Tax planning for business owners june 2014 Sean Rheubottom - United Financial
Outlook Jan 21 2009 - 2009 Economic Outlook
1. Winter 2009 Economic Outlook:
Recession and Recovery
Estate Planning Council of Abbotsford
January 2009
Presented by:
Allan Seychuk, Economist
Phillips, Hager & North Investment Management Limited
Est. 1964
4. Challenging Times Slowly Setting the Stage for
Next Bull Market
2009 to be extremely challenging for the US economy
Recession
Canada’s buffers against US spillovers will diminish
Risk of deflation and market disappointment remains
elevated
Recovery
Why we’re optimistic about 2010, and beyond
Signs we’re looking for the recovery is underway
What obstacles still stand in the way of true recovery?
Obstacles Have we indeed entered a new era, with new behaviour?
How much should today’s bailouts / stimulus worry us?
5. Financial Market Stress is Easing
CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) U.S. Dollar LIBOR
80 5.5
70 5.0
60 4.5
4.0
50
Index
3.5
40
%
3.0
30
2.5
20 2.0
10 1.5
0 1.0
06 06 06 07 07 07 08 08 08
Jan- May- Sep- Jan- May- Sep- Jan- May- Sep- Jan-
09 -07 -08 ar-
08 -08 ul-08 -08 ov-0
8 -0 9
Nov Jan M May J S ep N Jan
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange Source: U.S. Federal Reserve, Bank of England
CDX Credit Default Swap Index U.S. Financial Commercial Paper Outstanding
300 900
275 850
250
800
225 US$ billions
200 750
175
Index
700
150
125 650
100 600
75 550
50
25 500
0 450
Ju 8
Ju 7
Ja 6
Ja 7
08
M 7
M 8
M 7
M 8
Se 7
Se 8
No 6
No 7
No 8
M -03
M -04
M -05
M -06
M -07
08
De -04
De -05
De -06
De -07
De -08
J u -04
Ju -05
Ju -07
J u - 08
Ju -06
Se -04
Se -05
Se -06
Se -07
Se -08
-0
-0
0
0
-0
-0
0
0
l-0
l-0
0
0
0
v-
v-
v-
n-
n-
p-
p-
p-
c-
ay
ay
ar
ar
c
c
c
c
c
p
p
p
p
p
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
n
n
n
n
n
De
Se
Source: Bloomberg Source: Federal Reserve
6. Not Your Garden Variety Recession
U.S. Median Resale House Prices U.S. Light Vehicle Sales
20 20.0 0.20
Million units, annualized
Year-over-year % change
15
17.5
Sales per worker
10
0.15
15.0
5
0 12.5
0.10
-5
Single-family homes 10.0 Total new vehicle sales
-10 New vehicle sales per worker
-15 7.5 0.05
64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 00 03 06 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07
Source: National Association of Realtors Source: Autodata, US Census Bureau, PH&N
U.S. Household Net Worth Year-over-year Change US Household Net New Borrowing (% of GDP)
8,000 10
Borrowing, % of GDP
6,000
8 4 per. Mov. Avg. (Borrowing, % of GDP)
4,000
$ billions
% of GDP 6
2,000
- 4
-2,000
2
-4,000
0
-6,000
-8,000 -2
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve, Merrill Lynch Source: U.S. Flow of Funds, TD Newcrest
7. Current Conditions Continue To Deteriorate
Job Losses Accelerating U.S. Real Consumer Spending
0 10
8
-100
-82,000/month
6
-200
Thousand
4
-300
%
2
0
-400
-2
-500 -484,000/month
-4
-600 First 8 months Latest 3 months -6
of recession of recession 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 00 03 06 09
Source: BLS, Economic Policy Institute Source: U.S. BEA
8. Leading Indicators Signal Deep Downturn
Leading Economic Indicators: OECD & Selected Non-OECD
20
OECD
Non-OECD*
6-month rate of % change
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
* Trade-weighted average of China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia & South Africa
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, PH&N
9. Japan’s Recession Expected To Deepen
Japanese Exports Industrial Production & Machinery Orders
30 20
Industrial production
20 15
Domestic machinery orders
10
10
% Year-over-year
5
0
%
0
-10
-5
-20 To the US -10
To Western Europe
-30 To China -15
-40 -20 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 9
07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 09 -0 r-0 l-06 t-0 n-0 r-0 l-07 t-0 n-0 r-0 l-08 t-0 n-0
Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- n
Ja Ap Ju Oc Ja Ap Ju Oc Ja Ap Ju Oc Ja
Source: Ministry of Finance Source: Ministry of Industry & Commerce
10. Remarkable Deterioration in China, Asia
China Merchandise Trade Industrial Production
60 25
Year-over-year % change, 3 mth avg.
50 Exports
15
Imports
40
5
% year-over-year
30
-5
20
-15
10
Taiwan
0 -25 Korea
Thailand
Singapore
-10 -35
Apr-07
Apr-08
Jul-07
Jul-08
Jan-09
Jan-07
Jan-08
Oct-08
Oct-07
-20
97
00
02
03
05
06
07
98
99
01
04
08
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China Source: National Statistical Agencies
11. Canada’s Recession Just Getting Started
U.S. in the worst shape of any major economy and Canada is
the country the most exposed to the U.S.
Canada also exposed to global economic conditions via global
demand for commodities (which has crumbled)
Why should we expect Canada to hold up well in this
environment?
Expect: job losses, lower national income, falling nominal
GDP, more weakness in factories, housing and retail sales
Monetary stimulus to be joined by further fiscal stimulus
Positives: lower fuel prices, room for more government
spending, somewhat better household fundamentals, less
reliance on home equity for spending money
12. Canada Playing Catch-Up in Key Sectors
Existing House Prices New Light Vehicle Sales
20 120
15 110
Annual % change, 3 mth avg
Index, Jan 2006 = 100
10 100
5 90
0 80
U.S. 70
-5 U.S.
Canada
Canada
-10 60
-15 50
Apr-06
Jul-06
Jul-07
Jul-08
Apr-07
Apr-08
Oct-06
Oct-07
Oct-08
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
2003
2006
2007
2004
2005
2008
Source: Can. Real Estate Assoc., National Assoc. Source: Merrill Lynch, StatsCan,
of Realtors US Dept. of Commerce
13. Canadian Consumer Not Really So Different
Household Debt, % of Personal Disp. Income Growth in Household Net Worth
150 20
140 Canada
15 U.S.
130
U.S.
Year-over-year % change
120 Canada 10
110
5
100
%
90 0
80 -5
70
-10
60
50 -15
1961
1965
1985
2009
1969
1973
1977
1981
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
1998
2006
2008
1990
1992
1994
1996
2000
2002
2004
Source: Federal Reserve, Statistics Canada, PH&N
14. Extended Period of Low Interest Rates Ahead
Central Bank Policy Interest Rates
6
Bank of Canada Projection
5
U.S. Federal Reserve
4
%
3
2
1
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
15. Issues, Obstacles and Risks:
Resolution of auto sector’s troubles still uncertain, confusion regarding
bailout, TARP, etc.
More housing trouble ahead in Alt-A, Option ARMs
Need for looser credit conditions and strong financial sector: conflict
U.S. household financial conditions still a long way from good
Deleveraging: how much is enough? How fast can global GDP grow?
Can China generate sufficient growth internally?
“Frugal future”, or a temporary setback? Has behaviour really
changed?
How much to worry about the long term implications of bailout,
deficits?
16. US Deficit Set To Soar
United States: Deficit and Debt
25 80
Debt to GDP Ratio will rise
Financial balance (left)
20
Net debt (right)
64 sharply
15 48 No strong correlation
10 32 between deficits and bond
yields
5 16
Higher private sector
0 0
savings will offset public
-5 -16 sector dissaving
-10 -32
Business cycle will
1986
1988
1992
2000
2002
2004
1980
1982
1984
1990
1994
1996
1998
2006
2008
2010
2012
dominate issuance cycle
Source: Finance Canada, OECD Economic Outlook No. 83, June 2008.
Data is general government, national accounts basis.
17. U.S. Dollar Has Bottomed – For Now
U.S. Dollar Trade-Weighted Index
150
140
130
120
Index
110
100
90
80
70 Major currency index
60
1979
1985
1994
1997
2000
2003
2009
1973
1976
1982
1988
1991
2006
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve
18. From Conspicuous Consumption to Thrift?
US Household Debt Relative to Disposable Income
150
Household
deleveraging
130 will be a
drawn-out
process
110
%
90
70
50
30
1960
1968
1976
1984
1992
2004
1952
1956
1964
1972
1980
1988
1996
2000
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds
19. For How Many Years Will Spending Shrink?
U.S. Real Per Capita Personal Consumption
15
10
5
%
0
-5
-10
1889 1899 1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009
Source: Robert Shiller, www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
20. Summary: Near-term gloom, hope for the future
Economic indicators still deteriorating and will not bottom
until much later in 2009 – true recovery is a 2010 story
Credit will remain tight until house prices stop falling and
more people are finding jobs than losing them
Economic and market outlook must be reconciled with
magnitude of loss of wealth, jobs, income and confidence
Canada is very negatively positioned in this environment
Eventually, tremendous monetary and fiscal stimulus will
have an impact
Markets are forward-looking and have now priced in a
sharp recession
Eventually, central banks will have to mop up today’s flood
of liquidity
21. Early Cyclical Stocks Rallying While Bond
Yields Plummet
TSX Sectors Since January 2007 Canadian Treasury Bond Yields Since Jan. 2007
175 5.0
Energy 4.5
Materials
150
Financials 4.0
Index, Jan.1 = 100
3.5
125
%
3.0
100 2.5
2-year
2.0 10-year
75
1.5
50 1.0
May-07
Nov-07
May-08
Nov-08
Mar-07
Mar-08
Jul-07
Jan-07
Jul-08
Jan-09
Jan-08
Nov-07
Nov-08
Sep-07
Jul-07
Jul-08
Sep-08
Jan-07
Jan-08
Jan-09
May-07
May-08
Mar-07
Mar-08
Sep-07
Sep-08
Source: Datastream Source: Bank of Canada
22. 2008 – Optimal Asset Allocation Strategy
60% Ghana Stocks (+66%)
40% US Long Bonds (+30%)
Total Return: 52% plus currency!
23. Asset Mix Strategy – Patiently Await
Opportunity to Add to Stocks
Cash levels close to minimums as short-term yields
plunge. Overweight bonds – at maximum corporate
bond focused on high quality as credit cycle plays out
No rush to further add to stocks as bottoming process
could be prolonged – epic credit cycle continues as
consumers and financial system deleverage while the
contours of the global downturn remain unknown
24. Stocks Bottom In Advance of Earnings/Economy
Equity Markets, Earnings and Recessions
120
115
Equity Performance (DJIA)
110 DJIA Reported Earnings
Index, 4 week average
ISM Index
105
100
95 Reported earnings bottom ~ 2
DJIA bottoms ~ 5 years after end of recession
90 months before end of
recession
85
ISM bottoms ~ 4
80 months before end of
recession
75
Recession
70
-12-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
25. Searching for Signs of a Market Bottom
Extended period with no more nasty surprises!! (ie financial
system continues to regain normal functionality, systemic
stress eases)
US housing market stabilization: housing starts bottom,
defaults/foreclosures peak, ARM resets peak, monthly house
price declines slow, inventories stabilize
Other leading economic indicators stabilize: sentiment,
orders, retail sales, Chinese & Japanese exports
Commodity prices and oil prices stop falling and stabilize
Low interest rates begin to spur demand for loans and
banks actually lend
Technicals: stocks climb on rising volume, mountain of cash
begins to move from sidelines
Markets rise on bad news
26. Credit Markets
TED Spread Signals Increasing Risk Appetite
3-Month T-Bill Eurodollar Spread (TED Spread)
500
450 The TED spread is a leading indicator of liquidity
400 conditions and credit risk. T-bills are risk free
while eurodollar deposits reflect borrowing
350 conditions in the short-term corporate credit
Basis points
market. A widening spread indicates rising risk
300 aversion.
250
200
150
100
50
0
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Eurodollars are US dollar deposits in banks outside the USA. The eurodollar rate reflects
the cost of US dollar funds for large non-US financial institutions. Source: Datastream
27. Sentiment
Cash A Safe Haven Amidst Credit Crisis
U.S. Money Market Mutual Fund Assets
4,000
Dec 2008 = $3.36
3,500 trillion
3,000
2,500
$ Billions
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
28. Valuation
A 45 P/E on Bonds – Model Says Buy Stocks
Fed Model - United States
45
40 S&P500*
US Treasury Bond**
35
30
P/E
25
20
15
10
5
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
* Based on expected EPS for the S&P 500.
** Based on the interest income of a 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond.
30. Canadian Equity – Outlook
The Worse the Headlines…The Better the Return
S&P 500 Performance 12-Month after ISM-survey (since 1950)
12M fwd S&P 500 performance Average Probability of
ISM* <0% 0-10% 10-20% +20% Gain Positive return Return >
10%
<40 5 6 26 27% 100% 86%
# of occurrences
40-50 40 32 42 59 11% 77% 58%
50-60 109 85 102 73 8% 71% 47%
60+ 42 42 21 9 2% 63% 26%
* The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) publishes a monthly purchasing managers survey
Source: Scotia Capital, Bloomberg
31. Canadian Equity – Outlook
Looking Across the Valley
Phase 1: De-leveraging Phase 2: Markets Normalize Phase 3: Recovery
2009-2010?
Equity markets in Markets bottoming as Strong rally in
Equity Index freefall credit begins to thaw anticipation of
Good & bad stocks Short/sharp bear earnings recovery
fall sharply rallies Volatility normalizes
Valuation metrics Gradually improving Fundamentals matter
Fundamentals don’t apply! confidence in again!
Earnings estimates in fundamentals Cost cuts magnify
freefall Earnings finally margin expansion
Macro events drive reflect trough & Sharp earnings
markets begin to stabilize recovery
Survival of the fittest Market leaders take Pricing power/margin
Companies Weak companies share and drive out expansion
become distressed efficiencies Operating leverage
(GM) Weak competitors magnifies EPS
forced to exit/get growth for survivors
acquired
32. Canadian Equity - Strategy
Financials & Consumer Discretionary Lead in S&P/TSX
Recoveries
First Year of New Bull Market 1957 – 2008
Consumer Disc. 87.5%
Financials 87.5%
Industrials 62.5%
Consumer Staples 37.5%
Consumer Staples is a likely
Utilities 37.5% funding source to re-position
for early cycle leverage
Energy 37.5%
Materials Key Overweights
25.0%
Key Underweights
Telecom Services 12.5%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Source: BMO Capital Markets
33. Canadian Equity – Strategy
Canadian Banks Capital, Profitability, Valuation Dashboard
Bank Capital Strength – Nearly Double 1990s Crisis Canadian Banks ROEs – Q4/08
Overweight - Current Tier 1
Underweight - Current Tier 1 30% Operating ROE
1990 Tier 1 Ratios Reported ROE
10.4% 10.5% 25%
9.8% 10.1% 9.8%
9.3% 9.2% 21%
20% 20%
20% 18%
17%
16% 16%
6.5% 15% 15% 14%15%
13% 13%
5.5% 5.3% 5.3%
4.7% 5.0% 5.0%
10%
6%
5%
5%
0%
BMO BNS CM NA RY TD BNK BMO BNS CM NA RY TD BNK
Less Cyclical & Higher Recurring Revenue Streams Price to Book Multiple for Canadian Banks
3.5
10-year Average P/B: 1.9x
10-year Average
80% Non-Interest Income % of Total Revenue Current P/B: 1.5x
Current P/B: 1.5x
3.0
60% 55%
50% 2.5
40% 31% 2.0
19%
20%
1.5
0%
1980 1990 2000 Q4-2008 1.0
Dec-91
Dec-92
Dec-93
Dec-94
Dec-95
Dec-96
Dec-98
Dec-00
Dec-01
Dec-02
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-06
Dec-08
Dec-97
Dec-99
Dec-03
Dec-07
Source: Bloomberg, company reports and Scotia Capital
34. Canadian Equity – Strategy
Commodity Stocks are Late Cycle Performers!
CRB Index
525
475
425
375
325
275
225
175
125
75
Dec-86
Dec-88
Dec-08
Dec-70
Dec-72
Dec-74
Dec-76
Dec-78
Dec-80
Dec-82
Dec-84
Dec-90
Dec-92
Dec-94
Dec-96
Dec-98
Dec-00
Dec-02
Dec-04
Dec-06
Shaded areas highlight U.S. recession Source: Bloomberg
35. Investment Implications of Global Economic Trends
Infrastructure
Governments will support infrastructure investments
Developed world infrastructure is crumbling
Developing world needs to build infrastructure
Outsourcing
Companies will look for ways to turn fixed costs into variable
costs. Look for beneficiaries
Organic Growth
Most businesses have no pricing power. Look for those that have
organic or unit volume growth: driven by demographics, life
cycle of industry, changes in consumer behavior, long-term
secular trends.
Market Leadership
Leaders will become stronger weaker companies fail
36. Fixed Income Opportunities: Corporates
Corporate Bond Yields Less Gov’t of Canada Bond Yields*
4.4%
4.5
4.0
3.5
Yield Spread (%)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Dec-96
Dec-97
Dec-02
Dec-04
Dec-90
Dec-91
Dec-92
Dec-93
Dec-94
Dec-95
Dec-98
Dec-99
Dec-00
Dec-01
Dec-03
Dec-05
Dec-06
Dec-07
Dec-08
Source: DEX Mid Term Bond Index
37. Fixed Income Opportunities: Liquidity Spreads
Canada Housing Trust (CHT) Yield Spreads vs Similar
Term Canadas
1.0
These bonds are guaranteed by the
0.9 Government of Canada. The wider spreads
0.8 represent the nervousness of investors and
the “price of liquidity”.
0.7
Spread (%)
0.6 +0.54%
0.5
CHT Five Year Term
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07
Jun-08
Dec-06
Dec-03
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-07
Dec-08
Source: creditCHT spreads (5 yr chart) 1/2//09
39. Why Be Optimistic?
Governments Globalization Greed
Extremely low interest Well underway and Businesses will
rates, innovative irreversible continue to try to sell
monetary policy more
actions, banking Increased trade has led
system recapitalization to rising living Investors will
standards globally continue to look for
Tremendous fiscal gains
stimulus and more to Rise of Asian
come; Fed printing consumer is inevitable Fear will recede over
money time
Eases recession and Capitalism is not
lays groundwork for dead
recovery
40. Key Points
The equity market decline has been unprecedented in
severity and speed, and has been accompanied by extreme
strains in credit markets
We are positioned for an eventual narrowing of credit
spreads and are benefiting from higher yields of corporate
bonds
Economic recoveries in the U.S. and beyond will be
determined by bottoming in housing and wringing out of
credit crunch fears, likely not until later in 2009
Equity markets tend to bounce before the economy
42. U.S. Deflation To Be Short-Lived
U.S. CPI Projection
7 July 2008
5
3
%
1
-1
Monthly CPI % change, headline
-3 Year-over-year % change, headline
Year-over-year % change, core CPI
July 2009
-5
Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
43. Valuation
Reasonable Based on Long-Term Metrics
U.S. Price-Earnings Ratio Since 1881
50
Shiller P/E Ratio
45 One std deviation above
40 Mean
One std deviation below
35
30
Ratio
25
20
15
10
5
0
1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Source: Robert Shiller, www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
Notas del editor
Global equity markets have bounced back sharply since mid March led by the commodity heavy TSX. The exception is the Chinese stock market where stocks have plunged 50% from recent unsustainably high levels. It would appear that the bounce in stocks may be a bear market rally – expectations for earnings remain too optimistic in all major markets. Downward revisions may set the stage for further equity market weakness amidst an uncertain macro economic environment.
The crisis in financial markets turned what might have been a moderate US recession into a severe global one. Since November, the crisis appears to be abating. Among the indicators we follow, volatility is down from November’s peak level, interbank lending rates continue to decline, the cost of corporate bond default protection as measured by the CDX index is no longer climbing to new highs. By and large most credit market stress indicators have returned to levels last seen in September, pre-freeze-up. Encouragingly, commercial paper issuance has picked up again thanks in no small part to government intervention and guarantees. Financial markets seem to be regaining a measure of normal functioning, which is encouraging.
However, the financial crisis has become an economic crisis. Indicators of the current situation in the US range from tremendously bad to unprecedented. The decline in median house prices has been the worst in the post War era by a long shot; Vehicle sales are collapsing: level is the worst since the 1980s recession, but when scaled by population or by number of workers, sales levels are worst in post-War era; Household balance sheets are under tremendous stress as wealth evaporates; and households are deleveraging at a pace never before seen. In the absence of anything else, the wealth effect alone (equal to 5 cents per dollar of wealth change) suggests spending decline of $400 billion in 2009, enough to bring real consumer spending growth to zero. This does not even include the effects of deleveraging, and we can see by panel 4 that HH new borrowing has turned negative for first time in many decades. Debt paydown will exacerbate the effects of the negative wealth effect.
Households are also facing the largest loss of jobs of any recession since the mid-1970s. 2.6 million jobs have been eliminated since the start of the recession in December 2007, and the pace of layoffs is accelerating (left panel). The implication is that we expect to see a big drop in consumer spending in the 4 th quarter of 2008, and for 2009 as a whole (right panel), as job losses combine with deleveraging and the large negative wealth effect.
As recently as early Fall Japan could probably have escaped the worst of the effects of the US recession. Japan’s banks were in decent shape, Japan is not an overleveraged society and they have increasingly tied their trade sector to booming Chinese markets. However, the deepening global recession caught up to Japan via its dependence on exports for growth. Although Japanese exports to the US have been shrinking since mid-2007, this has been offset by growth in exports to Europe. As exports to Europe began to contract in mid-2008, exports to China picked up the slack, becoming by late 2008 Japan’s largest export market. Then, very recently, exports to China began to shrink as China’s manufacturing sector slowed abruptly. Now, Japan’s three key export markets are all contracting simultaneously. In this environment, Japanese industrial production and factory sector investment spending have begun to rapidly contract on a year-over-year basis. This highlights the risk of competitive devaluation: if yen remains elevated while won falls and yuan holds steady, Japan will want to take measures to protect exports. Intervention in foreign exchange markets? With rates at zero and little appetite/ability to undertake fiscal stimulus in any meaningful way, stimulating the trade sector seems to be the only option.
… and nowhere is this more true than in Canada.
Despite the lower deflation risk in Canada, the Bank of Canada is still expected to cut rates again by 50 basis points in early January, bringing the overnight rate to 1.00% where we expect it to stay for the balance of 2009 and much of 2010. The interest rate profile should be similar in the US, with rates remaining in the 0-0.25% range for much of the next 24 months.
At this point the outlook remains very murky. There are still several huge obstacles to recovery in the near term, no the least of which pertains to the auto sector and the risk of Ch. 11 filings. This risk is easing but has not been eliminated. Moreover, there is still a lot of uncertainty as to how much more funding will become available under the Troubled Asset Relief Program and how it will be used. Further fiscal stimulus is on the way, but once the announcement effect is out of the way there is room for disappointment as markets realize that fiscal stimulus and bailouts will have little impact on real consumer spending in the near term. There is risk of a later, second peak in foreclosures related to Option ARMs– some estimates peg that issue as one for 2011, highlighting the fact that the housing bust will have long-term implications on markets. There is a near-term conflict that needs to be sorted out between the need for banks to boost credit availability and the need for banks to shore up balance sheets and appear to have adequate capital hoards. More broadly, rebuilding the financial conditions of US households is a long process that implies weak consumer spending growth for several years. How much debt reduction is enough? That depends on how loose credit conditions become down the road. If a large debt reduction is needed before financing become freely available again, it will be tough for global GDP to return to the 3.5%-5% range seen in the past few years given how central the US consumer was to the global economy. We still don’t really know if consumer behaviour has permanently changed and whether households will see this increase in savings as temporary or permanent.
PCroft : The global economic outlook is challenged by the ongoing volatility in the price of oil and significant movements in global currencies. In addition, while most central banks have moved to the sidelines with the exception of the Fed, short-term interest rates have moved off recent lows. Importantly we do not foresee a global recession. China and the US should continue to grow at above-trend rates.
Despite the fact that the economy, and earnings growth, may remain muted for much of 2009, the stock market is a forward-looking mechanism and will begin to reflect the recovery well in advance of when we begin to see actual economic evidence. This chart attempts to highlight the fact that as far as we have data, markets bottom before earnings.
We have noted that we expect an eventual recovery in the economy and that markets rebound before the economic indicators. Okay, so what are we watching to determine when it might be a good time to more to a more aggressive stance? The slide shows a list of many indicators that are used to assess when markets have put in a durable bottom and are in the process of staging a durable recovery.
The TED spread is a further indicator of risk – the spread has narrowed sharply from the Lehman high of 464 bps, now back down to 100 bps. However, this is still above the longer-term norm of 25 to 50 bps.
A further indicator of sentiment is shown here – holdings of US money market mutual funds – now at a record high despite zero interest rates. This represents 41% of US equity market cap, a record high. For the first time since 1993, the assets held in money market mutual funds exceeds the dollar value of assets held in US equity mutual funds. While this source of liquidity is potentially positive for stocks, cash could be sidelined for some time owing to the uncertainties associated with the depth and duration of the recession and deleveraging process.
The Fed model is a screaming buy for stocks with the P/E on bonds at over 40% versus the S&P P/E at less than 10%.
Government action will prevent the recession from spiralling out of control and will lay the groundwork for eventual recovery Regarding globalization, the bottom line is that incomes and living standards will continue to steadily rise, the world economy will continue to grow and markets will eventually resume their advances Greed is not necessarily bad. The desire to make money has not disappeared. Eventually, people will find ways to improve on existing conditions, and will be rewarded for this.
Regarding deflation, it’s coming to the US in the very near future, given the path already taken by monthly CPI inflation rates. However, deflation is expected to be short-lived and confined to the headline rate, driven by falling prices for food and fuel. We do not expect to see falling core CPI prices as the price for core services continues to rise at a moderate pace. Nor do we expect to see a downward spiral in wages as was the case during the deflationary 1930s. We expect to see inflation return to positive territory by 2010, as year-on-year comparisons to $150 oil drop out and $40 oil moves steadily in to the equation.
This chart looks at valuation back to 1881 using trailing real ten year earnings. Valuation on equities has improved considerably in this cycle.