This presentation by Yvrande-Billon, Chair of the OECD Network of Economic Regulators and vice-president of the French transport regulator, was made during the discussion “Independent sector regulators and competition” held at the 68th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 2 December 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/isrc.

1. RoundtableonIndependentSectorRegulatorsandtheir
RelationshipwithCompetitionAuthorities
Anne Yvrande-Billon
OECD Competition Committee
Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation
1
Paris, 2 December 2019
Autorité de régulation des transports (since 10/1/19)

2. Transport regulation in France: The crucial role of ADLC
2009
• Creation of ARAF (Rail regulatory body) – Transposition Directive 2001/14 (ADLC Opinions 08-A-17)
• Economic regulation of rail infrastructure managers (fair and non discriminatory access
conditions to network)
2014
• Rail Reform Act I  Holding structure IM / RU (ADLC Opinions 11-A-05 on stations
management and 13-A-04 on Railway Act)
• Additional powers to the RB (e.g. sanction committee, binding opinions on IM’s CEO, SF access
charges)
2015
• Liberalization of intercity coach market (ADLC Sector inquiry 04-A-05)
• ADLC Opinion 14-A-13 on motorways concessionnaires
• Creation of ARAFER  Economic regulation of intercity coach stations and services (prevention
of « intermodal cream-skimming ») + Economic monitoring of motorway concessions and
control of procurement procedures
2018
• Rail Reform Act II  Liberalization of the domestic rail market
• Additional missions to the RB
2019
• Privatization of Aéroport de Paris (ADP)
• Creation of ART  Economic regulation of airport charges (ADLC Opinions 10-A-04 & 16-A-10)
2020
• New scope of competence  Parisian rail infrastructure manager + transport data
• Data collection powers extended

3. Legal basis
― L. 1264-15: reciprocal information
 ARTADLC : obligation to refer to ADLC if aware of abuse of dominance or any
anticompetitive practice in the rail, coach, motorway, airport sectors
 ADLCART : communication of any referral related to the regulated sectors + M&A
phase 2
― L. 2133-4: accounting separation
 Approval of accounting separation rules of the RU by ART, following ADLC’s opinion
― L. 3114-13, L. 3114-14: market position of coach stations managers
 Definition of relevant markets and assessment of market position by ART, following
ADLC’s opinion (passengers transport services markets)
 Asymetric regulation
Ensuring consistency between ART and ADLC
Voluntary coordination mechanisms
― Common job vacancy platform & Staff
exchange
― Regular meetings of sector regulators
and competition authorities (national
and European levels)
― Joint publications

4. ― Proactive role of ADLC
 Opinions or investigations on its own initiative (cf. creation of ART)
 Injunction powers / commitment procedures
― Access to essential facilities raises classic competition issues
 Use of confidential information on competitors or non replicable info obtained from
monopoly situation (12-D-25, 14-D-11)
 Discriminatory access conditions (12-D-25)
 Leverage effects / confusion (15-D-05)
 Margin squeeze (15-D-10), cross-subsidies …
― An abuse of dominance may materialize regulatory infringement or unfair
treatment (Cf. freight yards)
⇒ Forum shopping?
― ADLC = exclusive remedy for non regulated related markets
 Rolling stock, spare parts, certification…
 Ticket distribution, information, branding…
 Downstream market (transport services) & predatory pricing
Complementarity between sector regulators and competition authorities :
a perfect division of labour between landscapers and gardeners?