SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo
1 de 40
Descargar para leer sin conexión
SSL/TLS FOR MORTALSSSL/TLS FOR MORTALS
maartenm@infosupport.com
TROUBLESHOOTING TIME...TROUBLESHOOTING TIME...
Exception in thread "main" javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun
at sun.security.ssl.Alerts.getSSLException(Alerts.java:192)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.fatal(SSLSocketImpl.java:1949)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:302)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:296)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1506)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.processMessage(ClientHandshaker.java:216)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.processLoop(Handshaker.java:979)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.process_record(Handshaker.java:914)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:1062)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1375)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1403)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1387)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.afterConnect(HttpsClient.java:559)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:185)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1512)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1440)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getInputStream(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:254)
at com.infosupport.maartenm.Demo.main(Demo.java:13)
Caused by: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderExcepti
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:387)
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.engineValidate(PKIXValidator.java:292)
at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:260)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.validate(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:324)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:229)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:124)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1488)
... 13 more
Caused by: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target
at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.build(SunCertPathBuilder.java:146)
at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.engineBuild(SunCertPathBuilder.java:131)
at java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder.build(CertPathBuilder.java:280)
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:382)
... 19 more
WHY BOTHER?WHY BOTHER?
Using SSL/TLS correctly is o en hard to achieve
...and understand!
Crucial for secure connection between systems
Globally deployed (intra-)cloud applications
data unit layers
Data
Data
Data
Segments
Packets
Frames
Bits
Application 
Network Process to Application
Presentation 
Data Representation 
and Encryption
Session 
Interhost Communication
Transport 
End­to­End Connections 
and Reliability
Network 
Path Determination and 
Logical Addressing (IP)
Data Link 
Physical Addressing 
(MAC and LLC)
Physical 
Media, Signal and 
Binary Transmission
Host LayersMedia Layers
SSL 1.0
never released
SSL 2.0
1995 - POODLE (2011)
SSL 3.0
1996 - POODLE (2014)
TLS 1.0
1999 - BEAST (2011)
TLS 1.1
2006
TLS 1.2
2008
TLS 1.3
dra
DEMO TIME!DEMO TIME!
What's the issue?
HOW TO PREVENTHOW TO PREVENT
THIS?THIS?
1. public/private key encryption
2. signed certificates
3. certificate authorities
1. PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY1. PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY
ENCRYPTIONENCRYPTION
 
 
MATH TIME!MATH TIME!
1. Select two prime numbers:
2. Calculate modulo:
3. Select random number < modulo:
4. Find d, so that
p = 11, q = 17
p ∗ q = 187
e = 3
(d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0
320 mod 160 = 0
(321 − 1) mod (10 ∗ 16) = 0
(107 ∗ 3) = 321 ⇒d = 107
Note: varies with : whend e e = 75, ⇒ d = 183
NOW, WHAT IF P AND Q ARE UNKNOWN?NOW, WHAT IF P AND Q ARE UNKNOWN?
1.
2. Find d, so that
p ∗ q = 299, e = 5
(d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0
Pretty hard without knowing and !p q
 
p = 13, q = 23
(d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0
1584 mod 264 = 0
(1585 − 1) mod (12 ∗ 22) = 0
(317 ∗ 5) = 1585 ⇒d = 317
For big enough and , finding those factors will cost an
eternity!
p q
So we can distribute p ∗ q and even !e
ENCRYPT THE LETTER 'ENCRYPT THE LETTER 'GG''
 
p ∗ q = 187, e = 3, G ⇒ 7
= = 3437
e
7
3
343 mod 187 = 156
DECRYPT THE MESSAGE 'DECRYPT THE MESSAGE '156156''
Since we know and , we can calculate
 
p q d = 107
= ≈ 4.6 ∗156
d
156
107
10
234
mod 187 = 7156
107
7 ⇒ G
 
Negotiating a secure
connection
Client   Server
1 ClientHello →  
2   ← ServerHello
3   ← Certificate
4   ← ServerKeyExchange
5   ← ServerHelloDone
6 ClientKeyExchange →  
7 ChangeCipherSpec →  
8 Finished →  
9   ← ChangeCipherSpec
10   ← Finished
DEMO TIME!DEMO TIME!
No-one is eavesdropping!
2. SIGNED2. SIGNED
CERTIFICATESCERTIFICATES
Certificate contents
Serial Number
Subject
Validity
Usage
Public Key
Fingerprint Algorithm
Fingerprint
But wait... anyone could create a certificate!
So we also need
Signature Algorithm
Signature
Issuer
... and a way to sign stuff
 
A is a mathematical relationship between a
message , a private key and a public key .
signature
x sk pk
 
It consists of two functions:
1. signing function
2. verifying function
t = f (sk, x)
[accept, reject] = g(pk, t, x)
 
So, given and and knowing ,
we can tell if is indeed signed by .
x t pk
x sk
3. CERTIFICATE3. CERTIFICATE
AUTHORITIESAUTHORITIES
An entity that issues digital certificates, certifying the
ownership of a public key by the subject of the certificate.
"I can trust you, because I trust John, and John trusts Alice,
and Alice trusts you"
I
John
?
Alice
Who knows who "John" is?
Many "John"'s in todays browsers and operating systems!
Top-notch security procedures, including "key ceremonies"
And yet...
FAIRYTALE TIME!FAIRYTALE TIME!
Once upon a time, a Dutch certificate
authority named DigiNotar was living
happily and carefree in the town of
Beverwijk.
But on a bad day, evil hurt it...
Real hard.
An attacker compromised a webserver of
DigiNotar due to a vulnerability that is
present within the DotNetNuke so ware.
DotNetNuke version 4.8.2.0 is installed on
host winsrv119. This version is affected by a
file upload vulnerability.
Due to the weak security of Windows
passwords it must be assumed that the
attacker was able to compromise the
passwords [...] of the accounts found on the
system. On the system, [...] the domain
administrator account [...] is present.
The attacker was able to traverse the
infrastructure and obtain access to at least
two CA's that were used to generate
certificates.
/** intentionally le blank */
Google blacklists 247 certificates in Chromium
Microso removes the DigiNotar root certificate from all
supported Windows-releases *
Mozilla revokes trust in the DigiNotar root certificate in all
supported versions
Apple issued Security Update 2011-005
 
Update Certificate Revocation Lists (except these are self-
signed)
DEMO TIME!DEMO TIME!
Trust (for what it's worth)
TOOLSTOOLS
curl -v -k <address>
openssl s_client -showcerts -servername
<address> -connect <address>:443
Denotes where a can be found: a file that contains
.
is the password to that file.
JVM SETTINGS (1)JVM SETTINGS (1)
-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<file>
truststore
trusted certs
-Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=...
Denotes where a can be found: a file that contains
and/or .
is the password to that file.
JVM SETTINGS (2)JVM SETTINGS (2)
-Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=<file>
keystore
public private keys
-Djavax.net.ssl.keyStorePassword=...
Include debug logging for TLS handshake and connections.
JVM SETTINGS (3)JVM SETTINGS (3)
-Djavax.net.debug=all
Portecle
@mthmulders
SO LONGSO LONG
AND THANKS FOR ALL THE FISHAND THANKS FOR ALL THE FISH
IMAGE ATTRIBUTIONSIMAGE ATTRIBUTIONS
Beverwijk by @ .
Public Key Krüpto by , , and ( )
Gerard Hogervorst Wikimedia Commons
Sándor P. Fekete Sebastian Morr Sebastian Stiller @ideainstruction

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21
Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21
Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21Max Kleiner
 
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]RootedCON
 
Android Recoverable Keystore
Android Recoverable KeystoreAndroid Recoverable Keystore
Android Recoverable KeystoreNikolay Elenkov
 
Security as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native Apps
Security as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native AppsSecurity as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native Apps
Security as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native Appsenlamp
 
Rooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemy
Rooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemyRooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemy
Rooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemyRootedCON
 
BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S...
 BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S... BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S...
BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S...BlueHat Security Conference
 
Cac linux clusterintro
Cac linux clusterintroCac linux clusterintro
Cac linux clusterintroadolgert
 
Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...
Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...
Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...Athens IoT Meetup
 
232 md5-considered-harmful-slides
232 md5-considered-harmful-slides232 md5-considered-harmful-slides
232 md5-considered-harmful-slidesDan Kaminsky
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)Maarten Mulders
 
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal PurzynskiPROIDEA
 
Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...
Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...
Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...Shakacon
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand) SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand) Maarten Mulders
 
Nagios Conference 2006 | Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan Galstad
Nagios Conference 2006 |  Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan GalstadNagios Conference 2006 |  Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan Galstad
Nagios Conference 2006 | Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan GalstadNETWAYS
 
[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...
[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...
[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...Aaron Zauner
 
WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"
WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"
WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"DefCamp
 
Authentication Systems
Authentication SystemsAuthentication Systems
Authentication SystemsBit Hacker
 
Cryptography 101 for Java developers
Cryptography 101 for Java developersCryptography 101 for Java developers
Cryptography 101 for Java developersMichel Schudel
 
Some tales about TLS
Some tales about TLSSome tales about TLS
Some tales about TLShannob
 
TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)
TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)
TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)hannob
 

La actualidad más candente (20)

Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21
Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21
Open SSL and MS Crypto API EKON21
 
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]
Carlos García - Pentesting Active Directory Forests [rooted2019]
 
Android Recoverable Keystore
Android Recoverable KeystoreAndroid Recoverable Keystore
Android Recoverable Keystore
 
Security as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native Apps
Security as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native AppsSecurity as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native Apps
Security as Code in Docker Ecosystem for Cloud Native Apps
 
Rooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemy
Rooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemyRooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemy
Rooted2020 stefano maccaglia--_the_enemy_of_my_enemy
 
BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S...
 BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S... BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S...
BlueHat v17 || Scaling Incident Response - 5 Keys to Successful Defense at S...
 
Cac linux clusterintro
Cac linux clusterintroCac linux clusterintro
Cac linux clusterintro
 
Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...
Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...
Athens IoT meetup #7 - Create the Internet of your Things - Laurent Ellerbach...
 
232 md5-considered-harmful-slides
232 md5-considered-harmful-slides232 md5-considered-harmful-slides
232 md5-considered-harmful-slides
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx UK)
 
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski
"A rootkits writer’s guide to defense" - Michal Purzynski
 
Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...
Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...
Red vs Blue- Modern Atice Directory Attacks, Detection & Protection by Sean M...
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand) SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (JavaLand)
 
Nagios Conference 2006 | Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan Galstad
Nagios Conference 2006 |  Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan GalstadNagios Conference 2006 |  Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan Galstad
Nagios Conference 2006 | Nagios 3.0 and beyond by Ethan Galstad
 
[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...
[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...
[BlackHat USA 2016] Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attack...
 
WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"
WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"
WiFi practical hacking "Show me the passwords!"
 
Authentication Systems
Authentication SystemsAuthentication Systems
Authentication Systems
 
Cryptography 101 for Java developers
Cryptography 101 for Java developersCryptography 101 for Java developers
Cryptography 101 for Java developers
 
Some tales about TLS
Some tales about TLSSome tales about TLS
Some tales about TLS
 
TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)
TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)
TLS Interception considered harmful (Chaos Communication Camp 2015)
 

Similar a SSL/TLS for Mortals (JAX DE 2018)

SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)Maarten Mulders
 
WebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC application
WebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC applicationWebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC application
WebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC applicationDan Jenkins
 
Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019
Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019
Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019Michel Schudel
 
Dns protocol design attacks and security
Dns protocol design attacks and securityDns protocol design attacks and security
Dns protocol design attacks and securityMichael Earls
 
Overview of SSL & TLS Client-Server Interactions
Overview of SSL & TLS Client-Server InteractionsOverview of SSL & TLS Client-Server Interactions
Overview of SSL & TLS Client-Server InteractionsKatie Knowles
 
Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014
Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014
Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014Jakub Kałużny
 
Random musings on SSL/TLS configuration
Random musings on SSL/TLS configurationRandom musings on SSL/TLS configuration
Random musings on SSL/TLS configurationextremeunix
 
Secure socket layer
Secure socket layerSecure socket layer
Secure socket layerBU
 
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...Stanfy
 
Shameful secrets of proprietary network protocols
Shameful secrets of proprietary network protocolsShameful secrets of proprietary network protocols
Shameful secrets of proprietary network protocolsSlawomir Jasek
 
Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'
Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'
Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'Jen Andre
 
Seattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoia
Seattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoiaSeattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoia
Seattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoiazznate
 
Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...
Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...
Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...Quentin Adam
 
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSL
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSLTraining Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSL
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSLContinuent
 
VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012
VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012
VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012Martin Kobetic
 
Preventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security Stance
Preventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security StancePreventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security Stance
Preventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security StanceSara Goodison
 
BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.
BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.
BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.Jakub Kałużny
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)Maarten Mulders
 

Similar a SSL/TLS for Mortals (JAX DE 2018) (20)

SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Voxxed Days Luxembourg)
 
WebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC application
WebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC applicationWebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC application
WebRTC 101 - How to get started building your first WebRTC application
 
Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019
Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019
Cryptography 101 for_java_developers, Fall 2019
 
Dns protocol design attacks and security
Dns protocol design attacks and securityDns protocol design attacks and security
Dns protocol design attacks and security
 
Basics of ssl
Basics of sslBasics of ssl
Basics of ssl
 
Overview of SSL & TLS Client-Server Interactions
Overview of SSL & TLS Client-Server InteractionsOverview of SSL & TLS Client-Server Interactions
Overview of SSL & TLS Client-Server Interactions
 
Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014
Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014
Shameful Secrets of Proprietary Network Protocols - OWASP AppSec EU 2014
 
Random musings on SSL/TLS configuration
Random musings on SSL/TLS configurationRandom musings on SSL/TLS configuration
Random musings on SSL/TLS configuration
 
Secure socket layer
Secure socket layerSecure socket layer
Secure socket layer
 
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
Avoiding damage, shame and regrets data protection for mobile client-server a...
 
Shameful secrets of proprietary network protocols
Shameful secrets of proprietary network protocolsShameful secrets of proprietary network protocols
Shameful secrets of proprietary network protocols
 
Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'
Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'
Codetainer: a Docker-based browser code 'sandbox'
 
Seattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoia
Seattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoiaSeattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoia
Seattle C* Meetup: Hardening cassandra for compliance or paranoia
 
Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...
Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...
Remove centralization on Authorization - API Days Paris 2018 (announcement fo...
 
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSL
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSLTraining Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSL
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSL
 
Django cryptography
Django cryptographyDjango cryptography
Django cryptography
 
VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012
VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012
VisualWorks Security Reloaded - STIC 2012
 
Preventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security Stance
Preventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security StancePreventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security Stance
Preventing Data Breaches: How to Tighten Your Security Stance
 
BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.
BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.
BSides London 2015 - Proprietary network protocols - risky business on the wire.
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Lockdown Lecture)
 

Más de Maarten Mulders

What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)
What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)
What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)Maarten Mulders
 
Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)
Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)
Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)Maarten Mulders
 
Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)
Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)
Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)Maarten Mulders
 
Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)
Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)
Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)Maarten Mulders
 
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)Maarten Mulders
 
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)Maarten Mulders
 
React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania)
React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania) React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania)
React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania) Maarten Mulders
 
React in 40 minutes (JCON)
React in 40 minutes (JCON) React in 40 minutes (JCON)
React in 40 minutes (JCON) Maarten Mulders
 
React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)
React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)
React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)Maarten Mulders
 
React in 50 Minutes (JNation)
 React in 50 Minutes (JNation)  React in 50 Minutes (JNation)
React in 50 Minutes (JNation) Maarten Mulders
 
Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)
Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)
Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)Maarten Mulders
 
Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)Maarten Mulders
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)Maarten Mulders
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)Maarten Mulders
 
Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)Maarten Mulders
 
React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue)
React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue) React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue)
React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue) Maarten Mulders
 
React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus)
React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus) React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus)
React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus) Maarten Mulders
 
React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)
React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)
React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)Maarten Mulders
 
Building web applications with React (Jfokus)
Building web applications with React (Jfokus)Building web applications with React (Jfokus)
Building web applications with React (Jfokus)Maarten Mulders
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx)
 SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx) SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx)Maarten Mulders
 

Más de Maarten Mulders (20)

What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)
What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)
What's cooking in Maven? (Devoxx FR)
 
Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)
Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)
Making Maven Marvellous (Devnexus)
 
Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)
Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)
Making Maven Marvellous (Java.il)
 
Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)
Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)
Making Maven Marvellous (JavaZone)
 
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer's Dream? (v1)
 
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)
Dapr: Dinosaur or Developer Dream? (J-Fall)
 
React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania)
React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania) React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania)
React in 40 minutes (Voxxed Days Romania)
 
React in 40 minutes (JCON)
React in 40 minutes (JCON) React in 40 minutes (JCON)
React in 40 minutes (JCON)
 
React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)
React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)
React in 50 minutes (Bucharest Software Craftsmanship Community)
 
React in 50 Minutes (JNation)
 React in 50 Minutes (JNation)  React in 50 Minutes (JNation)
React in 50 Minutes (JNation)
 
Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)
Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)
Making Maven Marvellous (J-Fall)
 
Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (Oracle Groundbreaker APAC Virtual Tour)
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Oracle Groundbreaker EMEA Virtual Tour)
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (UtrechtJUG)
 
Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)
Building a DSL with GraalVM (javaBin online)
 
React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue)
React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue) React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue)
React in 50 Minutes (OpenValue)
 
React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus)
React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus) React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus)
React in 50 Minutes (DevNexus)
 
React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)
React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)
React in 45 Minutes (Jfokus)
 
Building web applications with React (Jfokus)
Building web applications with React (Jfokus)Building web applications with React (Jfokus)
Building web applications with React (Jfokus)
 
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx)
 SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx) SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx)
SSL/TLS for Mortals (Devoxx)
 

Último

Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024Lonnie McRorey
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brandgvaughan
 
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxMerck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024Lorenzo Miniero
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsSergiu Bodiu
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .Alan Dix
 
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersA Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersNicole Novielli
 
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxThe State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningDSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningLars Bell
 
unit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptx
unit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptxunit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptx
unit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptxBkGupta21
 
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii SoldatenkoFwdays
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionDilum Bandara
 
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache MavenDevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache MavenHervé Boutemy
 
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxA Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024Stephanie Beckett
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteDianaGray10
 
The Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxThe Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxDigital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 

Último (20)

Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
 
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxMerck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Merck Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
 
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersA Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
 
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxThe State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
 
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningDSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
 
unit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptx
unit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptxunit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptx
unit 4 immunoblotting technique complete.pptx
 
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An IntroductionAdvanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
Advanced Computer Architecture – An Introduction
 
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache MavenDevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
 
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxA Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
A Deep Dive on Passkeys: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
 
The Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxThe Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
The Fit for Passkeys for Employee and Consumer Sign-ins: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxDigital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Digital Identity is Under Attack: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 

SSL/TLS for Mortals (JAX DE 2018)

  • 1. SSL/TLS FOR MORTALSSSL/TLS FOR MORTALS maartenm@infosupport.com
  • 2. TROUBLESHOOTING TIME...TROUBLESHOOTING TIME... Exception in thread "main" javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun at sun.security.ssl.Alerts.getSSLException(Alerts.java:192) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.fatal(SSLSocketImpl.java:1949) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:302) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:296) at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1506) at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.processMessage(ClientHandshaker.java:216) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.processLoop(Handshaker.java:979) at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.process_record(Handshaker.java:914) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:1062) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1375) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1403) at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1387) at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.afterConnect(HttpsClient.java:559) at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:185) at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1512) at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1440) at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getInputStream(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:254) at com.infosupport.maartenm.Demo.main(Demo.java:13) Caused by: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderExcepti at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:387) at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.engineValidate(PKIXValidator.java:292) at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:260) at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.validate(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:324) at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:229) at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:124) at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1488) ... 13 more Caused by: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.build(SunCertPathBuilder.java:146) at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.engineBuild(SunCertPathBuilder.java:131) at java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder.build(CertPathBuilder.java:280) at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:382) ... 19 more
  • 3. WHY BOTHER?WHY BOTHER? Using SSL/TLS correctly is o en hard to achieve ...and understand! Crucial for secure connection between systems Globally deployed (intra-)cloud applications
  • 5. SSL 1.0 never released SSL 2.0 1995 - POODLE (2011) SSL 3.0 1996 - POODLE (2014) TLS 1.0 1999 - BEAST (2011) TLS 1.1 2006 TLS 1.2 2008 TLS 1.3 dra
  • 7. HOW TO PREVENTHOW TO PREVENT THIS?THIS? 1. public/private key encryption 2. signed certificates 3. certificate authorities
  • 8. 1. PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY1. PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY ENCRYPTIONENCRYPTION
  • 9.  
  • 10.  
  • 11. MATH TIME!MATH TIME! 1. Select two prime numbers: 2. Calculate modulo: 3. Select random number < modulo: 4. Find d, so that p = 11, q = 17 p ∗ q = 187 e = 3 (d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0 320 mod 160 = 0 (321 − 1) mod (10 ∗ 16) = 0 (107 ∗ 3) = 321 ⇒d = 107 Note: varies with : whend e e = 75, ⇒ d = 183
  • 12. NOW, WHAT IF P AND Q ARE UNKNOWN?NOW, WHAT IF P AND Q ARE UNKNOWN? 1. 2. Find d, so that p ∗ q = 299, e = 5 (d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0 Pretty hard without knowing and !p q   p = 13, q = 23 (d ∗ e) − 1 mod (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) = 0 1584 mod 264 = 0 (1585 − 1) mod (12 ∗ 22) = 0 (317 ∗ 5) = 1585 ⇒d = 317
  • 13. For big enough and , finding those factors will cost an eternity! p q So we can distribute p ∗ q and even !e
  • 14. ENCRYPT THE LETTER 'ENCRYPT THE LETTER 'GG''   p ∗ q = 187, e = 3, G ⇒ 7 = = 3437 e 7 3 343 mod 187 = 156
  • 15. DECRYPT THE MESSAGE 'DECRYPT THE MESSAGE '156156'' Since we know and , we can calculate   p q d = 107 = ≈ 4.6 ∗156 d 156 107 10 234 mod 187 = 7156 107 7 ⇒ G
  • 16.  
  • 17. Negotiating a secure connection Client   Server 1 ClientHello →   2   ← ServerHello 3   ← Certificate 4   ← ServerKeyExchange 5   ← ServerHelloDone 6 ClientKeyExchange →   7 ChangeCipherSpec →   8 Finished →   9   ← ChangeCipherSpec 10   ← Finished
  • 18. DEMO TIME!DEMO TIME! No-one is eavesdropping!
  • 21. But wait... anyone could create a certificate! So we also need Signature Algorithm Signature Issuer ... and a way to sign stuff
  • 22.  
  • 23. A is a mathematical relationship between a message , a private key and a public key . signature x sk pk   It consists of two functions: 1. signing function 2. verifying function t = f (sk, x) [accept, reject] = g(pk, t, x)   So, given and and knowing , we can tell if is indeed signed by . x t pk x sk
  • 25. An entity that issues digital certificates, certifying the ownership of a public key by the subject of the certificate.
  • 26. "I can trust you, because I trust John, and John trusts Alice, and Alice trusts you" I John ? Alice Who knows who "John" is? Many "John"'s in todays browsers and operating systems!
  • 27. Top-notch security procedures, including "key ceremonies" And yet...
  • 28. FAIRYTALE TIME!FAIRYTALE TIME! Once upon a time, a Dutch certificate authority named DigiNotar was living happily and carefree in the town of Beverwijk. But on a bad day, evil hurt it... Real hard.
  • 29. An attacker compromised a webserver of DigiNotar due to a vulnerability that is present within the DotNetNuke so ware. DotNetNuke version 4.8.2.0 is installed on host winsrv119. This version is affected by a file upload vulnerability.
  • 30. Due to the weak security of Windows passwords it must be assumed that the attacker was able to compromise the passwords [...] of the accounts found on the system. On the system, [...] the domain administrator account [...] is present.
  • 31. The attacker was able to traverse the infrastructure and obtain access to at least two CA's that were used to generate certificates.
  • 33. Google blacklists 247 certificates in Chromium Microso removes the DigiNotar root certificate from all supported Windows-releases * Mozilla revokes trust in the DigiNotar root certificate in all supported versions Apple issued Security Update 2011-005   Update Certificate Revocation Lists (except these are self- signed)
  • 34. DEMO TIME!DEMO TIME! Trust (for what it's worth)
  • 35. TOOLSTOOLS curl -v -k <address> openssl s_client -showcerts -servername <address> -connect <address>:443
  • 36. Denotes where a can be found: a file that contains . is the password to that file. JVM SETTINGS (1)JVM SETTINGS (1) -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStore=<file> truststore trusted certs -Djavax.net.ssl.trustStorePassword=...
  • 37. Denotes where a can be found: a file that contains and/or . is the password to that file. JVM SETTINGS (2)JVM SETTINGS (2) -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStore=<file> keystore public private keys -Djavax.net.ssl.keyStorePassword=...
  • 38. Include debug logging for TLS handshake and connections. JVM SETTINGS (3)JVM SETTINGS (3) -Djavax.net.debug=all
  • 40. @mthmulders SO LONGSO LONG AND THANKS FOR ALL THE FISHAND THANKS FOR ALL THE FISH IMAGE ATTRIBUTIONSIMAGE ATTRIBUTIONS Beverwijk by @ . Public Key Krüpto by , , and ( ) Gerard Hogervorst Wikimedia Commons Sándor P. Fekete Sebastian Morr Sebastian Stiller @ideainstruction