This presentation on the challenges for a humanitarian response in an urbanising crisis: the IDPs in Bangui, Central African Republic, was given by Dr Anne Burlat, housing and urban specialist, of Groupe URD at the International Institute for Environment and Development on 28 June 2017. The study explores the methods and objectives of the humanitarian response to the refugee crisis in Bangui, in the context of a national crisis where assistance is needed elsewhere. It highlights the stakeholders involved and their relations in this sector-based response. The humanitarian response has not managed to adapt to the way the crisis has evolved. Having originally been a humanitarian crisis with an urban component, in Bangui it has become an urban crisis with a humanitarian component. The goodwill of all those involved is obvious, but the complexity of urban issues and the Central African context is very difficult for a humanitarian system that is dedicated to beneficiaries. More details: https://www.iied.org/urban-crises-learning-fund

1. IIED
28th June 2017
When the humanitarian response
requires urban development policies:
THE RESPONSE TO
THE IDP CRISIS IN BANGUI
Presentation by Anne Burlat aburlat@urd.org

2. When IIED published its call for proposal for research grants (Oct. 2016),
Groupe URD was working on the response to the IDP crisis in Bangui and there were
28 000 estimated IDPs in the M’Poko (airport) site that had to be closed
Sept. 2016 - Peer exchange in Port-au-Prince: an official urban development
delegation from Bangui travelled to Haiti
 Field visits to informal settlements
 Discussions with government representatives about the different response
processes to the Earthquake crisis
 Lessons in the process of being learned
- Aug. 2016 - iNGOs & Governmental institutions: we are doing more than our
mandate requires - they need to make more effort to establish dialogue
 A stand off situation, where both sides are convinced that they are right
 Neither side makes an effort to understand the other’s mandate
- Mar. 2016 - iNGOs: no “forced” IDP displacement according to Kampala convention
 Tensions between CAR Govt. & Int. Humanitarians / Sectorial response
 No knowledge of the Bangui urban context and the impacts of the urban crisis
Research context - initial observations
Linking humanitarian response and development in urban contexts

3. Impacts of the crisis on Bangui
Neighbourhoods completely destroyed …
14 juin 2011 26 mai 2016
… around the commercial area which became an enclave: known as the Muslim enclave
 The conflict is not a religious one: this oversimplification led to misunderstandings
…there has been almost continuous conflict in the Central Africa Republic since 2002
 Bangui: a crisis within the crisis, where stakeholders did not take the
urban context into account

4. Crisis impacts
- Field impact: Neighbourhoods completely destroyed around the enclave
- Human impact: million IDPs, 100 000 in M’Poko site
- Political impact: M. Djotodja resigned
Crisis response
- Political response  restore stability
Accord de cessation des hostilités (23rd July 2014)
Temporary Government (Jan. 2015)
Accord DDR (10th May 2015) Forum de Bangui
Presidential election (Feb. 2016)
- Humanitarian response  supporting vulnerable people, mainly IDPs
MIRA (Jan. 2014)
- Structural support  aiming to restart: HRP 2017-2020 (approval Nov. 2016)
RCPCA 2017-2020
 stakeholders did not take the urban context into account
A crisis within the crisis
Which response to which crisis ?

5. The enclave & its neighbourhoods
by google earth

6. mid-Dec. 2016 - The site had been closed by the government (MASRN):
 operation Noël à la maison
mid-Feb. 2017 - Tensions between Gvt institutions and iNGOs
- Different positions within different UN agencies
April 2017 : field mission - Meetings, discussions, visits with all types of stakeholders
 Understanding the issues at stake
- Piece together stakeholders’ actions and choices
 with a focus on the relations between these
- First difficulty
 inability to have a clear picture of the past
- Validation of the global hypothesis
 No awareness of the change from a humanitarian crisis with an urban
component to an urban crisis with a humanitarian component.
 The response targets individual vulnerable people without responding to
structural urban issues, which can be seen as a part of the crisis.
The IDP crisis in Bangui
The challenge of responding to a humanitarian crisis
that became an urban crisis

7. M’Poko IDP site - Internal airport area
Became a part of the city puzzle
19th November 2015
M’Poko was the largest IDP site in Bangui, estimated IDPs: early January 2014 - 100 000
stabilized - 28 000

8. - M’Poko localisation inside airport area:
along the runway, which people and vehicles frequently cross
 Its closure is a priority for the government: high institutional pressure
and the airport management not accepted by iNGOs
- Dissension about its closure process:
Government proposed relocation to a site without facilities: AVICOM
 Its closure brought humanitarian stakeholders together against the gvt.
 Who can support the recovery ? UN agencies, temporary gvt., iNGOs …
- The first closure process was impeded:
a new explosion of violence (manipulation ?)
 Its closure has obscured other dimensions of the crisis
- Confrontation between two complementary positions
 The government wants to close the IDP site
 Humanitarians want to implement sustainable solutions for the IDPs
M’poko site: emblematic of the crisis in Bangui
What happened after the closure of the largest IDP site?

9. The 3 sustainable solutions: return, resettlement & local integration:
an interpretation of refugee policies:
- return to the home country,
- resettlement in another country (ideally chosen) or
- integration in the current country (often initially seen as temporary).
 For IDPs:
- return to the former house
- resettlement somewhere else in CAR (return to the village)
- local integration in areas where IDPs take refuge
 Humanitarian programs in Bangui emphasized return
- return to the former house: chosen by more than 90% of the IDPs
but: what question was asked during the profiling?
- resettlement in Bangui = individual choice
resettlement in rural areas: rare in CAR where the tendancy is towards urban
migration and the crisis is national
- local integration: all sites are private (mainly owned by churches) = impossible
local integration: AVICOM gathered the lowest profiling intention.
IDPs & the 3 Sustainable solutions
The framework of all humanitarian activities

10. 7-8 months after the crisis Return was chosen by 87% of IDPs (profiling July
2014)
- It is very common for resettled refugees to express the wish to go home even
though they do nothing to achieve this: could this be similar for IDPs?
- What are the other options in the questionnaire?
Return: what is the essential condition for IDPs?
 Security (and a job, and free access to water, and …)
When security is the objective, only armed solutions are considered: but
where would armed forces be deployed? (cf. profiling, July 2014)
 Along roads and public spaces
- No surveys of the completely destroyed neighbourhoods
- The urban fabric in these neighbourhoods is informal, without road networks
and the government is hostile to their existence.
Related issues: access to water (well issues) and previously non-existent
services (schools, health, etc.)
 iNGOs wanted to oversee the IDPs’ return in good conditions and … inertia
IDPs: the "over-promoted" return solution (1/3)
The security issue - without recognition of the urban context

11. under-integrated neighbourhoods destroyed
The strength
against informality
8 décembre 2013
26 mai 2016
South of the enclave

12. under-integrated neighbourhoods destroyed
The strenght
against informality
8 décembre 2013
26 mai 2016
North of the enclave

13. The majority of IDPs declared former informal activity, whereas the formal
market is the property of the enclave inhabitants
 Good knowledge about former situation and current wishes
(DRC, profiling, etc.)
- When 90% of IDPs declared that they would restart the same activity (profiling,
July 2014) this was seen as a sign that economic recovery was possible
 No questions about the recovery process
- What could have been done to prevent those who had developed a commercial
activity from losing this resilience behaviour?
- What about urban agriculture activities? When there are no local products,
when there are no jobs, and when the economic network has collapsed
Urban migration is due to job opportunities
 Urban contexts are made up of interconnected networks.
- Developing economic activities implies creating links and developing networks
- Having a home is more about having neighbours than having a roof
IDPs: the "over-promoted" return solution (2/3)
The economic issue - the city as a source of opportunities:
What is the situation “after” the crisis?

14. 8th December 2013
M’Poko international airport area
Urban agriculture
29th Decemeber 2016
A former issue
with its own agenda
What about the NUA
paragraphe
considering urban
agriculture inside
urban planification ?

15. Even though residential migration can reflect growing vulnerability
 Residential migration is a way of urban life
 The Return process only concerns owners
- 39% of M’Poko IDPs declared that they rented a flat/house
- The market is pushing vulnerable renters further and further from the city center
No one approached the MHLSU, which owns land for the city expansion
 MHLSU is the institution responsible for housing and urban issues
- MHLSU declared 35m2 as the minimum suitable size for a house
- MHLSU was involved in the first governmental commitee working on the
response, but did not come back to the next one.
Shelter programs not approved by the government (MHLSU or MASRN)
 Does this imply an indirect responsibility for the destructions?
- Certain government representatives were very vocal in their opposition
- The completly destroyed neighbourhoods were the least integrated areas near
the economic center in Bangui.
- No shared analysis or discussion between iNGOs & MHLSU
IDPs: the " over-promoted return solution (3/3)
The shelter issue - without taking into consideration
the impact on the urban fabric

16.  Crises in cities - a crisis taking place within a city
- Partial: flooding of a neighbourhood, etc.
- One-off / short-term: a strike, poorly managed waste, etc.
- One-off / mid-term: urban refugees (Amman), etc.
 Crises of cities - a crisis of the urban form …
- Shrinking cities: Industrial towns from former East-Germany, etc.
- Urban misery, slums (Daravi), shantytowns, informal settlements, etc.
- Socio-spatial segregation : gated communities, etc.
… Which often strongly impact the urban system Urban crisis
The crisis has become systemic and counteracts the (proper) operation
of the system
- Major (natural) disaster : Port-au-Prince, New Orleans
- Conflict, Civil war: Beirut, Aleppo, Bangui
- War outside the territory: assisting refugees (Lebanon), Tripoli (Leb.)
- Social crises (initially economic) caused by shrinking cities: Detroit
Recognition of the urban system
Identifying the right crisis scale

17. Humanitarian lens to characterize a crisis
Objectives of humanitarian response process
02 septembre 2016
How many and where : beneficiaries / vulnerable people in need
How much money : needed budget / gap with available funds

18. … The humanitarian view of the enclave
Situation de l’enclave et des quartiers abandonnés du PK5
BANGUI (25/11/2015) - OCHA
14 avril 2015

19. - Human environment
Population density, but more specifically diversity, charactarizes cities
 Importance of regulatory structures
- Built environment
Infrastructures are fragile, and their fragility increases in proportion to their
complexity and the size of the city
 The services delivered in an area reflect its level of formality
- Artificial environment
Supply dependency
 Security as a condition of exchange
 Exchange is the « raison d’être » of cities, including economic
exchange and mobility
 Urban life depends on properly functioning networks
 Once it has been recognised that this is an urban crisis, recovery will
depend on improved dialogue with the regulatory structures
Adressing an urban crisis
Cities as a human artefact: exchanges and diversity reinforce networks

20. It is the presence of humans, an economy or an environment, and their
vulnerability, that transforms a hazard into a risk.
 Preventing risk implies decreasing vulnerability
 Preventing its impact implies increasing resilience
 Resilience and vulnerability are not two sides of the same coin:
The most resilient city fabric is the slum …
A crisis reveals or highlights existing fragilities, making institutions doubly
powerless.
Weakened by the crisis, the institutions find themselves faced with a
problem amplified by the crisis which they had been unable to address
before.
 Should aid organisations support regulatory structures?
Can national institutions accept that fragilities exist and address them?
Adressing an urban crisis
Weakness of regulatory structures - lack of public spaces

21.  Who is responsible to prepare territories for the IDP’s return ?
UN Agencies Work on 2 levels : structural & emergency
- Structural action imply a long term agenda, defined by an approved plan, written
which targets development issues and written with national representatives.
 This process allow cross-cutting project, but depending the good
willing of the representatives.
- In Emergency, the cluster system is activated: each cluster work under
the (co)lead of a UN agency, includind the willing (i)NGOs :
- Gathering informations, structuring de mapping
- Checking the possible overlaps, Informing about the lack, etc.
 This process is sectorial, but depending the good willing of the
representatives.
 Integrated project is not the addition or the juxtaposition of topics
Humanitarian system
A sectorial structuration which handicaps the transversality

22. The lead issue  is another relationship suitable?
 Platform of humanitarian organisations to promote sustainable solutions
adopted the same sector-based approach: 7 pillars under the lead of iNGOs
The government was invited  but did not attend
The government created its own technical and strategic committees, based on the
same approach: ministries under a lead appointed by the Prime Minister, with
invitations to humanitarian partners.
 Which legitimacy does the lead structure have? No specific budget
 The government system is resilient: practices are still the same, but how could
this be different?
M’Poko closure: supported by UNHCR
"power relationship" with NGOs and some UN agencies
Stakeholders mandates
"We let the government take the lead, but maybe we were wrong"

23. Access to water – strengths and weaknesses of a well organised sector

Shelter reconstruction projects - major stakes

Humanitarian mediation

In the field