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ECCSSafe case studies

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ECCSSafe case studies

  1. 1. 1 ECCSSafe – Exploring the contribution of civil society to safety Deliverable 2: Case studies and transversal analysis 25th May 2016 Authors: Stéphane Baudé (Mutadis, France) Gilles Hériard Dubreuil (Mutadis, France) Drago Kos (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Nadja Železnik (Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe – Slovenia Country office) Mateja Šepec Jeršič (Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe – Slovenia Country office) Attila Antal (EnergiaKlub, Hungary)
  2. 2. 2 Table of contents 1. Introduction........................................................................................................................5 2. Method and choice of the case studies.............................................................................7 3. The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France) ..........9 3.1. Introduction.................................................................................................................9 3.2. Method........................................................................................................................9 3.3. Context of the case study .........................................................................................10 The Local Information Commissions in France...............................................................10 The strategy for openness to society of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN)..................................................................................................................10 3.4. Presentation of the case study .................................................................................12 The 3rd decennial review of nuclear reactors: a convergence between 2 process of engagement of civil society at the national and at the local level ...................................12 Engagement of the CLS of Fessenheim and GSIEN in decennial safety reviews..........12 A national process from 2009 to facilitate the engagement of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the decennial safety reviews of French nuclear reactors ............................................18 3.5. Analysis of the case study ........................................................................................21 Understanding of safety and safety culture.....................................................................21 Definition of safety as a public affair ...............................................................................23 Governance ....................................................................................................................23 Controversies and co-framing.........................................................................................24 Trust................................................................................................................................24 4. The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary) ....................................................25 4.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................25 4.2. Method......................................................................................................................25 4.3. Brief History of the Incinerator of Dorog and its Problems........................................26 The Importance of Dorog and considerations for the analysis........................................26 The birth of the Incinerator..............................................................................................27 Safety Problems at the Facility .......................................................................................27 4.4. The Role of the Local Participation...........................................................................29 Why Should the Public Participate?................................................................................30 Tools and Strategies used by the NGO ..........................................................................30 4.5. Civil Contribution to Safety – Experiences of the Interviewees ................................32 Two Strategies: from Civil Activism to Negotiations........................................................32 The NGOs and expertise ................................................................................................32 Trust between Individuals ...............................................................................................33 The Role of Communication and Motivation ...................................................................33
  3. 3. 3 The Local Government as a Mediator.............................................................................33 Strengthening the cooperation between the local and national NGOs ...........................34 The nature of trust...........................................................................................................34 Main investments concerning environmental protection at the incinerator .....................34 4.6. References for the case study..................................................................................35 5. The local partnerships for site selection for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste in Slovenia ...................................................................................................................36 5.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................36 5.2. Method......................................................................................................................36 5.3. The local partnership approach in Slovenia .............................................................38 Introduction .....................................................................................................................38 The LP concept in Slovenia ............................................................................................38 Financing ........................................................................................................................39 The implementation of LPs .............................................................................................40 SWOT assessment of LPs..............................................................................................43 A summary of Slovene local partnerships.......................................................................46 5.4. Summary of the answers from invited stakeholders.................................................48 Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local Partnership .................48 Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety .51 Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance ..........................................54 Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders ..................................56 Trust................................................................................................................................58 5.5. Analysis of the outcomes of the interviews...............................................................60 Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local Partnership .................60 Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety .62 Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance ..........................................62 Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders ..................................63 Trust................................................................................................................................63 5.6. Conclusions and recommendations..........................................................................64 5.7. References for the case study..................................................................................66 6. Transversal analysis of the case studies.........................................................................67 6.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................67 6.2. Understanding of safety and safety culture and identification of the contribution of civil society to safety.................................................................................................67 6.3. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety........................................................................................................................71 6.4. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance ....................................73 6.5. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders............................73
  4. 4. 4 6.6. Trust..........................................................................................................................74 7. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................75 Annex 1 – Grid of analysis of the case studies ......................................................................76 Annex 2 – Convention governing access of the GSIEN to information for the 3rd decennial safety review of Fessenheim 1 reactor ..................................................................................78
  5. 5. 5 1. Introduction From the 1990’s to now, the European context has been marked by the emergence and the reinforcement of reflections and research on the contribution of civil society to the quality of decisions concerning hazardous activities in risk governance studies (cf. TRUSTNET European research projects series, the works of O. Renn, the works of the International Risk Governance Council). It has also been marked by the development of various legal, institutional and regulatory arrangements aiming to organise participation of civil society and local stakeholders in decision-making concerning hazardous activities. The interactions between civil society and local actors on the one hand and institutional actors engaged in safety1 of industrial activities on the other hand are most often addressed either through the general issue of stakeholder involvement, perception studies, risk governance studies or through the more general issue of the exercise of democracy regarding technical issues. Social and human aspects of industrial safety are addressed through the analysis of human and organisation factors of safety that are focused either on the analysis of single organisations (e.g. operators2 ) and their safety culture or address a safety system where safety is the result of the actions and interactions of operators, regulators and experts. We can currently observe that some regulators and technical support organisations, in particular in the nuclear field (e.g. IRSN in France, SITEX network in Europe), are developing new approaches where civil society is incorporated in the safety system as an additional layer contributing to safety, moving from a 3-pillar safety approach (operators, regulators, experts) to a 4-pillar conception including civil society. In the same time, international organisations dealing with safety, in particular in the nuclear field, are evolving from a vision of engagement of civil society purely focused on the issue of acceptation of technological choices to an acknowledgement of a positive contribution of civil society to safety culture and to safety itself3 . In the field of radioactive waste management, the COWAM (Community waste Management) European research project series4 have emphasised the contribution of civil society to safety culture. In the nuclear field, empirical studies5 have also started to emphasise the role of civil society as a contributor to safety. However, this renewed role of civil society as regards safety has not yet been investigated from a theoretical point of view. In this context, the ECCSSafe (Exploring Civil Society Contribution to Safety) research project6 aims to further explore the contribution of civil society to industrial safety by providing a theoretical framework for the analysis of this contribution, analysing 3 concrete cases in the 1 The concept of industrial safety is defined as the set of technical provisions, human means and organisational measures internal and external to industrial facilities, destined to prevent accidents and malevolent acts and mitigate their consequences. 2 In this document, the word “operator” refers to the whole organisation that operates a hazardous facility (e.g. the electricity company operating a power plant). 3 See notably the report of the IAEA International nuclear safety group “INSAG-20: Stakeholder Involvement in Nuclear Issues” (2006), which states that the “involvement of stakeholders in nuclear issues can provide a substantial improvement in safety. 4 See the final reports of the European research projects COWAM, COWAM 2 and COWAM in Practice available on the COWAM website www.cowam.com 5 See P. Richardson, P. Rickwood, Public Involvement as a Tool to Enhance Nuclear Safety, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, 2012. The study notably concludes that “there are tangible benefits to be gained from a more frank relationship between the nuclear power industry and the public, … [which] appears to represent a possible untapped asset for enhancing and maintaining safety. 6 ECCSSafe is supported by the French Foundation for a Culture of Industrial Safety (Foncsi)
  6. 6. 6 nuclear field and in other industrial fields in Europe and identifying key issues to address in further research and proposing guidelines for a larger scale research. At first, a theoretical and methodological framework7 has been developed in order to set up the conceptual framework and methodology for choosing and carrying out the case studies. This document notably included interview guidelines for the interviews, a grid of analysis for the case studies and criteria for selecting the cases The present documents presents the 3 case studies: • The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France) • The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary) • The local partnerships for site selection for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste in Slovenia It then proposes a transversal analysis of the 3 case studies along the grid of analysis developed in the theoretical and methodological framework (see grid of analysis in Annex 1). 7 cf. ECCSSafe deliverable 1: Theoretical and methodological framework
  7. 7. 7 2. Method and choice of the case studies These three case studies have been selected out of 8 pre-identified case studies, including 4 cases in the nuclear field and 4 cases in other fields of activity8 (the 3 selected case studies are in italics): • Case studies in the nuclear field: o The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France) o The local partnerships for site selection for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste in Slovenia o Civil society and local actors engagement on the safety of the Asse II mine (used as a radioactive waste storage) in Germany through a citizen advisory group coupled to an expert group o Contribution of civil society organisations to the re-assessment of copper canisters quality in the radioactive waste programme of SKB in Sweden • Case studies in other fields of activity: o The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary) o The break of the barrier at the Aika bauxite mine near Kolontár, Hungary o The role of the Local Information and Dialogue Committees (Comité Locaux d’Information et de Concertation - CLIC) in the development of Plans for Prevention of Technological Hazards (Plans de Prévention des Risques Technologiques – PPRT) in France o Management of risks of hydro power plant dam destruction at the hydroelectrical power station Golica in Austria (on border with Slovenia) on the Bistrica River The 3 case studies fully developed in this report have been chosen on the basis of the following criteria: • Importance of safety among the addressed issues: safety issues should play a significant role in the considered process of interaction with civil society. • Availability of information on how engagement of civil society contributed to safety • Variety of stakeholders engaged in the considered case and availability of a diversity of stakeholders to be interviewed • Participation options and organisation: how participation process was organised, was it formal, the extent (only public hearings, or more intensive role in the process), or informal pressures groups by civil society? • Participatory influence: how the proposals and comments were addressed and taken into account, how the decisions were changed? • Extent of safety discussion The three selected case studies all present a developed safety dimension and a possibility to have access to different stakeholders, both from civil society organisations, from regulators and from other involved actors (experts and technical support organisations, industrial organisations, local actors, …). The method used to develop the case studies has involved collection of written information (reports, minutes of meetings, websites, …) and desk work as well as interviews with a variety of stakeholders engaged in the cases. The analysis of the case studies (and the 8 a short description of the 8 cases is available in ECCSSafe deliverable 1.
  8. 8. 8 process of information collection beforehand) has been carried out according to the grid of analysis previously developed in ECCSSafe9 , which focuses on the following themes: • Understanding of safety and safety culture • Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety • Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance • Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders • Trust 9 The complete grid of analysis and the interview guidelines are available in ECCSSafe deliverable 1: Theoretical and methodological framework.
  9. 9. 9 3. The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France) 3.1. Introduction This case study deals with the engagement of civil society actors in the three successive decennial safety reviews of the reactors of the French nuclear power plant of Fessenheim. It describes and analyses how hybrid local dialogue organisations, the Local Information Commissions (Commissions Locales d’Information – CLI), gathering local elected representatives, local civil society organisations, representatives of the workers of the power plant and qualified personalities, commissioned external expert assessment of the decennial safety reviews of Fessenheim power plant. It also describes how this local process is embedded in a broader process of opening of the governance of nuclear activities to civil society in the French context from the beginning of the 1980’s to the beginning of 2010’s (with strong evolutions in the decade of the 2000’s). After a description of the method of the case study, we will describe the institutional context related to the engagement of civil society in nuclear activities and its evolutions. We will then describe the process of engagement of the Local information commission of Fessenheim in the three successive decennial safety reviews of reactors of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant from 1989 to 2012. We will then describe the national process led by the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire – ASN) and the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire – IRSN) from 2009 to facilitate the engagement of the engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety reviews of nuclear reactors. Finally, the case study will be analysed according to the common grid of analysis developed earlier in the framework of ECCSSafe. 3.2. Method This case study was developed on the basis of • Desk research based on written documentation available about the considered process (reports, guidelines, laws and regulations, websites of the local information commission of Fessenheim, of the ASN and the IRSN, …) • Interviews of actors or representatives of institutions having played a key role in the considered processes. These interviews were carried out in a semi-directive way, based on the grid of interviews previously developed in the framework of the project. The interviews were carried out in conditions of confidentiality: the outcomes of the interviews are presented as an integrated analysis, without revealing the content of the individual interviews. The people interviewed were the following: • Monique Sené, member of the GSIEN and member of the Scientific Committee of the National Association of Local Information Commissions and Committees (ANCCLI) • Ludivine Gili, Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) • Franck Bigot, Deputy Director of the Division for nuclear safety expertise, Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN) • René Junker, Member of the Local Information Commission of Fessenheim • Sophie Letournel, Head of the ASN Division of Strasbourg (competent for the Fessenheim power plant) It has not been possible to interview a representative of EDF, the operator of the Fessenheim power plant. The collected information has then been analysed according to the grid of analysis previously
  10. 10. 10 developed in the framework of the project. 3.3. Context of the case study The Local Information Commissions in France In France, Local Information Commissions (Commissions Locales d’Information – CLI) are attached to most nuclear sites. These committees are pluralistic dialogue forums gathering various types of local actors (elected representatives, social and economic actors, environmental NGOs, and qualified personalities) in order to facilitate dialogue of local actors with public authorities and operators. The CLIs have a general mission of follow-up of the activity of nuclear facilities, local dialogue on safety, radiation protection and impact of nuclear activities on people and the environment, and of information of the public on these issues. The IRSN, the ASN and the organisation operating the nuclear facility are regularly invited to the meetings of the CLIs but are not members. The first CLI was the Local Commission of Surveillance (CLS) of Fessenheim, created in 1977 for the Fessenheim nuclear power plant. The circular of the Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy of 15th December 1981, known as “Circulaire Mauroy” opened the way to the official creation of CLIs in the vicinity of nuclear installations by Departmental Councils, by encouraging – but not making compulsory – their creation. The 2006 Law on transparency and security in the nuclear field made the existence of the CLIs compulsory around all nuclear sites and included provisions on the organisation, role and funding of the CLIs and reinforced the legal basis of their missions. The Mauroy circular also provided for a conference of presidents of CLIs to be held at least once a year. In 2000, this conference was transformed in a permanent organisation: the National Association of Local information Commissions and Committees (Association Nationale des Comités et Commissions Locales d’Information – ANCCLI). The ANCCLI facilitates exchanges of information and common reflections between CLIS, supports the CLIs (notably through the Scientific Committee), facilitates relationships with IRSN and the ASN and give the CLIs a voice at the national level, notably through the annual conference of CLIs and by issuing White Papers on various issues (e.g. governance of nuclear activities, radioactive waste management, emergency and post-emergency preparedness and management, dismantling of nuclear facilities). The ANCCLI also created permanent working groups on various issues of interest for the CLIs, including safety, as a tool to facilitate exchanges between CLIs and support their work. Between the creation of the CLI and the creation of the most recent one in 2001, about 30 CLIs were created. They represent a diversity of contexts and experiences that sheds light on the issue of the contribution of local actors to safety and health and environmental protection around nuclear sites. The strategy for openness to society of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) Since 2003, the IRSN has continuously developed a strategy of openness to society that has contributed to modify the way expertise is framed, developed and made available by the IRSN. This process began in a national context of general evolutions of risk governance affecting all types of hazardous activities since the 1990’s. This context was notably the result of several public health scandals in France and Europe like the “mad cow crisis“ or the “contaminated blood crisis“. This notably raised public expectations about transparency and openness of expertise processes and about separation between expertise and decision-making and about the independence of expertise organisations. In the nuclear field, these expectations notably led in 2002 to the creation of the IRSN enacted by Law as an autonomous institution in the form an independent public technical and scientific institute.
  11. 11. 11 This context of change in risk governance also included new legal requirements for transparency and public participation. At the international level, the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was signed in 1998 notably by EU member states including France and also by the European Union. At the national level, the legal context included legal provisions for transparency and participation both for environment-related decisions in general and in the nuclear field in particular. The IRSN thus wished to evolve from being a public expert organisation supporting the decision-making processes of State organisations to a vision of public expertise that also included being an expert also acting for the public. The IRSN’s strategy of openness to society aimed to reach this objective by experimenting new relationships with stakeholders from the civil society, contributing to increase the transparency of its expertise processes while supporting the development of the technical capacities of those actors regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection. The IRSN’s strategy developed continuously from 2003 to the present day, through several important milestones. The first one was the creation, in 2003, of an internal tool to develop and implement the strategy under the form of a dedicated department: the Department for Openness to Society. This Department aimed to • being an access point for stakeholders from the civil society; • involving IRSN in European projects related to risk governance; • and supporting operational IRSN teams’ work in their interactions with stakeholders. New relations with stakeholders were developed through an experimental approach relying on pilot projects in which IRSN experts engaged interactions with stakeholders from the civil society on concrete cases. The inner tools for developing the IRSN’s strategy were complemented by a cooperation framework with the CLIs and the ANCCLI. In 2003, a cooperation agreement was thus signed between the IRSN and the ANCCLI, which included cooperation with the CLIs on pilot projects with local committees and the creation of joint thematic working groups on topics of particular interest for the CLIs. This agreement is based on a mutual understanding that the development of the skills of CLIs and ANCCLI is beneficiary for the CLIs & ANCCLI, the IRSN and the regulator – the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire – ASN). The engagement of the IRSN towards openness to society was reaffirmed in 2006 at the occasion of the renewal of performance agreement between the IRSN and the State. The new performance agreement included “meeting the needs of other social and economic actors” as one of the four strategic axis of the IRSN in the performance agreement. The IRSN finally materialised its engagements under the form of a Charter of Openness to Society in a two-step process. A first step was the participation of the IRSN to the process of development of a common Charter of Openness to Society by several public scientific and technical institutes covering different fields of activity. The IRSN and 3 other public scientific and technical institutes signed the common Charter in October 2008. The second step was the development of the IRSN’s specific Charter of Openness to Society, which was issued in April 2009. The Charter of Openness to society, as well as other strategic documents like the IRSN’s performance agreement, notably makes explicit the approach of safety underlying the IRSN’s strategy. In this approach, civil society is incorporated in the safety system as an additional layer contributing to safety, moving from a 3-pillar safety approach (organisations operating nuclear facilities, the regulator – the ASN, and public experts – the IRSN) to a 4-pillar conception including civil society.
  12. 12. 12 3.4. Presentation of the case study The 3rd decennial review of nuclear reactors: a convergence between 2 process of engagement of civil society at the national and at the local level The engagement of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the 3rd decennial safety review of Fessenheim nuclear power plant reactors developed at the crossroads of two processes of engagement of civil society in nuclear safety issues. • The first one, at the local level, is the process of engagement of the CLS (Local Information and Surveillance Commission – Commission Locale d’Information et de Surveillance) of Fessenheim and the independent expert group GSIEN (Scientific Group for Information on Nuclear Energy – Groupe Scientifique d’information sur l’énergie nucléaire) in the successive decennial safety reviews of Fessenheim nuclear power plant. • The second process, at the national level, is the development by the IRSN, the ANCCLI and some CLIs (including the CLS of Fessenheim), as a part of the strategy of openness to society of the IRSN, of a pilot case aiming to facilitate the engagement of CLIs and the ANCCLI in the 3rd decennial safety review of French nuclear reactors, and the development of national guidelines by the ASN to facilitate the engagement of CLIs in the decennial safety review of nuclear reactors. Engagement of the CLS of Fessenheim and GSIEN in decennial safety reviews Engagement of the CLS in the 1st decennial safety review In 1989, the Fessenheim nuclear power plant underwent the first decennial safety review of its two reactors Fessenheim 1 and 2. At this occasion, in the framework of its mission of follow-up of the activities of the nuclear power plant, the CLS of Fessenheim wished to have an independent opinion on the safety of Fessenheim nuclear reactor 1. On 14th April 1989, following a proposition made by the President of the CLS, the Department Council of Haut-Rhin commissioned and funded a group of French and foreign experts (including members of the NGO “French Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy” – Groupement des Scientifiques pour l’Information sur l’Energie Nucléaire, GSIEN) to perform a safety assessment of the nuclear power plant at the occasion of the shutdown of reactor 1. This pluralistic group was composed of 5 expert: Christian Kuppers et Lothar Hahn (Institut of Ecology of Darmstadt, Germany), Jochen Benecke (Institut Sollner and University of Munich, Germany), Luc Gillon (University of Louvain and Center for Nuclear Studies – SCK-CEN – of Mol, Belgium) and Raymond Sené (CNRS - Collège de France and member of the GSIEN), and 2 associated consultants : Patrick Petitjean (GSIEN) and Michèle Rivasi (CRII-Rad NGO, France). This pluralistic expert group performed its work from 11th May to 18th September 198910 . The works of the pluralistic expert group notably included 3 working meetings with experts from EDF, the SCSIN and the DRIRE, in presence of experts from the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety – IPSN) as well as a visit of the reactor building. The final report of the expert group was presented on to the CLS 18th September 1989 with presence of the press. The expert group reported good working relations with the regulators (Central service for safety of nuclear facilities – SCSIN, and Regional direction of industry & research – DRIRE), 10 A complete description of the mission of the expert group is available (in French) in issue 98/99 of GSIEN’s journal “La Gazette Nucléaire” (year 1989), in the article “Fessenheim, 10 years already”: http://www.gazettenucleaire.org/1989/98_99p03.html
  13. 13. 13 which accepted to participate to working meetings, to answer the expert group’s questions and to give access to safety documents. However, this first citizen assessment of the safety of reactors Fessenheim 1 and 2 was also characterised by initial reluctance of EDF, the electricity company operating the power plant, to recognize the expert group, meet the group directly and allow access to some documents. This reluctance has been partially overcome during the expert group’s mission and the expert group finally had access to some safety documents of EDF and experts from EDF took part to some working meetings with the pluralistic expert group. The conclusions11 of the pluralistic expert group stressed that, within the time and resources that were available and with the fragmentary pieces of information at its disposal, the expert mission has tried to form an opinion on the adequacy of the safety requirements of the actions performed during the ten-year review, without being able to engage in a comprehensive expertise and a comprehensive study. In its conclusions, the expert group considered necessary that EDF give more attention to safety checks before restarting of the reactors and give further attention to safety issues including those related to accident beyond design basis. It also regretted that a number of improvements could not been made before restarting the reactor and recommended that these improvements can be made as quickly as possible. The expert group made 3 specific recommendations for safety improvement (based on comparison with what exists in pressurized water reactors – PWR – of similar design): • Protection of nuclear fuel storage pool by a roof resistant to falling objects that may damage the fuel • Installation in the reactor building of a number of devices for measuring hydrogen that may be released in case of an accident beyond design basis (i.e. of a greater magnitude that the accidents scenarios taken into account in the design of the power plant). • Installation of fans in the reactor building to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen in the vicinity of the discharge cover of the pressurizer and neighbouring premises The expert group also proposed several improvements in the system of monitoring of the environment of the nuclear site as well as provisions to improve the protection of workers. Considering the limitation of its works, the expert group concluded that it was able to make recommendations to improve safety without allowing it to give a blank check. In these circumstances, the expert mission considered it should not recommend postponement of the restarting of reactor Fessenheim 1. In addition to the delivery of a report addressed to the CLS, the mission of the expert group was also followed up by the CLS and its conclusions were presented ad discussed during a plenary meeting of the CLS. Engagement of the CLS in the 2nd decennial safety review At the occasion of the 2nd decennial safety review, in 1999 the GSIEN was solicited anew by the CLS for Fessenheim reactors 1, and accepted to carry out an external expertise on safety and environmental impacts. The mission of the GSIEN was co-funded by the Departmental Council of Haut-Rhin and the ASN and was organised after the 2nd decennial safety review. The mission given to the GSIEN was to give an expert opinion on the safety of the nuclear reactor and on its environmental impacts based on the safety case prepared by EDF and the safety report produced by the regulator as a result of the safety review. 11 A summary of the expert group’s conclusions is available (in French) in issue 98/99 of GSIEN’s journal “La Gazette Nucléaire” (year 1989), in the article “Fessenheim, 10 years already”: http://www.gazettenucleaire.org/1989/98_99p03.html
  14. 14. 14 To ensure better access of GSIEN to information than for the 1st decennial safety review, a convention was signed between the ASN, EDF and the CLS. This convention ensured both the access of the experts from GSIEN to the EDF’s safety case for the decennial safety review and confidentiality of commercially sensitive information by non-divulgation clauses. In order to facilitate information exchange, different technical meetings between EDF and the GSIEN were organised on various issues: • steam generators, • radiation protection of workers, • reactor vessel • containment building. Due to this more structured framework, the GSIEN found the working condition be more satisfying than for the 1st decennial safety review. However, GSIEN still pointed out a too constrained time frame to perform a complete and thorough assessment of EDF’s safety file. The GSIEN delivered its report to the CLS on 6th March 2000. In the report, the GSIEN stressed the convergence between its own conclusions and the outcomes of the safety review of the regulator. It pointed out different points related to: • the resistance of the reactor vessel • the analysis of incidents occurred since 1989 • the catalogue of situations where the primary water circuit and the use of this catalogue • how the conclusions of the regulator resulting from the 1st decennial safety review were taken into account The GSIEN concludes, as did the regulator, that the guarantee of a safe operation of the reactor up to 40 years (i.e. for 20 more years) is not demonstrated. The GSIEN also concludes that the operation of the reactor for 10 more years can be done under satisfying safety conditions, under the condition of more regular monitoring and good return of experience. The expertise report of the GSIEN stressed that the conclusions of the pluralistic expert group commissioned by the CLS during the 1st decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 1 led to additional controls and improved the safety of the reactor. In particular, EDF has equipped the reactor buildings with hydrogen recombiners to lower the risk of explosions due to hydrogen discharge. This modification was made not only on Fessenheim reactors, but also in all nuclear power plants in France. However, the GSIEN also pointed out that some points of concern expressed by the pluralistic expert group during the 1st decennial safety visit were still not taken into account: • need to prove the resistance of the reactor building to an explosion • need to fix the opening device on the depressurisation valve of the reactor vessel • resistance of the nuclear fuel storage building to external aggressions • vulnerability of the facility to flooding. In addition to the delivery of a report addressed to the CLS, the mission of the expert group was also followed up by the CLS and its conclusions were presented ad discussed during a plenary meeting of the CLS. The GSIEN was solicited again one year later for the safety review of reactor Fessenheim 2, under similar conditions (expertise carried out just after the decennial safety review of the reactor, funding from the Departmental Council of Haut-Rhin, signature of a convention with EDF and the regulator and technical meetings with EDF). The GSIEN was asked to deliver an opinion on the safety of the reactor – but not on its environmental impacts. The GSIEN report included opinions on the following points:
  15. 15. 15 • Monitoring of the reactor vessel resistance • Reactor containment structure • Seismic and flooding risks • Analysis of significant incidents • Mechanical aspects • Neutron flux The GIEN concluded that, if they do not share EDF’s opinion in some cases, they acknowledge the efforts made by the operating company to ensure the safety of the reactor, understand phenomena of ageing under irradiation, and analyse incidents. They concluded that, it would be essential to reassess the resistance of the reactor vessel after 25 years in order to follow-up the defects discovered during the 2nd decennial safety visit. The GSIEN finally included an estimation of the human resources that were necessary for the GSIEN’s to carry out its expert assessment: 60 person-days, i.e. approximately 15 days of works for 4 experts. Here again, the works of the GSIEN were followed-up by the CLS and their outcomes were subject of presentations and discussion during a plenary meeting of the CLS Engagement of the CLS in the 3rd decennial safety review At the occasion of the 3rd decennial safety review, the local commission of Fessenheim, nom named CLIS (Local Commission of Information and Surveillance) commissioned anew in 2008 the GSIEN in 2008 to carry out a complementary safety assessment. This assessment was carried out under a different legal context than ten years before. In effect, the 2006 Law on Transparency and Safety in nuclear activities (TSN Law) makes compulsory the existence of one CLI for each nuclear site, gives the chairmanship of the CLI to the Departmental Council, précises the composition of the CLI members, and defines the mission of CLIs as a “general gives the CLI a general mission of follow-up, information and dialogue on nuclear safety, radiation protection and impact of nuclear activities on people and the environment as regards the activities of the site”. In this new legal and regulatory framework, the activities of the CLIs are co-funded by the Departmental Council and by the ASN. Moreover, the public technical support organisation on nuclear safety and radiation protection (and technical support of the ASN) had changed its status in 2002, becoming and fully independent institute, the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire – IRSN). Since 2003, the IRSN has engaged in a strategy of openness to society (see subsection “context of the case study” above), which included support to activities of various CLIs and their national association, the ANCCLI. The first step has been the negotiation and signature of a convention (see Annex 2) between the Department Council of Haut-Rhin, the ASN, the GSIEN and one expert commissioned by the Scientific Committee of the ANCCLI, David Boilley, nuclear physicist and member of the Association for monitoring of radioactivity in the West of France (Association pour le Contrôle de la Radioactivité dans l’Ouest – ACRO). This convention set the perimeter of the experts’ mission, which was composed of the following themes: • Follow-up of the 2nd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 1: assessment of the outcomes of the 2nd decennial safety review and lessons for the 3rd decennial safety review. • Reactor vessel • Fatigue defects • Reactor containment structure • Analysis of significant safety events and influence on safety • Nuclear fuel
  16. 16. 16 The convention also fixed the costs of the expert group mission (50 000 euros) and their funding (50% funding from the Departmental Council, 50% from the ASN). Finally, the convention set the confidentiality conditions for the access to EDF’s documents: the expert group has access to EDF’s documents related to the object of the expertise and commits not to reveal any document which is confidential according to the provisions of the TSN Law12 . According to the convention, the Departmental Council and the CLIS are bound by the same engagement. The way the mission was organised was also different than for the previous decennial reviews, as the time frame of the experts mission was considerably extended compared to the first 2 decennial safety reviews, and was larger than the time frame of the decennial safety review carried out by the ASN. The mission of the expert group formally began on January 2009 according to the convention and ended in June 2010, while the decennial review lasted from 17th October 2009 to 25th March 2010. The mission of the expert group was organised in the following way: • 3 preparatory meetings of the expert group from 25th March 2009 to 8th June 2009 • 5 technical meetings with the expert group, the ASN and EDF on Fessenheim nuclear power plant site from 28th September 2009 to 12th May 2010. During some of these meetings, visits of the expert group in different parts of the nuclear power plants were organised, including a visit of the reactor building on 21st December 2009. The last two meetings were dedicated respectively to a debrief of the decennial safety review carried out by the ASN (25th March 2010), and to the statistical study of the incident which occurred between the end of the previous decennial review (2000) and the current one (2009) • The report of the expert group was issued on June 2010. Beyond the technical meetings with the ASN and EDF, the expert group also had access, as an experimental process (see section about “the IRSN pilot case on 3rd decennial safety reviews” below), to the expertise o the IRSN. In effect, the IRSN gave the GSIEN access to its report on the 3rd decennial safety review of the 900 MWE reactors in France13 . This helped the expert group to refine its questions. The works of the expert group were followed up by the CLIS and their outcomes were presented to the CLIS and discussed during a plenary meeting of the CLIS. All interviewees reported good working relations between the expert group, EDF and the ASN and stressed the full commitment of EDF to facilitate the work of the expert group and give access to all requested information (as stressed in the conclusions of the final report of the expert group). The CLIS underlined that the way the expertise was carried out represented “the maximum that could be done” in this kind of independent expertise process. The expert group conclusions included various points related to the different topics addressed by the expert group (as fixed in the convention). The general conclusion14 of the expert group was that “the analysis of the files and of the answers given by both the operator and its technical support do not reveal alarming factors, even if points concerning the maintenance, realization of works, training should be better taken into account and be greatly improved. However, some questions remain: 12 article 19 of the Law 13 This report deals with the generic safety of French 900 MWE reactors and is not specific to a particular facility. It assesses possible safety issues and points of attention for all the reactors of similar design. 14 See the final report of the expert group, available (in French) at: http://www.anccli.org/wp- content/uploads/2014/06/Rapport-final-1-VD3-FSH-1.pdf
  17. 17. 17 - For example, the resistance of the foundation raft in a severe accident sequence remains an important issue, and that to the extent the probability of such accidents would increase due to the general aging of the facility and the increased combustion rate of fuels. - The waste issue, for those without disposal route and whose storage on site is not necessarily compatible with the geography of this site (flood risk, for example). - The increase in releases of Tritium correlated to the switch to Cyclade fuel that drives the increased use of boron. - The problems inherent in a system built with equipment designed more than 40 years ago. The rejuvenation of some equipment may create conflicts between existing technologies and those of 60-70 years.” According to the GSIEN, the IRSN and the ASN, there was no significant divergence between the conclusions of the expert group and the conclusions of the decennial safety review carried out by the ASN. Following the 3rd decennial safety review ad the mission of the expert group, EDF reinforced the foundation raft of the reactors and demonstrated that this reinforcement increased to 3 days (compared to 12 hours before the reinforcement) the time in which the raft would be bored in case of a core meltdown. At the occasion of the 3rd decennial review of reactor Fessenheim 2 (carried out from 16th April 2011 to 6th March 2012), the Departmental Council and the ANS commissioned and funded an expertise mission of the GSIEN, on proposal of the CLIS, under similar terms and conditions as for the 3rd decennial review of reactor Fessenheim 1. During the year 2011, the convention, similar to the one signed for Fessenheim 1, was negotiated and signed between the GSIEN, EDF, ASN and the CLIS. The expertise carried out by the GSIEN dealt with the following issues: • Reactor vessel (aging of the vessel and follow-up of the vessel’s defects) • Fatigue defects • New steam generators (the steam generators were replaced by new ones at the occasion of the shutdown of the reactor for the decennial safety review) • Confinement building The mission of the GSIEN lasted from August 2011 to June 2012. The works of the experts were organised in a similar way as for the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 1. This process included different technical meetings with EDF and the ASN as well as field visits. The GSIEN concluded that “the files of the ASN, the IRSN, EDF and its technical support does not reveal alarming factors and explains the restart authorization for 1 year to reactor Fessenheim 2. However, the GSIEN stressed that some questions remain: • the control of the training of workers, the control of the realization of projects (quality of work sheets), monitoring of radiation protection (see ASN inspection follow-up letters); • the resistance of the foundation raft in a serious accident sequence remains a major question: GSIEN was not the recipient of technical records on this topic. A thickening of the concrete of the raft is under consideration. However, the GSIEN, in the state of his knowledge of the case, is not convinced that this operation can be performed because this thickening, requested for many years and still undergoing analysis, should absolutely be done before the end of June 2013. Regarding the 3rd decennial safety review, the GSIEN expects the requirements that the ASN
  18. 18. 18 will issue to allow or not the continued operation of Fessenheim 2, those requirements being expected for the end of 2012. GSIEN will analyse them for the CLIS. Following the Fukushima accident, additional requirements should be available end of June 2012, concerning among other things, protection against floods and the reassessment of seismic risk.” In effect, the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 2 as carried out after the Fukushima accident, at a time when all European nuclear reactors underwent “stress tests” asked by the European Commission. Here again, interviews members of the GSIEN, the CLIS, the IRSN and the ASN noted a strong convergence between the conclusions of the GSIEN and the conclusions of the ASN report on the decennial safety review. A national process from 2009 to facilitate the engagement of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the decennial safety reviews of French nuclear reactors The ASN guidelines on the engagement of CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety review of nuclear reactors In parallel to the joint works of the IRNS, the ANCCLI and some CLIs, the regulator (ASN) has also prepared “Guidelines on the engagement of the CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety reviews of 900 MWE reactors”, in cooperation with the “Openness to society” unit of the IRSN. This document, issued as official guidelines of the ASN, was first presented to the CLIs at the 21st annual national conference of CLIS on 9th December 2009; its final version was issued on 1st June 2010. These guidelines were prepared based on the experience of the CLS of Fessenheim with the 3rd decennial safety visit of reactor 1, and on dialogue with the CLIS and the ANCCLI, notably at the occasion of the 21st national conference of CLIs. These guidelines are intended for the CLIs and aim to help them organising their engagement in the 3rd decennial safety reviews and organise, if they would wish so, a pluralistic expertise. The document also proposes guidelines for organising dialogue between the ASN, the CLIs and the organisation operating a nuclear power plant. The guidelines distinguishes three different possible levels of engagements fro the CLIs: 1. A simple information of the CLI by the ASN, which can be completed by presentations of the works carried out on specific themes 2. The organisation of a pluralistic expertise on a particular theme 3. The organisation of a pluralistic expertise on the whole decennial safety review, like the one carried out by the GSIEN on the 3rd decennial review of Fessenheim nuclear power plant. In the case of pluralistic expertise, the guidelines notably recommend to have a clear contractual framework between the Department Council, the organisation operating the nuclear power plant, the ASN and the experts. The convention signed between the Department Council of Haut-Rhin, the nuclear power plant, the ASN and the experts for the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor 1 is proposed as a model of such contractual framework. The ASN stresses that, according to the current legal framework, pluralistic expertise processes carried out by the CLIs can be co-funded by the ASN for half the expenses. The ASN included in its guidelines an indicative list of themes that can be included in the scope of pluralistic expertise processes with propositions of independent experts that could be mobilised on each theme. The guideline also includes a non-exhaustive list of themes on which the ASN can organise information of the CLIs.
  19. 19. 19 The IRSN pilot case on 3rd decennial safety reviews In 2006, the national public debate on the EPR reactors developed in France raised issues concerning the access of civil society to information and technical documents covered by industrial secret or secret defence. As a result, the High Committee on Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety (HCTISN)15 recommended new procedures for improved access to information be tested on concrete cases. In the framework of its policy of openness to society, the IRSN decided to take the 3rd decennial safety review of Fessenheim 1 reactor as a pilot case to assess how the IRSN can facilitate the engagement of CLIs in the process of the 3rd decennial safety review of French nuclear reactors. This pilot case took place in a context of already existing cooperation between the CLIs, the ANCCLI and the IRSN through various pilot cases and through joint working groups. The pilot process for the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 3 pursued three objectives: • to build upstream technical discussion with the Local Committees and experimenting procedures for the CLIs to access the operator’s safety reports; • to support capacity building for the CLIs in the perspective of the 3rd decennial safety review of nuclear reactors in France; • improving the IRSN’s knowledge of the expectations of the CLIs for the 3rd decennial safety reviews. The method developed in this pilot case relied on a national working group including the IRSN, 4 CLIs (Fessenheim, Gravelines, Blayais and Dampierre), the ANCCLI, EDF and the ASN. Access to information and documentation was already guaranteed by the convention signed between EDF, the ASN, the CLIS of Fessenheim and the experts commissioned by the CLIS at the occasion of the 3rd decennial safety review (see page 15). The pilot case was developed between April 2009 and November 2010 and relied on 2 tools or forums of exchange: the above-mentioned national working group and a final seminar involving a larger number of CLIs and of participants. The IRSN took preliminary contacts with CLIs in April 2009. The national working group involved in the project was then formed. A second step in the cooperation process has the preparation of an independent review of the IRSN’s safety report by an independent expert group (GSIEN) commissioned by the Fessenheim CLIS. The IRSN sent its safety report to the GSIEN on May 2009. In December 2009, the working group identified specific topics of interest for the CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety review process. In March 2010, a presentation of the IRSN’s safety report on Fessenheim nuclear power plant was made available for the working group. The final step of the process consisted in preparing and organising the final seminar of the project. From May to June 2010, the national working group identified the topics to be addressed in the final seminar and prepared the programme of the seminar. The final seminar of the pilot case was organised in November 2010 and gathered about 35 people, including participants from 10 CLIs as well as the ANCCLI. The programme of the seminar was organised along two topics of particular interest for the CLIs: 15 The HCTISN was created by the 2006 Law on Transparency and safety of nuclear activities. It has a mission of information, dialogue and debate on the risks associated to nuclear activities and the impact of these activities on human health, the environment and nuclear safety. The HCTISN can issue opinions on any issue in these fields as well as on the associated controls and information. It can also take up any question related to accessibility of information on nuclear safety and make proposals aiming to guaranteeing or improving transparency.
  20. 20. 20 • How to implement an independent expert assessment of a decennial safety review at site level? • How can the CLIs perform a follow-up of the facility after the decennial safety review? Three types of experts were involved in the cooperation process: the experts of the IRSN, experts from an independent scientific group (GSIEN) commissioned by the CLI of Fessenheim, and other experts involved in the decennial safety assessment (operator EDF, Nuclear safety Authority – ASN). Each of these 3 types of experts had a specific role in the process: • The IRSN provided information to the CLIs and the ANCCLI on the safety assessment of the nuclear reactor of Fessenheim, in particular by making available the IRSN’s safety report; • The GSIEN provided independent expert review of the IRSN’s safety report; • EDF and the ASN provided insights on specific issues (stakes of safety assessment for EDF, regulator’s perspective for the ASN). The CLIs and the ANCCLI took part in the process as civil society actors with particular awareness of nuclear safety issues. In the process, their role was to • Contribute to the framing of the issues addressed in the decennial safety review; • Take benefit of the interactions with different types of experts in terms of empowerment and capacity to engage in the process of the 3rd decennial safety review. Civil society actors involved in the process were essentially members of the CLIs and of the ANCCLI. The members of CLIS and of the ANCCLI taking part to the national working group had access to information on the safety review of the Fessenheim reactors by different ways: • access to the IRSN’s safety report • access to the independent analysis of the IRSN’s safety report made by the GSIEN • exchanges with the IRSN, the operator of the reactors (EDF) and the Nuclear Safety Authority within the national working group • final seminar of the project. A broader range of CLI members (from 10 CLIs) had access to information on the safety review process through the final seminar of the project. The cooperation process resulted in competence building for the members of the working group. This includes the participating CLIs but also the IRSN, which improved its understanding of the stakes of the CLIs in the decennial review process and enhanced its capacity to interact with them in the decennial review processes for other reactors. The process thus enabled the CLIs and the IRSN to identify topics of particular interest for the CLIs during a periodic safety review. In particular, this cooperation led the CLIs and IRSN to identify and share the CLIs’ needs for playing an active, meaningful and effective role in decennial safety review: • Access to technical trainings • Information sharing between CLIs • Dialogue forums between CLIs and with the institutional actors of periodic safety reviews (IRSN, Nuclear Safety Authority, operator) • Access to diversified expert support resources: IRSN, Scientific Committee of the ANCCLI, independent expert, … The specifications of the safety review for Fessenheim nuclear power plant were also adapted as a result of the cooperation process. Finally, at the end of the process, some CLIs considered continuing the process in an autonomous way in the context of the 3rd decennial safety reviews of the French nuclear
  21. 21. 21 power plants. As a consequence, the IRSN continued to engage with the CLIs and the ANCCLI on the issue of decennial safety reviews through meeting with different working groups of the ANCCLI and discussions with the ANCCLI on the ways the IRSN can support the engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety reviews. The ANCCLI is currently defining with the IRSN the issues on which it wished to engage in the framework of the 4th decennial safety visits of French nuclear reactors. The IRSN-ANCCLI seminar on human and organisational factors Following the Fukushima catastrophe (11th March 2011), it appeared that this accident was due not only to a natural disaster, but also to human and organisational factors16 . This led the CLI and the ANCCLI to pay particular attention to the human and organisational factors in safety. On 18th June 2013, the IRSN and the ANCCLI organised a seminar17 for the members of the different CLIs on this theme. The objective of this seminar was to facilitate the building and reinforcement of the competences of CLIs on this issue and organise exchanges between the different stakeholders (IRSN, ASN, EDF, HCTISN and CLIs). The seminar gathered about 60 people, including 40 members from 20 CLIs. This seminar enabled the participants to share information on the history of how human and organisational factors have been taken into account in the expertise on nuclear safety, identify themes to further investigate following the Fukushima accident and discuss issues like competence management or subcontracting. 3.5. Analysis of the case study Understanding of safety and safety culture Both the documentation and the interviews show that all involved actors (EDF, the ASN, the IRSN, the CLIS of Fessenheim and the experts it had commissioned) share a common understanding of safety as a continuous improvement process. The understanding of the role of the civil society in this process evolved through time between the first decennial safety review of Fessenheim 1 reactor in 1989 to the end of the expertise mission of the GSIEN on the decennial safety review of Fessenheim 2 reactor. Initially being an initiative of the local actors, the engagement of the CLIS of Fessenheim in the decennial safety reviews now has become something usual. The experts commissioned by the CLIS of Fessenheim had a high level of technical qualification and demonstrated the capacity of civil society to produce sound competent and precise assessment of technical safety issues with nuanced conclusions. They played both a role of expertise and of mediation, conveying the results of their expertise to the CLIS in an understandable way. The CLIS represented a second level of mediation as it gave account of the outcomes of the expertise of the GSIEN to the general public through its information tools 16 The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) set up by the Japanese Parliament to investigate the Fukushima accident concluded that Fukushima was a “manmade” disaster (see executive summary of the commission’s report on http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp- content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf). 17 The programme of the seminar and the support documents of the different presentations made are available on the IRSN website: http://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Nucleaire_et_societe/expertise- pluraliste/IRSN-ANCCLI/Pages/2-Seminaire-Juin-2013-Facteurs-organisationnels-humains-surete- nucleaire.aspx
  22. 22. 22 (website and newsletter) in a form accessible to the general public. The engagement of the CLIS of Fessenheim and of the experts it commissioned for the first and second decennial safety review had an actual impact of safety as it led to some technical modifications of the facility and to adaptations of its monitoring programme. For the 3rd decennial safety review, there is a convergence of views between the CLIS, the GSIEN, the IRSN and the ASN on the fact that the engagement of the GSIEN did not bring up safety issues that would not have been detected by EDF or the ASN assisted by its technical support organisation, the IRSN. However, the engagement of civil society played a role of stretching and led the IRSN and ASN to better explain and justify their assessments. Two quotes from the interviews18 illustrate this assessment of the role of civil society: “A virtuous process which challenges everyone to better express and explain one’s positions” “It is good to have an external glance on the way safety is managed in the nuclear facilities, in order to cope with the fact every human system generates habituation” In the current French nuclear safety system, there is a shared understanding between the CLIS and the ANCCLI, the ASN and the IRSN that the first responsible of the safety of nuclear power plants are the organisations operating them (in the case of France, EDF), which is then complemented by the ASN (and its technical support organisation, the IRSN) as a second layer of safety, the engagement of civil society in safety issue representing a third layer of safety in this system which plays a specific role of quality insurance, both from the point of view of institutional players and from the one of civil society. The engagement of the CLIs on the nuclear safety reviews, which was an unexpected initiative form the CLS of Fessenheim in 1989, now appears as a normal and desirable component of the process of the decennial safety visits and is supported by both the regulator (ASN) and its technical support organisation (IRSN). In the framework of this case study, it was not possible to determine if EDF also shares or not this understanding of the safety system where civil society (and in particular the CLIs and the ANCCLI) constitutes a fourth pillar of nuclear safety. What can be traced in the interviews and documents is the evolution of EDF’s attitude along the successive decennial safety reviews, from reluctance to acknowledge the initiative of the local commission of Fessenheim to a full cooperation and extended and regular dialogue with the local commission and its experts. According to all interviewees, EDF is fully “playing the game” of the engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety reviews and contributed to create an enabling environment for the CLIs by giving access to its documents and make its own experts available for meetings and exchanges with the CLIS and its experts. This shared understanding of civil society as a component of the safety system (at least shared between the CLIs and ANCCLI, the ASN and the IRSN) is the outcome of a co- evolution process between civil society and the institutions responsible for safety. This co- evolution process, which deployed both at the local and at the national level, combines the progressive engagement of civil society organisation in safety issues, which becomes more and more structured, with the evolution of the institutional framework, which becomes more and more supportive to the engagement of civil society. In this process, both civil society and nuclear safety institutions progressively experienced and acknowledged the benefits of civil society engagement for safety and for the clarity and transparency of the safety system. Beyond the contribution of civil society to safety itself, the interviewees also identified the engagement of civil society in safety issues as a factor improving transparency of the safety system and mutual understanding between EDF, the ASN, the IRSN and civil society organisations. The integrity and quality of the work of the IRSN, ASN and CLIs is not 18 The method of the interviews includes an engagement of confidentiality on the content of individual interviews. The interviewees are therefore not identified in the quotes.
  23. 23. 23 questioned by any side. Finally, confronting the assessment of the ASN and the IRSN to external expert scrutiny also contributed to demonstrate the independence of these organisations. Definition of safety as a public affair In the considered case, the relationship between EDF, the regulator, its technical support organisation and civil society actors is structured around a common good recognised by all: ensuring that existing reactors operate at the best safety level. All actors share the view that safety is not granted once for all and requires permanent vigilance and improvement. Institutional actors (the ASN and the IRSN) note that civil society organisations actively engage in safety issues and that dialogue on safety of existing nuclear power plants between civil society organisations, EDF the ASN and the IRSN can be organised whatever the position of these civil society organisations vis-à-vis nuclear energy. The fact that nuclear energy production is recognised as a public affair in (e.g. an activity having consequences on other actors than the ones carrying out the activity, thus giving ground for these actors to influence the activity) and the consideration of safety as a common good is reflected in the institution of the CLIs, which are at the same time dialogue forums where safety issues can be discussed between all the concerned stakeholders and organisations capable of taking action (e.g. by commissioning non-institutional experts to analyse the safety of the reactors at the occasion of decennial safety reviews), this action being supported by the IRSN and the ASN. The process of decennial safety reviews also showed an agreement between all actors on the basis of safety assessment and on what should be investigated. The access to information and expertise for the CLIS and the experts it commissioned has been improved from one decennial safety review to the next one through the three successive decennial safety reviews. Starting from a point where the access to the documents of EDF was a subject of tensions during the first decennial safety review, the safety system (including the CLIS and its experts) has created a framework enabling access to EDF’s documentation as well as a facilitated access of civil society to the expertise of the IRSN and of the ASN. For the third decennial safety review, this framework set a time frame that accommodates the limitations and constraints of civil society experts. All actors now consider this framework and the associated practices of work satisfactory, although the limited number of available independent exerts still constitutes a limiting factor. Governance The governance framework in which the engagement of civil society on safety issues took place has evolved from 1989 to 2012. This evolution has been a result of both the engagement of the civil society and of the willingness of institutions (including the Parliament) to open the governance of nuclear society to civil society actors. This evolution included both local and national components: • At the local level, the conventions between EDF, the CLIS and the ASN have clarified the conditions of work and of access to information of the expert commissioned by the CLIs of Fessenheim and the conditions of interaction between EDF, the ASN, the IRSN, the CLIS of Fessenheim and the experts commissioned by the CLIS. • At the national level, the Mauroy circular of 1981 gave a first institutional framework for the creation of CLIs, which was reinforced and clarified with the 2006 Law on transparency and safety of nuclear activities. This Law grants a precise role of information and follow-up of nuclear activities to the CLIs and the ANCCLI. • Organisations like the ANCCLI (which gives a voice to the CLIs at the national level and facilitates inter-CLI dialogue) and processes like the pilot process developed by the IRSN o the decennial safety visits enables to establish links between the local and the national levels in this governance framework.
  24. 24. 24 Beyond the formal governance framework, a steady cooperation has developed between the CLIs and the ANCCLI, the IRSN and the ASN. This cooperation goes far beyond the sole issue of safety reviews of nuclear reactors and encompasses a wide diversity of other issues: radioactive waste management, post-accident situations, decommissioning of nuclear facilities, … The building of working practices with EDF, the IRSN and the ASN on the decennial safety reviews have been facilitated by the monopolistic position of EDF as the operator of all French nuclear power plants. Controversies and co-framing No controversies were identified by the CLIS, the GSIEN, the ANCCLI, the IRSN and the ASN in the process of decennial safety reviews. The issues addressed were of technical nature plus the issue of human and organisational factors affecting safety. The interviewees stressed that they observed, over decades, a progressive separation between the debate on nuclear energy and the debate on safety of existing reactors, and a capacity to avoid pro/anti nuclear polarisation of debates. One of the interviewees however noted that the debate on the extension of the lifetime of French nuclear reactors is now reconnecting the issues of the debate on nuclear energy and the issue of nuclear safety, while this does not impede constructive discussions on safety. In a landscape where a diversity of positions exist vis-à-vis nuclear energy, the CLIs and the ANCCLI aim to constitute independent information relays with a critical eye between the public and the regulator, the public expert (the IRSN) and the operator of nuclear reactors (EDF). In the case of Fessenheim, this independence has been well supported by the capacity of the CLIS to commission a sound external assessment of the safety review. Trust Through the successive decennial safety reviews, EDF and the other institutional actors of safety have demonstrated have been demonstrated that civil society actors are capable of constructive interactions. The convergence between the safety assessment of the ASN, IRSN and CLI/ANCCLI reinforces the credibility of IRSN and ASN. This did not damage the credibility of the CLIs and ANCCLI as the experts commissioned by the CLIS were capable of a precise safety assessment, and pointed out different points of improvement of safety. The engagement of civil society played a role of quality insurance for the safety system and reinforced the trustworthiness and robustness of the safety system as a whole and contributed to the transparency and readability of the safety system. In particular, the interactions between the CLIs and the IRSN and the ASN at the occasion of the 3rd decennial safety review (both the process in Fessenheim and the national pilot case developed by the IRSN) resulted in an improvement of the information delivered by these two organisations, which adapted their communication to better fit the needs of the civil society and the public. Finally, the testing of procedures and processes for access of experts commissioned by civil society to classified information and documentation of EDF has validated these procedures and processes, and first of all the very principle that an expert mandated by civil society can access under these condition to documents that cannot be made available to the public. This reinforces the transparency of the safety system, which is a factor of reinforcement of trust in this system.
  25. 25. 25 4. The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary) 4.1. Introduction Chapter 1 of this case study is concerning the brief history of incinerator in the town of Dorog. There are several factors why we have chosen Dorog as the subject of this study, for instance the civil participation was really active before and after the Hungarian regime change, so this is an ongoing civil (“watchdog”) control. According to the history of Dorog, Chapter 1 is dealing with several safety problems of more than 25 years: illegal waste storage and respiratory diseases; emission and slag problems; “waste of Garé”; serious water pollution. Chapter 2 is relating to the role of Environmental Protection Association of Dorog (EPAD): we are elaborating the aims of public participation, analyzing the tools and strategies of the Association, which has changed a lot during the operation of the incinerator. Chapter 3 is about the experiences of the interviews. Several important conclusions can be drawn: • From the late 1980s (before the Hungarian regime change) to the early 2000s the strategy of the local NGO can be characterized by massive civil resistance, pressure on the incinerator and environmental authorities, demonstrations. From the last huge disaster (water pollution in 2004) the Association has basically changed its model. The new strategy is based on negotiation with the incinerator. • The NGOs motivate the incinerator to operate correctly, on the other hand they have to trust each other. This trust depends on personal relationship. • The constant presence of civilian control must be interiorized to the company. • Without professional expertise the civil organization does not understand the operation of the facility or the relating problems, they cannot control the incinerator. • It would be the task of the Hungarian state strengthening the civil capacities (this is capacity building in a broad sense). • The civil contribution to safety depends on personal relationships between civil activists and employees of the industrial facility. There is a very poor cooperation between the local and national/international NGOs: they do not share their personal, professional experiences or coordinate their strategies. In the future contribution to the local and national trust, it would be necessary to strengthen the collaboration between the several types of NGOs and to reconcile their interest. 4.2. Method The case study of Dorog is based on desk research and interviews of different stakeholders. According to Deliverable 1: Theoretical and methodological framework (19 February 2015) the interviews have been built on a very various range of practical experience: industry, experts, and civil society, local communities (see the detailed profiles in the Appendix II). Unfortunately the Hungarian environmental and nature protection systems have been transformed in the recent months. The Environmental and Natural Protection Authorities have been integrated to the local Government Offices, which are the parts of the central Government at county level (there are 20 Government Offices in each counties and one in Budapest). Up to the closing date of this final version of the case study we do not receive a response about our interview’s request with a representative of the competent Environmental and Natural Protection Authority. That’s why the theoretical and methodological framework used for the interviews has been semi-directive and a qualitative rather than quantitative survey, on one hand we have used
  26. 26. 26 the interview guidelines and on the other hand we have modified and completed at some points these questions according to Hungarian case. We have invited the interviewees to present as much freely their experiences as they can. We detail hereunder the different questions that have been covered during the interviews. The interviewees were the following: • Mr. Attila Szuhi, energy policy expert and former activist of Humusz Waste Prevention Alliance19 , which is a national NGO relating to environmental protection. • Mr. János Tittmann, Mayor of Dorog since 1994, between 2002-2010 Member of the Hungarian Parliament.20 • Mr. Tamás Nádor, environmental activist and representative of Environmental Protection Association of Dorog, which is a local NGO.21 • Mrs. Katalin Lágler, general manager of Sarpi Dorog Ltd. 22 (member of Veolia Group23 ) since 1997. 4.3. Brief History of the Incinerator of Dorog and its Problems The Importance of Dorog and considerations for the analysis There are four main factors why the case of Dorog has been chosen the subject of this analysis: 1. Relating to the history of the Hungarian civil sphere this is the only case in which before and after the Hungarian regime change the civil participation and resistance was efficient and remarkable. 2. According to this specificity we can investigate the potentiality and specifications of the social participation, the resources and attitudes of the civil activists. 3. The role of the civilian control is not particularly significant in terms of violence or preventing the investment. The real importance is the civil ongoing ("watchdog") control, which could point out several misappropriations about the facility. 4. The inhabitants and civil activists of Dorog have experienced at first-hand why the social participation is so important and how it could contribute to safety culture. 19 Their mission: “Humusz Waste Prevention Alliance, originally established by five Hungarian environment protecting organizations in 1995, works for presenting waste poor, environment conscious solutions and lifestyle examples. We do show that there is a form of being, in which money and consumption are not prior to everything else, but one may still be satisfied within it. With the solutions recommended by us we wish to revive the small, local communities, to turn people towards each other again, instead of turning towards objects, and to restore trust through common adventure…. The objective of Humusz is to make sustainable production and consumption an everyday practice in Hungary. We work in order to create the will, to disseminate the knowledge required and to develop the societal, economic and environmental framework of conditions needed. In this regard we consider civil communities, teachers and students attending higher education to be our outstanding allies. Our tools include the provision of information, education and consulting, the research for good practices, developing and establishing waste prevention examples, and the stimulation of community co-operations.” Source: http://www.humusz.hu/english/one-day-you-will-end- humusz-anyway/721 20 Source: http://www.dorog.hu/index.php?nyelv=angol 21 Source: http://dke.hu/ 22 Source: http://www.sarpi.hu/fooldal/lang:en 23 Source: http://www.veolia.com/en
  27. 27. 27 The birth of the Incinerator The idea of incinerator originated back to the Communist ages (in 1984), when the three main Hungarian pharmaceutical company decided to build a incinerator for hazardous waste. Dorog has been accepted for two simple reasons: it situates in the center of an industry region, and 20 thousand barrels of hazardous waste have been accumulated around this area. The facility met with a huge social resistance, which was really unprecedented before the Hungarian regime change. In 1984 the land-use permit has been withdrawnd by the local authorities and the central government took over the case. Meanwhile the citizens of Dorog started to collect signatures for protest petitions, public forums has been initiated by local organizations. The constructions began in 1985 by the direct force of the Communist government. Before the Hungarian transition the protesters set up one of the first Hungarian green social organization in 1988 (Environmental Protection Association of Dorog – EPAD). After the regime change the ‘Dorog-saga’ has not finished, because under the new circumstances the relevance of the social control has been increased. The incinerator was denationalized. The trial operation of the incinerator was in 1989, the commissioning in 1991, the initial capacity was 25 thousand tons. In 1991, the facility got final approval. Although the incinerator would burn the waste of the three pharmaceutical companies and the county, later the facility’s license had been extended to the entire country. Safety Problems at the Facility From the beginning, detailed earlier, operation of the incinerator is burdened with several serious technical and environmental problems. We can say that the incinerator constantly provided causes and reasons to the civil participation and control. A. Illegal Waste Storage and Respiratory Diseases At the beginning of the operation, in the first part of 90s thanks to the investigation of EPAD, it came to light that the incinerator stored hazardous waste at the local railway station without any permission and safety measures. Although the company was fined 25 million Forints, this was not an isolated case. The civil activist of the Association brought to light that the proportion of children with respiratory diseases has been cautiously increased and by the end of 90s it was more than three times the national average. B. Problems with Emission and Slag In the 90s there were also several problems with the filtration system, namely the dust removal equipment did not meet the emission standards. The company had been operating for a long time with inaccurate, unsuitable emission instruments. In this case the town of Dorog and the public pressured the company and forced it to perform the needed measurements relating to the emission. It was also a huge problem to remove the slag from the incinerator. The slag was stored for a long time near the facility, without any environmental permission. According to Humusz, a Budapest-based environmental NGO specializing in waste issues: “The company does not have the necessary documentation, which is inevitable for the reliable and safe operation. Although the incinerator has the high level ISO 14001 certificate, the slag is not treated in a proper way. After burning 21 000 tons of waste approximately 12 000 tons of solid incineration residue is generated every year. This amount has been landfilled on the slag landfill of the incinerator, in the city area with no respect to the regulations between 1996 and 1998. The landfilled slag has already significantly polluted the groundwater but not yet the
  28. 28. 28 karst water.”24 This caused serious groundwater pollution, according to an expert research chlorinated solvents, carbohydrogens, benzenes, dioxins and different organic compounds can be found in the groundwater. The EPAD and the whole public sphere pressured the company to eliminate the pollution. C. “Waste of Garé” One of the most important scandals relating to the operation of the incinerator is the “waste of Garé”. The case of Garé25 is very similar to Dorog and the case reveals the problems of incineration itself. Because of the heavily polluted site, Garé has become one of the most dangerous cases of the Hungarian environmental history. This hazardous waste dumping site in Garé, a small village in southern Hungary, was used by the Hungarian Chemical Company for 10 years during the 1970s and 1980s. Because of financial difficulties the company was unable to comply with the standards and orders of the environmental authorities to clean up the site. In the early 1990s the company established a joint firm with a French hazardous waste incinerator company to build an incinerator near the dumping site. The planned incinerator would have burnt all the waste in one and a half years, but thereafter would have handled additional waste from other places. The problem of hazardous waste treatment and the planned incinerator represent a priority environmental dilemma for the southern region of Hungary. The key question is whether Hungary needs a second hazardous waste incinerator in addition to the existing one in Dorog. Due to strong opposition from the public, the regional inspector refused to issue an environmental permit in this case. The first Government of Viktor Orbán solved this huge environmental and social crisis by burning the waste of Garé in the operating incinerator at Dorog. Despite the fact that it was technically unsuitable, the Government tried it: during the experimental burnings it has been showed that that the incineration of the waste of Garé emitted six times more dioxins than the environmental limits. Residents of Dorog protested against the burning of unknown type of toxic waste; the NGO claimed that the incinerator failed to keep its emissions below the allowed maximum.26 As a result of the civil protest the company gave up the burning process, nevertheless until then a huge amount toxic waste has been burnt by the incinerator. In addition, the company tried again the incineration in 2001, and the only thing which prevented this, was the huge pressure by the residents. D. Water Pollution The latest pollution due to the incinerator happened in the summer of 2004. In that summer, the incinerator leaked a huge amount of toxic waste into the soil, contaminating local drinking water sources. According to Humusz, from one of the deposit tanks of the Dorog waste incinerator pollution was leaked out into the Danube and, from there, to the drinking water of Esztergom. Technical problems, technological indiscipline and human faults caused the environmental catastrophe. The environmentalists expressed their concerns that there were many malfunctions and the company informed the authority with a significant delay and did not even let the authorities’ people into the site right away. Furthermore information was kept back so the authorities were not aware of the different pollution materials that were spilled. Due to the lack of information the prohibition of the drinking water consumption came into force with remarkable delay. As a result the inhabitants were drinking the polluted water for 24 Humusz, 1995 25 Fülöp Sándor (1996). Case Examples from Central and Eastern Europe. Garé Hazardous Waste Incinerator Case. In: REC, 1996 Source: http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/BndBound/Hungary.html 26 Gille, 2007 174. p
  29. 29. 29 many days. There was no accurate information on the pollution in the water, their composition and therefore not even on their impacts on the human life. The drinking of the water from the pipeline was prohibited temporarily (the inhabitants could drink water in bottles only for weeks). “Residents of surrounding settlements could not drink tap water for two weeks, and the company is now facing not only a huge fine but also an ever-louder demand that the incinerator be shut down.”27 There were several demonstrations, collecting signatures, residential forums. The NGOs demanded the following: • to suspend the operation of the incinerator until the entire environmental impact assessment, • the punishment of the people in charge, • the remediation of the damaged environment, • compensation of the city and the inhabitants, • strengthening the environmental and health authorities in order to be able to prevent stricter the hazardous activities in the future, • the cost of environmental restoration should be paid by the concerned companies, • the relevant regulations should be more severe, • the municipalities and public should be regularly informed, • and the municipal and public control of companies with hazardous activities should be implemented. The company and its management have been fined, but there were no further (for instance criminal or administrative) consequences. However, these massive protestations were needed to inform and protect the public. The operator (at that time, ONYX Hungary Kft.) had submitted a request to the environmental authorities for additional capacity enlargement in September 2004, just weeks after the serious water pollution occurred in Esztergom. Although the authorities gave a free way to the capacity enlargement, many NGOs expressed deep concerns about the company that caused a serious environmental pollution. The increased capacity meant that the absolute amount of emitted pollution was increasing, even if the emission is below the value limits. Based on past experiences, the local NGO considered the capacity enlargement as a serious mistake. 4.4. The Role of the Local Participation After the regime change in 1989-1990, the EPAD continuously struggled against the contamination of the facility. The Association has become a member of Humusz Waste Prevention Alliance, which is a network of Hungarian civil organization and was established in 1995. The civil association has become an unavoidable player at the local politics with several representatives at the town council. One of the matchless outcomes of the Association is establishing a local newspaper, called Green Lines (Zöld Sorok)28 concerning local and regional environmental issues. It is nearly unprecedented that an NGO can establish and finance a local medium. This was one of the main factors of the success of this 27 Gille, 2007 175. p 28 Source: http://dke.hu/index.php/zold-sorok-lapszamai?start=25
  30. 30. 30 environmental movement. The protests with thousands of participants indicate the power of the organization. Without this continuous civil control the incinerator would have caused several irreversible damages (for instance at the case of Garé). We can say that the civil society contributed to safety and sometimes took over the authorities’ responsibility. The case of Dorog was proved awareness-raising at the national level. The fact that the Hungarian public could know about the problems and doubts about the procedure of incineration depended on this persistent civil activism. According to Kiss: “In modern societies dealing with environmental issues has become a part of everyday life. Making decisions on waste- or water-related issues is part of the public discourse in Hungary as well. The Hungarian literature on public participation discusses different participatory tools applied in particular policy fields. Public participation seems to have greater significance in environmental decisions than any other kind of democratic decision making processes.”29 The EPAD has proven that in the field of environmental protection there are several formal and informal participative techniques which could be very successful against industrial facilities. Why Should the Public Participate? If we would like to understand the civil tools and techniques, we have to answer the question why the public should participate in environmental decisions? There are several arguments relating to public participation. Kiss Gabriella distinguishes six arguments: “Democratic arguments come from the theory of democracy itself and the three models of democracy. Arguments from Habermas’ theory are based on deliberative democracy and communication theories. Green arguments are rooted in the concept of sustainability and connected to the model of environmental democracy. The arguments on risks and particularly environmental risks are based on the different risk approaches and assessments. The relationship between science and society could be the basis for the next argument. The behavioral arguments stem from behavioral economics and add a psychological point of view to these approaches.” Tools and Strategies used by the NGO Sherry R. Arnstein argues “that citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society.”30 Arnstein classified the types of participation and "non-participation". This typology of eight levels of participation is “arranged in a ladder pattern with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product.”31 We would like to use this concept to illustrate the evolution of techniques of the EPAD. 29 Kiss, 2014 13. p 30 Arnstein, 1969 216. p 31 Arnstein, 1969
  31. 31. 31 Eight rings of citizen participation Type of citizen participation Tools and Techniques used at the Case of Dorog Cases, Disasters When? (8) Citizen Control Citizen Power Visiting the Facility Direct Cooperation Interpersonal Relations - Last 5 - 10 years (7) Delegated Power (6) Partnerism (5) Placation Tokenism Demonstrations Data Requests Environmental Information Litigation Pressure on Environmental Authorities Water Pollution “Waste of Garé” 1990s - 2000s (4) Consultation (3) Informing (2) Therapy Non-participation Demonstrations Civil Disobedience Collecting Signatures Residential Forums Litigation Pressure on Local and Central Power, Environmental Authorities Problems with Emission and Slag Illegal Waste Storage and Respiratory Diseases 1980s - 1990s(1) Manipulation Table 1 - Arnstein's participation ladder and the case of Dorog According to the safety problems a significant displacement has happened as the local NGO of Dorog changed its strategy and the incinerator accepted the Association as a partner as well. The emergence of this trust structure is the main contribution to safety. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the demonstrations and pressuring were unnecessary, because without these tools the cooperation would not have happened.

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