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@pati_gallardo
Make it Fixable
Living with Risk
Patricia Aas
NDC Copenhagen 2018
@pati_gallardo
Who am I? @pati_gallardo
Patricia Aas
Programmer - mainly in C++ and Java
Currently : Vivaldi Technologies
Previously : Cisco Systems, Knowit, Opera Software
Master in Computer Science
Twitter : @pati_gallardo
Building A Browser
@pati_gallardo
Security is Hard @pati_gallardo
Just Remember :
- You live in the real world
- Take one step at a time
- Make a Plan @pati_gallardo
You Need A Security
“Hotline”
security@example.com
Symbiotic relationship
Be polite
Be grateful
Be professional
Be efficient and transparent
@pati_gallardo
- What is a System? - What is a vulnerability? -
@pati_gallardo
1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes
2. No Control over Dependencies
3. The Team is Gone
4. It’s in Our Code
5. My Boss Made Me Do It
6. User Experience of Security
Outline
@pati_gallardo
Unable to Roll Out Fixes @pati_gallardo
1
Unable to
Roll out Fixes
- Relying on User Updates
- Unable to Build
- Unable to Deploy
- Regression Fear
- No Issue Tracking
- No Release Tags
- No Source
- Issue in infrastructure
@pati_gallardo
Internet of Things
Toys: My Friend Cayla, i-Que Intelligent
Robots, Hello Barbie
Mirai: Botnets created with IOT
devices, users don’t update
“Shelfware”
No Maintenance contract
Abandonware
Closed source - no way to fix/fork
@pati_gallardo
Unable to Roll Out Fixes.
Fix : Ship It!
Holy Grail : Auto Update
Code
- Get the Code
- Use Version Control
- Keep Build Environment
- Write Integration Tests
Configuration Management
- Have Security Contact
- Track issues
- Make a Deployment Plan
- Control Infrastructure
@pati_gallardo
Unable to Roll Out Fixes.
Internet of Things
- Auto-update
- Different default passwords
- Unboxing security
“Shelfware”
- Get maintenance contract
- Change supplier
- Do in-house
- Use only Open Source Software
Fix : Ship It!
@pati_gallardoUnable to Roll Out Fixes.
1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes
2. No Control over Dependencies
3. The Team is Gone
4. It’s in Our Code
5. My Boss Made Me Do It
6. User Experience of Security
Outline
@pati_gallardo
No Control over Dependencies @pati_gallardo
2
No Control over
Dependencies
- Too Many Dependencies
- Frameworks are Abandoned
- Libraries Disappear
- Insecure Platform APIs
- Insecure Tooling
- End-of-Life OS (Windows)
- Licenses expire/change
- Known Issues not Fixed
- OS Not Updated (Android)
@pati_gallardo
Stagefright
Bugs in the multimedia library on
Android
Heartbleed
Bug in openssl
Left-Pad
Developer unpublished a mini-Js library
@pati_gallardo
No Control over Dependencies
Fix: Control It!
Goal : Dependency Control
Be conservative
- Is it needed?
- Do you understand it?
Be cautious
- Audit your upstream
- Avoid forking
- Have an upgrade plan
- Have someone responsible
@pati_gallardo
No Control over Dependencies
Stagefright
Workaround in apps calling into
stagefright
Heartbleed
Control over production environment
Left-Pad
Removing unnecessary dependency
Fix: Control It!
@pati_gallardoNo Control over Dependencies
1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes
2. No Control over Dependencies
3. The Team is Gone
4. It’s in Our Code
5. My Boss Made Me Do It
6. User Experience of Security
Outline
@pati_gallardo
The Team is Gone @pati_gallardo
3
The Team Is Gone
- Team were consultants
- They were downsized
- The job was outsourced
- “Bus factor”
- “Binary blob”
- Abandonware @pati_gallardo
“Public Sector”
- Leaves the code with subcontractor
- No build environment
- Third-party access to production
environment
Abandoned frameworks
- Framework interdependency
- Unable to upgrade
- Known bugs
The Team is Gone
@pati_gallardo
Fix : Own It!
Goal : Regain Control
Take it on yourselves
- Build competence in-house
- Fork, take control
- “Barely Sufficient” Docs
- Ship It and Control It
Outsource
- Maintenance Contract
- Add Security Clause
- Own deployment channel
@pati_gallardo
The Team Is Gone.
Fix : Own It!
“Public Sector”
- Backsourcing - Bring back work
previously outsourced
Abandoned frameworks
- Replace with equivalent (OSS)
- Remove dependency
- Fork if you don’t have a choice
@pati_gallardoThe Team Is Gone.
Use It!
@pati_gallardo
1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes
2. No Control over Dependencies
3. The Team is Gone
4. It’s in Our Code
5. My Boss Made Me Do It
6. User Experience of Security
Outline
@pati_gallardo
It’s in Our Code @pati_gallardo
4
It’s in Our Code
- Injection
- Exploited crash etc
- Debug code in production
- Server compromised
- Outdated platform
- Intercepted traffic
- Mined local data
- Good old fashioned BUG @pati_gallardo
REMA 1000 Æ App
- Reporter: Hallvard Nygård (@hallny)
- All user data could be retrieved
- Badly handled report
- “Bug” (Lack of security) in App
BEST CASE SCENARIO
@pati_gallardo
It’s In Our Code
Fix : Live It!
Goal : Prevent & Cure
Prevent
- Sanitize your input
- Send crash reports
- Code review + tests
- Review server security
- Encrypt all traffic
- Review local storage
- Sign and check
Cure
- Ship it!
@pati_gallardo
It’s In Our Code
Browsers are very experienced
- And therefore boring ;)
gitlab.com
- “rm -rf”
- Sysadmin maintenance
- Cascading errors as backups
fail
- All logged Publicly in real
time
Transparency
Fix : Live It!
@pati_gallardo
It’s In Our Code
1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes
2. No Control over Dependencies
3. The Team is Gone
4. It’s in Our Code
5. My Boss Made Me Do It
6. User Experience of Security
Outline
@pati_gallardo
My Boss Made Me Do It @pati_gallardo
5
My Boss Made Me Do It
The Feature
is the Bug
How?
- Security Problem
- Privacy Problem
- Unethical
- Illegal
@pati_gallardo
Capcom's Street Fighter V
- Installed a driver
- “anti-crack solution”
“...disables supervisor-mode execution
protection and then runs the arbitrary
code passed in through the ioctl buffer
with kernel permissions..”
- Reddit user extrwi
My Boss Made Me Do It
@pati_gallardo
Fix : Protect It!
Goal : Protect your user
Prevent : Protect your team
- Workers rights
- Build trust
Cure : Protect your company
- Find a Powerful Ally
- Do Risk Analysis : Brand Reputation,
Trust
- Use the Law
LAST RESORT : Whistleblowing & Quitting
@pati_gallardo
My Boss Made Me Do It
Statoil
- Internal reports of security
incidents after outsourcing
- Only public after serious IRL
incidents
Nødnett
- Transitive outsourcing
- National Security
These are often the Unsung Heroes
(Last Resort : Edward Snowden)
Fix : Protect It!
@pati_gallardo
My Boss Made Me Do It
@pati_gallardo
Ship It, Control It, Own It, Live It & Protect It
- You need a Security Hotline
- You Have to Ship
- You Can’t do This Alone
Recap
@pati_gallardo
1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes
2. No Control over Dependencies
3. The Team is Gone
4. It’s in Our Code
5. My Boss Made Me Do It
6. User Experience of Security
Outline
@pati_gallardo
Designing the User Experience of Security @pati_gallardo
6
@pati_gallardo
The Users Won’t Read
Error blindness
- Most users will mentally erase
permanent error notifiers - they
won’t read
“Just click next”
- Most users will accept the defaults
- they won’t read
“Make it go away”
- The user will try to make the error
dialog go away - they won’t read
@pati_gallardo
Fix : Less is More
Don’t leave it to the user
- Just do the right thing, you don’t
have to ask
Have good defaults
- Make sure that clicking next will
leave the user in a good place
Be very explicit when needed
- If the user is in a “dangerous”
situation - design carefully and if
you have to explain : use language
the user can understand
@pati_gallardo
They Trust You
With Personal information
- They trust you to protect them from
both hackers and governments
With Data
- They trust you to protect their
pictures, documents, email …
With Money
- They trust you to protect their
payment information and
passwords
@pati_gallardo
Fix : Be Trustworthy
Only store what you have to
- Try to use end-to-end encryption,
so that even you don’t have access.
Encrypt as much as you can
Back up everything
- Your users can’t afford to lose their
baby pictures
Use third party payment
- Avoid having responsibility for their
money
@pati_gallardo
@pati_gallardo
Ship It, Control It, Own It, Live It & Protect It
Design For It
Make it Fixable
Living with Risk
Patricia Aas, Vivaldi Technologies
@pati_gallardo
Photos from pixabay.com - CC0 Creative Commons License

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Make it Fixable (NDC Copenhagen 2018)

  • 2. Make it Fixable Living with Risk Patricia Aas NDC Copenhagen 2018 @pati_gallardo
  • 3. Who am I? @pati_gallardo
  • 4. Patricia Aas Programmer - mainly in C++ and Java Currently : Vivaldi Technologies Previously : Cisco Systems, Knowit, Opera Software Master in Computer Science Twitter : @pati_gallardo
  • 6. Security is Hard @pati_gallardo
  • 7. Just Remember : - You live in the real world - Take one step at a time - Make a Plan @pati_gallardo
  • 8. You Need A Security “Hotline” security@example.com Symbiotic relationship Be polite Be grateful Be professional Be efficient and transparent @pati_gallardo
  • 9. - What is a System? - What is a vulnerability? - @pati_gallardo
  • 10. 1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes 2. No Control over Dependencies 3. The Team is Gone 4. It’s in Our Code 5. My Boss Made Me Do It 6. User Experience of Security Outline @pati_gallardo
  • 11. Unable to Roll Out Fixes @pati_gallardo 1
  • 12. Unable to Roll out Fixes - Relying on User Updates - Unable to Build - Unable to Deploy - Regression Fear - No Issue Tracking - No Release Tags - No Source - Issue in infrastructure @pati_gallardo
  • 13. Internet of Things Toys: My Friend Cayla, i-Que Intelligent Robots, Hello Barbie Mirai: Botnets created with IOT devices, users don’t update “Shelfware” No Maintenance contract Abandonware Closed source - no way to fix/fork @pati_gallardo Unable to Roll Out Fixes.
  • 14. Fix : Ship It! Holy Grail : Auto Update Code - Get the Code - Use Version Control - Keep Build Environment - Write Integration Tests Configuration Management - Have Security Contact - Track issues - Make a Deployment Plan - Control Infrastructure @pati_gallardo Unable to Roll Out Fixes.
  • 15. Internet of Things - Auto-update - Different default passwords - Unboxing security “Shelfware” - Get maintenance contract - Change supplier - Do in-house - Use only Open Source Software Fix : Ship It! @pati_gallardoUnable to Roll Out Fixes.
  • 16. 1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes 2. No Control over Dependencies 3. The Team is Gone 4. It’s in Our Code 5. My Boss Made Me Do It 6. User Experience of Security Outline @pati_gallardo
  • 17. No Control over Dependencies @pati_gallardo 2
  • 18. No Control over Dependencies - Too Many Dependencies - Frameworks are Abandoned - Libraries Disappear - Insecure Platform APIs - Insecure Tooling - End-of-Life OS (Windows) - Licenses expire/change - Known Issues not Fixed - OS Not Updated (Android) @pati_gallardo
  • 19. Stagefright Bugs in the multimedia library on Android Heartbleed Bug in openssl Left-Pad Developer unpublished a mini-Js library @pati_gallardo No Control over Dependencies
  • 20. Fix: Control It! Goal : Dependency Control Be conservative - Is it needed? - Do you understand it? Be cautious - Audit your upstream - Avoid forking - Have an upgrade plan - Have someone responsible @pati_gallardo No Control over Dependencies
  • 21. Stagefright Workaround in apps calling into stagefright Heartbleed Control over production environment Left-Pad Removing unnecessary dependency Fix: Control It! @pati_gallardoNo Control over Dependencies
  • 22. 1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes 2. No Control over Dependencies 3. The Team is Gone 4. It’s in Our Code 5. My Boss Made Me Do It 6. User Experience of Security Outline @pati_gallardo
  • 23. The Team is Gone @pati_gallardo 3
  • 24. The Team Is Gone - Team were consultants - They were downsized - The job was outsourced - “Bus factor” - “Binary blob” - Abandonware @pati_gallardo
  • 25. “Public Sector” - Leaves the code with subcontractor - No build environment - Third-party access to production environment Abandoned frameworks - Framework interdependency - Unable to upgrade - Known bugs The Team is Gone @pati_gallardo
  • 26. Fix : Own It! Goal : Regain Control Take it on yourselves - Build competence in-house - Fork, take control - “Barely Sufficient” Docs - Ship It and Control It Outsource - Maintenance Contract - Add Security Clause - Own deployment channel @pati_gallardo The Team Is Gone.
  • 27. Fix : Own It! “Public Sector” - Backsourcing - Bring back work previously outsourced Abandoned frameworks - Replace with equivalent (OSS) - Remove dependency - Fork if you don’t have a choice @pati_gallardoThe Team Is Gone.
  • 29. 1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes 2. No Control over Dependencies 3. The Team is Gone 4. It’s in Our Code 5. My Boss Made Me Do It 6. User Experience of Security Outline @pati_gallardo
  • 30. It’s in Our Code @pati_gallardo 4
  • 31. It’s in Our Code - Injection - Exploited crash etc - Debug code in production - Server compromised - Outdated platform - Intercepted traffic - Mined local data - Good old fashioned BUG @pati_gallardo
  • 32. REMA 1000 Æ App - Reporter: Hallvard Nygård (@hallny) - All user data could be retrieved - Badly handled report - “Bug” (Lack of security) in App BEST CASE SCENARIO @pati_gallardo It’s In Our Code
  • 33. Fix : Live It! Goal : Prevent & Cure Prevent - Sanitize your input - Send crash reports - Code review + tests - Review server security - Encrypt all traffic - Review local storage - Sign and check Cure - Ship it! @pati_gallardo It’s In Our Code
  • 34. Browsers are very experienced - And therefore boring ;) gitlab.com - “rm -rf” - Sysadmin maintenance - Cascading errors as backups fail - All logged Publicly in real time Transparency Fix : Live It! @pati_gallardo It’s In Our Code
  • 35. 1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes 2. No Control over Dependencies 3. The Team is Gone 4. It’s in Our Code 5. My Boss Made Me Do It 6. User Experience of Security Outline @pati_gallardo
  • 36. My Boss Made Me Do It @pati_gallardo 5
  • 37. My Boss Made Me Do It The Feature is the Bug How? - Security Problem - Privacy Problem - Unethical - Illegal @pati_gallardo
  • 38. Capcom's Street Fighter V - Installed a driver - “anti-crack solution” “...disables supervisor-mode execution protection and then runs the arbitrary code passed in through the ioctl buffer with kernel permissions..” - Reddit user extrwi My Boss Made Me Do It @pati_gallardo
  • 39. Fix : Protect It! Goal : Protect your user Prevent : Protect your team - Workers rights - Build trust Cure : Protect your company - Find a Powerful Ally - Do Risk Analysis : Brand Reputation, Trust - Use the Law LAST RESORT : Whistleblowing & Quitting @pati_gallardo My Boss Made Me Do It
  • 40. Statoil - Internal reports of security incidents after outsourcing - Only public after serious IRL incidents Nødnett - Transitive outsourcing - National Security These are often the Unsung Heroes (Last Resort : Edward Snowden) Fix : Protect It! @pati_gallardo My Boss Made Me Do It
  • 41. @pati_gallardo Ship It, Control It, Own It, Live It & Protect It
  • 42. - You need a Security Hotline - You Have to Ship - You Can’t do This Alone Recap @pati_gallardo
  • 43. 1. Unable to Roll Out Fixes 2. No Control over Dependencies 3. The Team is Gone 4. It’s in Our Code 5. My Boss Made Me Do It 6. User Experience of Security Outline @pati_gallardo
  • 44. Designing the User Experience of Security @pati_gallardo 6
  • 46. The Users Won’t Read Error blindness - Most users will mentally erase permanent error notifiers - they won’t read “Just click next” - Most users will accept the defaults - they won’t read “Make it go away” - The user will try to make the error dialog go away - they won’t read @pati_gallardo
  • 47. Fix : Less is More Don’t leave it to the user - Just do the right thing, you don’t have to ask Have good defaults - Make sure that clicking next will leave the user in a good place Be very explicit when needed - If the user is in a “dangerous” situation - design carefully and if you have to explain : use language the user can understand @pati_gallardo
  • 48. They Trust You With Personal information - They trust you to protect them from both hackers and governments With Data - They trust you to protect their pictures, documents, email … With Money - They trust you to protect their payment information and passwords @pati_gallardo
  • 49. Fix : Be Trustworthy Only store what you have to - Try to use end-to-end encryption, so that even you don’t have access. Encrypt as much as you can Back up everything - Your users can’t afford to lose their baby pictures Use third party payment - Avoid having responsibility for their money @pati_gallardo
  • 50. @pati_gallardo Ship It, Control It, Own It, Live It & Protect It Design For It
  • 51. Make it Fixable Living with Risk Patricia Aas, Vivaldi Technologies @pati_gallardo Photos from pixabay.com - CC0 Creative Commons License