Order denying Abbott Labs Motion for Summary Judgment and finding in favor of Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 15-22700-CIV-ALTONAGA/O’Sullivan
GABRIEL VENGOECHEA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ABBVIE, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant, AbbVie, Inc.’s (“Defendant[’s]”)
Motion for Summary Judgment . . . (“Motion”) [ECF No. 49] and Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts . . . (“SMF”) [ECF No. 50], both filed March 8, 2016. Plaintiff, Gabriel
Vengoechea (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response . . . (“Response”) [ECF No. 56] and a Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts in Opposition . . . (“SMF Response”) [ECF No. 57] on April 11,
2016; Defendant filed a Reply . . . (“Reply”) [ECF No. 60] on April 20, 2016. Additionally, the
Court heard oral argument at a May 5, 2016 hearing (“the Hearing”) [ECF No. 68]. The Court
has carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the record, and applicable law.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an employment dispute. (See generally Complaint . . .
(“Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-2]). Plaintiff began working as a Florida salesman for Illinois-based
Defendant in April 2005. (See SMF ¶ 1). In early 2012, when he sought time off for medical
treatment — but was suspected instead of interviewing with a competitor — Plaintiff revealed to
his superior he was HIV-positive and homosexual. (See SMF Resp. ¶ 68). Shortly thereafter,
Defendant initiated an investigation of Plaintiff’s use of, and reimbursements for payments to, a
Case 1:15-cv-22700-CMA Document 73 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/17/2016 Page 1 of 13

2
specific caterer. (See id.). Plaintiff had previously been subjected to a similar investigation in
2008, following which he was told to use other caterers. (See SMF ¶¶ 30–35). He was
terminated in September 2012. (See id. ¶ 2).
Plaintiff nominally brings three claims against Defendant, alleging: 1) breach of contract
for improper termination on account of Defendant’s violations of its own disciplinary and
discrimination policies (“Count I”); 2) breach of contract for failure to pay commissions and
benefits owed to Plaintiff, along with failure to reimburse travel expenses (“Count II”); and, in
the alternative, 3) unjust enrichment seeking the same damages in the event there was no valid
contract between the parties (“Count III”). (See generally Compl.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c). “An issue of fact is
material if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might
affect the outcome of the case.” Burgos v. Chertoff, 274 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th
Cir. 1997)). “A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Channa Imps., Inc. v. Hybur, Ltd., No. 07-21516-CIV,
2008 WL 2914977, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). At summary judgment, the moving
party has the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and all factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Allen, 121 F.3d at 646.

3
III. ANALYSIS
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff constituted a breach of
the employment agreement and a breach of contract as it was without good cause in violation of
its own policies and without adhering to its progressive disciplinary policy.” (Compl. ¶ 16).
Count II alleges “Defendant breached the employment agreement with Plaintiff by failing to
properly pay Plaintiff all commissions and benefits due, including accrued and unused holiday
and sick pay, as well as failing to reimburse Plaintiff for all travel and work-related expenses
upon the termination of his employment.” (Id. ¶ 21). As explained at the Hearing, the Court
construes Counts I and II as a single claim for breach of an employment contract, as both claims
merely allege different damages arising from the same, single purported breach. Count III is
properly pleaded.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. Defendant argues Counts I and II
fail primarily because Plaintiff admits he was an at-will employee, and under Illinois law, an at-
will employee cannot bring a breach of contract claim challenging his termination. (See Mot. 8
(citations omitted)). Defendant argues Count III fails because either: 1) there is a contract; or 2)
under applicable Florida law, a salaried employee cannot bring suit for an employer’s failure to
pay purely discretionary bonuses. (See id. 18–19 (citations omitted)). On Counts I and II,
Plaintiff argues Defendant overlooks a relevant exception under which even an at-will employee
may challenge a termination in violation of the employee’s reasonable expectations of his terms
of employment; as to Count III, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s cited precedent for unjust
enrichment is inapplicable to this case. (See generally Resp.). The Court analyzes the claims in
order.

4
A. Counts I & II (Breach of Contract)
Defendant argues summary judgment is appropriate because under Illinois law, “at-will
employees cannot bring a breach of employment claim, as ‘either employer or employee may
terminate the employment at will, without liability for breach of contract.’” (Mot. 8 (emphasis
in original) (quoting Robinson v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 854 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006))).
It is undisputed Plaintiff signed an Employee Agreement (“Employment Agreement”) (Ex. L to
Declaration of Sharon Larson (“Larson Declaration”) [ECF No. 50-2])), which states he was an
at-will employee (see id. ¶ 14). Further, Defendant notes Plaintiff admitted in deposition
testimony he was an at-will employee. (See Ex. 1 to SMF (“Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript”)
[ECF No. 50-1] 31:9–23). Therefore, because Plaintiff was an employee at will, and Defendant
asserts “[t]he only exception to the Illinois at-will doctrine is the tort of retaliatory discharge” (id.
11 (alteration added; citation omitted)), which would be inapplicable here, Defendant argues the
breach of contract claim must fail.
In Response, Plaintiff correctly asserts there are additional exceptions under Illinois
precedent, including that “the employer’s vast discretion in firing an at-will employee is still
limited by the reasonable expectations of the parties.” (Resp. 6 (citing Wilson v. Career Educ.
Corp., 729 F.3d 665, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2013))). Plaintiff argues this implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing can result in liability for terminating an at-will employee who is arbitrarily,
capriciously, or opportunistically deprived of the benefits of his bargain with the employer. (See
id. 6–7 (citing, inter alia, Wilson, 729 F.3d at 675)). “This is especially true where[,] as in Mr.
Vengoechea’s case, the termination of the at[-]will employment results in an employee forfeiting
earned commissions, health, or pension benefits and other benefits of the employment and there

5
is evidence that the employer’s claimed reason for termination does not ‘square with the timing
of the termination.’” (Id. 7 (alterations added) (quoting Wilson, 729 F.3d at 677)).
In Reply, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to identify any plain language either within the
Employment Agreement, or any document that could be considered to have properly modified or
supplemented the Employment Agreement, which conferred contractual rights Defendant could
then have improperly denied by terminating Plaintiff’s admittedly at-will employment. (See
Reply 1–2). Defendant further argues Plaintiff’s cited case law is inapposite or distinguishable,
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not limit Defendant’s discretion to
fire Plaintiff — particularly following an investigation revealing good cause for termination.
(See id. 4–6).
If there is one thing that can be said with certainty here, it is the Court finds itself in
uncharted territory — out to sea in unfamiliar cross-currents of conflicting Illinois precedent,
while attempting to resolve what appears to be a fact pattern, if not issue, of first impression.
The inharmonious body of relevant case law provides general statements supportive of Plaintiff’s
argument, but no close factual analogues finding for a similarly situated plaintiff as a matter of
law. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff does not move for judgment as a matter of law, and there remain
disputes of material fact in the incomplete record presented here, the Court is able to resolve this
matter without charting a new course for Illinois law.
Illinois courts agree the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not create an
independent cause of action. See Wilson, 729 F.3d at 687 (Wood, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Anderson v. Burton Assocs., Ltd., 218 578 N.E.2d 199 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991)). Rather, it “is used as a construction aid to assist the Court in determining whether the
manner in which one party exercised its discretion under the contract is violated by the

6
reasonable expectations of the parties when they entered into the contract.” Wilson, 729 F.3d at
675. Courts have also clarified “promises made in an employee handbook can give rise to a
legitimate claim of entitlement sufficient to be protected as a property interest,” Border v. City of
Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Campbell v. City of Champaign, 940 F.2d
1111, 1112 (7th Cir. 1991)), and that is essentially what Plaintiff argues occurred here.
Plaintiff asserts he was provided an employee handbook when he started working for
Defendant, and in his deposition testimony explains: “when I read the handbook, it clearly stated
that under no circumstances somebody should be let go due to discrimination. That was in the
handbook. I don’t have the handbook with me, right now. . . . [I]t was given to me, in 2005,
when I was hired.” (Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 80:12–18 (alterations added)). Defendant disputes the
existence of such a handbook, and no handbook has been produced. Whether there existed an
employee handbook when Plaintiff began working for Defendant is a triable issue of fact, and the
Court cannot render judgment as a matter of law by resolving that dispute in place of the fact-
finder; if there was such a handbook, without access to it, the Court cannot conduct the close
textual analysis that would be required to determine if its language contained clear, definite
promises sufficient to impact the reasonable expectations of the parties. See Duldulao v. Saint
Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 505 N.E.2d, 314, 317–19 (Ill. 1987).
Even on the record currently before the Court, summary judgment is not appropriate. In
addition to the disputed employee handbook, Plaintiff asserts when his employment began he
was provided with a copy of Defendant’s “Business Code of Conduct.” (See Declaration of
Gabriel Vengoechea (“Plaintiff’s Declaration”) [ECF No. 57-11] ¶ 1). This document is in the
record (see Ex. A to Pl’s Decl. (“Code of Business Conduct”)), and the Employment Agreement
explicitly incorporates the Code of Business Conduct into the employment contract (see

7
Employment Agreement ¶ 18). The Code of Business Conduct states, “With respect to
disciplinary action, principles of fairness will apply, including, when appropriate, review of a
disciplinary decision.” (Code of Business Conduct 20 (emphasis added)). Courts have found the
use of unequivocal verbiage such as “will” sufficient to give rise to contract rights. See, e.g.,
Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318–19; Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982, 987 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990).
The Court is then confronted with the issue of defining the nebulous term “principles of
fairness.” Fortunately, the Court need not definitively resolve this issue: there remain triable
disputes of fact regarding both the extent to which Defendant’s internal investigative procedures
were followed during its investigation of Plaintiff, and the extent to which these policies,
scattered among numerous documents, were incorporated into the aforementioned principles of
fairness governing the employment contract. (See Resp. 3–5). Drawing all inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor — particularly in light of his success as a salesman up until that point — the
inception, execution, and use of Defendant’s investigation as a ground for Plaintiff’s termination
are at least disputed, if not outright suspect, and Defendant’s rationale arguably does not “square
with the timing of the termination.” Wilson, 729 F.3d at 677. Therefore, even without resolving
what the phrase “principles of fairness” entailed between the parties, there remain sufficient
disputes of material fact and reasonable inferences of unfairness to preclude judgment as a matter
of law in Defendant’s favor.
For the sake of thoroughness, the Court goes on to directly address Defendant’s
counterarguments. As noted, Defendant asserts even if its additional policy documents were
incorporated into its contract with Plaintiff, each of these other documents either includes a
disclaimer, stating it does not create or modify the employment relationship or limit Defendant’s

8
right to terminate an at-will employee, and/or fails to make a clear enough promise to constitute
a contractual right.1
(See Mot. 3–5; Reply 1–4). Defendant also argues the employment
agreement clearly states “[n]o statements, promises, or representations have been made by any
party to the other, or relied upon other than as expressly provided in this agreement[.]” (Reply
(alterations in original) (quoting Employment Agreement ¶ 21)). As a general proposition,
clearly worded disclaimers may defeat even concrete declarations of contract rights if the
disclaimers are known to the parties at the time of contracting. See Border, 75 F.3d at 273
(citations omitted). As applied here, however, this principle does not entitle Defendant to
judgment as a matter of law.
First, as to the Employment Agreement, this disclaimer does not remove the Code of
Business Conduct from consideration because it is incorporated by reference in the Employment
Agreement itself. (See Employment Agreement ¶ 18). Second, as to at least the disputed
employee handbook, Plaintiff states the version of the documents he was presented with —
which informed his reasonable expectations at the time he entered into the employment contract
— did not include any disclaimer. (See Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 3; SMF Resp. ¶ 77). Again, because
Defendant has failed to produce, and indeed even disputes the existence of, any such employee
handbook, there remain triable issues of fact as to whether the handbook existed and whether it
contained a disclaimer. If it existed and had no disclaimer, Duldulao indicates clear contract
language such as the Court is presented with here could support a breach of contact claim.2
See
1
Defendant also argues the Code of Business Conduct binds only employees and not Defendant, and
therefore could not have limited Defendant’s discretion. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive —
at least in the abstract without any additional support for such a unilateral interpretation.
2
Even if there was a disclaimer, Illinois courts have on occasion declined to enforce disclaimer
provisions. See, e.g., Perman, 554 N.E.2d 982, 987; Hicks v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 593 N.E.2d 119 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992); Long v. Tazewell/Pekin Consol. Comm’cn Ctr., 574 N.E.2d 1191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Although it has been questioned whether these cases represent a majority view in Illinois, see Border, 75

9
505 N.E.2d at 319. Therefore, summary judgment on the combination of Counts I and II is
inappropriate.
B. Count III (Unjust Enrichment)
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges, in the alternative, if there was no enforceable contract,
Defendant “would still be liable to Plaintiff for unpaid commissions and unreimbursed expenses.”
(Compl. ¶ 26). Defendant argues there was a governing contract, but asserts even if there was
not, Plaintiff cannot recover for unjust enrichment under Florida law because he already received
payment in the form of his salary for the benefit he conferred upon Defendant. (See Mot. 18–19
(citing Rionda v. HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A., No. 10-20654-CIV, 2010 WL 5476725, at *10 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 30, 2010))).
Plaintiff neglected to defend Count III at all in his Response. (See generally Resp.). In
oral argument at the Hearing, he asserted — entirely without support, as his argument is in
complete error — he need not have done so because the claim was pleaded in the alternative. On
the basis of the parties’ written submissions, Plaintiff’s omission would result in abandonment of
the claim. See Edmondson v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 258 F. App’x 250, 253 (11th Cir.
2007). With the benefit of oral argument at the Hearing, however, Plaintiff was provided the
opportunity to resuscitate this claim, and argued it should survive because the record provides
adequate evidence to find Defendant was unjustly enriched by Plaintiff’s termination. The Court
disagrees.
There can be no claim for unjust enrichment if a valid contract existed between the
parties. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). It is
undisputed Plaintiff was presented with an Employment Agreement and signed his name to it
F.3d at 275, these precedents compound the Court’s inability to grant judgment as a matter of law without
analyzing the text of every potentially applicable document.

10
when he began working for Defendant. (See SMF ¶ 4; SMF Resp. ¶ 4). Despite Plaintiff’s oral
defense of this claim in the alternative, the Court is at a loss as to how it would be possible the
Employment Agreement, Code of Business Conduct, and/or myriad policy documents to which
Plaintiff points could fail to constitute an employment contract.3
While the terms of the
agreement are disputed, it cannot reasonably be disputed that some contract existed between the
parties. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to Count III on this basis alone.
Even if no contract existed, partial summary judgment would be appropriate. One of the
three elements of unjust enrichment is “a benefit conferred upon a defendant by the plaintiff.”
Vega v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). This is true under both
Florida law and Illinois law,4
although it is clear Florida law would govern Count III in the event
there was no contract, because Illinois law applies to the combined Counts I and II only by dint
of being one of the undisputed terms of the contract between the parties. In fact, the very
existence of that choice of law clause demonstrates a contract existed and Claim III must fail.
Pressing on with the analysis, though, in the absence of a contract, Plaintiff struggles to
show a dispute of material fact regarding a benefit he bestowed upon Defendant for which
compensation was withheld, inequitably or otherwise. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the
withholding of earned commissions and unreimbursed travel expenses unjustly enriched
Defendant. Regarding travel expenses, at his deposition Plaintiff was asked what expenses had
not been reimbursed, and he stated there were none. (See Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 96:20–97:14).
3
Further, Plaintiff still attempts to argue his employment was not necessarily at will — despite not just an
explicit declaration of his at-will status in the Employment Agreement (see Employment Agreement ¶ 14),
but also the clear Illinois presumption that employment for an indefinite term is employment at will, see
Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 317. The Court is similarly at a loss to explain how Plaintiff believes he might
defeat the presumption of at-will employment if there was no contract.
4
The parties expended considerable argument debating whether Illinois or Florida law should apply,
without being able to identify any substantive difference between the two states’ approaches to unjust
enrichment — with the exception of the Florida precedent of Rionda, 2010 WL 5476725.

11
Accordingly, as the Court ruled at the Hearing in response to Defendant’s Motion in Limine . . .
[ECF No. 55], reimbursements are not longer at issue.
As for unpaid commissions, the Court is hindered in its analysis by Plaintiff’s failure to
brief this argument, but proceeds on the basis of the unpublished transcript. At the Hearing,
Plaintiff mentioned two types of unpaid commissions: 1) commissions owed for sales Plaintiff
had already made during the first two quarters of 2012, prior to his termination; and 2) potential
commissions foregone by Plaintiff’s purportedly unfair suspension during the investigation, on
account of which Plaintiff was prevented from continuing his outwardly exemplary sales
activities and earning more bonuses. Dealing with the latter argument first, in essence, Plaintiff
asserts Defendant spared itself the expense of having to pay Plaintiff for the extra commissions
he would have earned had he not been suspended. The obvious flaw in this argument is the same
suspension that prevented Plaintiff from earning extra commissions prevented him from
providing Defendant with the benefit of those very same potential sales; Plaintiff was not paid
because he did not work. Therefore, there was no enrichment, just or unjust.
As for commissions already “earned” 5
during the first two quarters of 2012, if there were
not a contract, this claim could survive summary judgment. Defendant cites Rionda, which
holds, without much analysis, a salaried employee eligible for bonuses at the sole discretion of
his employer cannot bring a claim for unjust enrichment as to the bonuses if the salary was paid.
See 2010 WL 5476725, at *10. In oral argument, Plaintiff asserted Rionda does not apply
because: 1) Illinois law should govern this claim; and 2) the case is inapposite because it did not
consider a fact pattern regarding the bad-faith avoidance of paying commissions. Neither
argument persuades.
5
Defendant would likely reiterate it is undisputed bonus payments were awarded in Defendant’s sole
discretion. However, the clear contract language to that effect would not apply if the parties found
themselves arguing Count III; instead, the course of dealing between the parties would be at issue.

12
As discussed, Illinois law is at issue in the combined Counts I and II only by the terms of
the employment contract; in the absence of a contract, as must be the case for unjust enrichment
to be in play, there is no basis to apply Illinois law. Plaintiff provides no cogent argument to the
contrary. As for Rionda being inapplicable, the Court does not find this case distinguishable on
the basis of alleged bad faith given Plaintiff provides no explanation for why bad faith would
require a deviation from the normal inquiry into whether a benefit was conferred, accepted, and
— as would be relevant in the case of bad faith — inequitably retained without compensation.
See Vega, 564 F.3d at 1274.
Nonetheless, the Court declines to extend Rionda — which is merely persuasive authority
— on the basis that here, the per-commission bonus Plaintiff had consistently been paid for years
would be more reasonably expected and more readily extrapolated from the parties’ course of
dealing than would have been the largely arbitrary discretionary bonus at issue for the plaintiff
bank executive in Rionda. Therefore, if there were no contract between the parties here,
summary judgment would be inappropriate as to the commissions “earned” from sales during
first and second quarter 2012, for which the parties disputed at the Hearing whether payment had
already been made. Nevertheless, because the Court finds there was a contact between the
parties, summary judgment is appropriate as to the entirety of Count III, and Plaintiff may pursue
these alleged damages only on a breach of contract theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [ECF No. 49] is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part as follows:
1. Counts I and II shall proceed as a combined claim for breach of contract.

13
2. Summary judgment is granted as to Count III for unjust enrichment.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 17th day of May, 2016.
_________________________________
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record

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