The UNEP organized an international expert mission to study Japan's management of disaster debris from the 2011 tsunami. The mission observed debris collection, sorting, and treatment in affected areas. Key lessons included having contingency plans, clear government guidelines, financial support, maximizing recycling, and environmental monitoring. The debris totaled 29 million tons, the most expensive cleanup ever. Japan's rapid mechanized response can inform other situations, but local variations and monitoring by independent agencies are also important lessons.

1. International Expert Mission to
Japan on Disaster Debris
Management
Muralee Thummarukudy
Chief, Disaster Risk Reduction
United Nations Environment Programme

2. Background
• UNEP has been
communicating with the
Government of Japan since
the tsunami event in March
• In May 2011, UNEP joined
an international expert
mission to tsunami hit areas
arranged by the Asian
Disaster Reduction Center
• In Q4, 2011, UNEP was
requested by MoFA to
organise an international
expert mission to Tohoku
region to study the
management of disaster
debris

3. Mission objectives
• Observe the disaster debris management in Japan and learn
lessons which may be applied in other countries
• Facilitate experience exchange from other disaster situations

4. Mission team
Ronnie Crossland, US EPA, (Organisation and management)
Thorste Kallnischkies, Germany, (Landfill operations)
David Smith, UK, (Hazardous wastes and asbestos)
Mike Cowing, St Lucia, (Waste recycling)
Yves Barthelemy, France, (Waste estimation)
Mario Burger, Switzerland, (Monitoring)
Prof Toshiaki Yoshioka, Tohoku University, (Member, National Task Force)
Surya Chandak, UNEP, International Environmental Tech Centre, (Waste to Energy Projects)
Muralee Thummarukudy, UNEP, Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme, (Team leader)
Experience in Hurricane Katrina, Rita, China earthquake, SE Asia tsunami, earthquake in Haiti,
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, oil spills + other emergencies

5. Mission itinerary
• Day 1 – Sendai
• Day 2 – Miyako and Ofonato
• Day 3 – Ichinomaki
• Day 4 – Soma City
• Day 6 – Tokyo Waste Management Facilities

6. Mission activities
• Gather basic information and maps
• Visit city officials, discuss their challenges and progress
• Visit the waste management facilities
• Exchange experiences
• Document them in videos, pictures, GPS
• Final output – video and report

7. Exclusions
• Fukushima reactor + exclusion zone
• Debris which got washed off into the sea during the
tsunami

8. Key observations
• The challenge faced
by Japan is massive
and unprecedented
• This will be the most
expensive disaster
debris management
project ever, costing
over ten billion
dollars, overtaking
Hurricane Katrina
(USD 4 billion)
• This is done under
very restrictive
conditions
(limitations of
landfilling and
transport)

9. Amount of disaster waste
at October 18, 2011
Amount of Amount of Amount of
Local wastes
Local
Pref. Pref. Local government dwastes Pref. wastes
government government
(tons) (tons) (tons)
Hirono 15,000 Sendai 1,352,000 Iwaki 880,000
Kuji 96,000 Ishinomaki 6,163,000 Souma 217,000
Noda 140,000 Shiogama 251,000 Minami-souma 640,000
Fudai 19,000 Kesen-numa 1,367,000 Shinchi 167,000
Tanohata 86,000 Natori 636,000 Hirono 25,000
Iwaizumi 42,000 Tagajyo 550,000 Naraha 58,000
Miyako 751,000 Iwanuma 520,000 Tomioka 49,000
Yamada 399,000 Higashi-Matsushima 1,657,000 Ohkuma 37,000
Iwate Miyagi Fukushima
Ohtsuchi 709,000 Watari 1,267,000 Futaba 60,000
Kamaishi 762,000 Yamamoto 533,000 Namie 147,000
Ohfunato 752,000 Matsushima 43,000
Rikuzen-Takata 1,016,000 Shichigahama 333,000
Rifu 15,000
Onagawa 444,000
Minami-Sanriku 56,000
Total 4,755,000 Total 15,691,000 Total 2,280,000
Aomori 0.8 million t, Ibaraki 0.46 million t, Chiba 0.13 million t
Total: 29 million tons

10. Key observations
• The Central government has given clear technical direction and
financial package to deal with the disaster debris in a time-bound
manner (MoE Directive, May 2011)
• The local municipalities are implementing them, with support of
prefectures, in a rapid and systematic manner
• Cities which had prior contingency plans were able to move forward
faster

11. Key observations
• Tsunamis typically
mix up all types of
debris into one mass
• The collection of
disaster debris from
the original location
and primary sorting
is almost over
• Secondary sorting
and final disposal is
ongoing

12. Planning for the Disaster Waste Treatment
Disaster waste 1.35 million tons
Public Treatment 1.03 million tons
Burnable 310,000 t Non-burnable 720,000 t Private Tsunami
Cars
Facilities sediment
Plastic, Paper Wood Metal Bulky Concrete, asphalt Kawara, 10,000t
74,000 t waste 608,000 t Plaster B 310,000 t 1.30mil. t
240,000 t 19,000t 34,000 t 58,000 t
Temporary Storage Sites
Store Temporary
Storage
（図）処理フロー
Crush Crush
Incineration
（ Public (Temporary 12,000 t 514,000 t 128,000 t
) Built )
265,000 t
37,000 t
Landfill Landfill Treatment
Recycle Recycled by will be done Recycling
（ Public Facility ） （ Private private by each (if able)
Facility ） companies
151,000 t 545,000 t facility 12
187,000 t

13. Gamo Storage Site for Disaster Wastes
蒲生搬入場平面図
Plastic, Paper and Tatami
木くず
Concrete, Bricks S=1:3000
木くず
Wood for recycling Sediment
大型車両
Cars
置 場 普通車両 普通車両
小型車両
置 場 置 場
廃車置場 木くず置場 置 場
木くず置場
廃車置場 廃油
Waste oil
Incinerator Cars 廃車置場
廃車置場
廃車置場
木くず
木くず
Wood for combustion
廃車置場 がれき破砕ヤード
破砕機
木くず
Concrete, Bricks
木くず
がれき
Debris from Tsunami がれき
木くず選別ヤード
ト ンメ
ロ ル
がれき
その他
冷蔵庫
Debris from Tsunami
TV
洗濯機
エアコン 農機具 木くず 燃えるごみ
Refrigerators Washing machines
その他
Air conditioners Ｔv Metal
13

14. Key observations
• Very high degree of mechanisation, from sorting to treatment
• Local employment is promoted but additional employment generation
is limited

15. Key observations
• When possible, use of local facilities - such as cement plant - to
treat disaster waste has been attempted
• Cars and white goods have not yet been processed

16. Key observations
• Speed at which new
facilities are being
set up, such as
sorting incineration
and desalinization, is
impressive
• The biggest
incinerator in Japan
is being set up in
Ichinomaki and will
be operational within
next 6 months
• Typically these take
many years in other
countries

17. Key observations
• Quantity of raw timber is massive
• The concrete foundations of buildings
have not yet been removed
• Quantity of hazardous substances
was somewhat limited compared to
disaster situations elsewhere

18. Observations
• Some waste is not amenable to easy management, such as
fishing nets
• Some waste still needs to be dug up from the ports

19. Key observations
• Monitoring of environmental conditions is ongoing at all locations
• Results are made publicly available often within hours of monitoring
• Health and safety management in the facilities are of a high standard
• No reported fatality relating to health and safety in the field

20. Lessons for other situations
• Having a contingency plan enables cities to initiate the disaster debris
management quickly, thereby speeding up overall recovery
• Clear instructions from central government (or agency) at an early
stage will facilitate standardisation of approaches
• Without liberal financial support and technical back-up, local
municipalities will not be able to cope with such disasters

21. Lessons, continued..
• Sorting of the debris to a
reasonable number of categories
enables maximising recycling, the
earlier it is done, the better
• All options, including land
reclamation, should be attempted
on an opportunistic basis
• Where possible, local
opportunities for waste-to-energy
should be evaluated
• Good health and safety should not
be neglected even during
emergency situations

22. Lessons, continued..
• Environmental monitoring should be integral part of the projects
• Documentation and communication of the process and results are
important

23. Lessons, from elsewhere
applicable in Japan
• No options, including
landfilling, should be
discounted at the
earliest stage
• Local variations should
be promoted from the
national guidelines so
long as it suits local
environmental
conditions
• Monitoring is best done
by an independent
academic/research
agency rather than the
contractor or
government

24. Lessons from elsewhere
applicable in Japan
• There should be continued effort to coordinate between the
municipalities and prefectures so that good practices can be shared
• Continued involvement of national experts to technically backstop the
local authorities will ensure more optimal outcomes locally

25. Follow-up actions
• A UNEP report on Japan’s disaster debris management
• A video documentary
• Website content, ongoing outreach to share findings
• UNEP to establish an international network of experts on
disaster waste management
• Disaster debris estimation methodology to be fine tuned