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OTN Architect Day Security Breakout Session
Dave Chappelle
14 December 2011
Rationalization and
                          Defense in Depth -
                         Two Steps Closer to
                             the Clouds




OTN Architect Day 2011
Perimeter Security
                                                                                                                                        DB




                                                All network traffic              All network traffic blocked
                                                blocked except for                   except from the proxy.
                                                    specific ports.




                                                  Web Server                           Application             Message        Mainframe
                                                  (app Proxy)                            Server                 Queue         Application



                     Client

                                     Firewall                         Firewall
                                                                                             DB                                   DB
                                                    DMZ

                  Unprotected Zone                Perimeter                                               Protected Zone(s)




  • Can establish multiple perimeters                                                    • Alone, often involves a lot of implied trust
  • Each perimeter can be more restrictive                                               • Modern environments don’t have such a clearly
  • Perimeters can be at varying degrees of granularity                                  defined perimeter



OTN Architect Day 2011
Defense in Depth

        • Military defensive strategy to secure
          a position using multiple defense        "Krak des Chavaliers“, Syria


          mechanisms.
        • Less emphasis is placed on a single
          perimeter wall
        • Several barriers and different types
          of fortifications
        • Objective is to win the battle by
          attrition. The attacker may overcome
          some barriers but can’t sustain the
          attack for such a long period of time.


OTN Architect Day 2011
Defense in Depth

                Governance,                  Identity &
             Risk Management,           Access Management
               & Compliance                                 Database Security (online storage & backups)
                                                            Content Security, Information Rights Management
                                 Data                       Message Level Security
                                                            Federation (SSO, Identity Propagation, Trust, …)
                              Application                   Authentication, Authorization, Auditing (AAA)
                                                            Security Assurance (coding practices)
                                 Host                       Platform O/S, Vulnerability Mgmt (patches),
                                                            Desktop (malware protection),…
                           Internal Network                 Transport Layer Security (encryption, identity)
                                                            Firewalls, network address translation, denial
                              Perimeter                     of service prevention, message parsing and
                                                            validation, ...
                               Physical                     Fences, walls, guards, locks, keys, badges, …
                                                             Data Classification, Password Strengths,
                   Policies, Procedures, & Awareness
                                                             Code Reviews, Usage Policies, …




OTN Architect Day 2011
Defense in Depth: Greater Control

                         Many enforcement points

 Data

 Application / Service

 Host

 Internal Network

 Perimeter

 Physical

 Policies & Procedures


                         Consistent set of policies & procedures

OTN Architect Day 2011
Security Silos
                                 Support        • Application silos with their own
                                                  standalone security architecture

                                                            • Integration is hard enough
                                                              without security
                         !
                                                              !      • End users have many
                                                                       logins & passwords
         End User
                                                       Security Administrator


                                                                  • Administration is time-
                                                                    consuming and error-prone

                                                                      • Auditing is inaccurate
                                       ?                                and/or impossible
               Finance

                                                    Sales
                             Security Auditor



OTN Architect Day 2011
Security Framework                     Support


        • Security is part of the foundation,
          not an inconvenient afterthought

         • Users have one
       identity and a set of
     roles & attributes that
            govern access             End User
                                                    Security        Security Administrator


          • Administration
       operator-centric, not                      Framework
            system-centric


     • Auditing is possible
              and realistic           Finance
                                                                           Sales
                                                 Security Auditor


OTN Architect Day 2011
Security Framework High Level Architecture

                                                                                           Information Processing:
                      Infrastructure Platforms                                             • Provide a secure run-time environment
    (Application Servers, Information Management Systems, etc.)                            • Offer security services to business logic
                                 Development &
                                 Administration
                                                                                           • Allow solution-level security administration




                                                                          Administration
             Business
                                                            Information




                                                                            Design &
              Logic

           Information                                 Information                         Information Management:
           Processing                                  Management                          • Provide a secure data persistence env.
         Security Services                           Security Services
                                                                                           • Offer security features to protect data
                                                                                           • Allow db-level security administration
                                      Security Interfaces

                                                                                           Security Framework:
                               Shared Security Services                                    • Provide shared security services
                                                                                           • Manage security data for the enterprise
                            Enterprise Security Information                                • Allow enterprise-level security administration

                         Security Management & Administration
                                                                                           Security Interfaces:
                         Enterprise Security Framework                                     • Provide consistent access to security services
                                                                                           • Embrace open, common industry standards




OTN Architect Day 2011
Support for Architecture Principles



                                                 Architecture Principles
                         Provides   Security as a Service
                         Supports   Defense in Depth
                         Supports   Least Privilege
                         Supports   Information Confidentiality, Integrity, & Availability
                         Provides   Secure Management of Security Information
                         Provides   Active Threat Detection and Analysis
                         Provides   Secure Audit Trail
                         Provides   Cross-Domain Identity Federation



OTN Architect Day 2011
Space Between the Clouds

                                         Technology Integration

                         Private   Private                                   Public
 Id & Access Mgmt
                         Cloud     Cloud                                     Cloud

 Data                                                                        SaaS
 Application / Service                                                       PaaS

 Host                                                                         IaaS

 Internal Network
 Perimeter
 Physical                             Your                         Cloud
                                   Organization                   Provider
 Policies & Procedures

 GRC

                                   Planning & Reconciliation




OTN Architect Day 2011
SaaS I&AM                                       Authorization                Authorization

             Patterns                                        Access Policy                Access Policy
                                                             Management                   Management
                                              Provider
                                                 B                                          Identity
          Provider
                                                                                          Management
             A
                                                                               Provider
                                                    SAML                          C
                                              User id & attributes
         User Id

                                                              SPML

                                                                       SAML
                         In-House (Private)                                                Authentication
                           IT Environment
                                                                                           Authorization

             Authentication         Authorization                STS                         Identity
                                                                              Provider
                                                                                 D         Management
                Identity            Access Policy
              Management            Management             SAML, WS-Trust,                 Access Policy
                                                            WS-Federation                  Management


OTN Architect Day 2011
Common Attacks & Cloud Computing



                         Common       What types of attacks
                          Attacks     happen most frequently?


                          Defense     How would you normally
                         Strategies   protect your IT resources?


                          Cloud       What might be different
                         Scenario     about a Cloud environment?




OTN Architect Day 2011
Common Threat Summarization

         • 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)
                   Verizon Investigative Response Team +
                   US Secret Service (financial & cyber fraud) +
                   Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit

               • 2010:         761 incidents,     ~ 4 million records compromised
               • 7 years:      > 1700 incidents, > 900 million records compromised


                                           Verizon Enterprise Risk & Incident Sharing
                                                     (VERIS) Framework
                                              • Agent: Whose actions affected the asset
                                              • Action: What actions affected the asset
                                              • Asset: Which assets were affected
                                              • Attribute: How the asset was affected


OTN Architect Day 2011
Threat Agents - External
                   1. External
         Agents

                                                                                                      91% / 99%
                   2. Internal                   16% / 1%
                   3. Partner        <1% / <1%




                          External
                                                        “[External Agents] created economies of
         58% Organized Criminal Groups                     scale by refining standardized,
         40% Unaffiliated individuals                      automated, and highly repeatable
         2% Former Employees                               attacks directed at smaller, vulnerable,
                                                           and largely homogenous targets.”
         1% Competitors


                   1. Malware
         Actions




                                                                                 49% / 79%
                   2. Hacking                                                     50% / 89%
                   3. Misuse                      17% / 1%

                                                                  Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)



OTN Architect Day 2011
Hacking (50% of breaches, 89% of records)
                                                                           Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)

 Backdoor or command/control channel           1                                                                 73% / 45%

         Default or guessable credentials      2                                                           67% / 30%

          Brute force & dictionary attacks     2                                          52% / 34%

              Footprinting & fingerprinting    1                                       49% / 19%
                                                                                                    71% via remote access services
           Use of stolen login credentials     2               21% / 21%                            (RDP, PCAnywhere, Go2Assist,
                                                                                                       LogMein, NetViewer, ssh,
                             SQL Injection     3       14% / 24%                                             telnet, rsh, …)


                 Insufficient authentication   4   10% / 21%

                     Abuse of functionality        10% / 19%

                            Buffer overflow    3   9% / 15%


      Defensive Strategy:                                        Cloud Implications:
      1. Limit network/port/protocol access                      • Remote access may be required for public
      2. Strengthen & change passwords                           cloud maintenance & troubleshooting
      3. Protect applications from SQL                           • Cloud provider may control authentication &
         injection & buffer overflows                            password requirements
      4. Require authentication                                  • Cloud provider may control code base


OTN Architect Day 2011
Malware                              (49% of breaches, 79% of records)
                                                                      Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)
                           Installed / Injected
                           by remote attacker
                                                         1                                                   81%

                                        Email       4%   2   3
                Web / Internet auto-executed
                         (“drive-by” infection)
                                                   3%    2   3
                Web / Internet user-executed
                                  (download)
                                                   3%    2   3


                         • Designed to: open back doors, perform key logging, RAM
                           scraping, network scanning, data capture & send, …
                         • 80% installed by attacker following breach of system
                         • Almost 100% caused by external agents

     Defensive Strategy:                                     Cloud Implications:
     1. Protect systems from hacking                         • Efficacy of cloud provider’s security
     2. Maintain system patches, virus                       measures will factor into risk -
        protection, security settings, firewalls                   • How are hacking threats handled?
     3. Internet Usage Policies & Awareness                        • How are Internet-facing devices
     4. Consider Internet-facing devices to be                     secured and isolated?
        suspect & limit access accordingly                         • How are they audited for compliance?


OTN Architect Day 2011
Perimeters & Internal Networks

         • Limit exposure to the Internet
               •   Turn off unnecessary ports & protocols
               •   Limit exposure to management interfaces
               •   Don’t plug in devices that may be contaminated
               •   Data Loss Prevention
         • VPN
               • Site to site
               • User to site
         • Cloud as a DMZ
         • Multi-tenancy
               • A hacker’s launch point?                           Firewall




OTN Architect Day 2011
Threat Agents - Internal
                   1. External
         Agents

                                                                                                         91% / 99%
                   2. Internal                     16% / 1%
                   3. Partner          <1% / <1%




                            Internal
                                                              • Not as scalable as external agents
         85% Regular Employee / End User                      • 9% of incidents involve a
         22% Finance / Accounting Staff                         combination of external and
         11% Executive / Upper Mgmt                             internal agents
         9% Helpdesk, SA, DBA, Developer                      • fewer records but greater impact


                   1. Malware
         Actions




                                                                                    49% / 79%
                   2. Hacking                                                        50% / 89%
                   3. Misuse                        17% / 1%

                                                                     Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)



OTN Architect Day 2011
Misuse (17% of breaches, 1% of records)
                                                          Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)

 Embezzlement, skimming, & related fraud                                                                     75%

        Abuse of system access / privileges                                   49%

     Use of unapproved hardware / devices                          39%

                  Abuse of private knowledge   7%


       Defensive Strategy:
       1. SoD, Principle of Least Privilege Access     •“…employees aren’t normally escalating
          Control measures                             their privileges in order to steal data
       2. Auditing & Review                            because they don’t need to. They simply
       3. Deprovisioning users                         take advantage of whatever standard
       4. Data Loss Prevention solutions               user privileges were granted to them by
                                                       their organizations.”
       Cloud Implications:
       • Cloud provider maintains some level of        •“…regular employees typically seek
       identity and access management                  “cashable” forms of information like
       • Auditing & review up to cloud provider        payment card data, bank account
       • DLP up to cloud provider                      numbers, and personal information.”
       • Abuse of privilege not “provider-dependent”


OTN Architect Day 2011
Threat Agents - Partner
                     1. External
            Agents

                                                                                                        91% / 99%
                     2. Internal                      16% / 1%
                     3. Partner           <1% / <1%
                                                                    Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)

        •       Includes vendors, suppliers, hosting providers, outsourced IT support
        •       Direct involvement has been on the decline
        •       Responsible involvement has not declined
        •       Attacks often involve compromised remote access connection
        •       Poor governance, lax security, too much trust
        •       “Out-of-sight, Out-of mind” condition
                         Cloud Implications:
                         • Provider’s enforcement of Least Privilege and Segregation of Duties
                         • Provider’s contrats, policies, controls, governance, & auditing
                         • Secure communications channels & active threat detection
                         • You can’t delegate accountability


OTN Architect Day 2011
Administrative & Management Control

         • Cloud control vs. your control
               •   Where are the lines drawn?
               •   Segregation of Duties, Least Privilege
               •   How do you measure your provider’s success?
               •   How will you know if your risk is greater than expected?


         • Audit & Review
               • What (objectives), by whom, how often


         • Motility of Data
               • How to ensure data remnants are destroyed (digital shredding)


OTN Architect Day 2011
(Some of) The Good…

        • Cloud providers have a deep vested interest in
          security
              • Must prove themselves to the market
              • Often much greater investment and attention to detail than
                traditional IT
        • Cloud homogeneity makes security auditing/testing
          simpler
        • Shifting public data to an external cloud
          reduces the exposure of the internal
          sensitive data
        • Data held by an unbiased party
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-v26.ppt


OTN Architect Day 2011
…The Bad…




         •   Multi-tenancy; need for isolation management
         •   High value target for hackers
         •   Fragmentation; creation of more silos
         •   Data dispersal and international privacy laws
                 •       EU Data Protection Directive and U.S. Safe Harbor program
                 •       Exposure of data to foreign government and data subpoenas
                 •       Data retention issues


http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-v26.ppt


OTN Architect Day 2011
…& The Ugly
         • Proprietary implementations
         • Audit & compliance
         • Availability
               • Relying on a vendor to stay in business
               • Equipment seizure (e.g. FBI - DigitalOne AG 2011)




http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-v26.ppt


OTN Architect Day 2011
Recommendations
                 Institute Defense in Depth
                   • Good general strategy to protect highly distributed
                     systems (SOA, BPM, Cloud, etc.)
                   • Protect the whole environment, not just the perimeter


                 Rationalize & Consolidate
                   • Standardized frameworks, services, & technologies
                   • Holistic management, visibility, & control


                 Mind The Gap(s)
                   • Technology: Secure integration
                   • Identity & Access Management
                   • Policies, Procedures, Audits, Attestation, GRC

Visit the ITSO Reference Library at www.oracle.com/goto/itstrategies
Rationalization and Defense in Depth - Two Steps Closer to the Clouds

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Rationalization and Defense in Depth - Two Steps Closer to the Clouds

  • 1. <Insert Picture Here> OTN Architect Day Security Breakout Session Dave Chappelle 14 December 2011
  • 2. Rationalization and Defense in Depth - Two Steps Closer to the Clouds OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 3. Perimeter Security DB All network traffic All network traffic blocked blocked except for except from the proxy. specific ports. Web Server Application Message Mainframe (app Proxy) Server Queue Application Client Firewall Firewall DB DB DMZ Unprotected Zone Perimeter Protected Zone(s) • Can establish multiple perimeters • Alone, often involves a lot of implied trust • Each perimeter can be more restrictive • Modern environments don’t have such a clearly • Perimeters can be at varying degrees of granularity defined perimeter OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 4. Defense in Depth • Military defensive strategy to secure a position using multiple defense "Krak des Chavaliers“, Syria mechanisms. • Less emphasis is placed on a single perimeter wall • Several barriers and different types of fortifications • Objective is to win the battle by attrition. The attacker may overcome some barriers but can’t sustain the attack for such a long period of time. OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 5. Defense in Depth Governance, Identity & Risk Management, Access Management & Compliance Database Security (online storage & backups) Content Security, Information Rights Management Data Message Level Security Federation (SSO, Identity Propagation, Trust, …) Application Authentication, Authorization, Auditing (AAA) Security Assurance (coding practices) Host Platform O/S, Vulnerability Mgmt (patches), Desktop (malware protection),… Internal Network Transport Layer Security (encryption, identity) Firewalls, network address translation, denial Perimeter of service prevention, message parsing and validation, ... Physical Fences, walls, guards, locks, keys, badges, … Data Classification, Password Strengths, Policies, Procedures, & Awareness Code Reviews, Usage Policies, … OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 6. Defense in Depth: Greater Control Many enforcement points Data Application / Service Host Internal Network Perimeter Physical Policies & Procedures Consistent set of policies & procedures OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 7. Security Silos Support • Application silos with their own standalone security architecture • Integration is hard enough without security ! ! • End users have many logins & passwords End User Security Administrator • Administration is time- consuming and error-prone • Auditing is inaccurate ? and/or impossible Finance Sales Security Auditor OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 8. Security Framework Support • Security is part of the foundation, not an inconvenient afterthought • Users have one identity and a set of roles & attributes that govern access End User Security Security Administrator • Administration operator-centric, not Framework system-centric • Auditing is possible and realistic Finance Sales Security Auditor OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 9. Security Framework High Level Architecture Information Processing: Infrastructure Platforms • Provide a secure run-time environment (Application Servers, Information Management Systems, etc.) • Offer security services to business logic Development & Administration • Allow solution-level security administration Administration Business Information Design & Logic Information Information Information Management: Processing Management • Provide a secure data persistence env. Security Services Security Services • Offer security features to protect data • Allow db-level security administration Security Interfaces Security Framework: Shared Security Services • Provide shared security services • Manage security data for the enterprise Enterprise Security Information • Allow enterprise-level security administration Security Management & Administration Security Interfaces: Enterprise Security Framework • Provide consistent access to security services • Embrace open, common industry standards OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 10. Support for Architecture Principles Architecture Principles Provides Security as a Service Supports Defense in Depth Supports Least Privilege Supports Information Confidentiality, Integrity, & Availability Provides Secure Management of Security Information Provides Active Threat Detection and Analysis Provides Secure Audit Trail Provides Cross-Domain Identity Federation OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 11. Space Between the Clouds Technology Integration Private Private Public Id & Access Mgmt Cloud Cloud Cloud Data SaaS Application / Service PaaS Host IaaS Internal Network Perimeter Physical Your Cloud Organization Provider Policies & Procedures GRC Planning & Reconciliation OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 12. SaaS I&AM Authorization Authorization Patterns Access Policy Access Policy Management Management Provider B Identity Provider Management A Provider SAML C User id & attributes User Id SPML SAML In-House (Private) Authentication IT Environment Authorization Authentication Authorization STS Identity Provider D Management Identity Access Policy Management Management SAML, WS-Trust, Access Policy WS-Federation Management OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 13. Common Attacks & Cloud Computing Common What types of attacks Attacks happen most frequently? Defense How would you normally Strategies protect your IT resources? Cloud What might be different Scenario about a Cloud environment? OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 14. Common Threat Summarization • 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) Verizon Investigative Response Team + US Secret Service (financial & cyber fraud) + Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit • 2010: 761 incidents, ~ 4 million records compromised • 7 years: > 1700 incidents, > 900 million records compromised Verizon Enterprise Risk & Incident Sharing (VERIS) Framework • Agent: Whose actions affected the asset • Action: What actions affected the asset • Asset: Which assets were affected • Attribute: How the asset was affected OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 15. Threat Agents - External 1. External Agents 91% / 99% 2. Internal 16% / 1% 3. Partner <1% / <1% External “[External Agents] created economies of 58% Organized Criminal Groups scale by refining standardized, 40% Unaffiliated individuals automated, and highly repeatable 2% Former Employees attacks directed at smaller, vulnerable, and largely homogenous targets.” 1% Competitors 1. Malware Actions 49% / 79% 2. Hacking 50% / 89% 3. Misuse 17% / 1% Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 16. Hacking (50% of breaches, 89% of records) Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) Backdoor or command/control channel 1 73% / 45% Default or guessable credentials 2 67% / 30% Brute force & dictionary attacks 2 52% / 34% Footprinting & fingerprinting 1 49% / 19% 71% via remote access services Use of stolen login credentials 2 21% / 21% (RDP, PCAnywhere, Go2Assist, LogMein, NetViewer, ssh, SQL Injection 3 14% / 24% telnet, rsh, …) Insufficient authentication 4 10% / 21% Abuse of functionality 10% / 19% Buffer overflow 3 9% / 15% Defensive Strategy: Cloud Implications: 1. Limit network/port/protocol access • Remote access may be required for public 2. Strengthen & change passwords cloud maintenance & troubleshooting 3. Protect applications from SQL • Cloud provider may control authentication & injection & buffer overflows password requirements 4. Require authentication • Cloud provider may control code base OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 17. Malware (49% of breaches, 79% of records) Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) Installed / Injected by remote attacker 1 81% Email 4% 2 3 Web / Internet auto-executed (“drive-by” infection) 3% 2 3 Web / Internet user-executed (download) 3% 2 3 • Designed to: open back doors, perform key logging, RAM scraping, network scanning, data capture & send, … • 80% installed by attacker following breach of system • Almost 100% caused by external agents Defensive Strategy: Cloud Implications: 1. Protect systems from hacking • Efficacy of cloud provider’s security 2. Maintain system patches, virus measures will factor into risk - protection, security settings, firewalls • How are hacking threats handled? 3. Internet Usage Policies & Awareness • How are Internet-facing devices 4. Consider Internet-facing devices to be secured and isolated? suspect & limit access accordingly • How are they audited for compliance? OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 18. Perimeters & Internal Networks • Limit exposure to the Internet • Turn off unnecessary ports & protocols • Limit exposure to management interfaces • Don’t plug in devices that may be contaminated • Data Loss Prevention • VPN • Site to site • User to site • Cloud as a DMZ • Multi-tenancy • A hacker’s launch point? Firewall OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 19. Threat Agents - Internal 1. External Agents 91% / 99% 2. Internal 16% / 1% 3. Partner <1% / <1% Internal • Not as scalable as external agents 85% Regular Employee / End User • 9% of incidents involve a 22% Finance / Accounting Staff combination of external and 11% Executive / Upper Mgmt internal agents 9% Helpdesk, SA, DBA, Developer • fewer records but greater impact 1. Malware Actions 49% / 79% 2. Hacking 50% / 89% 3. Misuse 17% / 1% Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 20. Misuse (17% of breaches, 1% of records) Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) Embezzlement, skimming, & related fraud 75% Abuse of system access / privileges 49% Use of unapproved hardware / devices 39% Abuse of private knowledge 7% Defensive Strategy: 1. SoD, Principle of Least Privilege Access •“…employees aren’t normally escalating Control measures their privileges in order to steal data 2. Auditing & Review because they don’t need to. They simply 3. Deprovisioning users take advantage of whatever standard 4. Data Loss Prevention solutions user privileges were granted to them by their organizations.” Cloud Implications: • Cloud provider maintains some level of •“…regular employees typically seek identity and access management “cashable” forms of information like • Auditing & review up to cloud provider payment card data, bank account • DLP up to cloud provider numbers, and personal information.” • Abuse of privilege not “provider-dependent” OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 21. Threat Agents - Partner 1. External Agents 91% / 99% 2. Internal 16% / 1% 3. Partner <1% / <1% Source: Verizon 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) • Includes vendors, suppliers, hosting providers, outsourced IT support • Direct involvement has been on the decline • Responsible involvement has not declined • Attacks often involve compromised remote access connection • Poor governance, lax security, too much trust • “Out-of-sight, Out-of mind” condition Cloud Implications: • Provider’s enforcement of Least Privilege and Segregation of Duties • Provider’s contrats, policies, controls, governance, & auditing • Secure communications channels & active threat detection • You can’t delegate accountability OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 22. Administrative & Management Control • Cloud control vs. your control • Where are the lines drawn? • Segregation of Duties, Least Privilege • How do you measure your provider’s success? • How will you know if your risk is greater than expected? • Audit & Review • What (objectives), by whom, how often • Motility of Data • How to ensure data remnants are destroyed (digital shredding) OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 23. (Some of) The Good… • Cloud providers have a deep vested interest in security • Must prove themselves to the market • Often much greater investment and attention to detail than traditional IT • Cloud homogeneity makes security auditing/testing simpler • Shifting public data to an external cloud reduces the exposure of the internal sensitive data • Data held by an unbiased party http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-v26.ppt OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 24. …The Bad… • Multi-tenancy; need for isolation management • High value target for hackers • Fragmentation; creation of more silos • Data dispersal and international privacy laws • EU Data Protection Directive and U.S. Safe Harbor program • Exposure of data to foreign government and data subpoenas • Data retention issues http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-v26.ppt OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 25. …& The Ugly • Proprietary implementations • Audit & compliance • Availability • Relying on a vendor to stay in business • Equipment seizure (e.g. FBI - DigitalOne AG 2011) http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-v26.ppt OTN Architect Day 2011
  • 26. Recommendations  Institute Defense in Depth • Good general strategy to protect highly distributed systems (SOA, BPM, Cloud, etc.) • Protect the whole environment, not just the perimeter  Rationalize & Consolidate • Standardized frameworks, services, & technologies • Holistic management, visibility, & control  Mind The Gap(s) • Technology: Secure integration • Identity & Access Management • Policies, Procedures, Audits, Attestation, GRC Visit the ITSO Reference Library at www.oracle.com/goto/itstrategies