Director - Innovation, Cyber Defense Operations, Threat Intelligence and Managed Services
19 de May de 2015•0 recomendaciones•654 vistas
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Smart grid in the Critical National Infrastructure
19 de May de 2015•0 recomendaciones•654 vistas
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Tecnología
A presentation from the IET's Cyber Security in Modern Power Systems held in Manchester, England in May 2015 on Smart grid in the Critical National Infrastructure.
Smart grid in the Critical National Infrastructure
1. Smart grid in the
Critical National Infrastructure
Ollie Whitehouse, Technical Director - NCC Group
NCC Group Technical Security Consulting
NCC Group Risk Management & Governance
2. Agenda
Managing the interface with government
Regulatory bodies – what are they doing?
Interoperability and standardisation
Managing the security of interconnections
4. Why interface with government?
Get guidance early on
Gain situational awareness
Gain insight from peers
Provide feedback and insight
Ensure ongoing operational preparedness
6. Managing the interface with government
https://www.cert.gov.uk/
https://www.cert.gov.uk/cisp/
https://www.cpni.gov.uk
SCADA and
Control
System
Information
Exchange
7. Managing the interface with government
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/advice/cyber/scada/
primarily developed 2008 - 2011
8. Managing the interface with government
https://www.cesg.gov.uk/servicecatalogue/Product-Assurance/CPA/Pages/Security-Characteristics.aspx
9. Regulatory bodies – what are they doing?
Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) sets policy
and legislative framework for UK networks.
- including Energy Emergencies Executive Committee (E3C)
OFGEM benefits from UK Regulators Network
- including cyber
Both sit in Smart Grid Forum
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-releases/uk-regulators-launch-new-network-bring-cross-sector-regulation-closer-together
ENA Energy Network Cyber
Security Forum (ENCSF)
10. Regulatory bodies – what are they doing?
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/386626/E3C_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
December 2014 report
11. Regulatory bodies – what are they doing?
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/science-technology/Resilienceofelectricityinfrasrtucture/CfEResilienceofElectricityInfrastructure.pdf
Launched July 2014
12. Regulatory bodies – what are they doing?
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/science-technology/Resilienceofelectricityinfrasrtucture/Resilienceofelectricityinfrastructureevidence.pdf
Over 600 pages and cyber mentioned 68 times
13. Regulatory bodies – what are they doing?
http://www.energynetworks.org/modx/assets/files/news/consultation-responses/Consultation%20responses%202014/House%20of%20Lords%20Committee%20Inquiry%20into%20Electricity%20Network%20Resilience%20-%20ENA%20Submission_2014.pdf
14. Interoperability and standardization
CEN = European Committee for Standardization
CENELEC = European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization
ESTI = European Telecommunications Standards Institute
http://www.smartgrids.eu/CEN-CENELEC-ETSI
20. Managing the Security of Interconnections
Prevent: design, build, test, sustain
Detect: changes in posture and active attacks
Respond: monitor and/or mitigate
21. Managing the Security of Interconnections
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Software-Security-Austerity-security-development-ebook/dp/B007H76ABC
22. Managing the Security of Interconnections
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Software-Security-Austerity-security-development-ebook/dp/B007H76ABC
23. Managing the Security of Interconnections
Contractual terms
Vendors/suppliers and their supply chains
- ability to receive vulnerability data
- set expectation that it will be pushed to you
Interconnect partners
- can’t be trusted all the time – avenue of attack
- information sharing agreements and/or forums
25. Conclusions
We have only scratched the surface
Focus on:
• Considering cyber from the outset
• Building relationships
• Consuming the vast amount of information already available
• Sharing experiences
• Sharing intelligence
• Accept that cyber is a shared problem
…
26. Europe
Manchester - Head Office
Cheltenham
Edinburgh
Leatherhead
London
Milton Keynes
Amsterdam
Copenhagen
Munich
Zurich
North America
Atlanta
Austin
Chicago
Mountain View
New York
San Francisco
Seattle
Australia
Sydney
Thanks! Questions?
Ollie Whitehouse
ollie.whitehouse@nccgroup.trust
Notas del editor
https://files.sans.org/summit/euscada10/PDFs/23%20Sandra%20C%20Benefits%20of%20Sharing%20-%20an%20Industry%20View.pdf
SCSIE formed in 2003 – need to know a vendor, be voted in etc.
Control systems engineering
Control systems security staff
Protective advice for SCADA systems
Smart Metering Security Characteristics
Security Characteristics for Smart Metering Equipment form a sub set of the CPA Security Characteristics, and products successfully assessed against these SC’s (and the aligned supporting Build Standard) have an extended certification validity period of six years. This is due to the specific requirements of the Smart Metering Implementation programme, and is limited to the four SC’s published in this table. There is no intent, implied or otherwise, that any product evaluated against other SC’s will have an extension to the certificate validity period, which remains at two years.
Smart MetersGas Smart Metering Equipment v1.0 Aug
Smart MetersElectricity Smart Metering Equipment v1.0
Smart MetersSmart Meters Communications Hub v1.0 Incorporating the Comms Hub Function and the Gas Proxy Function
Smart MetersSmart Metering HAN Connected Auxiliary Load Control Switch v1.0