The document summarizes the evolution of U.S. Navy tactical doctrine during the Solomons campaign from 1942-1943. It describes how the Navy initially relied on linear formations and individual heroics after failures early in the campaign. Through experiments with distributed formations, the Navy learned that coordination was difficult without stable formations. The development of the Combat Information Center and shared tactical pictures enabled new approaches like surprise destroyer torpedo attacks followed by gunfire. By late 1943, the Navy's surface warfare doctrine had evolved significantly through two levels of learning and experimentation during the campaign.

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Learning to
Win:
The Evolution of U.S. Navy
Tactical Doctrine During the
Solomons Campaign
Trent Hone

2. The Battle of Savo Island – 8-9 Aug 1942
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3. Interwar Experimentation and Learning
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4. • The Objective
• The Offensive
• Superiority
• Security
• Surprise
• Simplicity
• Movement
• Economy of Force
• Cooperation
1919 – Doctrinal Principles
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5. • Aggressive Action to Seize the Initiative
• Quick and Effective Gunfire
(Attack Effectively First)
• Decentralized Command and Control
(and Doctrinal Development)
1930s – Tactical Heuristics
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6. • Balanced Exploration and Exploitation
• Fleet Problems and exercises
• Variability within the fleet
• No defined approach – little codified “doctrine”
• Hindered by emphasis on “Major Action”
U.S. Navy’s Learning
System
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7. Initial Adaptations (Oct-Nov
1942)
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8. • Compact linear formations
(“double header”)
• Emphasis on gunnery
• Individual heroics
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Initial Adaptations (Oct-Nov
1942)

9. Experiments with Distributed Formations
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10. Experiments with Distributed Formations
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11. Distributed Formations (Nov 1942)
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• Linear formations abandoned
• Destroyers sent ahead
• Reliance on gunfire from heavy ships
• Coordination very difficult

12. • Commanders overwhelmed
• Too much data
• Too little actionable information
• Formations need to be more stable
• ”Minor Tactics” need more emphasis
Lessons from Guadalcanal
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13. Combat Information Center
(CIC)
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14. New Patterns, Old Doctrine (Jan-Jul 1943)
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15. New Patterns, Old Doctrine (Jan-Jul 1943)
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• Tassafaronga used as a model
• Cruiser gunfire emphasized
• Destroyer attacks subordinated
• Imperial Japanese Navy
counters with stealthy torpedo
attacks

16. 15
Evolutionary Tactics (Aug-Oct 1943)

17. Evolutionary Tactics (Aug-Oct 1943)
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• CIC comes into effective use
• Destroyers attack aggressively
• Torpedoes first, then guns
• Burke’s Doctrine; Moosbrugger’s Plan

18. Revolutionary Tactics (Nov
1943)
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19. 18
Revolutionary Tactics (Nov
1943)

20. 19
Revolutionary Tactics (Nov
1943)
• CIC enables true coordination
• Each captain has a shared picture
• Destroyers make surprise torpedo attacks
• Gunfire after torpedoes are launched

21. • “At no time was there
confusion or lack of
knowledge.”
• “… better than most drills.”
• “Track charts... superimposed
one over the other.”
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Results – According to Burke

22. • U.S. Navy surface warfare doctrine evolved
• Two levels of learning (in theater & at fleet level)
• Variability led to experimentation
• Decentralized approach meant rapid exploitation
• Pacific Fleet codified effective approaches
Summary
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