Sam Hickey's (University of Manchester) presentation at the Transfer Project Workshop in Arusha, Tanzania on 2nd April 2019.

1. The politics of social protection in Africa
Transfer Project Workshop, Arusha, 2-4 April 2019
Sam Hickey, Research Director, ESID
Professor, Global Development Institute, Manchester
Joint research with Tom Lavers (ex-ILO, now GDI) et al

2. ESID
www.effective-states.org
 Global Development Institute, University of
Manchester
 A DFID-funded research centre, 2011-2019
 Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America
Key research question
 Under what political conditions do developmental
forms of state capacity and elite commitment
emerge and become sustained?

3. All papers available at: http://www.effective-states.org/publications/
Ethiopia - Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Social protection in an aspiring ‘developmental state’:
The political drivers of Ethiopia’s PSNP‘, ESID Working Paper 73.
Ghana - Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai (2018) ‘Understanding elite commitment to social
protection in Ghana: the political settlement and transnational policy coalitions’, ESID
Working Paper 112.
Kenya - Fredrick Wanyama and Anna McCord (2017) ‘The politics of scaling up social
protection in Kenya’, ESID Working Paper 87.
Mozambique - Lars Buur and Padil Salimo (2018) ‘The Political Economy of Social
Protection in Mozambique’, ESID Working Paper 103.
Rwanda - Tom Lavers (2016). ‘Understanding elite commitment to social protection:
Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme‘, ESID Working Paper 68.
Tanzania – Rasmus Pedersen and Thabit Jacob (2018) ‘Social protection in an
electorally competitive environment: Productive social safety nets in Tanzania, ESID
Working Paper 109.
Uganda - Sam Hickey and Badru Bukenya (2016). ‘The politics of promoting social cash
transfers in Uganda‘, ESID Working Paper 69.
Zambia - Kate Pruce and Sam Hickey (2017). ‘The politics of promoting social
protection in Zambia‘. ESID Working Paper 75.

4. Key research question
What drives political commitment to
social protection in Africa?
From adoption to institutionalisation

5. What do we know already?
• One-off case-studies: politics matters
• Some comparative analysis
– Tends to over-emphasise the role of donors
• Problematic quantitative analyses
– But what type of outcome is being explained?
– Programme adoption, social expenditure,
coverage…?
– Data reliability

6. GDP and SP
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000 $16,000 $18,000
Public social
protection,
excluding health
care (% of GDP)
(ILO 2014)
GDP per capita (current US$)

7. Democracy and SP?
Egypt
Liberia
Tunisia
Mauritius
Algeria
South Africa
Angola NamibiaMorocco Cape Verde
Guinea-Bissau
Botswana
GhanaTanzania, United Republic ofTogo
MaliSenegalBurundiMozambique BeninDjibouti
Burkina Faso ZambiaSwaziland
Rwanda
Congo, Republic of Malawi
Zimbabwe
Uganda NigeriaCôte d'Ivoire
KenyaMauritaniaCameroon Congo, Democratic Republic of
Central African RepublicEthiopia Sierra LeoneNigerGambia GuineaEritrea Equatorial Guinea MadagascarChadSudan
Lesotho
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Publicsocialprotection,excludinghealthcare
as%ofGDP(ILO2014)
Polity IV

8. An alternative approach
Three key variables:
• Transnational policy coalitions
• ‘Democratisation’
– Meaningful elections and clientelism
• Elite perceptions, especially of ‘crises’
Methods
• In-depth case-studies, process tracing
comparative analysis

9. Institutionalisation of social
assistance
Component Description
Statutory
(ISSA/SSA)
The grounding of particular programmes in legislation and/or strategies:
 0: none
 0.25: pilot programme
 0.5: full programme
 0.75: Programme grounded in Social Protection Strategy or national
development strategy
 1: specific legal basis
Reach (x3; SA
Explorer)
The reach of the programme as a proportion of the poorest 10% of the
population
Finance The proportion of government financing of the programme
Implementatio
n
Implementation through government structures
Scope Whether the programme is national in its scope. Geographically targeted
programmes, where the whole country is potentially included would score 1.
Pilots or programmes that are in the process of rolling out would score lower.

10. The institutionalisation of SA
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Mozambique
Rwanda
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia

11. The transnational politics of promoting social
protection in Africa
• SCTs as a new global policy agenda
– Contest: ideas & institutional positioning
• Regional-level (Livingstone 2006, AU SPF 2009)
• Country-level strategies:
– Alliance-building with government officials
– Pilots and evidence-building
– Technical & financial assistance
– Study tours
• Getting political
– PEA, advocacy, political coalition-building, alignment
Hickey and Seekings, 2018, UNU-WIDER WP

12. Two main pathways to institutionalisation
• Dominant (with or without ideology)
– Ethiopia, Rwanda, also Mozambique
• Competitive
– Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, also Zambia
• Negative case that proves the above rules
– Uganda

13. Dominant pathway/s
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Rwanda
Uganda
Rwanda
Poverty
crisis
Moz
Urban riots
Poverty crisis
Ethiopia
Food
crises

14. Dominant pathways: Ethiopia
• Elite perceptions of existential crises: a series of ‘Armageddons’
– Factional split within the ruling coalition (2001)
– Urban riots (2001)
– Food/distributional crises (2001-03)
• Transnational pressures?
– ‘you don’t tell Ethiopians anything, you make suggestions’
– Donors regarded as unreliable, often ignored
– New Coalition for Food Security (2003)
– PSNP: delinked from wider international push for SCTs
– Technical & financial assistance (gov’t contribution in kind)
– Not welfarist: part of a productivist development strategy
– Graduation for ‘able-bodied’?

15. Dominant pathways
Cases Competitive
elections?
Elite crises? Coherent
donor-driven
coalition?
Outcome
Ethiopia N Y (2003) Y Rapid
expansion
(impartial)
Rwanda N Y (2006-7) N Rapid
expansion
(impartial)
Mozambique N Y (2008-10) Y Rapid
expansion
(partisan)
Uganda N (2011)
Y (2016)
N Y Limited
expansion
(vote-buying)

16. Competitive pathways
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ghana
Kenya
Tanzania
Zambia
Tanzania
Tanzania
2015
Kenya
Kenya
2007
Zambia
2011-2013?
Ghana/Kenya
2012
Ghana
2007

17. • Initial donor-driven agenda
– Pilots, evidence & coalition-building
• Ideological resistance from political elites
• But elites increasingly see political value of
SCTs – electoral support & rent distribution
– Elections in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania: Zambia?
• Crises can matter too: Kenya and Zambia
Competitive pathways

18. Competitive pathways
Cases Competitive
elections?
Elite crises? Coherent
donor-driven
coalition?
Outcome
Ghana Y: 2008?, 2012,
2016
N Y Episodic
expansion
(partisan)
Kenya Y: 2002, 2007,
2012, 2017
Y (2007-8)? Y Episodic
expansion
(political)
Tanzania Y: 2010, 2015 N Y Episodic
expansion
(partisan)
Zambia N: 2011 y: 2013 Y Episodic
expansion

19. Social protection in Zambia

20. Zambia: the process
• Early 2000s: PWAS does have support (but donors by-pass it)
• Donor promotional strategies
– Phase I (2003-7): ‘Kalomo-mania’; coalition-built by coherent donors
– Phase II (2007-): Politics conducted at arms-length; donors/academics
focus on the technical side (knowledge-base); RCTs and WB report
• Government response
– MoF: resistance; new Minister; poverty; rising stars co-opted
– 2010: agree to scale-up pilot…as long as DFID signs-up for 10 years
– 2011: new ‘pro-poor’ party takes power (Patriotic Front); manifesto
– 2012: MoF and Cabinet Secretary persuaded of technical case
– 2013: crisis in rent-distribution to rural areas; Pres’dt looks for
alternative to agricultural subsidies; 700% scale-up
– 2015: a further roll-out approved, problems with targeting model

21. Zambia: outcomes and analysis
• Donors critical in building a coalition and forming SP
as a credible policy agenda
• Gains political support when aligned with new
political dynamics
• 2011: competitive pressures, new ‘pro-poor party’ - ?
• 2013: Crisis in existing system of rent-distribution
• ‘Thinking politically, acting technically’?
• Politics largely done at arms-length via a (national) broker
• Informed by ‘embedded’ development advisors
• Donors focus on technical aspects
• May help protect the programme from political capture

22. Uganda: the counter example?
• Limited SP provision in early 2000s
• Donor promotional strategies
– Phase I (2002-6): some contestation amongst donors; coalition-
building; formal methods (PRSP, studies); pilot
– Phase II (2007-): improved donor co-ordination; PEA: new
tactics; shift discourse from ‘poverty’ to ‘vulnerability’; ESP 2010
• Government response
– Highly contested throughout (MoF); new Minister!
– 2010: scale-up CT pilot, ‘a political fact on the ground’
– 2013: President adds new district (North) after direct lobbying,
calls for national roll-out
– 2015: SCG to reach 40 districts by 2020; GoU finance in
response to strong donor pressure in election year

23. My Government aims to
restore the dignity of our
senior citizens…through in
particular the provision of
Senior Citizens Grants…
Launching these grants in
Nebbi today, represents a
clear delivery on our
Manifesto promises.
President M7, Nebbi, International
Women’s Day 2012/Launch of SAGE

24. Uganda: outcomes and analysis
• A donor-driven agenda: gains limited political
support when aligned with new political dynamics
• Increasingly competitive pressures, extend constituency in
the North
• BUT: no distributional crisis
• Other forms of clientelism preferred
• ‘Acting politically’ has pay-offs, but at a cost:
– How pro-poor?
– ‘Country ownership’?
• A new social contract or the politics of patronage?

26. • Multiple paths to institutionalisation of social
assistance
• Main pathways to institutionalisation involve either:
– Dominant regimes facing an existential threat and
seeking to re-establish strength and/or legitimacy
– Competitive pressures driving SA as rent distribution
• Transnational policy coalitions are important for
adoption, but less so for institutionalisation
Conclusions

27. Implications for SP practitioners
• Politics and power relations matter
– Need to grasp deeper logics and political dynamics
– Coalition-building, donor coordination
– Ideas matter: from evidence to ideology
• The pros and cons of working politically
• Towards a more joined-up approach: building
new fiscal contracts in Africa?
– e.g. domestic revenue mobilisation, bureaucratic
capacity, structural transformation