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  2. 2. I. Fundamental Principles and Policies Constitutional Provisions Article II Secs. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20
  3. 3. State Policies Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
  4. 4. Espina v. Zamora G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010 • 2000- President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762 or the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. • Some members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds: • First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
  5. 5. Espina v. Zamora, 2010 SC: But as the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
  6. 6. Espina v. Zamora, 2010 In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.
  7. 7. Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
  8. 8. Define Social Justice: Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
  9. 9. Bar Exam (11) Q: For labor, the Constitutionally adopted policy of promoting social justice in all phases of national development means- a) nationalization of the tools of production b) periodic examination of laws for the common good c) humanization of laws and equalization of economic forces (x) d) revision of laws to generate greater employment
  10. 10. Manila Water v. Del Rosario G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014 In the instant petition, Manila Water essentially questions the award of separation pay to respondent who was dismissed for stealing the company’s property which amounted to gross misconduct. It argues that separation pay or financial assistance is not awarded to employees guilty of gross misconduct or for cause reflecting on his moral character.
  11. 11. Manila Water v. Del Rosario 2014 SC: As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 297of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.
  12. 12. Manila Water v. Del Rosario 2014 The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best[,] it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.
  13. 13. Manila Water v. Del Rosario 2014 In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission we expanded the exclusions and elucidated that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than • serious misconduct, • willful disobedience, • gross and habitual neglect of duty, • fraud or willful breach of trust, • commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or • those reflecting on his moral character.
  14. 14. Manila Water v. Del Rosario 2014 The attendant circumstances in the present case considered, we are constrained to deny Del Rosario separation pay since the admitted cause of his dismissal amounts to serious misconduct. He is not only responsible for the loss of the water meters in flagrant violation of the company’s policy but his act is in utter disregard of his partnership with his employer in the pursuit of mutual benefits.
  15. 15. Bar Exam: Q: Which of the two takes precedence, human rights or property rights? Answer: human rights.
  16. 16. State Policies • Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. • Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
  17. 17. Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997 • On September 2, 1991, private respondent (Grace de Guzman) was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. • It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. (She was subsequently terminated.)
  18. 18. Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC 1997 SC: The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers.
  19. 19. Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC 1997 Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
  20. 20. Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC 1997 In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
  21. 21. Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC 1997 That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.")
  22. 22. Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC 1997 Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex.
  23. 23. State Policies Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
  24. 24. Wesleyan University v. Faculty G.R. No. 181806, March 12, 2014 • The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice. To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time. • An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law." The error, however, must be corrected immediately after its discovery; otherwise, the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply.
  25. 25. Wesleyan University v. Faculty 2014 Facts: Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered employees are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every year and that after the second year of service, all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year, not later than August 30 of each year. The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on a month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school year. For example, for the first four months of the school year or from June to September, an employee is only entitled to five days vacation leave and five days sick leave. SC: Considering that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA, we agree with the CA that it must be struck down.
  26. 26. Wesleyan University v. Faculty 2014 • In closing, it may not be amiss to mention that when the provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern. • However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it should be resolved in favor of labor, as this is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
  27. 27. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009 • For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, to wit: • Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. • does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
  28. 28. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay."
  29. 29. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 SC: Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
  30. 30. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 • Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-à-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs • The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
  31. 31. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 • Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals. • Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
  32. 32. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 • Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution. • While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, has described to be not self- actuating: • Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. Xxx
  33. 33. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 • Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability. (Emphasis added) • Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.
  34. 34. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime 2009 It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
  35. 35. Executive Order No. 51, May 2018
  36. 36. Executive Order No. 51, May 2018
  37. 37. State Policies Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
  38. 38. Rosario v. Victory Ricemill G.R. No. 147572, February 19, 2003 [N.B. Procedural process was not served because no Notice to Explain was served upon the dismissed employee.] • SC:Only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. • In so ruling, the Court recognized that "the law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer," thus: • The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust.
  39. 39. Rosario v. Victory Ricemill 2003 It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic force." But so does it declare that it "recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment. The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection to labor." But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self- destruction of the employer. And it is oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation when it is not economically in his interest to do so.
  40. 40. State Policies • Article III, Secs. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 18 (2) Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
  41. 41. Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
  42. 42. Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles 2014 To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment.
  43. 43. Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles 2014 In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.
  44. 44. Tongko v. Manulife G.R. No. 167622, November 7, 2008 In its Petition for Certiorari dated January 7, 2005 filed before the CA, Manulife argued that even if Tongko is considered as its employee, his employment was validly terminated on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duties, inefficiency, as well as willful disobedience of the lawful orders of Manulife. It is readily evident from the above-quoted portions of Manulife's petition that it failed to cite a single iota of evidence to support its claims. Manulife did not even point out which order or rule that Tongko disobeyed. More importantly, Manulife did not point out the specific acts that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife merely cited Tongko's alleged "laggard performance," without substantiating such claim, and equated the same to disobedience and neglect of duty.
  45. 45. Tongko v. Manulife 2008 SC: We cannot, therefore, accept Manulife's position. In Quebec, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that: When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. This burden of proof appropriately lies on the shoulders of the employer and not on the employee because a worker's job has some of the characteristics of property rights and is therefore within the constitutional mantle of protection. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
  46. 46. Tongko v. Manulife 2008 This burden of proof was clarified in Community Rural Bank of San Isidro (N.E.), Inc. v. Paez to mean substantial evidence, to wit: The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence. The settled rule in administrative and quasi- judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
  47. 47. Tongko v. Manulife 2008 Here, Manulife failed to overcome such burden of proof. It must be reiterated that Manulife even failed to identify the specific acts by which Tongko's employment was terminated much less support the same with substantial evidence. To repeat, mere conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Thus, it must be concluded that Tongko was illegally dismissed.
  48. 48. Serrano v. NLRC G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000 SC: Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer, however, to the denial of due process by the State, which is not the case here. There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff .
  49. 49. Serrano v. NLRC 2000 The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized
  50. 50. Serrano v. NLRC 2000 The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 298. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment.
  51. 51. Serrano v. NLRC 2000 Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 297, the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal. As Art. 292(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission."
  52. 52. Serrano v. NLRC 2000 The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 298 cannot be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 297 (i.e., serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and habitual neglect of duties, fraud or willful breach of trust of the employer, commission of crime against the employer or the latter's immediate family or duly authorized representatives, or other analogous cases).
  53. 53. Serrano v. NLRC 2000 Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal. This is clear from Art. 294 which provides: • Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed rom work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
  54. 54. Agabon v. NLRC G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004 Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full backwages are mandated under Article 294. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted.
  55. 55. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 297, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 298 and 299, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
  56. 56. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 297 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 298, or for health reasons under Article 299, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.
  57. 57. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 • In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer any liability. • In the second and third situations where the dismissals are illegal, Article 294 mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. • In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
  58. 58. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process
  59. 59. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process.
  60. 60. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
  61. 61. Agabon v. NLRC 2004 The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
  62. 62. De Jesus v. Hon. Aquino G.R. No. 164662, February 18, 2013 Under Agabon, the new doctrine is that the failure of the employer to observe the requirements of due process in favor of the dismissed employee (that is, the two-written notices rule) should not invalidate or render ineffectual the dismissal for just or authorized cause.
  63. 63. De Jesus v. Hon. Aquino 2013 Even so, the Agabon Court still deplored the employer's violation of the employee's right to statutory due process by directing the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which would be addressed to the sound discretion of the labor tribunal upon taking into account the relevant circumstances. Thus, the Agabon Court designed such form of damages as a deterrent to employers from committing in the future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees, and, at the same time, as at the very least a vindication or recognition of the fundamental right granted to the employees under the Labor Code and its implementing rules. Accordingly, consistent with precedent the amount of P50,000.00 as nominal damages is hereby fixed for the purpose of indemnifying De Jesus for the violation of her right to due process.
  64. 64. Abbott v. Alcaraz G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013 A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 296 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
  65. 65. Abbott v. Alcaraz 2013 SC: Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground to terminate Alcaraz’s employment and Abbott’s compliance with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is readily apparent that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.
  66. 66. Abbott v. Alcaraz 2013 Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract between the employer and employee. Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job performance of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a Performance Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge the gap between the employee’s performance and the standards set, if any. In addition, a signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott’s HRD as the same would serve as basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary employment
  67. 67. Abbott v. Alcaraz 2013 In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz’s probationary employment for her failure to meet the standards required for her regularization, and while it must be further pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve a written notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own company procedure renders the termination of Alcaraz’s employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of nominal damages.
  68. 68. Abbott v. Alcaraz 2013 Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon in the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka) where it created a distinction between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on the other.
  69. 69. Abbott v. Alcaraz 2013 It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 297 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 297 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an authorized cause of retrenchment – as contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty – the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at the higher amount of P50,000.00.
  70. 70. Facts: Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry. Duncan v. Glaxo G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
  71. 71. Duncan v. Glaxo 2004 SC: No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
  72. 72. Duncan v. Glaxo 2004 The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
  73. 73. Duncan v. Glaxo 2004 The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct.
  74. 74. Duncan v. Glaxo 2004 In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
  75. 75. Duncan v. Glaxo 2004 The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith." He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
  76. 76. Yrasuegui v. PAL G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008 SC: The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 297(e) of the Labor Code. A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards
  77. 77. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 297(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 297(e) – the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."
  78. 78. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 297; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional.
  79. 79. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 297(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions
  80. 80. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualificationj (BFOQ). In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.
  81. 81. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 In British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU) the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified.
  82. 82. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 Under this test: (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose
  83. 83. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that: (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be (un)able to properly perform the duties of the job.
  84. 84. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
  85. 85. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 In this case, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.
  86. 86. Yrasuegui v. PAL 2008 The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.
  87. 87. Opinaldo v. Ravina G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013 In the case at bar, we recognize that respondent’s act of requiring petitioner to undergo a medical examination and submit a medical certificate is a valid exercise of management prerogative. This is further justified in view of the letter-complaint from one of respondent’s clients, PAIJR, opining that petitioner was "no longer physically fit to perform his duties and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health condition." To be sure, petitioner’s job as security guard naturally requires physical and mental fitness under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5487, (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE DETECTIVE, WATCHMEN OR SECURITY GUARDS AGENCIES, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 11, October 3, 1972.) as amended by Presidential Decree No. 100.
  88. 88. Opinaldo v. Ravina 2013 While the necessity to prove one’s physical and mental fitness to be a security guard could not be more emphasized, the question to be settled is whether it is a valid exercise of respondent’s management prerogative to prevent petitioner’s continued employment with the Agency unless he presents the required medical certificate.
  89. 89. Opinaldo v. Ravina 2013 All said, what behooves the Court is the lack of evidence on record which establishes that respondent informed petitioner that his failure to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work assignment. It is a basic principle of labor protection in this jurisdiction that a worker cannot be deprived of his job without satisfying the requirements of due process. Labor is property and the right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. As enshrined under the Bill of Rights, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The due process requirement in the deprivation of one’s employment is transcendental that it limits the exercise of the management prerogative of the employer to control and regulate the affairs of the business.
  90. 90. Opinaldo v. Ravina 2013 In the case at bar, all that respondent employer needed to prove was that petitioner employee was notified that his failure to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work assignment – and eventually the termination of his employment – as a security guard. There is no iota of evidence in the records, save for the bare allegations of respondent, that petitioner was notified of such consequence for non-submission.
  91. 91. Bar Exam (06) Q: What property right is conferred upon an employee once there is employer-employee relationship? A: Right of person to his employment is deemed to be a “property” within the meaning of constitutional guarantees.
  92. 92. State Policies Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
  93. 93. Phimco Industries v. PILA G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010 A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course of setting their terms and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war between labor and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members, and one that must also necessarily affect management and its members. In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must always rest on rational basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot heads; it must focus on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.
  94. 94. Phimco Industries v. PILA 2010 Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management but also the general peace and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 278 of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.
  95. 95. Phimco Industries v. PILA 2010 These requirements are mandatory, and the union’s failure to comply renders the strike illegal. The 15 to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements; a strike notice was filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike vote was filed with the DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April 25, 1995.
  96. 96. Phimco Industries v. PILA 2010 But strike may be illegal for commission of prohibited acts Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. The means become illegal when they come within the prohibitions under Article 279(e) of the Labor Code which provides: No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
  97. 97. Phimco Industries v. PILA 2010 To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from the employer’s premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual stoppage of work.
  98. 98. BPI v. BPI Employees G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010 SC: Settled jurisprudence has already swung the balance in favor of unionism, in recognition that ultimately the individual employee will be benefited by that policy. In the hierarchy of constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly held that the right to abstain from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice. Taking a second look on this point, we have come to agree with Justice Brion’s view that it is more in keeping with the dictates of social justice and the State policy of according full protection to labor to deem employment contracts as automatically assumed by the surviving corporation in a merger, even in the absence of an express stipulation in the articles of merger or the merger plan.
  99. 99. BPI v. BPI Employees 2010 By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving corporation’s existing employment contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger, the Court strengthens judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding the status of their various benefits which were among the chief objections of our dissenting colleagues. However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair the right of an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of such an employee to resign, retire or otherwise sever his employment, whether before or after the merger, subject to existing contractual obligations.
  100. 100. BPI v. BPI Employees 2010 More importantly, we find no reason to reverse our previous pronouncement that the absorbed FEBTC employees are covered by the Union Shop Clause.
  101. 101. BPI v. BPI Employees 2010 In any event, it is of no moment that the former FEBTC employees retained the regular status that they possessed while working for their former employer upon their absorption by petitioner. This fact would not remove them from the scope of the phrase "new employees" as contemplated in the Union Shop Clause of the CBA, contrary to petitioner's insistence that the term "new employees" only refers to those who are initially hired as non-regular employees for possible regular employment.
  102. 102. Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
  103. 103. Pryce Corp. v. Chinabank G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014 SC: This court has brushed aside invocations of the non-impairment clause to give way to a valid exercise of police power and afford protection to labor.
  104. 104. Abella v. NLRC G.R. No. 71813, July 20, 1987 Issue: payment of separation pay to workers at the end of lease Petitioner contends that constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts is violated, because when she leased Hacienda Danao- Ramona on June 27, 1960, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the lease.
  105. 105. Abella v. NLRC 1987 SC: Such contention is untenable. The purpose of Article 283 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled — for the thirty three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties.
  106. 106. State Policies Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi- judicial, or administrative bodies.
  107. 107. Goya v. Goya Employees G.R. No. 170054, January 21, 2013 Issue: whether the voluntary arbitrator is empowered to rule on a matter not covered by the issue submitted for arbitration
  108. 108. Goya v. Goya Employees 2013 SC: In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly stated and limited in the submission agreement. However, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the power to make a final settlement. Thus, assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator to decide whether an employee was discharged for just cause, the arbitrator in this instance can reasonably assume that his powers extended beyond giving a yes-or-no answer and included the power to reinstate him with or without back pay.
  109. 109. Goya v. Goya Employees 2013 In one case, the Supreme Court stressed that "xxx the Voluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. The Arbitrator, as already indicated, viewed his authority as embracing not merely the determination of the abstract question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted but also, in the affirmative case, the amount thereof.
  110. 110. Goya v. Goya Employees 2013 By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement mentioned only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created – speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another action for payment of such benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor.
  111. 111. State Policies Section 18 (2). 2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
  112. 112. Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 Facts: According to petitioners, The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty- eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.
  113. 113. Imbong v. Ochoa 2014 The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right. SC: The point of the OSG is well-taken.
  114. 114. Imbong v. Ochoa 2014 It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.
  115. 115. Imbong v. Ochoa 2014 The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
  116. 116. State Policies Article XIII Secs. 1, 2, 3, 13, 14
  117. 117. ARTICLE XIII SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. xxx Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
  118. 118. LABOR Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
  119. 119. Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self- reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
  120. 120. WOMEN Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
  121. 121. International School v. Quisumbing G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000 That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
  122. 122. International School v. Quisumbing 2010 The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
  123. 123. International School v. Quisumbing 2010 It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
  124. 124. Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime G.R. No. 190161, October 13, 2014 The Seafarer’s Death Should Occur During The Term Of Employment. With respect to the second requirement for death compensability, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur during the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of his employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto. This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarer’s death, notwithstanding its evident work-connection. The present petition is a case in point.
  125. 125. Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime 2014 SC: A strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC, especially when the same would result into inequitable consequences against labor, is not subscribed to in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer.
  126. 126. Asia Brewery v. TPMA G.R. Nos. 171594-96, September 18, 2013 SC: We rule that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused her discretion when she relied on the unaudited financial statements of petitioner corporation in determining the wage award because such evidence is self-serving and inadmissible. Not only did this violate the December 19, 2003 Order of the Secretary of Labor herself to petitioner corporation to submit its complete audited financial statements, but this may have resulted to a wage award that is based on an inaccurate and biased picture of petitioner corporation's capacity to pay — one of the more significant factors in making a wage award. Petitioner corporation has offered no reason why it failed and/or refused to submit its audited financial statements for the past five years relevant to this case. This only further casts doubt as to the veracity and accuracy of the unaudited financial statements it submitted to the Secretary of Labor.
  127. 127. Asia Brewery v. TPMA 2013 Verily, we cannot countenance this procedure because this could unduly deprive labor of its right to a just share in the fruits of production (Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution states in part: The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.) - and provide employers with a means to understate their profitability in order to defeat the right of labor to a just wage.
  128. 128. Bar Exam (2012) Q: Which of the following is not a constitutional right of a worker? to engage in peaceful concerted activities to enjoy security of tenure to return of investment (x) to receive a living wage
  129. 129. Bar Exam (98) Q: What are the salient features of the protection to labor provisions of the Constitution? A: 1) Full Protection and Full Employment 2) Guarantee of Workers’ Rights 3) Shared Responsibility and Voluntary Settlement of Disputes 4) Share in the Fruits of Production
  130. 130. Civil Code Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
  131. 131. Dongon v. Rapid Movers, G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013 The prerogative of the employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience to company policies must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. Petitioner maintains that willful disobedience could not be a ground for his dismissal because he had acted in good faith and with the sole intention of facilitating deliveries for Rapid Movers when he allowed Villaruz to use his company ID. SC: Petitioner was not guilty of willful disobedience; hence, his dismissal was illegal
  132. 132. Dongon v. Rapid Movers G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013 The disobedience attributed to petitioner could not be justly characterized as willful within the contemplation of Article 297 of the Labor Code. He neither benefitted from it, nor thereby prejudiced the business interest of Rapid Movers. His explanation that his deed had been intended to benefit Rapid Movers was credible. There could be no wrong or perversity on his part that warranted the termination of his employment based on willful disobedience.
  133. 133. Dongon v. Rapid Movers 2013 Although we recognize the inherent right of the employer to discipline its employees, we should still ensure that the employer exercises the prerogative to discipline humanely and considerately, and that the sanction imposed is commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. The discipline exacted by the employer should further consider the employee’s length of service and the number of infractions during his employment. The employer should never forget that always at stake in disciplining its employee are not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he may also have a family entirely dependent on his earnings
  134. 134. Dongon v. Rapid Movers 2013 Considering that petitioner’s motive in lending his company ID to Villaruz was to benefit Rapid Movers as their employer by facilitating the loading of goods at the Tanduay Otis Warehouse for distribution to Rapid Movers’ clients, and considering also that petitioner had rendered seven long unblemished years of service to Rapid Movers, his dismissal was plainly unwarranted.
  135. 135. Civil Code Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
  136. 136. Cirtex Employees v. Cirtex G.R. No. 190515, November 15, 2010 Facts: Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created a Labor Management Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing for daily wage increases of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P9.00 per day effective January 1, 2005. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and Manifestation to the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the remaining officers signed the MOA under respondent’s assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage increase, respondent would comply
  137. 137. Cirtex Employees v. Cirtex 2010 SC: That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no moment. For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. He could, as he did, consider the financial documents submitted by respondent as well as the parties’ bargaining history and respondent’s financial outlook and improvements as stated in its website.
  138. 138. Cirtex Employees v. Cirtex 2010 While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is so in the present case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA in which even the union’s signatories had expressed reservations thereto. But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new CBA, since it is imbued with public interest, it must be construed liberally and yield to the common good.
  139. 139. Cirtex Employees v. Cirtex 2010 While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.
  140. 140. Civil Code Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation (not limited to Labor Code) and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
  141. 141. PNCC Traffic v. PNCC G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010 The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be understood in a different sense.
  142. 142. PNCC Traffic v. PNCC 2010 In the case at bar, the contested provision of the CBA is clear and unequivocal. Article VIII, Section 1 (b) of the CBA categorically provides that the scheduling of vacation leave shall be under the option of the employer. The preference requested by the employees is not controlling because respondent retains its power and prerogative to consider or to ignore said request.
  143. 143. PNCC Traffic v. PNCC 2010 Moreover, the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. "They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good x x x." The supremacy of the law over contracts is explained by the fact that labor contracts are not ordinary contracts; they are imbued with public interest and therefore are subject to the police power of the state. However, it should not be taken to mean that provisions agreed upon in the CBA are absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial review and nullification. If the provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or public policy, such provisions may very well be voided.
  144. 144. Magis Center v. Manalo G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009 What is truly contentious is whether the probationary appointment of the respondent on April 18, 2002 was for a fixed period of one (1) year, or without a fixed term, inasmuch as the parties presented different versions of the employment agreement. As articulated by the CA: In plain language, We are confronted with two (2) copies of an agreement, one with a negative period and one provided for a one (1) year period for its effectivity. Ironically, none among the parties offered corroborative evidence as to which of the two (2) discrepancies is the correct one that must be given effect. x x x.
  145. 145. Magis Center v. Manalo 2009 SC: Under this circumstance, We can only apply Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that, in case of doubt, all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the laborer. Then, too, settled is the rule that any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it. (contra proferentem) In the case at bar, the drafter of the contract is herein petitioners and must, therefore, be read against their contention.
  146. 146. Bar Exam (95) Q: Is Art. 1702 of the Civil Code (and Art. 4 of the Labor Code) violative of the Equal Protection Clause? A: No. EPC only applies to persons or things identically situated. There is reasonable classification between the employer and employee. Also, the articles are in pursuance of the Social Justice provision of the Constitution.
  147. 147. Bar Exam (93) Q: In what manner does the labor law show its solicitous compassionate policy towards the working man? A: 1) In case of doubt, interpretation is in favor of labor. 2) Termination must be only with just or authorized cause 3) Regularization of employees is assured despite contrary agreement 4) Reinstatement is immediately executory 5) Separation pay may still be awarded if employee is dismissed not for serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character
  148. 148. Labor Code Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
  149. 149. Labor Code Article 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
  150. 150. Labor Code Article 172 [166]. Policy. The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees’ compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work- connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical related benefits.
  151. 151. Labor Code Article 218 [211]. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State: To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes; To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social justice and development; To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement;
  152. 152. Labor Code To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union members and as employees; To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes; To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.
  153. 153. PAL v. PALEA G.R. No. 85985, August 13, 1993 In the instant petition for certiorari, the Court is presented the issue of whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees. As stated above, the Principal issue submitted for resolution in the instant petition is whether management may be compelled to share with the union or its employees its prerogative of formulating a code of discipline.
  154. 154. PAL v. PALEA 1993 PAL asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1985, there was no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility therefor between employer and employee. Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 218 [211] of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly considered it a State policy "(t)o ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting the rights, duties and welfare." However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina (177 SCRA 565 [1989]) it was held that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion.
  155. 155. PAL v. PALEA 1993 Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes action. PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the Code. Public respondents found to the contrary, which finding, to say the least is entitled to great respect.
  156. 156. Labor Code Article 267 [255]. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers’ participation in policy and decision-making. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. (Principle of Co-Determination) For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment.
  157. 157. Exceptions to Principle of Co-Determination- (limited to participation & representation, not co- management) • corporate planning • charting of corporate business • modes and procedure of corporate management • acquisition of property
  158. 158. Moresco v. Cagalawan G.R. No. 175170, September 5, 2012 When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. This is consistent with the rule that an employer’s cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.
  159. 159. Bar Exam (76) Q: What is the basis of the power of the State to enact labor laws and social legislation? A: Police Power
  160. 160. Bar Exam (95) Q: Differentiate labor legislation from social legislation A: Labor legislation covers employees and employers while social legislation covers generally covers members of the society (social justice). What about the Labor Code? It is both labor and social legislation. Labor Legislation- consists of statutes, regulations and jurisprudence governing labor and capital
  161. 161. Bar Exam (06) Q: What is the purpose of labor legislation? A: In general, to aid and assist employees or workers. In particular, to implement the State policy on labor.
  162. 162. Bar Exam (95) Q: What are the classification of labor laws? A: 1) Labor Standards- fixes the minimum terms and conditions of employment- wages, hours of work, cost and living allowances, etc. 2) Law on Social Security- applies when the employee is not able to work resulting in the impairment or loss of earning capacity, this provides substitute income, benefits or assistance, etc. 3) Labor Relations- governs the terms and conditions “above” the minimum standards that are determined through bargaining, conciliation, grievance machinery, etc.- or governs the relations between employer and employee
  163. 163. Bar Exam (97) Q: Are labor standards and labor relations mutually exclusive? A: They are not, they are interrelated.
  164. 164. What are other bases of labor law? - Doctrine of Incorporation (PIL) - Social Justice