrilla operations.
  12. 12. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-9 strategic objectives, or they may support a commander’s forward-presence1 operations or a US ambassador’s country plan. They may even occur in the2 US. No matter where stability operations and support operations are3 conducted and regardless of context, they are designed to promote regional4 stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain US influence and5 access abroad, provide humanitarian assistance, protect US interests, and6 assist US civil authorities. The Army conducts stability operations and support7 operations as part of a joint team and often in conjunction with other US and8 foreign government agencies.9 10 11 Figure 1-3. Stability operations.12 13 14 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT15 The brigade combat team’s primary source of information is its organic16 ISR assets. The fundamental role of the two types of reconnaissance troops is17 to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage18 assessment. Their operations facilitate the brigade commander’s ability to19 retain freedom of maneuver in order to concentrate combat power and apply20 assets deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Stealth21 remains the troops’ primary means of force protection, and organic weapons22 are used only in self-defense. See Figure 1-4.23
  13. 13. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-10 Relevant information is all information of importance to the troop/squadron/ brigade commander and staff in the exercise of command and control. It provides the answers for the successful conduct of operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. 1 2 Troop Orientation3 Reconnaissance troops are optimized to conduct reconnaissance and4 surveillance of a full multidimensional range of threats operating on an area5 basis. This means that the troop’s orientation is on the area of operations and6 the wide variety of threats facing the brigade. In more traditional7 reconnaissance and surveillance operations, the maneuver formation orients on8 the threat or reconnaissance objective and develops the situation when threat9 contact is made. This “reactionary” approach to reconnaissance operations often10 results in the early commitment of friendly forces to fight at a time and place of11 the threat’s choosing. By leveraging information technology and air/ground12 scout capabilities in complex and urban terrain, the troop can develop the13 situation by focusing early on designated areas and multidimensional and14 asymmetrical threats; thus empowering the brigade commander to achieve15 battlefield mobility and agility while choosing the time and place to confront16 the threat and his method of engagement.17 Situational Awareness, Situational Understanding, and18 Information Superiority19 Relevant information is all information20 of importance to the troop commander and to21 the squadron and brigade commanders and22 their staffs in the exercise of command and23 control. To be relevant, information must be24 accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise,25 and reliable, as humanly and technologically26 possible, to support all types of military27 operations. Relevant information answers the28 Figure 1-4. Stealth remains the primary means of force protection.
  14. 14. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-11 Situational awareness is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical situation. This picture includes a knowledge of both the friendly and threat situations and of relevant terrain. questions that dictate the successful execution of military operations. Simply,1 what do I need to know about the threat? What do I need to know about2 friendly forces? What do I need to know about myself? What do I need to3 know about the terrain and weather? Succinctly, what do I need to know for4 command and control? These questions constitute information requirements.5 Information requirements consist of all information elements required by the6 commander for the successful execution of operations; that is, all elements7 necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. Outfitted with Force XXI8 Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and given clear information9 requirements, the troop is capable of providing high-quality relevant10 information.11 Situational awareness is the ability12 to maintain a constant, clear mental13 picture of relevant information and the14 tactical situation. Simply stated,15 situational awareness answers the16 question what is the terrain, the friendly17 situation, and the enemy situation. This18 picture includes visualizing/seeing the19 relationship between terrain, friendly20 forces (yourself), and the threat (enemy)21 situations (see Figure 1-5). Since the22 troop normally operates dispersed, with23 its platoons and their individual sections24 conducting decentralized operations, all25 recce leaders must maintain situational26 awareness so they can make sound,27 quick tactical decisions. Critical28 outcomes of situational awareness on the29 part of all scouts are reducing fratricide30 incidents and staying one step ahead of31 the threat they are facing. FBCB2 and32 the Army tactical command and control33 system (ATCCS) assist recce leaders in attaining situational awareness.34 35 The recce platoon and troop assess and report all information within their36 area of operations (AO) to fulfill their primary responsibility of assisting the37 brigade or RSTA squadron in achieving awareness of the situation. The troop38 employs its scout and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capability39 (“boots on the ground”), augmented with sensor assets and access to other ISR40 reach-back information. The troop fulfills its own information requirements41 and answers the CCIR as it assists in providing situational awareness to the42 higher command. Relevant information as well as a leader’s operational43 picture and the common operational picture (COP) assist in achieving44 situational awareness.45 Figure 1-5. Situational awareness picture.
  15. 15. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-12 Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgments to the unit’s situation awareness and/or the COP to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC. Situational understanding enhances commanders’ decision making by identifying opportunities for mission accomplishment, threats to the force or mission accomplishment, and gaps in information. An operational picture is a single display of relevant information within a1 commander’s/leader’s area of interest. This information is a display of2 information such as status charts, overlays, and friendly and threat icons. This3 display can be analog (such as a map with acetate overlay) or digital (FBCB24 display). By collaborating, sharing, and tailoring information, separate5 echelons create a common operational picture. A COP is an operational6 picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common data and7 information shared by more than one command (troop to platoons,8 brigade/squadron to troop). The troop commander and the brigade/squadron9 commander and his staff merge all relevant information into a COP of the10 commander’s area of interest. The COP allows collaborative interaction and11 real time sharing of information among the commander and his troop12 leadership and the higher commander and his staffs. The COP assists the13 commander in achieving situational awareness; however, it is not a14 requirement. The commander applies his analysis and judgment to his15 situational awareness and the COP to determine the relationships among the16 factors of METT-TC, thereby achieving situational understanding.17 18 Situational awareness based on19 reports (relevant information,20 operational picture, COP) from the21 platoon and the troop and other22 elements are the key components of23 situational understanding at the24 troop, brigade and/or squadron level.25 Situational understanding is the26 product of applying analysis and27 judgments to the unit’s situational28 awareness and/or the COP to determine the relationships among the factors of29 METT-TC. Simply stated, situational understanding answers the question30 what it means. When the commander attains situational understanding, he can31 make sound decisions (see Figure 1-6).32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
  16. 16. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-13 Information superiority is a significant information advantage gained by collecting, processing, and disseminating an uninterrupted flow of relevant information in support of military operations while exploiting or denying a threat or adversary the ability to do the same. 1 Figure 1-6. Flow of relevant information into2 situational understanding.3 4 Information superiority is the5 operational advantage derived from the6 ability to collect, process, and disseminate7 an uninterrupted flow of information8 while exploiting or denying an adversary’s9 ability to do the same. Commanders10 exploit information superiority to impact11 threat perceptions, attitudes, decisions,12 and actions to accomplish mission objectives. During the course of13 operations, all sides attempt to gain information superiority to secure an14 operational advantage while denying it to adversaries. (NOTE: See FM 3-015 [FM 100-5] for more information on information superiority.)16 17 Visualizing the Battlefield18 The greatest challenge leaders face during operations is seeing, or more19 accurately, “visualizing” the battlefield in both real time and in the future.20 Normally their physical view is limited to brief segments of the battlefield.21 They must develop an art of visualizing what is occurring or might occur22 within their area of interest. For some, this comes almost naturally. For most,23 however, it requires a great deal of experience to adequately visualize the24 complexities of the battlefield. Enhanced analog and digital communications25 (FBCB2), computers, and command/control (C4) systems in the troop portray26 key relevant threat information so that commanders and staffs can better27 visualize the battlefield and be situationally aware. Not only will these28
  17. 17. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-14 systems fuse standard threat information (location, composition, and1 disposition) but also multidimensional aspects—psychological, physical,2 allegiance, intent, underground and above-ground infrastructure—that must3 now be considered. High technology facilitates analysis of this information4 through digital systems and the transmitting and receiving of intelligence5 (vertically and horizontally) rapidly enhances the brigade’s situational6 awareness. See Figure 1-7.7 8 Figure 1-7. Visualizing the battlefield using reconnaissance assets.9 10 11 12 SECTION II. ORGANIZATIONS13 THE RECCE TROOP (RSTA)14 The troop consists of six officers and 84 enlisted soldiers. It is organized15 into a headquarters section, a mortar section, and three scout platoons.16 17 Headquarters Section18 The troop headquarters section is organized and equipped to perform19 command and control and logistical support functions for the troop. The20 section consists of three officers and fourteen enlisted soldiers. The21 headquarters section includes the troop commander, executive officer, first22 sergeant, and the operations, NBC, communications, and supply sergeants.23
  18. 18. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-15 The troop does not have any organic maintenance assets or personnel other1 than the two communications repairmen. See Figure 1-8.2 3 4 Figure 1-8. Troop headquarters section.5 6 7 Troop Command Post8 The troop command post (CP) serves as the net control station for the9 troop and is a critical communications link to the squadron or brigade TOC.10 One of the primary functions of the troop CP is collecting combat information11 from the scout platoons and reporting significant threat information gathered12 during their reconnaissance and surveillance activities to the higher TOC. The13 CP functions are as follows:14 • Assist the commander in command and control.15 • Coordinate combat service support for the troop.16 • Report information to higher headquarters and adjacent units.17 The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by the18 troop operations sergeant, the NBC NCO and the two communications19 maintenance personnel. The CP tracks the battle at the troop and squadron20 levels and relays information to the commander and subordinate platoons21 pertaining to the friendly and enemy situation. The CP assists the commander22 in the control of the troop by advising him on the status of subordinate and23 adjacent units, by assisting in creating/forwarding digital and voice reports,24 and by controlling and monitoring the troop’s combat service support25
  19. 19. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-16 activities. The CP continuously monitors the situational awareness picture to1 alert elements to threat, terrain conditions, or obstacles. The CP coordinates2 and integrates actions with supporting and adjacent units. The primary3 concern when positioning the troop CP is its ability to communicate with the4 controlling unit command post and the subordinate elements of the troop.5 During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP should remain at6 least one terrain feature behind the troop combat elements, positioned to7 maintain communications with the platoons and the controlling brigade8 command post (TAC or main). During security or defensive operations, the9 CP should be positioned in sufficient depth to avoid contact with the threat10 while maintaining communications with the forward scout sections.11 NOTE: The previous example portrays the troop CP location in a linear12 environment. For noncontiguous environments, the troop is13 positioned to facilitate command, control, and communications and14 to provide local security. See Appendix G for more detailed15 information on the troop command post.16 17 HUMINT NCO (97B)18 The HUMINT NCOIC is responsible for the training of the HUMINT19 collectors. He advises the reconnaissance troop commander on the optimal20 utilization of the HUMINT collectors. He provides technical support and21 advice to the HUMINT collectors concerning HUMINT collection and22 reporting methodology. He reviews HUMINT reporting for format and23 completeness. He reviews HUMINT collector recommendations, identifying24 sources for further exploitation by the tactical HUMINT platoon of the MI25 Company. During tactical operations, he is located in the troop CP. He acts26 as the troop intelligence oversight NCO and is the troop POC with the S2X for27 technical support to HUMINT collection operations.28 29 The Fire Support Team30 The fire support team (FIST) is responsible for coordinating indirect fires31 for the troop. The FIST consists of one fire support officer (FSO), one NCO32 (team chief), one enlisted fire support specialist, and one enlisted radio33 operator/driver. In the recce troop, the team is mounted on an IAV fire34 support vehicle (see Figure 1-9).35 36 Figure 1-9. FIST organization.37
  20. 20. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-17 Human Intelligence is the intelligence derived from the analysis of information obtained from a human source or a related document by a HUMINT collector. The HUMINT discipline includes those personnel and organizations directed toward the collection, processing, analysis, and production of human intelligence. Recce Platoon1 The recce platoon’s primary missions are reconnaissance/surveillance,2 execution of security missions, and in some METT-TC conditions, to conduct3 offensive or defensive missions. Serving as the commander’s eyes and ears,4 recce platoons provide current battlefield information to help the troop5 commander plan and conduct tactical operations. They are critical in painting6 the picture of the enemy situation, using both FM and digital communications7 (FBCB2). Additionally, the scouts can be expected to execute target8 acquisition missions and battle damage assessment.9 10 11 The recce platoons are organized and equipped to conduct reconnaissance12 and screening in support of the troop. They may conduct an economy-of-13 force role, or offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations based on METT-14 TC. The platoon consists of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers (see Figure15 1-10.)16 17 18 Figure 1-10. Recce platoon organization.19 20 Each recce squad in the platoon has an21 assigned a 97B HUMINT collector. The22 HUMINT collector conducts initial23 contact and gathers information from24 EPWs, detainees, refugees, local25 inhabitants, friendly forces, and captured26 documents. The reconnaissance27 HUMINT collectors in the RSTA28 squadron are integral parts of the29 reconnaissance squads. They conduct tactical questioning (the expedient30
  21. 21. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-18 initial questioning of a HUMINT source directed toward the collection of1 priority tactical information) and limited document exploitation in support of2 the RSTA squadron’s ground reconnaissance mission. They pass their3 collection results through their chain of command in the form of SALUTE4 reports. They do not have the expertise, experience, or organizational support5 to conduct contact operations, nor will they be tasked with conducting6 counterintelligence operations. They will, however, pass source data through7 the HUMINT NCOIC to the S2X to help the S2X identify human sources for8 exploitation by the tactical HUMINT teams of the MI Company.9 10 The recce platoon may operate with attached STRIKER teams, TUAV11 teams, IREMBASS-equipped MI teams, or attached engineer elements. The12 platoon can organize into various configurations, but is usually employed as13 two scout sections, depending on factors of METT-TC.14 15 16 Mortar Section17 The mortar section is organized and equipped to provide immediate18 indirect fires in support of troop operations. Such supporting fires are usually19 suppression, screening, obscuration, or illumination. The section consists of20 10 enlisted soldiers. It is equipped with two 120-mm mortars mounted in two21 self-propelled mortar carriers. See Figure 1-11.22 23 24 Figure 1-11. Mortar section organization.25 26 27
  22. 22. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-19 THE BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP1 The BRT consists of four officers and 45 enlisted soldiers. It is organized2 into a headquarters section and two scout platoons (see Figure 1-12).3 4 5 Figure 1-12. Brigade reconnaissance troop organization.6 7 8
  23. 23. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-20 Headquarters Section1 The BRT headquarters section is organized and equipped to perform2 command and control and logistical support functions for the BRT. The3 section consists of two officers and 11 enlisted soldiers. The headquarters4 section includes the troop commander, executive officer, first sergeant, and5 the NBC, communications, and supply sergeants. The troop does not have6 any organic maintenance assets or personnel other than the two7 communications repairmen. See Figure 1-13.8 9 10 Figure 1-13. BRT headquarters organization.11 12 BRT Command Post (CP)13 The BRT CP serves as the net control station for the troop and is a critical14 communications link to the BCT TOC. One of the primary functions of the15 BRT CP is collecting combat information from the scout platoons and16 reporting significant threat information gathered during their reconnaissance17 and surveillance activities to the BCT TOC. The CP functions are as follows:18 • Assist the commander in command and control.19 • Coordinate combat service support for the BRT.20 • Report information to BCT headquarters and to forward and adjacent21 units.22 • Coordinate required information from higher.23 • Ensure information is pushed down.24
  24. 24. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-21 The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by the1 troop operations sergeant, the NBC NCO, and the two communication2 maintenance personnel. The CP tracks the battle at the troop and BCT levels3 and relays information to the commander and subordinate platoons pertaining4 to the friendly and enemy situation. The CP assists the commander in the5 control of the BRT by advising him on the status of subordinate units and6 adjacent units, by assisting in creating/forwarding digital and voice reports,7 and by controlling and monitoring the BRT’s combat service support8 activities. The CP continuously monitors the situational awareness picture to9 alert elements to unexpected threat, terrain conditions, or obstacles. The CP10 coordinates and integrates actions with supporting and adjacent units. The11 primary concern when positioning the BRT CP is its ability to communicate12 with the controlling brigade command post and the subordinate elements of13 the BRT.14 During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP should remain at15 least one terrain feature behind the BRT combat elements, positioned to16 maintain communications with the platoons and the controlling brigade17 command post (TAC or main). During security or defensive operations, the18 CP should be positioned in sufficient depth to avoid contact with the threat19 while maintaining communications with the forward scout sections.20 21 Scout Platoon22 The scout platoons are organized and equipped to conduct reconnaissance23 and screening in support of the BCT. The scout platoons may conduct an24 economy-of-force role, or offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations25 based on METT-TC. The platoon consists of one officer and 17 enlisted26 soldiers. It is equipped with six M1025/M1026 HMMWVs (three MK-1927 equipped and three caliber .50 equipped, with three of the six also LRAS328 equipped). The scout platoon frequently operates with attached STRIKER29 teams, IREMBASS-equipped MI teams, or attached engineer elements. The30 platoon can organize into various configurations, but is usually employed as a31 headquarters and two scout sections, depending on factors of METT-TC. See32 Figure 1-14.33
  25. 25. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-22 1 Figure 1-14. BRT scout platoon organization.2 3 4 5 Strike Recon (STRIKER) Platoon6 The STRIKER platoon is organic to the direct support artillery battalion,7 but will normally operate in direct support of the brigade, with the platoon8 leader acting as the BRT fire support officer. Although the STRIKER platoon9 leader does not have the same number of FM communication links that the10 FIST does, he can fulfill the same role during planning and preparation. The11 troop TOC must ensure that the STRIKER has communication with the12 brigade fire support element.13 The platoon is composed of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers organized14 into a platoon headquarters and three squads, with each squad composed of15 two teams. Each team is equipped with the lightweight laser16 designator/rangefinder (LLDR) that will lase targets for those munitions17 requiring reflected laser energy for final ballistics guidance. They are also18 equipped with the AFATDS lightweight computer unit loaded with the19 forward observer software (FOS-LCU). The target designator set is also20 equipped with a thermal sight. They operate from the same or similar21 HMMWV platforms as the BRT scouts and are capable of both mounted and22 dismounted operations. See Figure 1-15.23
  26. 26. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-23 1 Figure 1-15. STRIKER platoon organization.2 3
  27. 27. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-24 SECTION III. MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND1 LIMITATIONS2 Cavalry troops perform reconnaissance and security missions to provide3 timely information to the maneuver commander and protect and preserve the4 fighting ability of the units to which they are assigned or attached. Troops5 may also conduct additional missions as assigned. Cavalry troops in general6 have limitations and capabilities associated with their TOEs and METT-TC7 that must be considered when employing them in a specific mission role (see8 Figure 1-16). The capabilities and limitations of each organization will be9 covered in each respective chapter.10 11 RECCE TRP BRT RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS Route P/R P/R Zone F F Area F F SECURITY MISSIONS Screen P/R R Area Security P P Route Security N N Convoy Security R P/R F = Fully Capable R = Capable When Reinforced P = Capable Under Permissive METT-TC N = Not- applicable Mission Figure 1-16. Troop missions.12 13 OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSIONS14 Although the reconnaissance troop is not optimized for decisive15 operations, it may be tasked to conduct offensive and defensive missions in16 support of the brigade’s or the squadron’s operations. The troop has the17 required assets for command and control but must be heavily augmented with18 combat units to be successful in an offensive or defensive mission.19 20 STABILITY OPERATIONS OR SUPPORT OPERATIONS21 With permissive METT-TC, the recce troop is capable of operations in a22 stability or a support environment. Refer to Appendix E for a detailed23 discussion of reconnaissance troop operations in a stability or support24 operational environment.25
  28. 28. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-25 SECTION IV. RESPONSIBILITIES1 TROOP COMMANDER2 The troop commander is responsible to his higher commander for the3 discipline, combat readiness, and training of the troop, and for the4 maintenance of its equipment. He must be proficient in the tactical5 employment of the troop and its assigned and attached CSS elements. He must6 also know the capabilities and limitations of the troop’s personnel and7 equipment as well as those of CSS elements attached to him.8 The troop commander’s responsibility in combat is twofold. He will—9 • Accomplish all missions assigned to the troop in accordance with the10 higher commander’s intent.11 • Preserve the fighting capability of the troop.12 13 EXECUTIVE OFFICER14 The troop XO is second in command. He supervises the troop TOC, and15 stays attuned to the tactical situation in the troop’s AO. He receives, verifies,16 and consolidates digital and voice tactical reports from the platoons and17 forwards them to the squadron, adjacent, and following units. When elements18 are in contact and at night when light discipline limits FBCB2 use, the XO19 and personnel in the troop CPs convert FM threat SPOTREPs into digital20 reports to generate the red situational awareness picture. During all operations,21 he monitors the situational awareness picture to warn elements of unexpected22 threat, obstacles, or terrain. Assisted by the troop 1SG and the supply23 sergeant, the XO plans and coordinates CSS operations. The XO assists the24 commander in performing PCI checks, and he should ensure all voice and25 digital communications are properly functioning to support combat26 operations. He assists the commander in planning, integrating, and27 coordinating operations and in the integration of attached or task organized28 elements. The XO must be an expert in IPB. He assists the commander in the29 development and continual management of the IPB for the troop.30 31 FIRST SERGEANT32 The 1SG is the troop’s senior NCO and normally is its most experienced33 soldier. He is an expert in individual and NCO skills. The primary34 responsibility of the troop 1SG is sustaining the troop’s ability to fight. He is35 the commander’s primary tactical advisor. He is the troop’s primary CSS36 operator; he helps the commander to plan, coordinate, and supervise all37 logistical activities that support the tactical mission. He operates where the38 commander directs or where his duties require him.39
  29. 29. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-26 The 1SG’s specific duties include the following:1 • Execute and supervise routine operations. This may include enforcing2 the tactical SOP; planning and coordinating training; coordinating and3 reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising4 supply, maintenance, communications, and field hygiene operations.5 • Supervise, inspect, and/or observe all matters designated by the6 commander. For example, the 1SG may observe and report on a7 portion of the troop’s sector.8 • Plan, rehearse, and supervise key logistical actions in support of the9 tactical mission. These activities include resupply of Class I, III, and V10 products and materials; maintenance and recovery; medical treatment11 and evacuation; and replacement/RTD processing.12 • Assist and coordinate with the XO in all critical functions.13 • As necessary, serve as quartering party NCOIC.14 • Conduct training and ensure proficiency in individual and NCO skills15 and small-unit collective skills that support the troop’s METL.16 • In conjunction with the commander, establish and maintain the17 foundation for troop discipline.18 TROOP FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER19 The troop fire support officer (FSO) assists the commander in planning,20 coordinating, and executing the troop’s fire support requirements and target21 acquisition tasks (target acquisition tasks are discussed in Chapter 6). During22 operational planning, he develops and refines a fire support plan based on the23 commander’s concept and guidance. He then coordinates the plan with the24 squadron FSO. The troop FSO may control and position the mortars during25 combat operations. The FSO also has these responsibilities:26 • Advise the commander on the capabilities and current status of all27 available fire support assets.28 • Serve as the commander’s primary advisor on the threat’s indirect fire29 capabilities.30 • Assist the commander in developing the OPORD to ensure full31 integration of fires.32 • Recommend targets and fire control measures, and determine methods33 of engagement and responsibility for firing the targets.34 • Determine the specific tasks and instructions required to conduct and35 control the fire plan.36 • Develop an observation plan, with limited visibility contingencies, that37 supports the troop and squadron missions.38
  30. 30. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-27 • Brief the fire support plan to the troop commander and the squadron1 FSO.2 • Refine and integrate the troop target worksheet; submit the completed3 worksheet to the squadron fire support element.4 • Assist the commander in incorporating execution of the indirect fire5 and target acquisition plan into each rehearsal. This includes6 integrating indirect fire observers into the rehearsal plan.7 • In tactical situations, alert the commander if a request for fires against8 a target has been denied.9 • In tactical situations, monitor the location and capabilities of friendly10 units and assist the commander in clearance of indirect fires.11 • Request counterbattery support in response to threat artillery and/or12 mortar attacks.13 14 PLATOON LEADER15 The platoon leader is responsible to the troop commander for the16 discipline, combat readiness, and training of the platoon, and for the17 maintenance of its equipment. He must be proficient in the tactical18 employment of the platoon and know the capabilities and limitations of the19 platoon’s personnel and equipment.20 21 The platoon leader’s responsibility in combat is twofold. He must—22 • Accomplish all missions assigned to the platoon in accordance with23 the troop commander’s intent.24 • Preserve the fighting capability of the platoon.25 26 PLATOON SERGEANT27 The platoon sergeant (PSG) leads elements of the platoon as directed by28 the platoon leader, and assumes command of the platoon in his absence. The29 PSG assists the platoon leader in maintaining discipline, conducting training,30 and exercising control. He supervises platoon CSS, which includes supply and31 equipment maintenance.32 33 34
  31. 31. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 1-28 MORTAR SECTION SERGEANT1 The mortar section sergeant is responsible for providing responsive2 indirect fires to support the troop commander’s concept of the operation. He3 is also the principal advisor to the commander and FSO on the tactical4 employment of mortars. He performs the following functions:5 • Recommends task organization, employment techniques, and6 positioning of the mortars to support the scheme of maneuver.7 • Assists in developing the troop fire support plan; determines the best8 type and amount of mortar ammunition to fire, based on the factors of9 METT-TC.10 • Is responsible for training the platoon to ensure technical and tactical11 proficiency and combat lifesaver skills; cross-trains personnel within12 the platoon on key tasks to ensure continuous operations.13 • Selects and reconnoiters new positions and routes for the platoon;14 controls the movements of the section.15 • Keeps abreast of the enemy situation and locations of friendly units to16 ensure the best use of ammunition and the safety of friendly troops.17 • Supervises the execution of orders; ensures that priority targets are18 covered at all times; establishes the amount and type of ammunition19 set aside for priority targets.20 • Coordinates the fires and displacement of the mortar section with the21 action of other units.22 • Anticipates needs and ensures timely ammunition resupply,23 maintenance, and refuel requests are submitted to sustain combat24 operations.25 26 SUPPLY SERGEANT27 The supply sergeant picks up, transports, and issues supplies and28 equipment to the troop. He works closely with the 1SG to accomplish these29 tasks. He also evacuates enemy prisoners of war and assists in the evacuation30 of soldiers who are killed in action to the graves registration collection point.31 32 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (NBC) NCO33 The troop NBC NCO is responsible for troop NBC defense activities. He34 supervises radiological monitoring, chemical detection, and decontamination35 operations. He assists in maintaining NBC equipment and training NBC36 equipment operators and decontamination teams.37 38
  32. 32. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-1 Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking opponent. It combines leadership and the art and science of battlefield decision making to successfully accomplish assigned missions. CHAPTER 21 BATTLE COMMAND2 Battle command is the art and3 science of decision making, leading,4 and motivating soldiers and5 organizations into action to6 accomplish missions. Battle command7 entails visualizing the operation, from8 start to finish and formulating a9 concept of operation to get from the10 current state to the desired end state. In addition to visualizing and11 formulating concepts, battle command encompasses assigning missions;12 prioritizing and allocating resources; selecting the critical time and place to13 act; and knowing how and when to make adjustments in the fight. By14 integrating command and control, communications, computer technology, and15 intelligence (C4I), the brigade’s battle command systems enable the16 commander to have accurate and timely information upon which to base his17 decisions.18 The reconnaissance troop supports the brigade’s battle command by—19 • Facilitating the commander’s ability to visualize the operation by20 answering information requirements (IR and CCIR) and providing21 detailed information on the terrain and threat in his AO and AI22 (components of METT-TC).23 • Defining portions of METT-TC to allow the commander to describe24 the operation with his intent and specified tasks to his subordinates.25 • Assisting the commander’s ability to direct forces by facilitating26 situational awareness (SA) and contributing in the brigade’s situational27 understanding (SU).28 29 30 CONTENTS31 Page32 SECTION I. Command and Control .................................................... 2-333 SECTION II. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and34 Intelligence Architectures.............................................. 2-4635 SECTION III. Techniques of Tactical Control........................................ 2-5736 SECTION IV. Command Guidance and Organizational Control............ 2-5737 SECTION V. Tactical Movement .......................................................... 2-6938 39 40 Battle command is the art of decision making and leading on the41 battlefield. It covers the knowledge, techniques, and procedures necessary to42
  33. 33. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-2 control operations and to motivate soldiers and their organizations into action1 to accomplish assigned missions. As part of battle command, commanders2 visualize the current state of the battlefield as well as future states at different3 points in the operation; they then formulate concepts of operations that allow4 their units to progress from one state to the other at the least cost. Other5 elements of the battle command process include assigning missions,6 prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical times and places to7 act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.8 9 10 Battle command of reconnaissance units is typically decentralized due to11 the size of the area of operation (AO) and the nature of reconnaissance12 missions. The reconnaissance troop is a vital element in developing13 information on the terrain and threat within the brigade’s battlespace, which14 may extend over 65 x 100 kilometers. Operating widely disbursed over15 extended space places the burden of sound, timely decision making at the16 lowest levels. Intensive, challenging training in reconnaissance, reporting,17 and communications techniques is essential for the troop, and ultimately the18 brigade, to be successful.19 20 21 The reconnaissance commander employs a variety of means to prepare for22 operations, issue orders, employ the troop, and communicate. The success of23 this command and control process rests mainly on effective training; thorough24 (and thoroughly understood) SOPs; accurate, timely communications; and,25 most of all, decisive leadership.26 27 28 The advent and continual development of digital systems facilitates battle29 command at all echelons. The troop clearly gains from the digital displays of30 friendly and reported threat forces as well as the navigational aids that Force31 XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) provides. Continual32 development of FBCB2 will improve the ability of troop personnel to analyze33 terrain, report quickly and accurately, and maneuver over increasingly large34 sectors.35 36 Effective battle command begins in the planning phase and continues37 through the consolidation phase. This chapter outlines the digital tools and38 techniques a troop commander needs to effectively command and control (C2)39 his unit in combat. It also addresses aspects of situational awareness, planning,40 and C2 procedures in a digital environment.41 42
  34. 34. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-3 Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. SECTION I. COMMAND AND CONTROL1 The command and control (C2) system is2 the arrangement of personnel, information3 management, procedures, equipment, and4 facilities essential to the commander to plan,5 prepare, execute, and assess operations. The6 C2 system supports the commander in three7 ways:8 • Creating and maintaining the common operational picture.9 • Supporting decision making by improving its speed and accuracy.10 • Supporting preparation and communication of execution of11 information.12 A commander cannot exercise command and control alone except in the13 simplest and smallest organizations. Even at the lowest levels, however, a14 commander needs some support to exercise C2 effectively. At the troop level,15 the C2 system—integrating key personnel, FBCB2, FM communications,16 doctrinal procedures, and unit SOPs—provides that support.17 DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL18 Troop Commander19 20 The commander is responsible for everything the troop does, or fails to do.21 His responsibilities include leadership, discipline, tactical employment,22 training, administration, personnel management, supply, maintenance,23 communications, and sustainment activities. These duties require the24 commander to understand the capabilities of his soldiers and their equipment25 and to know how to employ them to best tactical advantage. At the same time,26 he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment.27 28 Using this knowledge, the commander prepares his unit for combat29 operations using troop-leading procedures. Ultimately, he must know how to30 exercise command effectively and decisively. He must be flexible, using31 sound judgment to make correct decisions quickly and at the right time based32 on the higher commander’s intent and the tactical situation. He must be able to33 issue instructions to his subordinate leaders in the form of clear, accurate34 combat orders; he then must ensure that the orders are executed.35 36 37
  35. 35. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-4 The troop commander’s responsibilities in the tactical environment are—1 • Serving as the subject matter expert in reconnaissance and security2 fundamentals and critical tasks.3 • Planning and executing fires to support the troop’s missions.4 • Synchronizing operations with adjacent units and supporting units.5 • Synchronizing and planning the use of additional ISR assets (TUAV,6 IREMBASS, GSR, PROPHET, CI, etc).7 • Understanding brigade combat team (BCT) doctrine.8 • Synchronizing and planning the use of additional combat arms assets9 (infantry platoon, MGS platoon, tank or mechanized platoon).10 • Accomplishing all missions assigned to the troop in accordance with11 the higher commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver.12 • Preserving the reconnaissance capability of the troop.13 Executive Officer14 15 In combat, the troop executive officer (XO) is second in command. He16 supervises the troop command post (CP), where he stays abreast of the tactical17 situation in the troop’s area of operations (AO). He manages the flow of18 combat information, both FM and digital, between the troop and the higher19 unit from the troop CP.20 21 The XO’s other duties are:22 • Ensure accurate, timely tactical reports are sent to the23 brigade/squadron.24 • Assume command of the troop, as required.25 • In conjunction with the 1SG, plan and supervise the troop’s CSS effort26 prior to the battle.27 • Assist in preparation of the OPORD, especially paragraph 4 (service28 support).29 • Conduct tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and supporting30 units.31 • As required, assist the commander in issuing orders to the troop32 headquarters and attachments.33 • Conduct additional missions, as required. These may include serving34 as OIC for a quartering party or as the leader of the detachment left in35 contact (DLIC) in a withdrawal.36 • Assist the commander in preparations for follow-on missions.37
  36. 36. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-5 Troop Command Post1 The troop CP serves as the net control station for the troop and is a critical2 communications link to the squadron or brigade TOC. One of the primary3 functions of the troop CP is collecting combat information from the scout4 platoons and reporting significant threat information gathered during their5 reconnaissance and surveillance activities to the higher TOC. The CP6 functions are as follows:7 • Assist the commander in command and control.8 • Coordinate combat service support for the troop.9 • Report information to higher headquarters and adjacent units.10 NOTE: Refer to Appendix G, Command Post Operations, for more detailed11 discussion.12 First Sergeant13 The primary responsibility of the troop 1SG is sustaining the troop’s14 ability to conduct continued operations. He supervises the procurement and15 distribution of—16 • All classes of supplies.17 • Personnel replacements.18 • Actions of the maintenance section, to include recovery and19 evacuation of damaged combat equipment.20 • Medical, KIA, and EPW evacuation.21 22 Using the FBCB2 system, he consolidates the platoon’s logistical status23 (LOGSTAT) and personnel status (PERSTAT) reports and digitally sends24 them to the squadron S4/S1. He assists the troop commander and XO in C225 and digital reporting.26 Reconnaissance Platoon Leader27 The platoon leader is responsible to the troop commander for the28 discipline and combat readiness of the platoon. He must be proficient in the29 use of his digital equipment and tactical employment of the platoon. He must30 know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and31 equipment. He must remain cognizant of all attached elements operating in32 his sector of responsibility, and continually update plans for their security and33 logistical support as required. The platoon leader’s responsibilities in combat34 are—35 • To accomplish all missions assigned to the platoon in accordance with36 the troop commander’s intent.37
  37. 37. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-6 • To preserve the reconnaissance capability of the platoon, and inform1 the commander and XO of the tactical situation via FM and digitized2 contact and spot reports.3 • To lead an integrated scout/STRIKER platoon in executing both fire4 support and R&S missions.5 Reconnaissance Platoon Sergeant6 The platoon sergeant is the senior NCO in the platoon. He leads elements7 of the platoon as directed by the platoon leader and assumes command of the8 platoon in the platoon leader’s absence. He assists the platoon leader in9 maintaining discipline and exercising control. He supervises platoon CSS, to10 include supply requirements and equipment maintenance, and monitors the11 platoon’s logistics status and submits FBCB2 LOGSTAT reports.12 Fire Support Team13 The fire support team (FIST) is the critical link with the supporting14 artillery and is responsible for coordinating indirect fires (mortar, field15 artillery [FA], close air support [CAS]) for the troop. The team processes16 calls for fire from the platoons and allocates the appropriate indirect-fire17 system based on the commander’s guidance for fire support. The FIST can18 also assist the brigade/squadron with the employment of joint fires.19 NOTE: In the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), the STRIKER platoon20 leader may fill the role of the FIST.21 The FIST operates on three radio nets:22 • Troop command.23 • Troop fire direction.24 • Squadron fire support element digital/voice.25 26 The FIST monitors at least one of the following nets:27 • Squadron command.28 • Squadron operations and intelligence (OI).29 • Firing battery (supporting artillery headquarters in the heavy and light30 division).31 32 The fire support team vehicle also may serve as the alternate troop CP.33 The fire support officer has ready access to the higher-level situation and the34 radio systems to replicate the troop CP if it becomes damaged or destroyed.35 36 Command guidance to the FIST should include the following:37 • Purpose of indirect fires. How does the commander intend to use FA38 and mortar fires to support his maneuver?39
  38. 38. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-7 − Screening.1 − Suppression.2 − Disengagement.3 • Engagement/attack criteria. How many rounds and of what type and4 mix will be fired at a particular target? Which targets will be engaged5 with artillery and which with mortars?6 • Control of troop mortars. If the FIST controls movement of troop7 mortars, how far forward of the scouts will the mortars be able to8 range? Where are the mortars going to move? When are the mortars9 going to move?10 The primary considerations when positioning the FIST are security of the11 team and the ability to communicate with the squadron fire support element,12 howitzer battery, or direct support artillery. The FIST is not the forward13 observer team for the troop; the troop has 19Ds that act as forward observers.14 The five techniques to maneuvering the FIST are—15 • Maneuvers with the commander.16 • Maneuvers with or near the mortar section.17 • Maneuvers with the troop CP.18 • Maneuvers alone to maintain communications.19 • Maneuvers with the scouts to directly control fires or to use the ground20 laser designator (GLD).21 See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth discussion of troop fire support C222 techniques.23 Mortar Section Sergeant (Recce Troop Only)24 The mortar section sergeant is responsible for providing responsive25 indirect fires to support the commander’s concept of the operation. The26 section sergeant assists the troop commander in indirect mortar fire planning.27 He assists in establishing movement control, triggers for movement, triggers28 for shifting targets, and mortar caches. As a rule of thumb the section29 maintains two-thirds maximum range of mortar fire forward of the30 reconnaissance elements. The section sergeant is charged with maintaining31 discipline, conducting training, and exercising control over his mortar section.32 He supervises the section’s CSS, which includes supply and equipment33 maintenance.34 Supply Sergeant35 Working closely with the 1SG, the supply sergeant assumes responsibility36 for troop logistical support. Using his position navigation capability and37
  39. 39. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-8 established checkpoint data, he leads the LOGPAC to the linkup point, or if1 the situation dictates, moves it forward to the supported unit’s location. He2 also evacuates EPWs and assists in the evacuation of soldiers killed in action3 to the mortuary affairs collection point.4 Communications Sergeant5 The communications sergeant assists in all aspects of tactical6 communications. He locates with the XO or 1SG per SOP and may operate7 the troop net control station (NCS). He receives and distributes signal8 operating instructions (SOI) and COMSEC encryption keys. He ensures the9 troop receives the appropriate database for FBCB2, SINCGARS-SIP, EPLRS,10 very high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC), and other systems operating on11 the tactical internet. He ensures operators are properly trained in initialization12 and re-initialization of the systems and maintains the troop addressing and13 routing schemes. He troubleshoots troop digital communications equipment14 and ensures that necessary repairs are completed.15 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Sergeant16 The troop NBC sergeant is responsible for troop NBC defense activities.17 He supervises radiological monitoring, chemical detection, and18 decontamination operations. He assists in maintaining NBC equipment and19 training NBC equipment operators and decontamination teams. He operates20 from the troop CP and assists the XO in executing C2 operations. He is the21 NBC expert and advises the commander in the employment of the NBC22 reconnaissance section/platoon troop, if augmented with this asset.23 Troop HUMINT NCO (Recce Troop only)24 The troop HUMINT collection NCO advises the troop commander on25 HUMINT collection operations, provides assessment and quality control of26 HUMINT collection and source spotting, and ensures that HUMINT training27 is conducted to standard. He operates from the troop CP and assists the XO in28 executing C2 operations. (See Chapter 6, Section I, for more information on29 HUMINT collection personnel.)30 COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES31 32 Whether a unit is digital or analog, command and control procedures33 provide effective guidelines for planning and preparing a unit for operations.34 Techniques for utilizing digital systems to aid in the execution of these35 procedures are included.36 37 38
  40. 40. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-9 Mission-Oriented Command and Control1 This method of directing military operations encourages and assists2 subordinates in taking action consistent with the intent and concept of higher3 headquarters. Mission-oriented command and control requires a clear4 understanding by subordinate elements of the unit purpose; at the same time,5 it provides them with the freedom to react to enemy actions without further6 guidance. The following paragraphs outline the underlying principles of this7 type of command and control.8 9 Expect Uncertainty. The commander must understand the environment10 of combat. The operation will be dynamic and the enemy uncooperative.11 Communications may be degraded, and the chaos of battle may prevent the12 commander from knowing what is happening beyond the reach of his own13 senses. The situation the unit anticipates during the planning phase will14 inevitably change before and during execution.15 16 Reduce Leader Intervention. When soldiers expect the commander to17 make every decision or initiate every action, they may become reluctant to act.18 To counter this tendency, the commander must plan and direct operations in a19 manner that requires a minimum of intervention. He operates on the principle20 that some loss of precision is better than inactivity.21 22 The commander still must be prepared to provide subordinates with the23 criteria and guidance for making decisions when precise control is required24 for synchronization. During the planning process, he should identify those25 few critical decisions that will absolutely be required during the operation and26 then determine the criteria for initiation of actions associated with these27 decisions. Examples include the use of engagement criteria, bypass criteria,28 and disengagement criteria. The commander then disseminates the decision29 criteria throughout the troop.30 31 NOTE: The commander must keep in mind that changing conditions and32 unexpected situations will require him to make decisions33 continuously once the operation begins. His preparations related to34 critical decisions will allow him, and his subordinates, to react more35 effectively when changes become necessary.36 37 Optimize Planning Time for Subordinates. The commander must38 ensure that the timelines he develops for mission planning and preparation39 provide adequate troop-leading time for the subordinate elements. An40 effective way to optimize the use of the available time, no matter how short, is41 to conduct training of the troop orders process under tough, realistic42 conditions at every available opportunity.43 44 Allow Maximum Freedom of Action for Subordinates. Given the45 expected battlefield conditions, leaders at every level must avoid placing46
  41. 41. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-10 unnecessary limits on their soldiers’ freedom of action. The leader at the1 point of decision must have the knowledge, training, and freedom necessary to2 make the correct choice in support of the commander’s intent. This concept3 must be emphasized at every opportunity at every level of leadership.4 Soldiers win battles; their leaders can only place them in a position where they5 are able to seize the opportunity to do so. Subordinates will be successful on6 the battlefield only if their commanders and leaders have fostered the7 necessary confidence and initiative before the battle begins.8 9 Encourage Cross-Talk. Subordinate leaders do not always require10 guidance from the commander to address a change in the situation. In some11 instances, because of their position on the battlefield, two or more12 subordinates, working together, may have the clearest view of what is13 happening and may be better suited than the commander to develop a tactical14 solution. This type of problem solving, involving direct coordination between15 subordinate elements, is critical to mission-oriented command and control. In16 addition to its obvious impact on mission accomplishment, it empowers17 subordinates to take decisive action and teaches them the value of close18 cooperation in achieving the unit’s overall purpose.19 20 Command and Lead Well Forward. The commander positions himself21 where he can best command his troop and make critical decisions to influence22 the outcome of the mission. This position is normally with the main effort to23 allow the commander to exert his leadership and to shift or retask the main24 effort as necessary. He must be far enough forward to “see” the battlefield25 using all available resources; these assets include not only visual observation26 but also radio reports and, in digitized units, information provided over digital27 systems.28 29 Plans and Orders30 31 Plans are the basis for any mission. The troop commander develops his32 concept of the operation summarizing how best to accomplish his mission33 within the scope of the commanders’ intents (two levels up). The troop34 commander uses troop-leading procedures to turn the concept into a fully35 developed plan and to prepare a concise, accurate OPORD. He assigns36 additional tasks (and outlines their purpose) for subordinate elements,37 allocates available resources, and establishes priorities to make the concept38 work.39 40 The following discussion, covering important aspects of orders41 development, serves as an introduction to the discussion of troop-leading42 procedures. The first portion focuses on the mission statement and the43 commander’s intent, which provide the doctrinal foundation for the OPORD.44 Also included are basic discussions of the three types of orders (warning45
  42. 42. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-11 orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs) used by the commander. It is important for1 the troop commander to have a thorough understanding of these elements2 because they are the building blocks for everything else that he does during3 the troop-leading process.4 5 Mission Statement6 7 The commander uses the mission statement to summarize the upcoming8 operation. This brief paragraph (sometimes a single sentence) describes the9 form of operation, the unit’s task and purpose, the actions to be taken, and the10 reasons for these actions. It is written in a format based on the five “Ws”: who11 (unit), what (tasks), when (date-time group), where (grid12 location/geographical reference for the area of operations and/or objective),13 and why (purpose). The commander must ensure that the mission is14 thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers two echelons below (section15 or squad). The following paragraphs cover considerations that apply in16 development of the mission statement.17 18 Tactical tasks are specific activities performed by the unit while it is19 conducting a form of tactical operation or a choice of maneuver. (NOTE: The20 title of each task can also be used as an action verb in the unit’s mission21 statement to describe actions during the operation.) Normally, a commander22 will assign one mission-essential task to each subordinate unit. Tasks should23 be definable, attainable, and measurable. Critical tasks that require specific24 tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the troop are covered in detail25 throughout this publication.26 27 A simple, clearly stated purpose improves understanding of the28 commander’s intent. It will also assist subordinate leaders in adjusting their29 tasks during execution of the mission, allowing them to stay within the30 parameters of the higher commander’s intent. The purpose should tell the31 subordinates why the troop is conducting the mission and how the team will32 operate with or provide support for other units.33 34 The commander has several options as to where in the OPORD he outlines35 his subordinates’ mission-essential tasks and purpose. His overriding36 consideration is that placement of the mission statement should assist37 subordinate leaders in understanding exactly each of the five “W” elements.38 39 Commander’s Intent40 41 The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the troop42 must do to succeed in relation to the enemy, the terrain, and the desired end43 state. It provides the link between the mission statement and the concept of the44 operation by stating the key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis45
  43. 43. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-12 for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise1 or when the original concept of the operation no longer applies. The2 commander can also use the intent statement to explain a broader purpose for3 the operation beyond that outlined in the mission statement. The intent, which4 is mandatory in all orders, may be expressed in several “bullets” or in5 complete sentences. As with the mission, the commander must ensure that the6 intent statement is thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers two7 echelons below (section or squad). The following paragraphs focus on8 considerations that apply in development and presentation of the intent9 statement.10 11 The purpose of the intent at the troop level is to provide vehicle12 commanders and squad leaders with a summary of the most important details13 of what the troop is supposed to achieve during the operation. The intent14 statement must be developed and presented so they can remember this critical15 information, recognize specific situations while in contact on the battlefield,16 and act in accordance with the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end17 state.18 19 The focus of the intent is on the troop’s key tasks during the operation.20 Key tasks are those that the troop must perform to achieve the stated purpose21 of the operation, as outlined in paragraph 2 of the OPORD; they may also22 specify conditions that must be met for mission accomplishment. Key tasks23 are not tied to a specific course of action (COA); rather, they identify actions24 or conditions that are fundamental to the unit’s success. In the ever-changing25 operational environment, such as when significant opportunities present26 themselves or when the original concept or COA does not apply, subordinate27 elements use these tasks to ensure their efforts continue to support the28 commander’s intent. Examples of critical areas that key tasks may cover29 include the tempo of the operation, the desired effect of fires on the enemy,30 and areas that must be observed.31 32 At the same time, the intent statement does not specify the technique or33 method by which the unit will achieve the commander’s projected end state;34 the method is covered in the concept of the operation. Nor does the intent35 cover “acceptable risk”; risk factors are part of the commander’s guidance and36 are addressed in the evaluation of all COAs for the operation. In addition, the37 purpose addressed in the intent is not merely a restatement of the why38 (purpose) from the mission statement, which focuses on the troop’s immediate39 operation. Instead, the commander uses the intent to examine the broader40 operational context of the troop and higher missions.41 42 Combat Orders43 44 Combat orders are the means by which the troop commander receives and45 transmits information, from the earliest notification that an operation will46
  44. 44. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-13 occur through the final phases of execution. These basic tools are absolutely1 critical to mission success. In a tactical situation, the commander will receive2 the troop’s mission from higher in the form of written or digital (sent on3 FBCB2) operation order (OPORD) and fragmentary order (FRAGO). The4 troop commander and subordinate leaders will work with combat orders on a5 daily basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of the correct format6 for each type. At the same time, they must ensure that every soldier in the7 troop understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders.8 Because of these requirements, the commander must take every opportunity to9 train the troop in the use of combat orders. The skills associated with orders10 development and dissemination are highly perishable; they can be lost without11 constant, realistic practice.12 13 Warning Orders (WO). During the planning phase of an operation,14 commanders use warning orders as a shorthand method of alerting their15 subordinate leaders. Warning orders also initiate the commander’s most16 valuable time management tool, the parallel planning process. The troop17 commander usually sends a series of warning orders to his subordinate leaders18 to help them prepare for new missions. The directions and guidelines in the19 warning order allow subordinates to begin their own planning and preparation20 activities.21 22 The content of warning orders is based on two major variables:23 information about the upcoming operation that is available to the troop from24 the brigade/squadron and what the troop commander ultimately wants to25 achieve by issuing the warning order (what he wants his subordinates to do26 with the information). The commander normally issues his warning orders27 either as he receives additional orders from the task force or as he completes28 his own analysis of the situation.29 30 In addition to alerting the unit to the upcoming operation, warning orders31 allow the commander to put out tactical information incrementally and,32 ultimately, to shorten the length of the actual OPORD. In the example shown33 in Figure 2-1, the commander uses three warning orders to issue information34 that otherwise would make up paragraphs 1 and 2 and most of paragraph 3 in35 the OPORD. As a result, when he issues the OPORD, he can simply review36 previously issued information or brief the changes or earlier omissions. He37 will then have more time to concentrate on visualizing his concept of the fight38 for his subordinates.39 40 Figure 2-1 summarizes an example of how the troop commander might41 use a series of warning orders both to alert the troop to an upcoming operation42 and to provide tactical information and initial planning guidance. The left-43 hand column lists actions the commander takes before issuing each of the44 three warning orders in the example. The center column describes specific45
  45. 45. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-14 elements included in each warning order, with the right-hand column1 outlining the commander’s purpose for each order.2 3 NOTE: The numbering system used in the Figure 2-1 (WO #1, #2, and #3)4 recurs in the discussion of troop-leading procedures to explain how5 warning orders are used at various phases of the troop-leading6 process.7 8 TROOP COMMANDER’S ACTION POSSIBLE CONTENT OF WARNING ORDER COMMANDER’S PURPOSE Receive the brigade/squadron warning order Warning order #1 covers the following: • Security plan. • Movement plan. • Task organization. • Tentative timeline. • Standard drills to be rehearsed. • Prepare platoons for movement to the tactical assembly area. • Obtain map sheets. • Specify troop task organization. Conduct METT-TC analysis Warning order #2 covers the following: • Friendly situation. • Enemy situation. • Terrain analysis. • Troop mission. • Initiate platoon- level mission analysis. • Initiate generic rehearsals (drill- and task-related). • Prepare for combat. Develop and analyze COAs Warning order #3 covers the following: • Commander’s intent. • Concept of the operation. • COA analysis/selection. • Concept of fires. • Subordinate unit tasks and purposes. • R&S guidance. • Updated SITEMP/ draft graphics. • Initiate platoon- level COA development. • Identify platoon- level reconnaissance requirements. • Direct leader’s reconnaissance. • Prepare for combat. Figure 2-1. Commander’s use of multiple warning orders.9
  46. 46. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-15 Operation Order (OPORD). When time and information are available,1 the troop commander will normally issue a complete OPORD as part of his2 troop-leading procedures. As noted, he does not need to repeat information3 covered previously in his warning orders. The commander may also issue an4 execution matrix, either to supplement the OPORD or as a tool to aid in the5 execution of the mission; however, the matrix order does not replace a five-6 paragraph OPORD.7 8 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). The FRAGO is a brief oral or written9 order that can serve any of the following purposes:10 • Implement timely changes to existing orders.11 • Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders.12 • Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed.13 • Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a14 complete order.15 A written FRAGO follows the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however,16 it includes only the information required for subordinates to accomplish their17 mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped18 units can quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays.19 20 During the execution of an operation, FRAGOs are the medium of battle21 command. The troop commander uses them to communicate changes in the22 enemy or friendly situation and to retask his subordinate elements based on23 changes in the situation (see Figure 2-2). The FRAGO normally includes the24 following information:25 • Updated enemy or friendly situation.26 • Changes to troop or platoon tasks and/or purposes.27 • Changes to the scheme of maneuver.28 • Specific instructions as necessary.29 30 31
  47. 47. FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft) 2-16 1 TYPE/PURPOSE OF ORDER RADIO TRANSMISSION Alert “GUIDONS, THIS IS BLACK 6; FRAGO FOLLOWS.” Situation “J-STARS REPORTS, “TEN BMPs, AND SUPPORTING VEHICLES VICINITY CP 17, MOVING EAST TOWARD CP 11.” Mission “WE WILL CONTINUE TO SCREEN AND GAIN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY VICINITY CP 17 AND CONDUCT A SECURITY DRILL FROM PL BLUE TO PL RED AND THE TASK FORCE WHICH IS MOVING TO OUR SOUTH.” Intent “I WANT FA FIRES TO INITIALLY INTERDICT AND HARRASS THE ENEMY’S MOVEMENT VIC OF NAI 5.” “I WANT TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH RED AND I WANT WHITE TO ASSIST THE XO IN CONDUCTING RECON HAND OVER WITH THE TASK FORCE SCOUTS.” “I THEN WANT THE STRIKERS TO ASSIST IN THE DESTUCTION OF THE ENEMY BY ATTACKING HIM WITH PRECISION FIRES.” Tasks to subordinate units “RED AND WHITE, CONDUCT SECURITY DRILLS IOT MAINTAIN CONTACT AND REPOSITION IN SECTOR.” “RED, FIRE TAI 5 ONCE TARGET HITS TRIGGER.” “WHITE SET SUBSEQUENT POSITIONS ALONG PL GREEN ASSUME CONTACTS FOR RED.” “BLACK 5, CONDUCT INITIAL RECON HAND OVER COORDINATION, PLAN TO RPOL ON LANES TIN AND COPPER.” “REDLEG, MOVE TO A POSITION VICINITY CP 8 FROM WHICH TO DESIGNATE FIRES TO ASSIST THE TASK FORCE.” Coordinating instructions “I WANT TO INITIATE FIRES WHEN FIVE OR SIX VEHICLES HAVE CROSSED PL ABRAMS.” “BEGIN THE SECURITY DRILL WHEN ENEMY IS AT CP 17 OR IF THE ENEMY BEGINS MOVEMENT SOUTH TOWARD CP 10.” CSS “TROOP TRAINS MOVE TO CP 4.” Command and signal “I WILL BE WITH RED.” Acknowledgment “ACKNOWLEDGE. OVER.” Figure 2-2. Example troop FRAGO.2 3

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