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Blue and Gray Berets H4D Final Presentation
1. Blue and Gray Berets
H4D Team Members
Chris Cottrell
J.D. Englehart
Patrick Hynes
Brian Norville
Jeremy Straughter
2. Team
Chris Cottrell J.D. Englehart Patrick Hynes Brian Norville
Jeremy
Straughter
MBA MBA MBA
Masters in Technology
Management
MPM
https://www.linkedin.c
om/in/chriscottrell
https://www.linkedin.c
om/in/jdenglehart
https://www.linkedin.c
om/in/patrickhynes
https://www.linkedin.c
om/in/brian-norville-
023b09131
https://www.linkedin.c
om/in/jeremystraughte
r
Experience in
government work,
future USAR
intelligence officer,
More than four years
experience in
government
contracting, including
in direct support of
cleared cyber
programs for IC
customers.
More than four years
experience developing
software for Defense
and Intelligence
customers as a
Software Engineer at
Harris Corp.
More than four years
providing intelligence
analysis and
document and media
exploitation support to
the Intelligence
Community.
More than fifteen
years in the United
States Army; six years
of special operations
experience within
USSOCOM.
3. Problem:
Develop a one-way, cross domain solution (CDS) that allows SOCOM to move information from an external media device
(e.g. thumb drive, hard drive, SD Card) directly into a SECRET computer system.
External Media Stand-Alone System Approved Media Classified Network
7. Initial
MVP
• One Way Connection
• Windows Machine w/virus scanning capability
• Small form factor
• Support for multiple connections formats
• Durable
CDS
Transfer
Source Device
Destination Device
• Multiple formats
to include SD
cards, USB, CD
● Windows Machine
Temporar
y Storage
Virus
Scan
8. Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) wants to transfer data from removable
media and SSE to a connected Secret computer system.
Experiments: USSOCOM, NSW
1. Why does SOCOM need a cross domain solution (CDS) when there are
several successful workaround methods?
2. How much time does data transfer currently take?
3. How long do current cross domain transfer processes take?
4. Is the Naval Special Warfare Command aware of how others are solving this
problem across SOCOM enterprise? Throughout the
interagency/intelligence community?
9. Hypothesis
Hypothesis
The CDS solution is required to go through an accreditation process.
Experiments: Customer Interviews- UCDSMO, DSAWG, NSA
1. What is the accreditation process for CDS solutions?
2. Is there a timeframe for the accreditation process?
3. Is there a cost associated with the accreditation process?
10. Discovery
◇The need for secure and expedited transfer of data from removable media and SSE to
SECRET classified systems
◇There is a multi-organization accreditation process. The process starts with the Air Force
CDO, then goes to the Cross Domain Technical Advisory Board (CDTAB), then to the Defense
Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working Group (DSAWG), and finally to the
DOD Information Security Risk Management Committee (DOD ISRMC). Accreditation costs is
between 500k-700k and can take 12 months or more.
◇A solution called TACDS already exists and is currently going through accreditation
process.
◇Each military branch has their own cross domain office.
11. “
I don’t think this is an issue of lack of technology.
The technology is out there.
12. Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Special Operations Command (SOCOM)’s needs are met by the broader
community, with occasional new feature introductions and associated
accreditation cycles.
Experiments: Customer Interview – SOCOM, Perfecta Federal, NSA, Army CDO
1. Why does SOCOM need a cross domain solution (CDS) when there are
several successful workaround methods and solutions?
2. Does TACDS solve the needs if approved?
3. Are policies valid?
13. Discovery
◇TACDS fits most of customer requirements, but does not support COT.
◇ Accreditation process is slow and does not allow rapid feature introduction.
◇There is an abbreviated accreditation process for new or modified features.
Process depends on complexity of feature.
◇The problem of not being able transfer information cross domain is primarily an
issue for Theater SOF and personnel in an office setting.
15. Mission Model Canvas
Mission/Problem
Description
Key Activities
Deployment
Value Propositions
Mission Budget/Cost Mission Achievement/Impact
Factors
Key Resources
Buy-In & SupportKey Partners
Beneficiaries
Design a one-way CDS to transfer unclassified data to a connected secret computer for
dissemination to SOTF Commander.
Secure, one-way transfer of
tactical ISR data to a SIPR
computer
Train SOF personnel in proper use
of hardware and software.
Conducts more missions because
the Intelligence Officer provides
more consistent targets with better
analysis.
Provides more targets to operators
because the CDS streamlines data
transfer process - more information,
better analysis, consistent
dissemination.
SOCOM Acquisition Center
Cross Domain Management
Office
Physically distribute to SOF units
through USSOCOM
Task Force Commander
Operations Officer
Intelligence Officer
Detachment Commander
Intelligence Sergeant
Communications Sergeant
Staff Judge Advocate
SOF personnel can easily use solution to successfully transfer ISR information from
unclassified systems to DOD SIPRNet.
USSOCOM Acquisition Center
● Comptroller
● Logistics/J4
● Procurement
● Science & Tech
● PEO C4
Perfecta Federal
Brendon Reedy, Sponsor,
USSOCOM PEO SOF Warrior XTS Guard 5
Perfecta Federal Software
Pricing information not available (we did ask)
16. Recommendations
1. Increased information sharing within SOCOM regarding cross domain
accreditation process and associated costs.
2. Information sharing on service level cross domain offices.
3. Information sharing on types of Cross Domain Solutions (Example: guards vs.
composed).
4. Greater knowledge of existing solutions on the market.
17. Way Forward
No viable commercial opportunity
◇High CAPEX
◇High barriers to entry (accreditation and time to revenue)
◇Technical expertise not on the team
◇Solutions exist
◇Relatively small market without product suite
We have connected USSOCOM and Perfecta Federal. They are in discussions for
potential purchase.
18. JIDO Framework
“…as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD), JIDO will enable rapid tactical
responsiveness and anticipate acquisition requirements to prepare for, and react to,
battlefield surprise to help meet counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), and
other related operational challenges, including counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED).”
19. JIDO asked for a framework that
• Defines the improvised threat
• Considers the JIDO mission statement
• Considers the operational environment
• Could focus on domain and relevant technologies
20. • JIDO excels in rapid acquisitions by using its Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Fund (JIEDDF)
• JIDO’s pinwheel is a visualization of the authorities given it by the Joint
Staff to counter the IED threat (JROCM)
• JIDO lacks the authority to execute the preemptive acquisitions
strategies that its mission statement requires
• JIDO lacks a framework that articulates how its use of the JIEDDF has
achieved the desired outcomes (i.e., threat mitigation and reduction).
Key Findings
21.
22. 22
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DTRA-JIDO
Rapid Reaction Technology
Office X X X
Rapid Equipping Force X X X X
Rapid Capabilities Offices X X X X
Countering Terrorism
Technical Support Office X X X
JIDO Organizational Comparison
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
1. DODD 5105. 62 Establishes DTRA’s mission, organization and management, responsibilities and functions, relationships, authorities, and administration
2. CJCSI 3170.01 Establishes JCIDS as the process used by JROC to fulfill its responsibilities to the CJCS to assess and prioritize joint military capability requirements
3. DoDD 5000.02 Enclosure 13 provides policy and procedure for acquisition programs to fulfill urgent operational needs and other quick reaction capabilities that can
be fielded in less than 2 years
4. 2007 NDAA Established the Joint IED Defeat Fund (JIEDDF), a standalone 3-year, flexible appropriation (i.e. “colorless”)
5. JIDO CONOPS Approved by USD(AT&L), the CONOPS establishes JIDO’s mission, responsibilities, organization, lines of operations, authorities, and relationship to
DTRA
6. DoDD 5000.71 Establishes the Warfighter Senior Integration Group (W-SIG) to lead and assign responsibility for rapid responses to combatant commander JUONs
and JEONs
7. DODD 3000.06 Establishes policy and responsibilities for Combat Support Agencies (CSA)
(1, 7) (2,5) (4) (3, 6)
JIDO Authorities
JIDO operates in a mission space which is unique in DoD
(5)
23. JIDO enables DOD actions to counter
improvised threats with tactical
responsiveness and through
anticipatory, rapid acquisition in
support of GCC efforts to prepare
for, and adapt to, battlefield
surprise in support of counter-
terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency
(COIN), and other related mission
areas, including counter-improvised
explosive device (C-IED).
Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization
Mission Statement
24. 24
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Anticipatory
Actions
Understanding of
Capability Gaps
Risk Tolerant
Pursue Emerging
Technologies
Broad Understanding of the
Threat
Unified Team of
Operators & Scientists
Improvised Threat
Expertise
Partnering with Industry,
Academia, & Allied Nations
Unique Authorities &
Processes
0-2 Year Solution
Development & Delivery
Flexible Funding
Authority
In-Theater Implementation &
Integration Support
Rapid Solution
Development & Delivery
Agile Testing
& Evaluation
Integrated Approach to
Problem Solving
Customized and
Proven Oversight
Process
J8 has distinct capabilities in four strategic focus areas, which together compose an integrated solution set unique in DoD
JIDO J8 Strategic Focus Areas
Maintain Knowledge
Leadership
Mitigate Battlefield
Surprise
Ensure Rapid Response
Solve Warfighter
Problems
25.
26. • Deliberate Requirements
– Service, CCMD or Agency Driven
– Traditional route for capabilities that require
significant tech development and/or are not urgent
or compelling in nature
• Emergent Requirements
– CCMD Driven
– Supports accelerated acquisition of capabilities
needed for an anticipated or pending contingency
operation
– VCJCS verifies, JCB or JROC validates
• Urgent Requirements
– CCMD Driven
– Urgent and compelling to prevent loss of life
and/or mission failure during current operations
– Require little tech development and can be
resolved in less than two years
– DDR validates
“Keep right, except to
pass”
D
E
L
I
B
E
R
A
T
E
E
M
E
R
G
E
N
T
U
R
G
E
N
T
0 – 2
YRS
0+ to
5 YRS
CONFLICT
LANE
ONLY
POTENTIAL
CONFLICT
LANE
2-6+
YRS
Three Requirements “Lanes”
27.
28. Mission Model Canvas
Mission/Problem Description
Key Activities
Deployment
Value Propositions
Mission Budget/Cost Mission Achievement/Impact
Factors
Key Resources
Buy-In & SupportKey Partners
Beneficiaries
Develop a framework to anticipate improvised threats
Refine threat definition
parameters
Refine risk analysis
parameters
Method for categorizing
threats, prioritizing threats,
and categorizing responses
to threats in order to more
effectively organize
understanding of future
threats and responses.
Joint Staff
JIDO
Contracted Personnel
Adopted by JIDO, and
implemented in day-to-
day business across the
organization
Vice Chairman, JCS
Vice Chairman, Services
Geographic Combatant
CommanderContract Personnel
JIDO J8
29. Those supporting threat tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP)
and devices designed, fielded, or employed in any modality of
conflict that adversely affect US joint force maneuverability or
force protection.
-JIDO Concept of Operations
Improvised Threat Defined
30. Asymmetric Improvised
Tactics vs. Means
◇ Organized, unconventional
action against a much
larger force
◇ Common or Improvised
Weapons
◇ Low Barrier to Entry
■ Inexpensive,
■ Rapidly producible
■ Minimal Training
◇ Uses or combines items
contrary to their intended
purpose
33. ● COA #1: Give JIDO an updated authorities document
that defines anticipatory acquisitions, improvised
threats, and JIDO’s role
● COA #2: Change the Mission Statement to focus
solely on the rapid acquisition and not anticipation
● COA #3: JIDO serves as a sensor for potential
improvised threats, but takes no further action
without GCC/Service concurrence
Recommendations