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17 USC § 107 (LIMITATIONS On EXCLUSIVE Rights - FAIR USE)
For Educational and Information Purposes!
JUNE 17, 2016 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY PLEADING
THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT and ITS LEGAL COUNSEL
BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ
ARE OBSTRUCTING FROM BEING FILED –
CRIMES ARE BEING COMMITTED
TO KEEP THIS INFORMATION OUT OF PUBLIC VIEW
DID YOU KNOW THAT
THE KLAN’S/UNITED STATES’ LAWYERS/ATTORNEYS –
BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ
HAS AN OFFICE RIGHT DOWN THE STREET
FROM THE PULSE NIGHTCLUB and IS LEGAL COUNSEL TO
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)
THAT HELD MEETINGS
WITH THE ALLEGED GUNMAN
ACCUSED OF THE RECENT (06/2016)
MASS PULSE NIGHTCLUB SHOOTING IN
ORLANDO, FLORIDA?
TARGETING CHRISTIANS – –MUSLIMS
AND NOW HOMOSEXUALS. . .
IT APPEARS THAT THE LAW FIRM OF
BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ
and IT’s KLAN/WHITE SUPREMACIST/ZIONIST CLIENTS
ARE THE NO. 1 DOMESTIC and
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
IN THE WORLD and
ARE USING THEIR CONTROL OF THE MEDIA NETWORKS
TO FALSIFY NEWS REPORTED and EXPLOIT
THEIR CRIMES OF HATRED and
THE FRAMING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE
THAT THEY KILL/MURDER
IN ALLEGED STANDOFFS TO
KEEP ALLEGED SHOOTERS
and EXPOSING THEM!FROM TALKING
It Appears USING Government Agencies’
Resources To PLAN, ORCHESTRATE and
CARRY OUT Their TERRORIST ACTS
And Then Proceed To
COVER-UP/DESTROY EVIDENCE!
Was The PULSE Nightclub On President Barack Obama’s “SECRET KILL LIST”
That He Goes Over With His Advisor Baker Donelson. . .?
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/obama-secret-kill-list-13166139
17 USC § 107 (LIMITATIONS On EXCLUSIVE Rights - FAIR USE)
For Educational and Information Purposes!
OPEN INVITATION - PUBLIC REQUEST:
IT APPEARS THAT
DOMESTIC and INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
ARE LEGALLY and NEEDED TO BRING THELAWFULLY
UNITED STATES DESPOTISM GOVERNMENT REGIME AND
ITS TERRORIST LEADER(S) FRONTING AS A
LAW FIRM BY THE NAME OF
BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ
AND ITS WHITE SUPREMACIST/ZIONISTS CLIENTS
!TO JUSTICE
It Appears That Out of FEAR Of The
EXPOSURE Of A FRAUDULENTLY CREATED
CORPORATION (UNITED STATES – That Has
HIJACKED The United States of America’s
Government) IS COMING TO LIGHT,
DISTRACTION(S) AS “MEDIA OVERKILL” OF
THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SCAM
IS BEING USED!
Using The MEDIA Networks For Purposes Of
The HILLARY CLINTON and DONALD TRUMP
SPECTACLE - - - RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT
OF THIS FRAUDULENTLY-CREATED
CORPORATION!
TERRORIST ACTS are BEING CARRIED OUT FOR PURPOSES OF FEAR and CONTROL! AT
LEAST KNOW THE TRUTH AS TO WHY IT APPEARS THIS FRAUDULENT CORPORATION’S
BUSINESS PARTNERS ARE PULLING OUT – U.S. TREASURIES BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
ARE BEING DUMPED - - CUTTING LOSSES and LEAVING THEM HOLDING THE BAG! - - - THIS
FRAUDULENT CORPORATION’S CRIMES ARE COMING TO LIGHT!
Page 1 of 63
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
IN RE:
LADYE M. TOWNSEND CHAPTER 7
DEBTOR CASE NO. 11-00167-ee
CREDITOR VOGEL NEWSOME’S
OBJECTION TO 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . .(DOCKET NO. 78);
TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO BANKRUPTCY COURT ADVISING 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . .- DOCKET NO. 78 – IS A NONAPPEALABLE ORDER;
TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS - -
TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT UPON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS;
REITERATION OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON; and
NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC and WORLD/FOREIGN LEADERS1
COMES NOW Creditor Vogel Newsome (“Newsome”) without waiving her rights, without submitting
to the jurisdiction of this Court, without waiving previous defenses and claims set forth in her pleadings filed
with this Court and files this her, OBJECTION TO 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. .
.(DOCKET NO. 78); TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO BANKRUPTCY COURT ADVISING 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . . – DOCKET NO. 78 – IS A NONAPPEALABLE ORDER; TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS; TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT UPON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS; REITERATION OF MOTION
FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON; AND NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC AND WORLD/FOREIGN
LEADERS (“CVNOT06/07/16ORDER”) pursuant to Rule 12, Rule 46, Rule 52 and Rule 60 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), 28 USC § 455; FRCP Rule 12(G) – consolidation of matters; United States
Constitution Article III/United States Constitution Article III, § 1; Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution – and other statutes/laws governing said matters. In support thereof, Newsome states the
following:
1
NOTE: Boldface, italics and underline, etc. represents “emphasis” added.
Page 2 of 63
1. Newsome DOES NOT waive her defense to the jurisdictional issue which arises in this
matter. Therefore, Newsome does not submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. While
the laws are clear that Newsome cannot waive jurisdictional rights, she believes it is
necessary to provide information regarding decisions of court(s) on said issue(s):
In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310 (4th
Cir. 2010) - Subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can be raised by party,
or by court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment.
2. This instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” is submitted in good faith and has not been
submitted for purposes of delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment,
obstructing the administration of justice, vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of
litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the rights of Newsome
secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the
United States.
3. For purposes of PRESERVING the issues was and/or addressed in this instant
Bankruptcy filing as well as in her PREVIOUS filings, Creditor Newsome submits her
TIMELY OBJECTION(s) pursuant to Rule 46 of the FRCP to address the ERRORS in
this instant Bankruptcy action and the 06/07/16 ruling (DOCKET No. 78) by Judge
Edward Ellington.
A formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary. When the ruling or order
is requested or made, a party need only state the action that it wants the court to
take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection. Failing to
object does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when the
ruling or order was made.
Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541 (5th
Cir. 1968) -
Purpose of rule requiring party to inform court at time order or ruling is made
to make known the action which he desires court to take, or his objection to
action of court and his grounds therefor, is to inform trial judge of possible
errors so that he may have an opportunity to reconsider his ruling and make any
changes deemed advisable. FRCP Rule46, 28 U.S.C.A.
Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th
Cir. 1971) - Timely
objection is necessary to bring to trial court's attention alleged errors in conduct
of a trial.
Pigrenet v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 1091 (5th
Cir. 1981) -
Procedural objections to action of . . . trial court must be timely made to give
tribunal an opportunity to correct the error, if there be.
Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496 (5th
Cir. Miss., 1999) - A
failure to make a procedural objection waives the error, precluding review by
Court of Appeals.
4. For the purposes of expedition, saving of time and minimize costs associated with
litigation, Newsome consolidate her motions/pleadings herein pursuant to FRCP Rule
12(G) which states:
FRCP Rule 12(g) Joining Motions.
Right to Join. A motion under this rule may be joined with
any other motion allowed by this rule.
Page 3 of 63
5. This Bankruptcy Court LACKS Jurisdiction to act in that Creditor Newsome does NOT
waive Jurisdiction and does NOT authorize this Bankruptcy Court nor Judge Edward
Ellington to INFRINGE upon her Constitutional Rights and USURP authority in which
it/he LACKS! From the record EVIDENCE, statutes/laws and GUIDELINES
governing said matters, would properly place this Bankruptcy action as a NON-Core
Proceeding!
6. Because Debtor Townsend’s instant FRIVOLOUS Bankruptcy action a NON-Core
proceeding, it PRECLUDES this Court from entering a FINAL Judgment.
Nevertheless, this is EXACTLY what Judge Edward Ellington attempted to do on or
about 09/30/15, in efforts of DEPRIVING Creditor Newsome DUE PROCESS
of Law and EQUAL PROTECTION of the Laws! See DOCKET No. 61 of this
Bankruptcy Court.
7. This Bankruptcy Court and Judge Edward Ellington (“Judge
Ellington”) LACKS authority to act pursuant to the United States
Constitution Art. III. This Bankruptcy Court and Judge Ellington is
PURPORTING Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 157 –
i.e. which is NOT only in CLEAR ERROR but a GROSS
INFRINGEMENT upon Creditor Vogel Newsome’s
Page 4 of 63
CONSTITUTIONAL Rights and other Rights secured and/or
guaranteed under the statutes/laws governing said matters.
8. The Court of FIRST FILING and with PROPER and
LEGAL/LAWFUL JURISDICTION regarding the CIVIL Lawsuit
filed by Vogel Newsome in “Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt &
Sams, PA, etal.,” wherein Debtor Ladye M. Townsend is NAMED as
a Defendant, IS the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT –
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704” that
was filed on or about 12/03/10!
I. LACK OF JURISDICTION:
There is authority that dismissal of a bankruptcy case does not mandate
dismissal of all pending adversary proceedings. However, if an entity
joined as a party in an adversary proceeding raised the defense that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter and that defense is
sustained, the court must dismiss such entity from the adversary
proceeding. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7019(1).
Mississippi Case: Rice v. McMullen, 43 So.2d 195 (Miss. 1949) - A
court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of
Page 5 of 63
the parties, to give validity to its final judgments, orders and decrees,
and legislature cannot under the Constitution dispense with notice,
actual or constructive.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 135
F.Supp. 304 (S.D.Miss.Jackson.Div.,1955) - “Judicial power” is the
legal right, ability and authority to hear and decide a justifiable issue or
controversy, and such power is ordinarily vested in a court of justice.
U.S. Supreme Court Case: U.S. v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. 641(1874) -
“Jurisdiction” is the power to hear and determine a cause.
In re N.L.R.B., 58 S.Ct. 1001 (1938) - “Jurisdiction” means, in one
sense, the power to hear and determine the controversy presented, but a
court has “jurisdiction,” in another sense, to determine whether such
power is conferred upon it in the circumstances disclosed, and if it finds
such power is not granted, it lacks “jurisdiction” of the subject matter
and must refrain from an adjudication of rights in connection
therewith.
Other Court Cases: In re Jahelka, 2010 WL 5558990 (Bankr., 2010)
- Subject matter jurisdiction is threshold question in every case.
In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 435 B.R. 894 (2010) - A motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges the power of the
federal court to hear a claim or case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1),
28 U.S.C.A.
Issue of court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised in any
manner, including on motion of one of the parties or by the court sua
sponte. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A
A) LACK OF JURISDICTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT: SUPREME COURT
DECISION – Please see Howard K. Stern, Executor of the Estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall v.
Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall, 564 U.S. 462; 131 S. Ct.
2594; 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011) at EXHIBIT “A” attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full and, states in part:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: . . . Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the
debtor challenged the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit which held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
judgment.
OVERVIEW: The debtor contended that 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(2)(C)
expressly granted the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the debtor's
counterclaim to the creditor's claim, but the creditor argued that the
counterclaim was not within core bankruptcy jurisdiction and was
excluded as a personal injury claim. The U.S. Supreme Court held that,
although the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on
the core counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional counterclaim by the debtor,
the bankruptcy court was not established under U.S. Const. art. III and
was not subject to the constitutional assurances of independence which
Page 6 of 63
would allow adjudication of the debtor's state common law claim. Further,
resolving the creditor's claim would not necessarily resolve the debtor's
counterclaim, and the debtor's claim was otherwise unrelated to the claim-
allowance process. Also, the debtor's claim did not involve public rights to
allow the congressional extension of bankruptcy jurisdiction, since the debtor's
claim flowed from state law rather than the federal bankruptcy scheme
authority to do so under U.S. Const. art. III. While § 157 purported to extend
bankruptcy jurisdiction to any.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment.
[HN2] Bankruptcy courts may hear and enter final judgments in core
proceedings in a bankruptcy case. In non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy
courts instead submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
the district court for that court's review and issuance of final judgment.
[HN3] With certain exceptions, the district courts of the United States have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases under Title 11 of
the U.S. Code. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(a). Congress divides bankruptcy
proceedings into three categories: those that arise under Title 11, those that arise
in a Title 11 case, and those that are related to a case under Title 11. 28
U.S.C.S. § 157(a). District courts may refer any or all such proceedings to the
bankruptcy judges of their district. District courts also may withdraw a case or
proceeding referred to the bankruptcy court for cause shown. § 157(d).
[HN4] Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter final judgments in all core
proceedings arising under Title 11 of the U.S. Code, or arising in a case under
Title 11. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(1). Core proceedings include, but are not limited
to 16 different types of matters, including counterclaims by a bankruptcy
debtor's estate against persons filing claims against the estate. § 157(b)(2)(C).
Parties may appeal final judgments of a bankruptcy court in core
proceedings to the district court, which reviews them under traditional
appellate standards. 28 U.S.C.S. § 158(a).
[HN6] When a bankruptcy judge determines that a referred proceeding is not a
core proceeding but is otherwise related to a case under Title 11 of the U.S.
Code, the judge may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the district court. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(1). It is the district court
that enters final judgment in such cases after reviewing de novo any matter
to which a party objects.
[HN8] 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy judges to enter final
judgments in core proceedings arising under Title 11 of the U.S. Code, or
arising in a case under Title 11. Section 157(c)(1) instructs bankruptcy judges
to instead submit proposed findings in a proceeding that is not a core
proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under Title 11.
[HN12] Because branding a rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction
alters the normal operation of the adversarial system, courts are not inclined to
interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar when they are not framed
as such.
[HN13] 28 U.S.C.S. § 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment
between a bankruptcy court and a district court. § 157(b)(1), (c)(1). That
allocation does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Under §
157(c)(2), parties may consent to entry of final judgment by bankruptcy
Page 7 of 63
judge in non-core case. By the same token, § 157(b)(5) simply specifies where
a particular category of cases should be tried.
DECISION: [***475] Bankruptcy court's entry of final judgment on
debtor's counterclaim against creditor, though valid under 28 U.S.C.S. §
157, held to violate Article III of Federal Constitution.
9. Debtor Lady M. Townsend’s Bankruptcy action is a NON-Core proceeding. This
Court was TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY notified of the NON-Core
status of this Bankruptcy action through Creditor Newsome’s REBUTTAL Motion filed
on or about 10/15/15, OBJECTING to this Court’s 09/30/15 Final Judgment. See
DOCKET No. 64.
10. This Bankruptcy Court/Judge Edward Ellington is alleging JURISDICTION pursuant to
28 USC § 1334 and 28 USC § 157 and FALSE claims of a Core proceeding – when it
is NOT – in efforts of FRAUDULENTLY and DECEPTIVELY obtaining Jurisdiction
in which this Court and he LACKS!
11. Debtor Ladye M. Townsend in filing this FRIVOLOUS Bankruptcy action NAMED
Vogel Newsome as a CREDITOR for purposes of UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY
obtaining a DISCHARGE from damages Newsome seeks to receive from her WELL-
PRESERVED Civil Lawsuit styled, “Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA,
etal., USDC – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704” that was
filed with the United States DISTRICT Court on or about 12/03/10!
12. In the Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams Lawsuit in the United States District
Court- Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, the RECORD
EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that Newsome PAID the $350 FILING FEE
and RECEIPT No. 34643006821 was ISSUED by said District
Court! - - - EMPHASIS ADDED! See Docket No. 1 in the
referenced District Court matter.
Page 8 of 63
13. In the Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams Lawsuit in the United States District
Court- Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, the RECORD
EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that Newsome TIMELY DEMANDED a JURY
TRIAL - - EMPHASIS ADDED – CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION!
14. On or about 12/16/10, Creditor Newsome SERVED via United States Postal Service
Mail Defendant (in the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams CIVIL Lawsuit) Ladye
Margaret Townsend with “Waiver Of The Service Of Summons” which was
RECEIVED on or about 12/27/10:
and executed by Townsend on or about 01/20/11 – See
DOCKET No. 12 of USDC-Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704. SUBSTANTIAL
Page 9 of 63
EVIDENCE of Townsend’s KNOWLEDGE of the Civil
Lawsuit filed AGAINST her as well as other Defendants.
15. From Record EVIDENCE, Defendant Townsend in the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt
& Sams matter had until about 02/14/11 (i.e. 60 DAYS from 12/16/10 mailing of
Complaint) to file an Answer and/or Responsive Pleading to Plaintiff Vogel
Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit. However Defendant Townsend made a
FOOLISH and FATAL move to file a “VOLUNTARY
Page 10 of 63
PETITION” in this BANKRUPTCY action on or about 01/18/11,
with the United States Bankruptcy Court-Southern District Of
Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 11-00167!
See DOCKET No. 1 of this Bankruptcy Court – Case No. 11-00167!
16. Debtor Ladye M. Townsend in this instant Bankruptcy action – according to United
States Postal Service (“USPS”) information – OBTAINED KNOWLEDGE of
Creditor Newsome’s FILING of a CIVIL Lawsuit AGAINST her and other Defendants
through the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. matter on or about
12/27/11.
Page 11 of 63
17. As a DEFENSIVE move, Debtor Townsend filed her VOLUNTARY
PETITION with this Bankruptcy Court on or about 01/18/11, and then SWIFTLY
moved to EXECUTE the “WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS” in the Newsome
vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. matter approximately TWO DAYS LATER
on or about 01/20/11 - - EMPHASIS ADDED!
18. In its 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case . . .(Docket No. 78) of this
Bankruptcy Court, Judge Ellington asserts that Creditor Newsome IS NOT a Creditor;
however, the Record EVIDENCE will STRONGLY rebut such FRIVOLOUS assertion
in that Debtor Townsend in her document filed with this Court entitled, “MATRIX,”
indeed has NAMED Vogel Newsome as a CREDITOR! See DOCKET No. 2 of
this instant Bankruptcy action!
19. The Record EVIDENCE will also support that Vogel Newsome is NAMED as a
CREDITOR in a document filed in this instant Bankruptcy matter entitled, “ Notice of
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines” – See DOCKET
No. 8.
Page 12 of 63
20. There is NO record evidence to support that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT –
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) “REFERRED” Vogel Newsome v.
Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA, etal. – Case No. 10-704, to this
Bankruptcy Court because said District Court did NOT!
21. The CORE vs. NON-Core issue has been addressed in Creditor
Newsome’s pleading filed with this Bankruptcy Court on or
about 10/15/16 - DOCKET No. 64 – as well as in Creditor’s
subsequent pleadings. This is EVIDENCED in said Court’s
06/07/16, Order Denying Motion To Reopen. . . (Docket No. 78) in
that it ONLY provides FRIVOLOUS “Findings of Fact” which,
through this instant filing is TIMELY, PROPERLY,
ADEQUATELY and LAWFULLY/LEGALLY CONTESTED!
Page 13 of 63
22. Creditor Newsome’s OBJECTION pleadings and/or pleadings CONTESTING rulings by this
Bankruptcy Court as well as those that have been filed on behalf of Debtor Townsend will
SUSTAIN that Newsome does NOT CONSENT to this Bankruptcy Court’s Jurisdiction
and, therefore, Newsome does NOT CONSENT and VEHEMENTLY
OBJECTS to this Bankruptcy Court’s and Judge Edward
Ellington’s DEFIANCE of the CONSTITUTION and efforts to
ASSERT himself as an ARTICLE III Judge as well as this
Bankruptcy Court under U.S. Constitutional Art. III – ERROR. . .
.ERROR. . .ERROR - - GROSS Judicial USURPATION and
ABUSE OF POWER. . .!
B) FIRST-TO-FILE: Please see The Cadle Company v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174
F.3d 599 (5th
Cir.); 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8615; 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 369 at EXHIBIT
“B” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
Page 14 of 63
OUTCOME: The dismissal of the plaintiff's claims was reversed because,
although the district court properly applied the first-to-file rule, it should not
have dismissed the claims but should have transferred them to the court of
first jurisdiction.
[HN3] Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two
federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it
if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap. The rule rests on principles
of comity and sound judicial administration. The concern manifestly is to avoid
the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the
authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that
call for a uniform result.
[HN4] The first-filed court takes priority by virtue of its prior
jurisdiction over the common subject matter.
[HN5] Courts apply the first-to-file doctrine to avoid relitigation of, and
inconsistency with, issues already decided by other courts.
[HN6] The first-to-file rule not only determines which court may
decide the merits of substantially similar issues, but also establishes which
court may decide whether the second suit filed must be dismissed, stayed, or
transferred and consolidated.
OPINION. . .
The Cadle Company ("Cadle") appeals the district court's decision to dismiss
its RICO and state law claims under the "first-to-file" rule. Cadle argues that the
district court should have applied the rule only if it first determined that the
first-filed court's jurisdiction was proper, and erred by failing to do so in this
case. Cadle argues in the alternative that even if the lower court did not err in
applying the rule, it should have transferred the case rather than dismissed it. We
find that the district court properly applied the first-to-file rule, but should have
[**2] transferred the suit rather than dismissed it. The judgment of the district
court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded to the district court with
instructions to transfer the case. . . .
3. The District Court Properly Applied the First-To-File Rule
In sum, Cadle's view of the first-to-file rule is supported by neither the policies
behind the rule nor the cases that apply it. While the jurisdictional certainty of
the first-filed court might be a proper factor for a district court to weigh in
maximizing judicial economy, Cadle does not allege that the court below erred
in this respect. Nor could it: the district court in this case was the second-filed
court, and under Fifth Circuit precedent that balancing act is reserved only for
the first-filed court. "Once the likelihood of a substantial overlap between the
two suits has been demonstrated, it [is] was no longer up to the [second filed
court] to resolve [**19] the question of whether both should be allowed to
proceed." Mann, 439 F.2d at [*606] 407. The district court correctly refused
to act as a "super appellate court" by entertaining either Cadle's jurisdiction
or the defendants' standing arguments, and properly limited its inquiry to the
potential overlap between the two cases. By so limiting its analysis, the district
court indeed avoided trenching on the authority of its sister court, one of
"the very abuses the first-to-file rule is designed to prevent." Cadle, No. 97-
1502, slip op. at 4.
B. Transfer or Dismiss?
Cadle argues in the alternative that the district court should have transferred
the case back to the Laredo division rather than dismiss it entirely. We agree. "
Page 15 of 63
[HN6] The 'first to file rule' not only determines which court may decide the
merits of substantially similar issues, but also establishes which court may
decide whether the second suit filed must be dismissed, stayed or
transferred and consolidated." Sutter Corp., 125 F.3d at 920. As noted above,
"the Fifth Circuit adheres to the general rule, that the court in which an
action is first filed is the appropriate court to determine whether
subsequently filed cases [**20] involving substantially similar issues should
proceed." Save Power, 121 F.3d at 948. Thus, once the district court found
that the issues might substantially overlap, the proper course of action was for
the court to transfer the case to the Laredo court to determine which case
should, in the interests of sound judicial administration and judicial economy,
proceed. The district court erred by dismissing the suit.
MOTIONS DENIED. The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and
the case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to transfer the
case to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Laredo Division, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party
shall bear its own costs.
23. On or about 08/10/15, this Bankruptcy Court NOTICED a Bankruptcy Hearing for
09/18/15 – See DOCKET No. 15 in this instant Bankruptcy action.
Page 16 of 63
The above SNAPSHOT is an EXCERPT from a 09/18/15 Transcript of the Hearing before this
Bankruptcy Court and will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome advised of the FIRST-TO-FILE
Defense asserted as well as advised said Bankruptcy Court of its LACK OF JURISDICTION to
proceed. To NO avail! Therefore, SUPPORTING and SUSTAINING this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge
Edward Ellington’s ABUSE of POWER, USURPATION. . .DEPRIVATION of Due Process of
Law and DEPRIVATION of Equal Protection of Laws . . .
PLEASE BE ADVISED: That a copy of the 09/18/15 Bankruptcy Hearing has
been MADE AVAILABLE for PUBLIC viewing and/or listening at:
AUDIO MAY BE FOUND AT:
YOUTUBE AUDIO – MAY BE FOUND:
FILESANYWHERE AUDIO–MAY BE FOUND:
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/091815-u-s-
bankruptcy-hearing-recording-townsend-matter
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/091815-bankruptcy-
hearing-transcribed-townsend-matter-photos-added
https://youtu.be/viLIo7KObUU
https://www.filesanywhere.com/fs/v.aspx?v=8b706587596674
75ad6c
TRANSCRIPT MAY BE FOUND AT: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/0091815-bankruptcy-
hearing-transcribed-townsend-matter-photos-added
NOTE: Multiple COPIES of this Transcript has been made and POSTED due to
what appears to be CONSPIRACIES (obstruction of LINKS by Web Host
Providers) to keep the PUBLIC/WORLD from getting a copy of it! So if interested
persons DO NOT get it at one location, hopefully, they will be able to get a copy
using one of the OTHER Links!
24. The Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy action will SUSTAIN that Creditor
Newsome NOT ONLY through pleadings filed but also in the 09/18/15 Hearing
ADDRESSED the FACT that her CIVIL Lawsuit in “Vogel Newsome v.
Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA, etal.,” wherein Debtor Ladye M.
Townsend is NAMED as a Defendant in the UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson),
Case No. 10-704” was filed FIRST - on or about 12/03/10. It
appears that Debtor Townsend then made a FATAL decision to file
this instant Bankruptcy and WAIVE filing an Answer and/or Rule 12
Responsive pleading in Newsome’s Civil Lawsuit in efforts of
AVOIDING Liability – i.e. which as a matter of law, Townsend has
FAILED and YES, is LIABLE for the injury/harm done to Plaintiff
Vogel Newsome!
Page 17 of 63
25. The Record EVIDENCE will
SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court
and/or Judge Edward Ellington has
ERRED regarding the FIRST-TO-
FILE Rule and is VERY ADAMANT
in USURPING his authority and
ABUSING POWERS in
FURTHERANCE of the
Conspiracies and RACIAL Animus
towards Creditor Vogel Newsome!
26. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has KNOWINGLY
INFRINGED not only upon Rights secured under the United States Constitution, but is
ABUSING statutes/laws MANDATED to PREVENT such unlawful/illegal practices
Judge Ellington has become ACCUSTOMED to! Further SUPPORTING his being
UNFIT to even remain on the Judicial Bench as a Bankruptcy Judge and/or Judge in
any other Court of Law.
27. The Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy matter as well as in this instant
“CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” will SUSTAIN that DUE to this Bankruptcy Court’s
LACK OF JURISDICTION as well as the FIRST-TO-FILE Rule, that this matter is to
be TRANSFERRED to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District
of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 for handling.
28. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge Edward
Ellington’s KNOWLEDGE that Creditor Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT-Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No.
10-704, is STILL an ACTIVE Lawsuit and has been PRESERVED by Newsome’s
FILING of the applicable pleadings! Moreover, her PRESERVATION of said issues
has been RECORDED in the 09/18/15 Bankruptcy Hearing!
29. The FIFTH CIRCUIT Court of Appeals ADHERES to the FIRST-TO-FILE Rule
and said Court’s decision will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court UPON
LEARNING of Creditor Newsome’s Lawsuit in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT in the Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, was to
TRANSFER Debtor Townsend’s Bankruptcy action to the DISTRICT COURT for
CONSOLIDATION with Creditor/Plaintiff Newsome’s Lawsuit. However, this did
NOT occur and Judge Edward Ellington is DETERMINED to DEFY the statutes/laws
governing said matters because for some STUPID reason, he may believe that he is
IMMUNED from CRIMINAL Liability and PROSECUTION in the ROLE he is
Page 18 of 63
playing in the CONSPIRACIES and other crimes being carried out AGAINST
Creditor/Plaintiff Vogel Newsome. Judge Edward Ellington IS NOT immune from
CRIMINAL Prosecution and/or LIABILITY! Furthermore, the Record EVIDENCE
will SUSTAIN that it appears that Judge Edward Ellington is a WILLING participant
in the CRIMINAL acts being carried out against Creditor Newsome and that said acts
are RACIALLY and DISCRIMINATORILY motivated!
30. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED in the
DISCHARGE and DISMISSAL of Debtor Townsend’s Bankruptcy action in that
CLEARLY it LACKED Jurisdiction to execute the FRIVOLOUS Final Judgment
(DOCKET No. 61) it asserts has been issued and is acting in VIOLATION of the
United States Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters!
31. There is EVIDENCE to support that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT –
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 (at DOCKET No. 14) was
TIMELY NOTIFIED of Debtor Ladye M. Townsend’s filing of this instant Bankruptcy
action; however, DELIBERATELY and with MALICIOUS and RECKLESS disregard
for the laws governing said matters, FAILED to NOTIFY this Bankruptcy Court of the
PENDING CIVIL Lawsuit!
32. There is Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy action to SUSTAIN that
Creditor Newsome TIMELY NOTIFIED this Court of her OPPOSITION to Debtor
Townsend’s Bankruptcy action through her pleading entitled, “Creditor’s
Opposition/Response To Notice Of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors,
& Deadlines; and Motion To Be Dismissed From Action.” (DOCKET No. 14-1).
Page 19 of 63
33. There is Record Evidence in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern
District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 – action to SUSTAIN that Debtor
Ladye M. Townsend’s filing of this instant Bankruptcy action has PROVEN to be
FATAL and she has LOST ALL rights to DEFEND against the claims set forth in
Creditor/Plaintiff Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit. When Debtor Townsend SHOULD have
PRESERVED her Rights to defend through ANSWER and/or a RESPONSIVE Rule 12
pleading in Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al., Townsend FAILED to do so.
As a DIRECT and PROXIMATE result, Creditor/Plaintiff Newsome has moved in the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for a DEFAULT JUDGMENT! See DOCKET
No. 17 in the DISTRICT COURT action!
C) NO FINAL JUDGEMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED IN UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT ACTION – SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI (JACKSON) – CASE NO. 10-704.
34. The Record EVIDENCE will support that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, on or about
10/21/13, an "ORDER REASSIGNING CASE" was entered. See DOCKET No. 31 of
the DISTRICT COURT.
35. Creditor Newsome believes it is IMPORTANT to note that at the time of filing the
lawsuit in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi
(Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, it appears that the following HOUSE NEGROES were
being used for DECEPTIVE purposes:
Judge Henry T. Wingate Linda Randle Anderson Carlyle C. White (Butler, Snow,
O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada
Page 20 of 63
and have since been removed and replaced with the likes of the KLAN’s CHIEF Judge
Louis Guirola, Jr.
36. The Record EVIDENCE will support that AFTER the UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT in the Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. matter – Southern District
of Mississippi [Jackson] - (Case No. 10-704) entered its "ORDER REASSIGNING
CASE," it then moved SWIFTLY to enter TEXT ONLY ORDERS and/or ENTERIES
into the DOCKET of the Court for purposes of ABUSING the Court’s ELECTRONIC
FILING process, OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE, DEPRIVING Plaintiff Newsome DUE
PROCESS of Law, DEPRIVING Plaintiff EQUAL PROTECTION of the Laws and
DEPRIVATION of other PROTECTED Rights secured and/or guaranteed under the
United States Constitution and/or other statutes/laws governing said matters.
37. The Record EVIDENCE will support that on or about 10/23/13, that in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) matter, it
appears that CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. moved SWIFTLY to enter a
FINAL JUDGMENT (See Docket No. 33 - Case No. 10-704).
38. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 11/12/13, the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No.
10-704 filed Plaintiff Vogel Newsome's pleading entitled, “Motion For Relief From
The October 23, 2013 Final Judgment; Motion To Disqualify Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.
and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” See Docket No. 34
39. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 11/12/13,
the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 NOTED Plaintiff Vogel
Newsome's DEMAND for TRIAL BY JURY! See Docket No. 35.
40. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 11/13/13, in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No.
10-704, CHIEF District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. AGAIN "ABUSED" the Court's
Page 21 of 63
ELECTRONIC FILING SYSTEM for purposes of DEPRIVING Plaintiff Newsome
DUE PROCESS of Law, DEPRIVING Plaintiff Newsome EQUAL PROTECTION of
the Laws and DEPRIVATION of other PROTECTED Rights secured/guaranteed under
the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters. See
Docket reflecting 11/13/13 Entry.
41. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/02/13, the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No.
10-704 filed Plaintiff Newsome's pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To November 13, 2013
‘DOCKET’ Text Order; Findings Of Fact and Conclusion Issue(s); and DEMAND For
JURY TRIAL.” See DOCKET No. 36.
42. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/02/13,
the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 NOTED Plaintiff Vogel
Newsome's DEMAND for TRIAL BY JURY! See Docket No. 37.
43. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/12/13, in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No.
10-704 that CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. entered an “Order Denying
Plaintiff’s DEMAND For JURY TRIAL and Objections RE Text Order.” See Docket
No. 38.
44. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/31/13, in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No.
10-704 that Plaintiff Vogel Newsome filed her pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To
December 12, 2013, Order Denying Plaintiff’s DEMAND For JURY TRIAL and
Objections RE Text Order and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” See Docket No. 39.
45. The Docket of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT -
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 - will
further support that there are NO separate “documents – i.e.
Order(s) and/or Judgment(s)” pursuant to Rule 58 of the FRCP,
and, thus, Plaintiff Newsome will NOT waive any such requirements
for purposes of supporting the ERRORS and BIAS,
DISCRIMINATORY, PREJUDICIAL and UNLAWFUL/
Page 22 of 63
ILLEGAL handling of this lawsuit by said Court/Judge Louis
Guirola, Jr. Therefore, the “Docket Text” entries asserting
“Order(s)” and or “Judgment(s)” that Court/Judge Guirola attempted
to rely upon to DISMISS that lawsuit is clearly PROHIBITED and,
thus, has been TIMELY CONTESTED as a matter of statutes/laws
governing said matters:
Matter of American Precision Vibrator Co., 863 F.2d 428 (5th
Cir. 1989) - Undocketed orders cannot be enforced or appealed.
Orders do not become “final” until they are docketed.
46. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 01/03/14, in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No.
10-704 that CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. entered an “Order Sanctioning
Plaintiff and Preventing Plaintiff From Filing Additional Pleadings Unless Granted
Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court.” See Docket No. 40.
47. The record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome is a PAYING
Litigant (has PAID the $350 Filing Fee) and TIMELY DEMANDED a JURY
TRIAL at the time of filing her CIVIL Lawsuit in the UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-
704. Therefore, said Court has ERRED in its EFFORTS to DEPRIVE Plaintiff
Vogel Newsome access in that CIVIL Lawsuit.
Hooten v. Jenne, 786 F.2d 692 (5th
Cir. Miss. 1986): Right of access
to courts springs from First Amendment.
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1982): Ready access to the
courts is a “fundamental constitutional right.”
Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Co., 44 S.Ct. 220 (1924): A citizen's right to sue in a court
having jurisdiction of the parties and the cause includes the right to
prosecute his claim to judgment.
Page 23 of 63
Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874): Every
citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country and to invoke
the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him and
he cannot barter away his life, or his freedom, or his substantial rights.
Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002): Claim for
deprivation of constitutional right of access to courts must allege both:
(1) underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, and (2)
official acts frustrating litigation.
Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425 (5th
Cir. 1994): Right of
access to courts is implicated where ability to file suit was delayed or
blocked altogether.
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804 (5th
Cir. 1989): If state officials
wrongfully and intentionally conceal information crucial to a person's
ability to obtain redress through the courts, and do so for purpose of
frustrating that right, and concealment and delay engendered thereby
substantially reduces likelihood of one's obtaining relief to which one is
otherwise entitled, state officials may have committed constitutional
violation by denying access to courts.
U.S. v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806 (5th
Cir. 2012): To maintain a
backward-looking claim for violation of right of access to courts, a
plaintiff must identify (1) a nonfrivolous underlying claim, (2) an
official act that frustrated the litigation of that claim, and (3) a remedy
that is not otherwise available in another suit that may yet be brought.
American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, Inc. v. Mabus, 719
F.Supp. 1345 (S.D.Miss.Jackson.Div.,1989): Only a compelling state
interest can justify limitation of the right of access to the courts.
and because there is NO “FINAL” Judgment entered on Plaintiff
Newsome’s POST-Judgment pleadings CONTESTING and/or
OBJECTING to rulings, as a matter of law, the Newsome v. Mitchell
McNutt & Sams, et al. is STILL a VERY ACTIVE and VIABLE
Lawsuit despite the FALSE showing by said DISTRICT Court
alleging that it is CLOSED for DECEPTIVE purposes!
48. There is EVIDENCE that will SUPPORT that on or about 01/17/14, that Plaintiff
Vogel Newsome submitted for filing in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT -
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 her pleading entitled,
“Objection(s) To January 3, 2014 Order Sanctioning Plaintiff and Preventing Plaintiff From
Filing Additional Pleadings Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court and
DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” Said PROOF of SUBMITTAL of pleading which further
SUSTAINS the CRIMINAL acts by the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT and
OBSTRUCTION of MAIL, OBSTRUCTION of JUSTICE, DEPRIVATION of Due
Process of Law and DEPRIVATION of Equal Protection of the Laws, etc.! It is a
GOOD THING that Newsome used the United States Postal
Service’s MAIL-TRACKING procedures!
Page 24 of 63
49. The Record EVIDENCE will support that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704, there has
been NO "FINAL JUDGMENT" entered regarding Newsome's POST-
Judgment pleadings OBJECTING and/or CONTESTING the “TEXT ONLY” Order(s)
and 12/12/13 Order entered by CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. Therefore,
as a matter of law, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Civil Lawsuit is STILL
ACTIVE and VIABLE regardless of the DECEPTIVE APPEARANCE of the
Docket Sheet reflecting "CLOSED!" Moreover, there is EVIDENCE to support
that Newsome submitted her 01/17/14 pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To
January 3, 2014 Order Sanctioning Plaintiff and Preventing Plaintiff From
Filing Additional Pleadings Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of
This Court and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL” which to DATE (06/17/16) has
NOT been filed!
D) DOCKET SHEET MISREPRESENTATION OF CLOSED CASE:
Please see the FIFTH CIRCUIT Court of Appeals’ decision in, Dillon v. State of Mississippi
Military Department, 23 F.3d 915; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14578 at EXHIBIT “__” and
is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein and which states in part:
The United States asserts correctly that, because there was no final judgment,
appellate jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 3
; e.g., Thompson v.
Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291) [HN3]
(absent Rule 54(b) designation, "a partial disposition of a multi-claim or multi-
party action does not qualify as a final decision . . . and is ordinarily an
unappealable interlocutory order") (internal citations and quotations omitted),
cited in Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220. Ordinarily, a judgment is not final for purposes
of appeal unless it "ends [**5] the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment." Way v. Reliance Ins. Co., 815
F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing cases; internal quotation marks and citation
Page 25 of 63
omitted) (judgment finding defendant liable, but not awarding damages pending
arbitration, was not a final order for purposes of § 1291). . .
Most surprisingly (read amazingly), plaintiffs did not file a reply brief in
response to the government's jurisdictional point. . .
4 Needless to say, a reply brief responding to this
contention should have been filed. This is a classic instance
for when such a brief is called for -- to respond to a new point
raised by an appellee. And, where, as here, the point
concerns jurisdiction, the call for the reply is all the
louder; the need, all the greater.
5 Although the district court dismissed only the United States,
the docket sheet states that the case has been "closed",
despite a later motion to dismiss by the state defendants
(apparently not ruled upon). . . .
Because there has not been a final judgment, under Rule 54(b) or otherwise,
we lack jurisdiction.
50. On or about 09/30/15 this Bankruptcy Court attempted to MISLEAD Creditor
Newsome in its filing of a Final Judgment in this NON-Core Bankruptcy action;
however, Newsome did NOT bite and CONTESTED the Final Judgment. See
DOCKET No. 64.
51. While this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington asserts Creditor
Newsome’s BELABORS the JURISDICTIONAL issue, Newsome takes such
FRIVOLOUS attacks as EVIDENCE that, “the CALL for REPLY is
all the LOUDER” and, “the NEED, all the GREATER” has been
SUSTAINED!
52. While the Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy matter WILL SUPPORT that
the DOCKET alleges that this case is CLOSED - - FAR FROM IT! Creditor
Newsome will NOT be BULLIED, THREATENED, COERCED, etc. into
WAIVING Rights secured/guaranteed under the Constitution and other statutes/laws
governing said matters.
53. While the Record EVIDENCE in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT –
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704 - WILL SUPPORT that
the DOCKET alleges that this case is CLOSED - - FAR FROM IT!
Page 26 of 63
Plaintiff Newsome will NOT be BULLIED, THREATENED, COERCED, etc. into
WAIVING Rights secured/guaranteed under the Constitution and other statutes/laws
governing said matters.
54. There is EVIDENCE to support that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
action in Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al., that on or about 01/17/14,
Plaintiff Newsome submitted for filing, “Plaintiff’s Objection(s) To January 3, 2014
Order Sanctioning Plaintiff And Preventing Plaintiff From Filing Additional Pleading
Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court and DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL!”
Page 27 of 63
FACT: Plaintiff Newsome PAID the $350 Filing
Fee and at the TIME of filing her Complaint
PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY NOTIFIED the
District Court of her DEMAND for a JURY
TRIAL!
55. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED
in trying to BULLY Creditor Newsome into filing an Appeal. NO
Final Judgment has been entered.
Page 28 of 63
56. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED and IS
ENGAGING in CRIMINAL acts in efforts of EMBEZZLING monies (masked as
FILING Fee) from Creditor Newsome and for purposes of
UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY infringing upon the Constitutional Rights and other
Rights secured/guaranteed under the statutes/laws governing said matters.
E) FILING OF OBJECTION(S): Please see Flores v. United States Attorney General,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90513 which states in part:
The parties are warned that any such objections are required to be in
writing and must be filed within fourteen (14) days of this date. Failure to
timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and
recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party,
except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal unobjected-
to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district
court. Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th
Cir. 1996).
57. The Record EVIDENCE (not ONLY in this instant Bankruptcy action brought by
Debtor Townsend) will SUPPORT that Creditor Newsome has TIMELY submitted her
OBJECTIONS in accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters; moreover,
has done SO in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704 for purposes of PRESERVING
PROTECTED rights as well as the PRESERVATION of the ISSUES and the
EVIDENCE provided to sustain her claims and/or defenses.
58. This instant filing will also SUPPORT and SUSTAIN Creditor Newsome’s
OBJECTION(s) to the 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case. . . (DOCKET
No. 78) in this instant Bankruptcy action! Thus, PRESERVING Creditor Newsome’s
ISSUES as well as the DEFENSES that this Court and Opposing Counsel/Debtor
Townsend have FAILED to REBUT!
F) DEPRIVATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS: Please see
Kenyatta v. Moore, 623 F. Supp. 224; 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13701 at EXHIBIT “C”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
OVERVIEW: The debtor contended that 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(2)(C)
expressly granted the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the debtor's
counterclaim to the creditor's claim, but the creditor argued that the
counterclaim was not within core bankruptcy jurisdiction and was excluded
as a personal injury claim. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, although the
bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on the core
counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional counterclaim by the debtor, the
bankruptcy court was not established under U.S. Const. art. III and was not
subject to the constitutional assurances of independence which would allow
adjudication of the debtor's state common law claim. Further, resolving the
creditor's claim would not necessarily resolve the debtor's counterclaim, and the
debtor's claim was otherwise unrelated to the claim-allowance process. Also, the
debtor's claim did not involve public rights to allow the congressional extension
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, since the debtor's claim flowed from state law rather
Page 29 of 63
than the federal bankruptcy scheme authority to do so under U.S. Const. art.
III. While § 157 purported to extend bankruptcy jurisdiction to any.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment.
[HN3] A federal employee who uses his office to commit a federal
constitutional violation should not be allowed to claim that office as
grounds for an absolute immunity defense. In conspiring to commit such
constitutional violation with racially discriminatory animus, such federal
official is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3).
[HN4] By its specific terms, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) proscribes any conspiracy
which has the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws.
[HN5] The source of the congressional power to create a cause of action for
private conspiracies does not rest in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, as does the cause of action created in 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983
for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law; rather, the
power to reach private conspiracies under § 1985(3) emanates from the
Thirteenth Amendment. Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment "to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and
the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation,"
[HN7] 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 provides that every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
[HN8] 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies engaged in by
federal officials.
[HN9] An individual defendant, regardless of the nature of his employment
or official status, who acts with invidious, class-based discriminatory
animus and conspires with one or more defendants to deprive another of
clearly established constitutional rights can be held liable for money
damages under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3).
[**6] Defendants' instant motion seeks partial judgment on the pleadings on
the ground that persons acting under color of federal law are not within the reach
of § 1985(3). In a well-stated brief, defendants submit a three-fold argument for
precluding the availability of a § 1985(3) cause of action in this case: (1) the
legislative intent behind the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 2 of
which is the parent of § 1985(3), was to curb Ku Klux Klan activities in the
Reconstruction South and indeed to protect federal officials, and thus
conspiracies by federal officials are not covered by the Act; (2) the concept of
equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under the laws
in § 1985(3) necessarily contemplates some involvement by a state or by one
acting under color of its authority before a violation can be established; (3)
decisional law in the Fifth Circuit indicates that a § 1985(3) cause of action is
Page 30 of 63
subject to the same state-action requirement that exists in an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore federal officials acting under color of federal law
cannot be held liable under § 1985(3). For the reasons stated hereinafter, this
court declines [**7] to give identical construction to the legislative intent
behind § 1983 and § 1985(3), and concludes that federal officials can be held
individually liable for engaging in a private conspiracy to deprive a person
of equal protection of the laws.
Defendants correctly contend that the "central concern" of the 42d Congress in
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was to combat the "violent and other
efforts of the Klan and its allies to resist and to frustrate the intended affects
[sic] of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments . . ." Carpenters v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1983). A principal
purpose underlying the legislation was to provide, through a private damages
remedy, some protection for blacks, union sympathizers and federal officials at
work in the Reconstruction South. Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837; Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100-03, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971);
McCord v. Bailey, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 334, 636 F.2d 606, 615-16 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 68 L. Ed. 2d 839, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981).
Defendants argue that it would have been [**8] "anomalous" for the 42d
Congress to have included within the same legislation having the purpose of
protecting federal institutions a section imposing liability on those charged
with carrying out that difficult purpose and for whose protection the
legislation was passed. . .
[HN3] A federal employee who uses his office to commit [**9] a federal
constitutional violation should not be allowed to claim that office as
grounds for an absolute immunity defense. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L.
Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28
S. Ct. 441 (1908). In conspiring to commit such constitutional violation with
racially discriminatory animus, such federal official is a "person" within
the meaning of § 1985(3). See Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 219, 737
F.2d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909, 939 (M.D.
N.C. 1984).
Given the broad language of § 1985(3) and the construction of that language in
Griffin to cover private conspiracies, this court rejects defendants' contention
that federal officials are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute
simply because their safety was of some concern to the 42d Congress. Indeed,
the major concern of the 42d Congress in promulgating what is now § 1985(3) --
to provide "a statutory cause of action for negro citizens who have been the
victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at
depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men."
Griffin [**10] , 403 U.S. at 105 -- would be thwarted by such a holding.
Therefore, the court concludes that there is nothing in the legislative history of §
1985(3) that would exclude conspiratorial private action by federal employees
from its coverage. . . .
Second, [HN5] the source of the congressional power to create a cause of action
for private conspiracies does not rest in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, as does the cause of action created in § 1983 for deprivation
of constitutional rights under color of state law; rather, the power [**12] to
reach private conspiracies under § 1985(3) emanates from the Thirteenth
Amendment. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104-105. Congress has the power under the
Thirteenth Amendment "to determine what are the badges and incidents of
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation," Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440, 20 L. Ed. 2d
Page 31 of 63
1189, 88 S. Ct. 2186 (1968), without regard to the existence vel non of state
action. Federal officials are certainly as capable as state officials of violating
the mandates of the Thirteenth Amendment. . .
The better reasoned view has been adopted in a number of recent cases in which
§ 1985(3) has been applied to private conspiracies by federal officials. 9
Two
of these cases, Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 219, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1984), and Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), involved suits
against F.B.I. agents under § 1985(3) for engaging in private conspiracies
pursuant to the same F.B.I. COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist program at
issue in this suit. In both cases, the courts of appeals held that the respective
plaintiffs had stated cognizable causes of action against the individual F.B.I.
agents under § 1985(3). Hobson, 737 F.2d at 20; Hampton, 600 F.2d at 623. . .
The court is therefore of the opinion that the clear weight of recent authority on
this issue is to the effect that [HN8] § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies
engaged in by federal officials, including those acting to further the stated
objectives of the F.B.I. . . .
In conclusion, the court holds that [HN9] an individual defendant, regardless
of the nature of his employment or official status, who acts with invidious,
class-based discriminatory animus and conspires with one or more
defendants to deprive another of clearly established constitutional rights
can be held liable for money damages under § 1985(3). Kenyatta's amended
complaint sufficiently sets out the elements of a cause of action under § 1985(3)
to allow this case to go forward to trial.
59. Creditor Newsome asserts that in this instant Bankruptcy action, this Court and/or
Judge Edward Ellington LACKS the Constitutional authority to enter a Final Judgment;
moreover, that said Court is NOT established under U.S. Const. Art. III and is NOT
subject to the Constitutional assurances of independence which would allow for Debtor
Townsend’s claims to be discharged from LIABILITY sought through Newsome’s
CIVIL Lawsuit.
60. This Bankruptcy Court LACKS JURISDICTION to enter a Final Judgment.
61. Creditor Newsome does NOT consent to this Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of
Debtor Townsend’s claims and, as a matter of law, this Court is REQUIRED to submit
Townsend’s Bankruptcy action to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT –
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704.
62. It appears that in this instant Bankruptcy action that Judge Edward Ellington and his
LAW CLERK are KNOWINGLY engaging in CRIMINAL acts because they may
believe that Judge Ellington is IMMUNED from LIABILITY. However, NEITHER
Judge Ellington NOR his Law Clerk are IMMUNED from CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION for the ROLES being played in furtherance of the CONSPIRACIES
and other CRIMES leveled against Creditor Newsome that are being ADDRESSED in
her DISTRICT COURT action (Case No. 10-704).
63. It appears that the CONSPIRACIES that this Court’s Judge Edward Ellington and his
Law Clerk are engaging in IS WITH Racially Discriminatory ANIMUS, and, thus, are
WITHIN the boundaries of claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Page 32 of 63
64. The record evidence will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward
Ellington and his Law Clerk ARE ENGAGING in Conspiracies within 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) for the PURPOSE of DEPRIVING Creditor Newsome of the EQUAL
PROTECTION of the laws and/or DEPRIVING Newsome EQUAL PRIVILEGES and
IMMUNITIES under the laws.
65. The Record EVIDENCE will support that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward
Ellington and his Law Clerk are ENGAGING in PRIVATE Conspiracies leveled
AGAINST Creditor Newsome.
66. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward
Ellington and his Law Clerk (regardless of the nature of their employment and/or
official status) ARE ACTING with INVIDIOUS, CLASS-BASED Discriminatory
ANIMUS and IS CONSPIRING with ONE or MORE persons to DEPRIVE Creditor
Newsome of ESTABLISHED Constitutional Rights and, therefore, both Judge
Ellington and his Law Clerk may be held LIABLE for the ROLE(s) played in
CONSPIRACIES and the IRREPARABLE injury/harm done to Newsome.
67. The Record Evidence will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward
Ellington has been TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY placed on NOTICE of
the role that the KLAN’S Law Firm Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz
(“Baker Donelson”) is playing in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Creditor
Newsome. Moreover, HOW such Law Firms as Baker Donelson use FRONTING
Firms to CONCEAL their IDENTITY as well as efforts to CIRCUMVENT laws as
the KU KLUX KLAN Act! The Klan’s Law Firm of Baker Donelson is ALIVE and is
in BAD SHAPE while it DESPERATELY SEEKS MEMBERS in 2016, and Creditor
Newsome is HERE TO EXPOSE! - - NO PATTY CAKE PLAYING! The Klan’s
TERRORIST Law Firm Baker Donelson and its COHORTS are on their way DOWN!
Creditor Newsome is MORE THAN HAPPY to LEAD THE CHARGE!
Page 33 of 63
G) IMMUNITY ISSUE: Please see U.S. District Court – Southern District of Mississippi
(Hattiesburg), Hudson v. Jones County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12237 at EXHIBIT “D”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein which states
in part:
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Fifth Circuit has held that "government officials performing discretionary
functions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified
immunity if their conduct violates no 'clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"
Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1998)(quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)).
Under the two step analysis employed by the Fifth Circuit in reviewing claims
wherein qualified immunity has been asserted, the Court must first determine
"whether the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right. If so, the court decides whether the defendant's conduct was
objectively reasonable." Sorenson, 134 F.3d at 327 quoting Coleman v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997)(applying the two-prong test
of Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1792-93, 114 L. Ed.
2d 277 (1991)). The first step "is subdivided into three questions: (1) whether a
constitutional violation is alleged; (2) whether the law regarding the alleged
violation was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3)
whether the record shows that a violation occurred." Dudley v. Angel, 209 F.3d
460, 462 quoting Kerr v.Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) citing Rich v.
Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988)).
In this case, the court finds that Hudson cannot demonstrate he has suffered a
constitutional deprivation and, as such, his claims against Gavin must be
dismissed.
I. DUE PROCESS
To state a claim for a due process violation, Hudson must establish a
"recognized ,,liberty or property. interest within the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that he was intentionally or recklessly
deprived of that interest, even temporarily, under color of state law.'"
Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990). The procedural
[*10] component of the Due Process Clause makes certain that citizens
receive fair process i.e. notice and an opportunity to respond, when deprived
of a protected liberty interest. Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d
555, 562 (5th Cir. 2003). The substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions ,,regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them." Marco Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Reg'l Transit Auth.,
489 F.3d 669, 673 (5th Cir.. 2007) (quoting, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
125, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)). Substantive due process is
violated by state conduct that "shocks the conscience." McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 326 (5th Cir. 2002).
Thus, in order to prove a due process violation, Hudson must first show that he
has a "recognized liberty or property interest within the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450
(5th Cir. 1995).
Page 34 of 63
68. The Record EVIDENCE will support that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward
Ellington will NOT qualify for IMMUNITY because he is KNOWINGLY and
WILLINGLY engaging in criminal acts that VIOLATE clearly established
STATUTORY and/or CONSTITUTIONAL Rights of which a REASONABLE person
would have known; moreover, VIOLATIONS that have been BEAUTIFULLY set
further pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL violations ARE alleged!
69. Pursuant to Rule 8 (General Rules of Pleading) of the FRCP, Creditor Newsome’s
pleadings in this instant Bankruptcy action specifically sets forth “short and plain
statement(s)” of the grounds for relief/claims; however, due to this Court’s/Judge
Edward Ellington’s INABILITY to respond in accordance to said Rule to
legally/lawfully REBUT the claims, allegations
and/or arguments set forth in Creditor Newsome’s
pleadings, this Court/Judge Ellington merely
CONTINUALLY proceeds on what appears to be
a MENTALLY DISTURBED and RABID
Judge/Law Clerk THROWING TOGETHER a
FRIVOLOUS and BASELESS 8-PAGE rambling
of UNSUBSTANTIATED GARBAGE! Further
supporting and challenging Judge Edward
Ellington’s FITNESS as well as
MENTAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL state to preside in
this matter; moreover, his INABILITY to
understand and interpret the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Creditor
Newsome’s pleadings providing in this Bankruptcy action.
70. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome has CLEARLY
ASSERTED VIOLATION(s) of CLEARLY ESTABLISHED Constitutional Right(s)
and that this Court’s Judge Ellington’s CONDUCT is UNREASONABLE and done
with MALICE, PREJUDICE and INCORPORATES a Racially Discriminatory
Animus!
71. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that in this instant Bankruptcy action, the
LAWS SUPPORTING Creditor Newsome’s claims have been REPEATEDLY set forth
at the time of VIOLATIONS for purposes of TIMELY, PROPERLY and
ADEQUATELY putting this Court, Judge Edward Ellington, his Law Clerk,
OPPOSING Party (Debtor Townsend and her Counsel) and their CO-
CONSPIRATORS on NOTICE of the CONSTITUTIONAL violations as well as
Criminal/Civil violations being committed. To NO AVAIL!
72. The Record EVIDENCE in this Bankruptcy action WILL SUSTAIN the SHOWING of
VIOLATION(s) of and AGAINST Creditor Newsome from Judge Edward Ellington
and those with whom he CONSPIRES!
73. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAN that in this instant Bankruptcy action, that this
Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has REPEATEDLY VIOLATED and
DEPRIVED Creditor Newsome of DUE PROCESS and the DEPRIVATION of
LIBERTIES set forth in this instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” as well as PREVIOUS
filings from Creditor Newsome. Moreover, that the VIOLATIONS of this Bankruptcy
Court and/or Judge Ellington are DONE INTENTIONALLY and with RECKLESS
DISREGARD for Creditor Newsome’s Rights secured/guaranteed under the
Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters.
Page 35 of 63
74. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge
Edward Ellington ERRED and is attempting to BULLY Creditor Newsome to forego
PROTECTED Rights by noting for instance, “Vogel Newsome is PROHIBITED from
FILING ANOTHER pleading in this case OTHER than a NOTICE OF APPEAL which
is ACCOMPANIED by the RELATED FILING FEE” – i.e. SUSTAINING the
UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL practices of this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Ellington to
DEPRIVE Creditor Newsome DUE PROCESS and an OPPORTUNITY to RESPOND
to his FRIVOLOUS 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case. . . (DOCKET
No. 78).
75. Due Process BARS the ARBITRARY and WRONGFUL Government actions of this
Bankruptcy Court and Judge Edward Ellington. Moreover, the
UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL procedures that are being used to DEPRIVE Creditor
Newsome DUE PROCESS!
76. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and Judge Edward
Ellington Due Process VIOLATION(s) INDEED “SHOCKS the CONSCIENCE!”
H) DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW/DENIAL OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW: Please see U.S. Southern District of Mississippi,
Wickton v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 45 F.2d 615; 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1528 which
states in part:
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may
not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall
not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it
must not, under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate
to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the
main fact thus presumed.
"If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself, prescribing a rule of
evidence, in either criminal or civil cases, does not shut out from the
party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his
defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for
holding that due process of law has been denied him.
77. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN a NEXUS as well as a RATIONAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN the Fact(s) PROVED and the Ultimate Fact(s)
PRESUMED through this instant Bankruptcy filing as well as PREVIOUS filings in
this action that Creditor Vogel Newsome has been DEPRIVED/DENIED Due Process
of Law as well as DEPRIVED/DENIED the Equal Protection of the Laws!
78. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome has TIMELY,
PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY NOTIFIED this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge
Edward Ellington of her DEMAND for a JURY TRIAL! To NO AVAIL!
This Bankruptcy Court and Judge Ellington are DETERMINED to DEPRIVE
Creditor Newsome of DUE PROCESS of Law and EQUAL PROTECTION of the
Page 36 of 63
Laws in FULFILLING ROLE(s) in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Creditor
Newsome!
I) CORE PROCEEDINGS: Please see the FIFTH Circuits decision in, In The Matter of
Timothy Michael Frazin, 732 F.3d 313; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20032 at EXHIBIT “E”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference which states in part:
[HN6] Hudson's holding, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, that bankruptcy courts can enter final judgments in all core proceedings
is clearly inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's Stern's holding that
bankruptcy courts cannot enter final judgments in one type of core
proceeding, namely, state-law counterclaims that are not necessarily resolved in
the claims-allowance process. Therefore, Stern has unequivocally sub silentio
overruled Hudson as to that type of core proceeding. . .
[HN7] When separation of powers is implicated in a given case, the parties
cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty. When such U.S. Const. art.
III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive
because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be
expected to protect.
[HN8] The practice of bankruptcy courts entering final judgments in certain
state-law counterclaims compromises the integrity of the system of separated
powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system. Thus, structural concerns
cannot be ameliorated by a party's consent or waiver to the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction.
[HN14] In order to preserve an argument for appeal, the litigant must press and
not merely intimate the argument during the proceedings before the district court.
If an argument is not raised to such a degree that the district court has an
opportunity to rule on it, the appellate court will not address it on appeal.
79. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this instant Bankruptcy action is NOT a
Core proceeding!
80. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome does NOT CONSENT
to this Bankruptcy Court presiding over Debtor Lady M. Townsend Bankruptcy action
which has named Newsome as a CREDITOR!
81. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome has TIMELY,
PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY CONTESTED the FRIVOLOUS/VOID
Discharge of Debt granted to Debtor Townsend! Furthermore, this Bankruptcy Court
and/or Judge Edward Ellington ERRED in the ENTRY of Discharge of Debt because it
FALSELY and INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTS that Debtor Townsend is
DISCHARGED from LIABILITY and DAMAGES in the Civil Lawsuit brought by
Creditor Newsome in Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al., in the UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District Of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No.
10-704 – when Debtor Townsend is NOT Discharged as a matter of statutes/laws
governing said matters.
Page 37 of 63
J) NON-CORE PROCEEDING: Please see the FIFTH Circuit Court decision in, In
the Matter of BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, LLC, 735 F.3d 279; 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22791 at EXHIBIT “F” attached hereto and incorporated by reference with
states in part:
OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Where a debtor filed an adversary complaint
alleging various state law tort and contract claims against creditors, the
bankruptcy court lacked U.S. Const. art. III authority to enter final
judgment denying relief on the debtor's claims because the proceedings
were non-core proceedings that were not necessary to the resolution of
the bankruptcy estate; [2]-Although the debtor initially consented to the
bankruptcy court's entry of final judgment, but later withdrew its consent
such that the bankruptcy court was statutorily authorized under 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 157(c)(2) to issue a final judgment, the debtor's consent did not cure the
constitutional deficiency because parties could not consent to such
circumvention of art. III that impinged on the structural interests of the
Judicial Branch.
OUTCOME: Judgment vacated and case remanded.
[HN2] . . . For non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy court submits
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,
which then reviews the submissions de novo. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(1). With
consent of the parties, however, the bankruptcy court may enter final,
appealable judgments in non-core proceedings. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(2).
[HN5] In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that a bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to
enter final judgment on a debtor's state-law counterclaim even though the
statute conferred such authority.
[HN6] Courts emphasize the importance of our tripartite system and
separation of powers, stressing that the system of checks and balances
exists to serve two related purposes: to protect the independence of each
branch and to protect the individual citizen. . .
[HN7] When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions at common
law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789, and is brought within the
bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests
with U.S. Const. art. III judges in art. III courts. The Constitution assigns that
job--resolution of the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of common
law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of
law--to the Judiciary.
[HN9] Non-core proceedings usually require a bankruptcy court to enter
findings and conclusions for the district court to review. 28 U.S.C.S. §
157(c)(1). But, with the consent of the parties, a district court may refer a
case to the bankruptcy court to hear and determine and to enter appropriate
orders and judgments. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(2).
[HN11] The consequences of a litigant sandbagging the court--remaining
silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case
does not conclude in his favor--can be particularly severe.
Page 38 of 63
[HN12] Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), held that, regardless of
statutory authority, a bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional
authority to enter a final judgment on claims that are so deeply at the heart of
the federal judiciary's U.S. Const. art. III powers and are not necessary to the
resolution of the bankruptcy estate.
[HN15] . . . However, by failing to object until a case reaches a U.S. Court
of Appeals, an appellant consents to the adjudication of the claim by a
bankruptcy judge.
[HN16] Parties cannot consent to circumvention of U.S. Const. art. III that
impinges on the structural interests of the Judicial Branch.
[HN21] Where a structural interest is triggered, the parties cannot by consent
cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by
consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the
limitations imposed by U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. When the art. III limitations
are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the
limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to
protect.
[HN22] Under Stern, a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to
enter final judgment on certain state-law counterclaims by a debtor, despite
that the debtor has impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction.
[HN23] Although a district court does have the authority to retain jurisdiction,
a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter a final judgment if
the district court does not retain and the reference is not withdrawn. And
once entered, a purported judgment of the bankruptcy court -- the entry of a
final, binding judgment by a court with broad substantive jurisdiction -- would
be entitled to the usual deference, for example, the clearly-erroneous standard
for factual findings, owed to such an act that is final, subject to review only if
a party chooses to appeal, to a higher, U.S. Const. art. III tribunal.
Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir. Miss. 1987) - If proceeding
involves right created by federal bankruptcy law, or is one which would
only arise in bankruptcy, it is core proceeding, but if proceeding does
not invoke substantive right created by federal bankruptcy law and is
one that could exist outside of bankruptcy, it is noncore proceeding,
though it may be related to bankruptcy because of its potential effect
on debtor's estate. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157.
In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359 (5th
Cir. 2008) - Bankruptcy court's
adjudicative authority is constrained if the adversary proceeding is non-
core.
82. This instant Bankruptcy action brought by Debtor Ladye M.
Townsend is a NON-Core proceeding!
83. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington ERRED in the ENTRY of a
FRIVOLOUS Final Judgment on or about 09/30/15, in which said Court LACKED
Jurisdiction to enter!
Page 39 of 63
84. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge Edward
Ellington’s KNOWLEDGE that this instant Bankruptcy action is NON-Core and, thus,
the TRUE reason that Judge Ellington this time ONLY submitted the 06/07/15
Findings Of Fact (which is hereby TIMELY CONTESTED) because of the NON-Core
status!
85. Bankruptcy courts have NO power to ENTER judgments in NON-Core matters. - In re
Cathedral of Incarnation in Diocese of Long Island, 99 F.3d 66 (1996)
(a) IF this Bankruptcy Court had Jurisdiction (which it does NOT) it would have
ONLY required a “PROPOSED Findings of Fact” or “REPORT and
RECOMMENDATION” for submittal to DISTRICT COURT! However,
instead, this Court MISTAKENLY submitted “Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on Creditor’s (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From
Order/Judgement (sic); Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions Of And Against Robert
Rex McRaney Jr./McRaney & McRaney; and Request To be Advised Of
Conflict-Of-Interests (DKT. #34)” – See DOCKET No. 60 - which clearly is
neither “PROPOSED” or a “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” in
Bankruptcy matters (as in this instant action) which is a NON-CORE
proceeding – i.e. as evidenced in this instant filing as well as Creditor
Newsome’s previous filings in this Bankruptcy matter.
Page 40 of 63
28 USC § 157(c) as of 10/08/15: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/157
(b) This Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington MISTAKENLY moved and
QUICKLY entered “FINAL JUDGMENT ON CREDITOR’S (VOGEL
NEWSOME) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER/JUDGEMENT (sic);
MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST ROBERT REX
McRANEY JR./McRANEY & McRANEY; AND REQUEST TO BE
ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS (DOCKET No. 61)” in a NON-
CORE proceeding WITHOUT the Consent of Creditor Newsome! Action
which is CLEARLY in VIOLATION of the statutes/laws governing said
matters and DEPRIVES Creditor Newsome of RIGHTS GUARANTEED under
the Constitution and other governing statutes/laws.
Phrase “final judgments and orders,” as used in statute that
AUTHORIZES bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments and
orders in NON-core proceedings ONLY WITH consent of parties, is
not limited in scope merely to ultimate rulings entered following
evidentiary hearing but also includes rulings upon dispositive motions
that present only questions of law; UNLESS parties CONSENT to
some different procedure, whenever bankruptcy court reaches
conclusion with respect to dispositive motion in NON-core
proceeding, it MUST prepare REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
for SUBMISSION to district court, REQUESTING entry of final
order thereon. – In re Blakwell ex rel. Estate of I.G. Services Ltd.,
279 B.R. 818 (2002)
Page 41 of 63
(c) Having KNOWLEDGE that this instant Bankruptcy matter is a NON-CORE
proceeding. Therefore, this Bankruptcy Court LACKED jurisdiction to
render the “Findings of Fact. . .” – DOCKET NO. 60 and then SWIFTLY
moved ILLEGALLY and UNLAWFULLY to enter its FINAL JUDGMENT –
DOCKET NO. 61.
To decide whether particular matter falls within its
bankruptcy jurisdiction, it is NOT necessary for DISTRICT court to
distinguish between “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related to”
proceedings; DISTRICT court NEED ONLY determine whether
the matter is at least “related to” bankruptcy. – Beasley v. Personal
Finance Corporation, 279 B.R. 523 (S.D. Miss. 2002) – Dixon v.
First Family Financial Services, 276 B.R. 173 (S.D. Miss. 2002)
For purpose of determining whether particular matter falls
within DISTRICT court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction, it is NOT
necessary to distinguish between proceedings “arising under,”
“arising in a case under,” or “related to a case under” Title 11; these
REFERENCES operate CONJUNCTIVELY to define scope of
court’s jurisdiction. 28 USCA § 1334 – Thomas v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 259 B.R. 571 (S.D. Miss. 2001)
The 1984 Bankruptcy Act did NOT change scope of
bankruptcy jurisdiction set forth in 1978 Act, but rather altered
PLACEMENT of bankruptcy jurisdiction by creating statutory
distinction between core and NON-core proceedings and
RESTRICTING power of BANKRUPTCY court to adjudicate the
latter. . . . 28 USCA § 1334 – Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90, on
remand 84 B.R. 432 (5th
Cir. (Miss) 1987) – If proceeding involves
right created by federal bankruptcy law, or is one which would only
arise in bankruptcy, it IS core proceeding, but IF proceeding does
NOT invoke substantive right created by federal bankruptcy law and
is one that could EXIST OUTSIDE of bankruptcy, it is NONcore
proceeding, though it may BE RELATED to bankruptcy because of its
potential effect on debtor’s estate. (Id.)
86. As a matter of law, the United States District Court – Southern District of Mississippi
(Jackson Division), Case No. 10-704 - on December 3, 2010, FIRST retained
jurisdiction over this matter.
Jurisdiction is the power to decide; it must be conferred, not
assumed. Matter of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co., 794 F.2d
1182 (7th
Cir. 1986). All bankruptcy jurisdiction is given in the first
instance to the United States district courts. Acolyte Elec. Corp. v.
City of New York, 69 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1986), ordered aff’d,
1987 1987 WL 47763 (E.D. N.Y. 1987); In re Double TRL, Inc., 65
B.R. 993 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1986).
The district courts are granted jurisdiction over bankruptcy
cases, that is cases under the Bankruptcy Code and over three
categories of bankruptcy proceedings: (1) civil proceedings arising
under Title 11; (2) civil proceedings arising in a case under Title 11;
and (3) civil proceedings related to cases under Title 11. 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b). As used in this statute, the phrase “arising under Title 11” is
meant, not to distinguish between different matters, but to identify
collectively a broad range of matters subject to the bankruptcy
Page 42 of 63
jurisdiction of federal courts. Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir.
1987).
On or about December 16, 2010, Newsome served Debtor (Ladye M. Townsend
[“Townsend”]) with the required: (a) “Notice of Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service
of Summons;” and (b) “Waiver of the Service of Summons” which was accompanied by
Notification Accompanying Waiver of Service of Summons. According to United
States Postal Service information, Townsend received these documents on or about
December 27, 2010.
K) INTERLOCUTORY ORDER NOT APPEALABLE: Please see the FIFTH
CIRCUIT Court of Appeals’ decision in, In Re Bobby Ray Foust, 96 Fed. Appx. 940; 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 1217 at EXHIBIT “G” attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full herein which states in part:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi reversed the bankruptcy court's decision
holding appellees liable for failing to turn over property of the appellant debtors'
bankruptcy estate. The district court also reversed on the issue of damages,
remanded for further development of expert testimony regarding valuation, and
remanded for consideration of the debtors' advice of counsel defense. The
debtors appealed.
OVERVIEW: The parties did not contest the appellate court's jurisdiction.
The appellate court raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte and found that the
district court's decision was not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C.S. § 158(d).
The district court reversed and remanded to the bankruptcy court for further
consideration of adequate protection, expert testimony regarding valuation, and
the appellees' advice of counsel defense. These issues constituted significant
further proceedings because the bankruptcy court was required to do more than
simply enter judgment. An alternative avenue for jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C.S. §
1291, which governed appeals from final judgments of district courts. The
district court's decision was not final under § 1291 for the same reasons the
district court's decision was not final under § 158(d). Finally, the case did not
meet the standards for an interlocutory appeal, and the district court did not
certify its decision for interlocutory appeal.
OUTCOME: The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
[HN1] . . . Remands requiring judicial functions by the bankruptcy court,
for example additional fact-finding, are not final orders and, as such, are
not appealable to the appellate court.
An alternative avenue for jurisdiction in this case is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
[HN2] governs appeals from final judgments of district courts. The district
court's decision is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for the same reasons the
district court's decision is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). See In re Nichols,
21 F.3d at 692. Finally, this case does not meet the standards for an
interlocutory appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and the district court did not
certify its decision for interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Page 43 of 63
87. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court LACKS
JURISDICTION to preside over Debtor Ladye M. Townsend’s Bankruptcy claims
under the FIRST-TO-FILE Rule!
88. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that from the ONSET of Debtor Townsend’s
Bankruptcy action, Creditor Newsome has REPEATEDLY CONTESTED this
Bankruptcy Court’s Jurisdiction.
89. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge
Edward Ellington’s 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case . . .(DOCKET
No. 78) is MERELY a FRIVOLOUS Order and that NO “FINAL Judgment” has been
entered! Thus, this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington have ERRED in
advising Newsome to bring an APPEAL action.
90. The Record EVIDENCE will support that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward
Ellington DID KNOWINGLY advise Creditor Newsome to file an Appeal for
purposes of UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY EXTORTING and/or EMBEZZLING
monies (MASKED as Filing Fees) from Creditor Newsome.
91. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge
Edward Ellington’s 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen. . .(DOCKET No. 78)
is NOT a FINAL Judgment and any APPEAL on said Order and INSTRUCTIONS by
this Court would be FRIVOLOUS and REJECTED due to the 06/07/16
INTERLOCUTORY Order!
II. TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: Through this instant Bankruptcy action that Creditor
Vogel Newsome does hereby TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY put this Court and Opposing
Parties on NOTICE of the Constitutional Violations set forth above in this instant
“CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” as well as in Creditor Newsome’s PREVIOUS filings with this Bankruptcy
Court!
III. TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT
UPON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: Through this instant Bankruptcy action that Creditor
Vogel Newsome does hereby TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY put this Court and Opposing
Page 44 of 63
Parties on NOTICE of the INFRINGEMENT UPON the Constitutional Rights of Creditor Newsome as
set forth above in this instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” as well as in Creditor Newsome’s PREVIOUS
filings with this Bankruptcy Court!
IV. REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-
INTERESTS
Creditor Vogel Newsome request through this instant Bankruptcy action as well as
INCORPORATES request(s) submitted in PREVIOUS filings with this Court to be advised of the
CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS that appears to be present in this Court’s and/or Judge Edward
Ellington’s handling of this case.
V. REITERATION OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF
JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON
Creditor Vogel Newsome REITERATES her DEMAND that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge
Edward Ellington IMMEDIATELY RECUSE himself from this Bankruptcy action. In support thereof,
Creditor herein INCORPORATES the claims and defenses set forth in PREVIOUS Filings (as set forth
in Docket Nos. 41, 52, 64, 67, 70, 73, and 77) as if set forth in full herein!
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Creditor Vogel Newsome IS CONFIDENT that
INVESTIGATIONS in to Judge Edward Ellington’s handling of this Bankruptcy matter WILL
SUSTAIN that CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS exist, thus, making him UNFIT/UNJUST and
UNQUALIFIED to proceed as the Judge in this Bankruptcy Action. Furthermore, SUPPORTING
WILLFUL, MALICIOUS and WANTON behavior by Judge Edward Ellington in his ZEALOUS efforts
to fulfill his roles in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Vogel Denise Newsome on behalf of his
LEGAL COUNSEL Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and, said
Law Firm’s other PARTIES/CLIENTS with an interest in the outcome of this Bankruptcy Action.
Page 45 of 63
The record evidence will support that this Court as well as Judge Edward Ellington has been
TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY notified and requested to address the CONFLICT-OF-
INTEREST PRESENT; however, has BLATANTLY refused in his QUEST and ZEAL to fulfill his
ROLES in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome by him, his Legal Counsel and opposing
counsel and their CLIENTS having in INTEREST in the outcome of this Bankruptcy Action.
VI. NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC and
WORLD/FOREIGN LEADERS
Creditor Newsome believes that the Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN the PUBLIC’s and/or
the WORLD/FOREIGN Leaders’ INTEREST in the information that she shares through her Bankruptcy
and/or Court pleadings and that said INTEREST(s) is sparked by EVIDENCE and the EXPOSURE of
the CORRUPTION of the United States of America’s CORRUPT Judicial System and HOW it appears
it is being CONTROLLED and MANIPULATED by the KLAN’S Law Firm of Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz for purposes of PROMOTING its RACIALLY and
DISCRIMINATORY practices against People-Of-Color as Creditor Newsome and/or NATIONS-OF-
COLOR!
WHETHER FILED or NOT (due to the CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES
leveled against Creditor Newsome), this pleading WILL BE MADE
AVAILABLE for PUBLIC viewing to the WORLD/FOREIGN Leaders due to
the OVERWHELMING Domestic and International Interests in Creditor Vogel
Newsome’s COMMUNITY Activist and/or CIVIL RIGHTS Activist work!
Page 46 of 63
Creditor Vogel Newsome made it clear in the pleadings filed in this instant Bankruptcy action
the GOAL of “TAKING DOWN” of the WHITE SUPREMACIST’s and JEW’s/ZIONIST’s WALL
STREET! As this Court can see, OTHER Governments are PAYING attention as well as are WAKING
UP and TAKING the NECESSARY PRECAUTIONARY steps to DUMP U.S. TREASURIES and RID
THEMSELVES of TIES to the United States’ DESPOTISM Government Regime that is presently being
CONTROLLED by WHITE SUPREMACIST Groups as the KU KLUX KLAN and JEWS/ZIONISTS!
Page 47 of 63
LOOK at the United States’ MASSIVE DEBT
and WHO they OWE!
Page 48 of 63
LOOK at all of the MONEY GIVEN to the United States’
DESPOTISM Government Regime!
MONEY Being USED To FINANCE The
UNITED STATES’ TERRORIST Government Regime!
NOT MUCH HAS CHANGED SINCE 2011 and it is GETTING WORSE!
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/debt-usa3norwayindiafrance
Page 49 of 63
A QUESTION BEING PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC/WORLD:
HOW WERE SMALL WHITE SUPREMACISTS and JEWS/ZIONISTS GROUPS
ALLOWED TO HIJACKTHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S GOVERNMENT
And CREATE A CORPORATION
UNDER WHICH IT IS ALLEGED TO BE OPERATING?
While this appears to sound a little FAR FETCHED, Creditor Vogel Newsome looks forward
to looking into the AUTHENTICITY of such allegations because, IF TRUE, the LEGAL and
LAWFUL “OVERTHROW” of a DESPOTISM Government Regime will be INEVITABLE! For
instance there are those who may not know:
(1) That WASHINGTON, D.C. is NOT a part of the United States of America’s STATES!
(2) Has NO Representtion in the United States Senate!
Washington, D.C, which is MERELY a DISTRICT and on a SMALL Parcel
of Land out of which it is alleged this FRAUDULENT and DECEPTIVE CORPORATION
and its TERRORIST Counterparts are conducting BUSINESS!
Page 50 of 63
HOW WERE SUCH SMALL TERRORIST GROUPS AS
THIS DECEPTIVE CORPORATION
WHOSE ALLEGED HEADQUARTERS IS
THE UNITED STATES WHITE HOUSE
AND ITS WHITE SUPREMACISTS and
JEWISH/ZIONIST COUNTERPARTS
WITH ALLEGED HEADQUARTERS IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM and ISRAEL
ALLOWED TO GET CONTROL OF
GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF
PUSHING THEIR WHITE SUPREMACIST
AND ZIONIST PERVERTED RELIGIOUS AGENDAS?
Page 51 of 63
Page 52 of 63
DID YOU KNOW THAT TO SERVE ON
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
YOU HAVE TO BE EITHER JEWISH OR CATHOLIC?
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?
HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL EXPLAIN
THE “PERVERTED” DECISIONS
HANDED DOWN FROM THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
THAT CATER TO THEIR BELIEFS
Page 53 of 63
AND THEN THE USE OF THE
ZIONIST-CONTROLLED MEDIA
NETWORKS TO FORCE THEIR
LIFESTYLE AND BELIEFS DOWN
THE THROATS OF THOSE
WHO OPPOSE!
Page 54 of 63
Page 55 of 63
U.S. v. Jimenez Recio, 123 S.Ct. 819 (2003) -
Essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit
an unlawful act.
Agreement to commit an unlawful act, which
constitutes the essence of a conspiracy, is a distinct
evil that may exist and be punished whether or not
the substantive crime ensues. Id.
Conspiracy poses a threat to the public over
and above the threat of the commission of the
relevant substantive crime, both because the
combination in crime makes more likely the
commission of other crimes and because it
decreases the probability that the individuals
involved will depart from their path of criminality.
Id.
DID YOU KNOW THAT WHEN SUCH
PERVERSIONS AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES
ARE ALLOWED TO GO UNPUNISH,
THESE WHITE SUPREMACISTS AND ZIONISTS
WILL CONTINUE ON THEIR
“PATH OF CRIMINALITY”
AND FRAME OTHERS FOR THEIR CRIMES
WHILE USING THEIR MEDIA NETWORKS
TO EXPLOIT AND MAGNIFY THEIR TERRORIST ACTS?
Page 56 of 63
FOR INSTANCE,
DID YOU KNOW THAT
THE KLAN’S LAW FIRM
BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ
IS ALSO LEGAL COUNSEL TO
THE UNITED STATES AND
HAS AN OFFICE IN ORLANDO, FLORIDA?
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061716 - OJECTION(s) To 060716 ORDER & PUBLIC NOTIFICATION (Townsend)

  • 1. 17 USC § 107 (LIMITATIONS On EXCLUSIVE Rights - FAIR USE) For Educational and Information Purposes! JUNE 17, 2016 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY PLEADING THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT and ITS LEGAL COUNSEL BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ ARE OBSTRUCTING FROM BEING FILED – CRIMES ARE BEING COMMITTED TO KEEP THIS INFORMATION OUT OF PUBLIC VIEW DID YOU KNOW THAT THE KLAN’S/UNITED STATES’ LAWYERS/ATTORNEYS – BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ HAS AN OFFICE RIGHT DOWN THE STREET FROM THE PULSE NIGHTCLUB and IS LEGAL COUNSEL TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) THAT HELD MEETINGS WITH THE ALLEGED GUNMAN ACCUSED OF THE RECENT (06/2016) MASS PULSE NIGHTCLUB SHOOTING IN ORLANDO, FLORIDA? TARGETING CHRISTIANS – –MUSLIMS AND NOW HOMOSEXUALS. . . IT APPEARS THAT THE LAW FIRM OF BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ and IT’s KLAN/WHITE SUPREMACIST/ZIONIST CLIENTS ARE THE NO. 1 DOMESTIC and INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
  • 2. IN THE WORLD and ARE USING THEIR CONTROL OF THE MEDIA NETWORKS TO FALSIFY NEWS REPORTED and EXPLOIT THEIR CRIMES OF HATRED and THE FRAMING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE THAT THEY KILL/MURDER IN ALLEGED STANDOFFS TO KEEP ALLEGED SHOOTERS and EXPOSING THEM!FROM TALKING It Appears USING Government Agencies’ Resources To PLAN, ORCHESTRATE and CARRY OUT Their TERRORIST ACTS And Then Proceed To COVER-UP/DESTROY EVIDENCE! Was The PULSE Nightclub On President Barack Obama’s “SECRET KILL LIST” That He Goes Over With His Advisor Baker Donelson. . .? http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/obama-secret-kill-list-13166139 17 USC § 107 (LIMITATIONS On EXCLUSIVE Rights - FAIR USE) For Educational and Information Purposes! OPEN INVITATION - PUBLIC REQUEST: IT APPEARS THAT DOMESTIC and INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION ARE LEGALLY and NEEDED TO BRING THELAWFULLY UNITED STATES DESPOTISM GOVERNMENT REGIME AND ITS TERRORIST LEADER(S) FRONTING AS A LAW FIRM BY THE NAME OF BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ AND ITS WHITE SUPREMACIST/ZIONISTS CLIENTS !TO JUSTICE It Appears That Out of FEAR Of The EXPOSURE Of A FRAUDULENTLY CREATED CORPORATION (UNITED STATES – That Has HIJACKED The United States of America’s Government) IS COMING TO LIGHT, DISTRACTION(S) AS “MEDIA OVERKILL” OF THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SCAM IS BEING USED! Using The MEDIA Networks For Purposes Of The HILLARY CLINTON and DONALD TRUMP SPECTACLE - - - RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF THIS FRAUDULENTLY-CREATED CORPORATION! TERRORIST ACTS are BEING CARRIED OUT FOR PURPOSES OF FEAR and CONTROL! AT LEAST KNOW THE TRUTH AS TO WHY IT APPEARS THIS FRAUDULENT CORPORATION’S BUSINESS PARTNERS ARE PULLING OUT – U.S. TREASURIES BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ARE BEING DUMPED - - CUTTING LOSSES and LEAVING THEM HOLDING THE BAG! - - - THIS FRAUDULENT CORPORATION’S CRIMES ARE COMING TO LIGHT!
  • 3. Page 1 of 63 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI IN RE: LADYE M. TOWNSEND CHAPTER 7 DEBTOR CASE NO. 11-00167-ee CREDITOR VOGEL NEWSOME’S OBJECTION TO 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . .(DOCKET NO. 78); TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO BANKRUPTCY COURT ADVISING 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . .- DOCKET NO. 78 – IS A NONAPPEALABLE ORDER; TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS - - TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT UPON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS; REITERATION OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON; and NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC and WORLD/FOREIGN LEADERS1 COMES NOW Creditor Vogel Newsome (“Newsome”) without waiving her rights, without submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court, without waiving previous defenses and claims set forth in her pleadings filed with this Court and files this her, OBJECTION TO 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . .(DOCKET NO. 78); TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO BANKRUPTCY COURT ADVISING 06/07/16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN CASE. . . – DOCKET NO. 78 – IS A NONAPPEALABLE ORDER; TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS; TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT UPON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS; REITERATION OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON; AND NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC AND WORLD/FOREIGN LEADERS (“CVNOT06/07/16ORDER”) pursuant to Rule 12, Rule 46, Rule 52 and Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), 28 USC § 455; FRCP Rule 12(G) – consolidation of matters; United States Constitution Article III/United States Constitution Article III, § 1; Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution – and other statutes/laws governing said matters. In support thereof, Newsome states the following: 1 NOTE: Boldface, italics and underline, etc. represents “emphasis” added.
  • 4. Page 2 of 63 1. Newsome DOES NOT waive her defense to the jurisdictional issue which arises in this matter. Therefore, Newsome does not submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. While the laws are clear that Newsome cannot waive jurisdictional rights, she believes it is necessary to provide information regarding decisions of court(s) on said issue(s): In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2010) - Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can be raised by party, or by court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment. 2. This instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” is submitted in good faith and has not been submitted for purposes of delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of justice, vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the rights of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the United States. 3. For purposes of PRESERVING the issues was and/or addressed in this instant Bankruptcy filing as well as in her PREVIOUS filings, Creditor Newsome submits her TIMELY OBJECTION(s) pursuant to Rule 46 of the FRCP to address the ERRORS in this instant Bankruptcy action and the 06/07/16 ruling (DOCKET No. 78) by Judge Edward Ellington. A formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary. When the ruling or order is requested or made, a party need only state the action that it wants the court to take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection. Failing to object does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when the ruling or order was made. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1968) - Purpose of rule requiring party to inform court at time order or ruling is made to make known the action which he desires court to take, or his objection to action of court and his grounds therefor, is to inform trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to reconsider his ruling and make any changes deemed advisable. FRCP Rule46, 28 U.S.C.A. Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) - Timely objection is necessary to bring to trial court's attention alleged errors in conduct of a trial. Pigrenet v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1981) - Procedural objections to action of . . . trial court must be timely made to give tribunal an opportunity to correct the error, if there be. Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. Miss., 1999) - A failure to make a procedural objection waives the error, precluding review by Court of Appeals. 4. For the purposes of expedition, saving of time and minimize costs associated with litigation, Newsome consolidate her motions/pleadings herein pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(G) which states: FRCP Rule 12(g) Joining Motions. Right to Join. A motion under this rule may be joined with any other motion allowed by this rule.
  • 5. Page 3 of 63 5. This Bankruptcy Court LACKS Jurisdiction to act in that Creditor Newsome does NOT waive Jurisdiction and does NOT authorize this Bankruptcy Court nor Judge Edward Ellington to INFRINGE upon her Constitutional Rights and USURP authority in which it/he LACKS! From the record EVIDENCE, statutes/laws and GUIDELINES governing said matters, would properly place this Bankruptcy action as a NON-Core Proceeding! 6. Because Debtor Townsend’s instant FRIVOLOUS Bankruptcy action a NON-Core proceeding, it PRECLUDES this Court from entering a FINAL Judgment. Nevertheless, this is EXACTLY what Judge Edward Ellington attempted to do on or about 09/30/15, in efforts of DEPRIVING Creditor Newsome DUE PROCESS of Law and EQUAL PROTECTION of the Laws! See DOCKET No. 61 of this Bankruptcy Court. 7. This Bankruptcy Court and Judge Edward Ellington (“Judge Ellington”) LACKS authority to act pursuant to the United States Constitution Art. III. This Bankruptcy Court and Judge Ellington is PURPORTING Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 157 – i.e. which is NOT only in CLEAR ERROR but a GROSS INFRINGEMENT upon Creditor Vogel Newsome’s
  • 6. Page 4 of 63 CONSTITUTIONAL Rights and other Rights secured and/or guaranteed under the statutes/laws governing said matters. 8. The Court of FIRST FILING and with PROPER and LEGAL/LAWFUL JURISDICTION regarding the CIVIL Lawsuit filed by Vogel Newsome in “Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA, etal.,” wherein Debtor Ladye M. Townsend is NAMED as a Defendant, IS the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704” that was filed on or about 12/03/10! I. LACK OF JURISDICTION: There is authority that dismissal of a bankruptcy case does not mandate dismissal of all pending adversary proceedings. However, if an entity joined as a party in an adversary proceeding raised the defense that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter and that defense is sustained, the court must dismiss such entity from the adversary proceeding. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7019(1). Mississippi Case: Rice v. McMullen, 43 So.2d 195 (Miss. 1949) - A court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of
  • 7. Page 5 of 63 the parties, to give validity to its final judgments, orders and decrees, and legislature cannot under the Constitution dispense with notice, actual or constructive. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 135 F.Supp. 304 (S.D.Miss.Jackson.Div.,1955) - “Judicial power” is the legal right, ability and authority to hear and decide a justifiable issue or controversy, and such power is ordinarily vested in a court of justice. U.S. Supreme Court Case: U.S. v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. 641(1874) - “Jurisdiction” is the power to hear and determine a cause. In re N.L.R.B., 58 S.Ct. 1001 (1938) - “Jurisdiction” means, in one sense, the power to hear and determine the controversy presented, but a court has “jurisdiction,” in another sense, to determine whether such power is conferred upon it in the circumstances disclosed, and if it finds such power is not granted, it lacks “jurisdiction” of the subject matter and must refrain from an adjudication of rights in connection therewith. Other Court Cases: In re Jahelka, 2010 WL 5558990 (Bankr., 2010) - Subject matter jurisdiction is threshold question in every case. In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 435 B.R. 894 (2010) - A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges the power of the federal court to hear a claim or case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. Issue of court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised in any manner, including on motion of one of the parties or by the court sua sponte. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A A) LACK OF JURISDICTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT: SUPREME COURT DECISION – Please see Howard K. Stern, Executor of the Estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall v. Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall, 564 U.S. 462; 131 S. Ct. 2594; 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011) at EXHIBIT “A” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full and, states in part: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: . . . Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the debtor challenged the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. OVERVIEW: The debtor contended that 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(2)(C) expressly granted the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the debtor's counterclaim to the creditor's claim, but the creditor argued that the counterclaim was not within core bankruptcy jurisdiction and was excluded as a personal injury claim. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, although the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on the core counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional counterclaim by the debtor, the bankruptcy court was not established under U.S. Const. art. III and was not subject to the constitutional assurances of independence which
  • 8. Page 6 of 63 would allow adjudication of the debtor's state common law claim. Further, resolving the creditor's claim would not necessarily resolve the debtor's counterclaim, and the debtor's claim was otherwise unrelated to the claim- allowance process. Also, the debtor's claim did not involve public rights to allow the congressional extension of bankruptcy jurisdiction, since the debtor's claim flowed from state law rather than the federal bankruptcy scheme authority to do so under U.S. Const. art. III. While § 157 purported to extend bankruptcy jurisdiction to any. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. [HN2] Bankruptcy courts may hear and enter final judgments in core proceedings in a bankruptcy case. In non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy courts instead submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for that court's review and issuance of final judgment. [HN3] With certain exceptions, the district courts of the United States have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases under Title 11 of the U.S. Code. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(a). Congress divides bankruptcy proceedings into three categories: those that arise under Title 11, those that arise in a Title 11 case, and those that are related to a case under Title 11. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(a). District courts may refer any or all such proceedings to the bankruptcy judges of their district. District courts also may withdraw a case or proceeding referred to the bankruptcy court for cause shown. § 157(d). [HN4] Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter final judgments in all core proceedings arising under Title 11 of the U.S. Code, or arising in a case under Title 11. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(1). Core proceedings include, but are not limited to 16 different types of matters, including counterclaims by a bankruptcy debtor's estate against persons filing claims against the estate. § 157(b)(2)(C). Parties may appeal final judgments of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court, which reviews them under traditional appellate standards. 28 U.S.C.S. § 158(a). [HN6] When a bankruptcy judge determines that a referred proceeding is not a core proceeding but is otherwise related to a case under Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the judge may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(1). It is the district court that enters final judgment in such cases after reviewing de novo any matter to which a party objects. [HN8] 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in core proceedings arising under Title 11 of the U.S. Code, or arising in a case under Title 11. Section 157(c)(1) instructs bankruptcy judges to instead submit proposed findings in a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under Title 11. [HN12] Because branding a rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of the adversarial system, courts are not inclined to interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar when they are not framed as such. [HN13] 28 U.S.C.S. § 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment between a bankruptcy court and a district court. § 157(b)(1), (c)(1). That allocation does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Under § 157(c)(2), parties may consent to entry of final judgment by bankruptcy
  • 9. Page 7 of 63 judge in non-core case. By the same token, § 157(b)(5) simply specifies where a particular category of cases should be tried. DECISION: [***475] Bankruptcy court's entry of final judgment on debtor's counterclaim against creditor, though valid under 28 U.S.C.S. § 157, held to violate Article III of Federal Constitution. 9. Debtor Lady M. Townsend’s Bankruptcy action is a NON-Core proceeding. This Court was TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY notified of the NON-Core status of this Bankruptcy action through Creditor Newsome’s REBUTTAL Motion filed on or about 10/15/15, OBJECTING to this Court’s 09/30/15 Final Judgment. See DOCKET No. 64. 10. This Bankruptcy Court/Judge Edward Ellington is alleging JURISDICTION pursuant to 28 USC § 1334 and 28 USC § 157 and FALSE claims of a Core proceeding – when it is NOT – in efforts of FRAUDULENTLY and DECEPTIVELY obtaining Jurisdiction in which this Court and he LACKS! 11. Debtor Ladye M. Townsend in filing this FRIVOLOUS Bankruptcy action NAMED Vogel Newsome as a CREDITOR for purposes of UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY obtaining a DISCHARGE from damages Newsome seeks to receive from her WELL- PRESERVED Civil Lawsuit styled, “Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA, etal., USDC – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704” that was filed with the United States DISTRICT Court on or about 12/03/10! 12. In the Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams Lawsuit in the United States District Court- Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, the RECORD EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that Newsome PAID the $350 FILING FEE and RECEIPT No. 34643006821 was ISSUED by said District Court! - - - EMPHASIS ADDED! See Docket No. 1 in the referenced District Court matter.
  • 10. Page 8 of 63 13. In the Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams Lawsuit in the United States District Court- Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, the RECORD EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that Newsome TIMELY DEMANDED a JURY TRIAL - - EMPHASIS ADDED – CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION! 14. On or about 12/16/10, Creditor Newsome SERVED via United States Postal Service Mail Defendant (in the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams CIVIL Lawsuit) Ladye Margaret Townsend with “Waiver Of The Service Of Summons” which was RECEIVED on or about 12/27/10: and executed by Townsend on or about 01/20/11 – See DOCKET No. 12 of USDC-Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704. SUBSTANTIAL
  • 11. Page 9 of 63 EVIDENCE of Townsend’s KNOWLEDGE of the Civil Lawsuit filed AGAINST her as well as other Defendants. 15. From Record EVIDENCE, Defendant Townsend in the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams matter had until about 02/14/11 (i.e. 60 DAYS from 12/16/10 mailing of Complaint) to file an Answer and/or Responsive Pleading to Plaintiff Vogel Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit. However Defendant Townsend made a FOOLISH and FATAL move to file a “VOLUNTARY
  • 12. Page 10 of 63 PETITION” in this BANKRUPTCY action on or about 01/18/11, with the United States Bankruptcy Court-Southern District Of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 11-00167! See DOCKET No. 1 of this Bankruptcy Court – Case No. 11-00167! 16. Debtor Ladye M. Townsend in this instant Bankruptcy action – according to United States Postal Service (“USPS”) information – OBTAINED KNOWLEDGE of Creditor Newsome’s FILING of a CIVIL Lawsuit AGAINST her and other Defendants through the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. matter on or about 12/27/11.
  • 13. Page 11 of 63 17. As a DEFENSIVE move, Debtor Townsend filed her VOLUNTARY PETITION with this Bankruptcy Court on or about 01/18/11, and then SWIFTLY moved to EXECUTE the “WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS” in the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. matter approximately TWO DAYS LATER on or about 01/20/11 - - EMPHASIS ADDED! 18. In its 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case . . .(Docket No. 78) of this Bankruptcy Court, Judge Ellington asserts that Creditor Newsome IS NOT a Creditor; however, the Record EVIDENCE will STRONGLY rebut such FRIVOLOUS assertion in that Debtor Townsend in her document filed with this Court entitled, “MATRIX,” indeed has NAMED Vogel Newsome as a CREDITOR! See DOCKET No. 2 of this instant Bankruptcy action! 19. The Record EVIDENCE will also support that Vogel Newsome is NAMED as a CREDITOR in a document filed in this instant Bankruptcy matter entitled, “ Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines” – See DOCKET No. 8.
  • 14. Page 12 of 63 20. There is NO record evidence to support that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) “REFERRED” Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA, etal. – Case No. 10-704, to this Bankruptcy Court because said District Court did NOT! 21. The CORE vs. NON-Core issue has been addressed in Creditor Newsome’s pleading filed with this Bankruptcy Court on or about 10/15/16 - DOCKET No. 64 – as well as in Creditor’s subsequent pleadings. This is EVIDENCED in said Court’s 06/07/16, Order Denying Motion To Reopen. . . (Docket No. 78) in that it ONLY provides FRIVOLOUS “Findings of Fact” which, through this instant filing is TIMELY, PROPERLY, ADEQUATELY and LAWFULLY/LEGALLY CONTESTED!
  • 15. Page 13 of 63 22. Creditor Newsome’s OBJECTION pleadings and/or pleadings CONTESTING rulings by this Bankruptcy Court as well as those that have been filed on behalf of Debtor Townsend will SUSTAIN that Newsome does NOT CONSENT to this Bankruptcy Court’s Jurisdiction and, therefore, Newsome does NOT CONSENT and VEHEMENTLY OBJECTS to this Bankruptcy Court’s and Judge Edward Ellington’s DEFIANCE of the CONSTITUTION and efforts to ASSERT himself as an ARTICLE III Judge as well as this Bankruptcy Court under U.S. Constitutional Art. III – ERROR. . . .ERROR. . .ERROR - - GROSS Judicial USURPATION and ABUSE OF POWER. . .! B) FIRST-TO-FILE: Please see The Cadle Company v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599 (5th Cir.); 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8615; 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 369 at EXHIBIT “B” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
  • 16. Page 14 of 63 OUTCOME: The dismissal of the plaintiff's claims was reversed because, although the district court properly applied the first-to-file rule, it should not have dismissed the claims but should have transferred them to the court of first jurisdiction. [HN3] Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap. The rule rests on principles of comity and sound judicial administration. The concern manifestly is to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result. [HN4] The first-filed court takes priority by virtue of its prior jurisdiction over the common subject matter. [HN5] Courts apply the first-to-file doctrine to avoid relitigation of, and inconsistency with, issues already decided by other courts. [HN6] The first-to-file rule not only determines which court may decide the merits of substantially similar issues, but also establishes which court may decide whether the second suit filed must be dismissed, stayed, or transferred and consolidated. OPINION. . . The Cadle Company ("Cadle") appeals the district court's decision to dismiss its RICO and state law claims under the "first-to-file" rule. Cadle argues that the district court should have applied the rule only if it first determined that the first-filed court's jurisdiction was proper, and erred by failing to do so in this case. Cadle argues in the alternative that even if the lower court did not err in applying the rule, it should have transferred the case rather than dismissed it. We find that the district court properly applied the first-to-file rule, but should have [**2] transferred the suit rather than dismissed it. The judgment of the district court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to transfer the case. . . . 3. The District Court Properly Applied the First-To-File Rule In sum, Cadle's view of the first-to-file rule is supported by neither the policies behind the rule nor the cases that apply it. While the jurisdictional certainty of the first-filed court might be a proper factor for a district court to weigh in maximizing judicial economy, Cadle does not allege that the court below erred in this respect. Nor could it: the district court in this case was the second-filed court, and under Fifth Circuit precedent that balancing act is reserved only for the first-filed court. "Once the likelihood of a substantial overlap between the two suits has been demonstrated, it [is] was no longer up to the [second filed court] to resolve [**19] the question of whether both should be allowed to proceed." Mann, 439 F.2d at [*606] 407. The district court correctly refused to act as a "super appellate court" by entertaining either Cadle's jurisdiction or the defendants' standing arguments, and properly limited its inquiry to the potential overlap between the two cases. By so limiting its analysis, the district court indeed avoided trenching on the authority of its sister court, one of "the very abuses the first-to-file rule is designed to prevent." Cadle, No. 97- 1502, slip op. at 4. B. Transfer or Dismiss? Cadle argues in the alternative that the district court should have transferred the case back to the Laredo division rather than dismiss it entirely. We agree. "
  • 17. Page 15 of 63 [HN6] The 'first to file rule' not only determines which court may decide the merits of substantially similar issues, but also establishes which court may decide whether the second suit filed must be dismissed, stayed or transferred and consolidated." Sutter Corp., 125 F.3d at 920. As noted above, "the Fifth Circuit adheres to the general rule, that the court in which an action is first filed is the appropriate court to determine whether subsequently filed cases [**20] involving substantially similar issues should proceed." Save Power, 121 F.3d at 948. Thus, once the district court found that the issues might substantially overlap, the proper course of action was for the court to transfer the case to the Laredo court to determine which case should, in the interests of sound judicial administration and judicial economy, proceed. The district court erred by dismissing the suit. MOTIONS DENIED. The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs. 23. On or about 08/10/15, this Bankruptcy Court NOTICED a Bankruptcy Hearing for 09/18/15 – See DOCKET No. 15 in this instant Bankruptcy action.
  • 18. Page 16 of 63 The above SNAPSHOT is an EXCERPT from a 09/18/15 Transcript of the Hearing before this Bankruptcy Court and will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome advised of the FIRST-TO-FILE Defense asserted as well as advised said Bankruptcy Court of its LACK OF JURISDICTION to proceed. To NO avail! Therefore, SUPPORTING and SUSTAINING this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington’s ABUSE of POWER, USURPATION. . .DEPRIVATION of Due Process of Law and DEPRIVATION of Equal Protection of Laws . . . PLEASE BE ADVISED: That a copy of the 09/18/15 Bankruptcy Hearing has been MADE AVAILABLE for PUBLIC viewing and/or listening at: AUDIO MAY BE FOUND AT: YOUTUBE AUDIO – MAY BE FOUND: FILESANYWHERE AUDIO–MAY BE FOUND: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/091815-u-s- bankruptcy-hearing-recording-townsend-matter http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/091815-bankruptcy- hearing-transcribed-townsend-matter-photos-added https://youtu.be/viLIo7KObUU https://www.filesanywhere.com/fs/v.aspx?v=8b706587596674 75ad6c TRANSCRIPT MAY BE FOUND AT: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/0091815-bankruptcy- hearing-transcribed-townsend-matter-photos-added NOTE: Multiple COPIES of this Transcript has been made and POSTED due to what appears to be CONSPIRACIES (obstruction of LINKS by Web Host Providers) to keep the PUBLIC/WORLD from getting a copy of it! So if interested persons DO NOT get it at one location, hopefully, they will be able to get a copy using one of the OTHER Links! 24. The Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy action will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome NOT ONLY through pleadings filed but also in the 09/18/15 Hearing ADDRESSED the FACT that her CIVIL Lawsuit in “Vogel Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, PA, etal.,” wherein Debtor Ladye M. Townsend is NAMED as a Defendant in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704” was filed FIRST - on or about 12/03/10. It appears that Debtor Townsend then made a FATAL decision to file this instant Bankruptcy and WAIVE filing an Answer and/or Rule 12 Responsive pleading in Newsome’s Civil Lawsuit in efforts of AVOIDING Liability – i.e. which as a matter of law, Townsend has FAILED and YES, is LIABLE for the injury/harm done to Plaintiff Vogel Newsome!
  • 19. Page 17 of 63 25. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED regarding the FIRST-TO- FILE Rule and is VERY ADAMANT in USURPING his authority and ABUSING POWERS in FURTHERANCE of the Conspiracies and RACIAL Animus towards Creditor Vogel Newsome! 26. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has KNOWINGLY INFRINGED not only upon Rights secured under the United States Constitution, but is ABUSING statutes/laws MANDATED to PREVENT such unlawful/illegal practices Judge Ellington has become ACCUSTOMED to! Further SUPPORTING his being UNFIT to even remain on the Judicial Bench as a Bankruptcy Judge and/or Judge in any other Court of Law. 27. The Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy matter as well as in this instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” will SUSTAIN that DUE to this Bankruptcy Court’s LACK OF JURISDICTION as well as the FIRST-TO-FILE Rule, that this matter is to be TRANSFERRED to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 for handling. 28. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge Edward Ellington’s KNOWLEDGE that Creditor Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, is STILL an ACTIVE Lawsuit and has been PRESERVED by Newsome’s FILING of the applicable pleadings! Moreover, her PRESERVATION of said issues has been RECORDED in the 09/18/15 Bankruptcy Hearing! 29. The FIFTH CIRCUIT Court of Appeals ADHERES to the FIRST-TO-FILE Rule and said Court’s decision will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court UPON LEARNING of Creditor Newsome’s Lawsuit in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT in the Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, was to TRANSFER Debtor Townsend’s Bankruptcy action to the DISTRICT COURT for CONSOLIDATION with Creditor/Plaintiff Newsome’s Lawsuit. However, this did NOT occur and Judge Edward Ellington is DETERMINED to DEFY the statutes/laws governing said matters because for some STUPID reason, he may believe that he is IMMUNED from CRIMINAL Liability and PROSECUTION in the ROLE he is
  • 20. Page 18 of 63 playing in the CONSPIRACIES and other crimes being carried out AGAINST Creditor/Plaintiff Vogel Newsome. Judge Edward Ellington IS NOT immune from CRIMINAL Prosecution and/or LIABILITY! Furthermore, the Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that it appears that Judge Edward Ellington is a WILLING participant in the CRIMINAL acts being carried out against Creditor Newsome and that said acts are RACIALLY and DISCRIMINATORILY motivated! 30. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED in the DISCHARGE and DISMISSAL of Debtor Townsend’s Bankruptcy action in that CLEARLY it LACKED Jurisdiction to execute the FRIVOLOUS Final Judgment (DOCKET No. 61) it asserts has been issued and is acting in VIOLATION of the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters! 31. There is EVIDENCE to support that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 (at DOCKET No. 14) was TIMELY NOTIFIED of Debtor Ladye M. Townsend’s filing of this instant Bankruptcy action; however, DELIBERATELY and with MALICIOUS and RECKLESS disregard for the laws governing said matters, FAILED to NOTIFY this Bankruptcy Court of the PENDING CIVIL Lawsuit! 32. There is Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy action to SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome TIMELY NOTIFIED this Court of her OPPOSITION to Debtor Townsend’s Bankruptcy action through her pleading entitled, “Creditor’s Opposition/Response To Notice Of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines; and Motion To Be Dismissed From Action.” (DOCKET No. 14-1).
  • 21. Page 19 of 63 33. There is Record Evidence in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 – action to SUSTAIN that Debtor Ladye M. Townsend’s filing of this instant Bankruptcy action has PROVEN to be FATAL and she has LOST ALL rights to DEFEND against the claims set forth in Creditor/Plaintiff Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit. When Debtor Townsend SHOULD have PRESERVED her Rights to defend through ANSWER and/or a RESPONSIVE Rule 12 pleading in Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al., Townsend FAILED to do so. As a DIRECT and PROXIMATE result, Creditor/Plaintiff Newsome has moved in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for a DEFAULT JUDGMENT! See DOCKET No. 17 in the DISTRICT COURT action! C) NO FINAL JUDGEMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ACTION – SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI (JACKSON) – CASE NO. 10-704. 34. The Record EVIDENCE will support that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, on or about 10/21/13, an "ORDER REASSIGNING CASE" was entered. See DOCKET No. 31 of the DISTRICT COURT. 35. Creditor Newsome believes it is IMPORTANT to note that at the time of filing the lawsuit in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704, it appears that the following HOUSE NEGROES were being used for DECEPTIVE purposes: Judge Henry T. Wingate Linda Randle Anderson Carlyle C. White (Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada
  • 22. Page 20 of 63 and have since been removed and replaced with the likes of the KLAN’s CHIEF Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. 36. The Record EVIDENCE will support that AFTER the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT in the Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. matter – Southern District of Mississippi [Jackson] - (Case No. 10-704) entered its "ORDER REASSIGNING CASE," it then moved SWIFTLY to enter TEXT ONLY ORDERS and/or ENTERIES into the DOCKET of the Court for purposes of ABUSING the Court’s ELECTRONIC FILING process, OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE, DEPRIVING Plaintiff Newsome DUE PROCESS of Law, DEPRIVING Plaintiff EQUAL PROTECTION of the Laws and DEPRIVATION of other PROTECTED Rights secured and/or guaranteed under the United States Constitution and/or other statutes/laws governing said matters. 37. The Record EVIDENCE will support that on or about 10/23/13, that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) matter, it appears that CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. moved SWIFTLY to enter a FINAL JUDGMENT (See Docket No. 33 - Case No. 10-704). 38. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 11/12/13, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 filed Plaintiff Vogel Newsome's pleading entitled, “Motion For Relief From The October 23, 2013 Final Judgment; Motion To Disqualify Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” See Docket No. 34 39. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 11/12/13, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 NOTED Plaintiff Vogel Newsome's DEMAND for TRIAL BY JURY! See Docket No. 35. 40. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 11/13/13, in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704, CHIEF District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. AGAIN "ABUSED" the Court's
  • 23. Page 21 of 63 ELECTRONIC FILING SYSTEM for purposes of DEPRIVING Plaintiff Newsome DUE PROCESS of Law, DEPRIVING Plaintiff Newsome EQUAL PROTECTION of the Laws and DEPRIVATION of other PROTECTED Rights secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters. See Docket reflecting 11/13/13 Entry. 41. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/02/13, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 filed Plaintiff Newsome's pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To November 13, 2013 ‘DOCKET’ Text Order; Findings Of Fact and Conclusion Issue(s); and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” See DOCKET No. 36. 42. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/02/13, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 NOTED Plaintiff Vogel Newsome's DEMAND for TRIAL BY JURY! See Docket No. 37. 43. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/12/13, in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 that CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. entered an “Order Denying Plaintiff’s DEMAND For JURY TRIAL and Objections RE Text Order.” See Docket No. 38. 44. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 12/31/13, in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 that Plaintiff Vogel Newsome filed her pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To December 12, 2013, Order Denying Plaintiff’s DEMAND For JURY TRIAL and Objections RE Text Order and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” See Docket No. 39. 45. The Docket of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 - will further support that there are NO separate “documents – i.e. Order(s) and/or Judgment(s)” pursuant to Rule 58 of the FRCP, and, thus, Plaintiff Newsome will NOT waive any such requirements for purposes of supporting the ERRORS and BIAS, DISCRIMINATORY, PREJUDICIAL and UNLAWFUL/
  • 24. Page 22 of 63 ILLEGAL handling of this lawsuit by said Court/Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. Therefore, the “Docket Text” entries asserting “Order(s)” and or “Judgment(s)” that Court/Judge Guirola attempted to rely upon to DISMISS that lawsuit is clearly PROHIBITED and, thus, has been TIMELY CONTESTED as a matter of statutes/laws governing said matters: Matter of American Precision Vibrator Co., 863 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1989) - Undocketed orders cannot be enforced or appealed. Orders do not become “final” until they are docketed. 46. The Record EVIDENCE will SUPPORT that on or about 01/03/14, in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 that CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. entered an “Order Sanctioning Plaintiff and Preventing Plaintiff From Filing Additional Pleadings Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court.” See Docket No. 40. 47. The record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome is a PAYING Litigant (has PAID the $350 Filing Fee) and TIMELY DEMANDED a JURY TRIAL at the time of filing her CIVIL Lawsuit in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10- 704. Therefore, said Court has ERRED in its EFFORTS to DEPRIVE Plaintiff Vogel Newsome access in that CIVIL Lawsuit. Hooten v. Jenne, 786 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. Miss. 1986): Right of access to courts springs from First Amendment. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982): Ready access to the courts is a “fundamental constitutional right.” Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 44 S.Ct. 220 (1924): A citizen's right to sue in a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the cause includes the right to prosecute his claim to judgment.
  • 25. Page 23 of 63 Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874): Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him and he cannot barter away his life, or his freedom, or his substantial rights. Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002): Claim for deprivation of constitutional right of access to courts must allege both: (1) underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, and (2) official acts frustrating litigation. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 1994): Right of access to courts is implicated where ability to file suit was delayed or blocked altogether. Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1989): If state officials wrongfully and intentionally conceal information crucial to a person's ability to obtain redress through the courts, and do so for purpose of frustrating that right, and concealment and delay engendered thereby substantially reduces likelihood of one's obtaining relief to which one is otherwise entitled, state officials may have committed constitutional violation by denying access to courts. U.S. v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 2012): To maintain a backward-looking claim for violation of right of access to courts, a plaintiff must identify (1) a nonfrivolous underlying claim, (2) an official act that frustrated the litigation of that claim, and (3) a remedy that is not otherwise available in another suit that may yet be brought. American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, Inc. v. Mabus, 719 F.Supp. 1345 (S.D.Miss.Jackson.Div.,1989): Only a compelling state interest can justify limitation of the right of access to the courts. and because there is NO “FINAL” Judgment entered on Plaintiff Newsome’s POST-Judgment pleadings CONTESTING and/or OBJECTING to rulings, as a matter of law, the Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al. is STILL a VERY ACTIVE and VIABLE Lawsuit despite the FALSE showing by said DISTRICT Court alleging that it is CLOSED for DECEPTIVE purposes! 48. There is EVIDENCE that will SUPPORT that on or about 01/17/14, that Plaintiff Vogel Newsome submitted for filing in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704 her pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To January 3, 2014 Order Sanctioning Plaintiff and Preventing Plaintiff From Filing Additional Pleadings Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL.” Said PROOF of SUBMITTAL of pleading which further SUSTAINS the CRIMINAL acts by the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT and OBSTRUCTION of MAIL, OBSTRUCTION of JUSTICE, DEPRIVATION of Due Process of Law and DEPRIVATION of Equal Protection of the Laws, etc.! It is a GOOD THING that Newsome used the United States Postal Service’s MAIL-TRACKING procedures!
  • 26. Page 24 of 63 49. The Record EVIDENCE will support that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) - Case No. 10-704, there has been NO "FINAL JUDGMENT" entered regarding Newsome's POST- Judgment pleadings OBJECTING and/or CONTESTING the “TEXT ONLY” Order(s) and 12/12/13 Order entered by CHIEF DISTRICT Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. Therefore, as a matter of law, the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Civil Lawsuit is STILL ACTIVE and VIABLE regardless of the DECEPTIVE APPEARANCE of the Docket Sheet reflecting "CLOSED!" Moreover, there is EVIDENCE to support that Newsome submitted her 01/17/14 pleading entitled, “Objection(s) To January 3, 2014 Order Sanctioning Plaintiff and Preventing Plaintiff From Filing Additional Pleadings Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court and DEMAND For JURY TRIAL” which to DATE (06/17/16) has NOT been filed! D) DOCKET SHEET MISREPRESENTATION OF CLOSED CASE: Please see the FIFTH CIRCUIT Court of Appeals’ decision in, Dillon v. State of Mississippi Military Department, 23 F.3d 915; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14578 at EXHIBIT “__” and is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein and which states in part: The United States asserts correctly that, because there was no final judgment, appellate jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 3 ; e.g., Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291) [HN3] (absent Rule 54(b) designation, "a partial disposition of a multi-claim or multi- party action does not qualify as a final decision . . . and is ordinarily an unappealable interlocutory order") (internal citations and quotations omitted), cited in Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220. Ordinarily, a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it "ends [**5] the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Way v. Reliance Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing cases; internal quotation marks and citation
  • 27. Page 25 of 63 omitted) (judgment finding defendant liable, but not awarding damages pending arbitration, was not a final order for purposes of § 1291). . . Most surprisingly (read amazingly), plaintiffs did not file a reply brief in response to the government's jurisdictional point. . . 4 Needless to say, a reply brief responding to this contention should have been filed. This is a classic instance for when such a brief is called for -- to respond to a new point raised by an appellee. And, where, as here, the point concerns jurisdiction, the call for the reply is all the louder; the need, all the greater. 5 Although the district court dismissed only the United States, the docket sheet states that the case has been "closed", despite a later motion to dismiss by the state defendants (apparently not ruled upon). . . . Because there has not been a final judgment, under Rule 54(b) or otherwise, we lack jurisdiction. 50. On or about 09/30/15 this Bankruptcy Court attempted to MISLEAD Creditor Newsome in its filing of a Final Judgment in this NON-Core Bankruptcy action; however, Newsome did NOT bite and CONTESTED the Final Judgment. See DOCKET No. 64. 51. While this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington asserts Creditor Newsome’s BELABORS the JURISDICTIONAL issue, Newsome takes such FRIVOLOUS attacks as EVIDENCE that, “the CALL for REPLY is all the LOUDER” and, “the NEED, all the GREATER” has been SUSTAINED! 52. While the Record EVIDENCE in this instant Bankruptcy matter WILL SUPPORT that the DOCKET alleges that this case is CLOSED - - FAR FROM IT! Creditor Newsome will NOT be BULLIED, THREATENED, COERCED, etc. into WAIVING Rights secured/guaranteed under the Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters. 53. While the Record EVIDENCE in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704 - WILL SUPPORT that the DOCKET alleges that this case is CLOSED - - FAR FROM IT!
  • 28. Page 26 of 63 Plaintiff Newsome will NOT be BULLIED, THREATENED, COERCED, etc. into WAIVING Rights secured/guaranteed under the Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters. 54. There is EVIDENCE to support that in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT action in Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al., that on or about 01/17/14, Plaintiff Newsome submitted for filing, “Plaintiff’s Objection(s) To January 3, 2014 Order Sanctioning Plaintiff And Preventing Plaintiff From Filing Additional Pleading Unless Granted Prior Approval From A Judge Of This Court and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL!”
  • 29. Page 27 of 63 FACT: Plaintiff Newsome PAID the $350 Filing Fee and at the TIME of filing her Complaint PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY NOTIFIED the District Court of her DEMAND for a JURY TRIAL! 55. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED in trying to BULLY Creditor Newsome into filing an Appeal. NO Final Judgment has been entered.
  • 30. Page 28 of 63 56. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has ERRED and IS ENGAGING in CRIMINAL acts in efforts of EMBEZZLING monies (masked as FILING Fee) from Creditor Newsome and for purposes of UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY infringing upon the Constitutional Rights and other Rights secured/guaranteed under the statutes/laws governing said matters. E) FILING OF OBJECTION(S): Please see Flores v. United States Attorney General, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90513 which states in part: The parties are warned that any such objections are required to be in writing and must be filed within fourteen (14) days of this date. Failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal unobjected- to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996). 57. The Record EVIDENCE (not ONLY in this instant Bankruptcy action brought by Debtor Townsend) will SUPPORT that Creditor Newsome has TIMELY submitted her OBJECTIONS in accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters; moreover, has done SO in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) – Case No. 10-704 for purposes of PRESERVING PROTECTED rights as well as the PRESERVATION of the ISSUES and the EVIDENCE provided to sustain her claims and/or defenses. 58. This instant filing will also SUPPORT and SUSTAIN Creditor Newsome’s OBJECTION(s) to the 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case. . . (DOCKET No. 78) in this instant Bankruptcy action! Thus, PRESERVING Creditor Newsome’s ISSUES as well as the DEFENSES that this Court and Opposing Counsel/Debtor Townsend have FAILED to REBUT! F) DEPRIVATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS: Please see Kenyatta v. Moore, 623 F. Supp. 224; 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13701 at EXHIBIT “C” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. OVERVIEW: The debtor contended that 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b)(2)(C) expressly granted the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the debtor's counterclaim to the creditor's claim, but the creditor argued that the counterclaim was not within core bankruptcy jurisdiction and was excluded as a personal injury claim. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, although the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on the core counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional counterclaim by the debtor, the bankruptcy court was not established under U.S. Const. art. III and was not subject to the constitutional assurances of independence which would allow adjudication of the debtor's state common law claim. Further, resolving the creditor's claim would not necessarily resolve the debtor's counterclaim, and the debtor's claim was otherwise unrelated to the claim-allowance process. Also, the debtor's claim did not involve public rights to allow the congressional extension of bankruptcy jurisdiction, since the debtor's claim flowed from state law rather
  • 31. Page 29 of 63 than the federal bankruptcy scheme authority to do so under U.S. Const. art. III. While § 157 purported to extend bankruptcy jurisdiction to any. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. [HN3] A federal employee who uses his office to commit a federal constitutional violation should not be allowed to claim that office as grounds for an absolute immunity defense. In conspiring to commit such constitutional violation with racially discriminatory animus, such federal official is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3). [HN4] By its specific terms, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) proscribes any conspiracy which has the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. [HN5] The source of the congressional power to create a cause of action for private conspiracies does not rest in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as does the cause of action created in 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law; rather, the power to reach private conspiracies under § 1985(3) emanates from the Thirteenth Amendment. Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment "to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation," [HN7] 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 provides that every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. [HN8] 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies engaged in by federal officials. [HN9] An individual defendant, regardless of the nature of his employment or official status, who acts with invidious, class-based discriminatory animus and conspires with one or more defendants to deprive another of clearly established constitutional rights can be held liable for money damages under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3). [**6] Defendants' instant motion seeks partial judgment on the pleadings on the ground that persons acting under color of federal law are not within the reach of § 1985(3). In a well-stated brief, defendants submit a three-fold argument for precluding the availability of a § 1985(3) cause of action in this case: (1) the legislative intent behind the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 2 of which is the parent of § 1985(3), was to curb Ku Klux Klan activities in the Reconstruction South and indeed to protect federal officials, and thus conspiracies by federal officials are not covered by the Act; (2) the concept of equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under the laws in § 1985(3) necessarily contemplates some involvement by a state or by one acting under color of its authority before a violation can be established; (3) decisional law in the Fifth Circuit indicates that a § 1985(3) cause of action is
  • 32. Page 30 of 63 subject to the same state-action requirement that exists in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore federal officials acting under color of federal law cannot be held liable under § 1985(3). For the reasons stated hereinafter, this court declines [**7] to give identical construction to the legislative intent behind § 1983 and § 1985(3), and concludes that federal officials can be held individually liable for engaging in a private conspiracy to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws. Defendants correctly contend that the "central concern" of the 42d Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was to combat the "violent and other efforts of the Klan and its allies to resist and to frustrate the intended affects [sic] of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments . . ." Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1983). A principal purpose underlying the legislation was to provide, through a private damages remedy, some protection for blacks, union sympathizers and federal officials at work in the Reconstruction South. Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837; Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100-03, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971); McCord v. Bailey, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 334, 636 F.2d 606, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 68 L. Ed. 2d 839, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981). Defendants argue that it would have been [**8] "anomalous" for the 42d Congress to have included within the same legislation having the purpose of protecting federal institutions a section imposing liability on those charged with carrying out that difficult purpose and for whose protection the legislation was passed. . . [HN3] A federal employee who uses his office to commit [**9] a federal constitutional violation should not be allowed to claim that office as grounds for an absolute immunity defense. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908). In conspiring to commit such constitutional violation with racially discriminatory animus, such federal official is a "person" within the meaning of § 1985(3). See Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 219, 737 F.2d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909, 939 (M.D. N.C. 1984). Given the broad language of § 1985(3) and the construction of that language in Griffin to cover private conspiracies, this court rejects defendants' contention that federal officials are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute simply because their safety was of some concern to the 42d Congress. Indeed, the major concern of the 42d Congress in promulgating what is now § 1985(3) -- to provide "a statutory cause of action for negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men." Griffin [**10] , 403 U.S. at 105 -- would be thwarted by such a holding. Therefore, the court concludes that there is nothing in the legislative history of § 1985(3) that would exclude conspiratorial private action by federal employees from its coverage. . . . Second, [HN5] the source of the congressional power to create a cause of action for private conspiracies does not rest in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as does the cause of action created in § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law; rather, the power [**12] to reach private conspiracies under § 1985(3) emanates from the Thirteenth Amendment. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104-105. Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment "to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation," Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440, 20 L. Ed. 2d
  • 33. Page 31 of 63 1189, 88 S. Ct. 2186 (1968), without regard to the existence vel non of state action. Federal officials are certainly as capable as state officials of violating the mandates of the Thirteenth Amendment. . . The better reasoned view has been adopted in a number of recent cases in which § 1985(3) has been applied to private conspiracies by federal officials. 9 Two of these cases, Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 219, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), involved suits against F.B.I. agents under § 1985(3) for engaging in private conspiracies pursuant to the same F.B.I. COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist program at issue in this suit. In both cases, the courts of appeals held that the respective plaintiffs had stated cognizable causes of action against the individual F.B.I. agents under § 1985(3). Hobson, 737 F.2d at 20; Hampton, 600 F.2d at 623. . . The court is therefore of the opinion that the clear weight of recent authority on this issue is to the effect that [HN8] § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies engaged in by federal officials, including those acting to further the stated objectives of the F.B.I. . . . In conclusion, the court holds that [HN9] an individual defendant, regardless of the nature of his employment or official status, who acts with invidious, class-based discriminatory animus and conspires with one or more defendants to deprive another of clearly established constitutional rights can be held liable for money damages under § 1985(3). Kenyatta's amended complaint sufficiently sets out the elements of a cause of action under § 1985(3) to allow this case to go forward to trial. 59. Creditor Newsome asserts that in this instant Bankruptcy action, this Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington LACKS the Constitutional authority to enter a Final Judgment; moreover, that said Court is NOT established under U.S. Const. Art. III and is NOT subject to the Constitutional assurances of independence which would allow for Debtor Townsend’s claims to be discharged from LIABILITY sought through Newsome’s CIVIL Lawsuit. 60. This Bankruptcy Court LACKS JURISDICTION to enter a Final Judgment. 61. Creditor Newsome does NOT consent to this Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of Debtor Townsend’s claims and, as a matter of law, this Court is REQUIRED to submit Townsend’s Bankruptcy action to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704. 62. It appears that in this instant Bankruptcy action that Judge Edward Ellington and his LAW CLERK are KNOWINGLY engaging in CRIMINAL acts because they may believe that Judge Ellington is IMMUNED from LIABILITY. However, NEITHER Judge Ellington NOR his Law Clerk are IMMUNED from CRIMINAL PROSECUTION for the ROLES being played in furtherance of the CONSPIRACIES and other CRIMES leveled against Creditor Newsome that are being ADDRESSED in her DISTRICT COURT action (Case No. 10-704). 63. It appears that the CONSPIRACIES that this Court’s Judge Edward Ellington and his Law Clerk are engaging in IS WITH Racially Discriminatory ANIMUS, and, thus, are WITHIN the boundaries of claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
  • 34. Page 32 of 63 64. The record evidence will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington and his Law Clerk ARE ENGAGING in Conspiracies within 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for the PURPOSE of DEPRIVING Creditor Newsome of the EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws and/or DEPRIVING Newsome EQUAL PRIVILEGES and IMMUNITIES under the laws. 65. The Record EVIDENCE will support that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington and his Law Clerk are ENGAGING in PRIVATE Conspiracies leveled AGAINST Creditor Newsome. 66. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington and his Law Clerk (regardless of the nature of their employment and/or official status) ARE ACTING with INVIDIOUS, CLASS-BASED Discriminatory ANIMUS and IS CONSPIRING with ONE or MORE persons to DEPRIVE Creditor Newsome of ESTABLISHED Constitutional Rights and, therefore, both Judge Ellington and his Law Clerk may be held LIABLE for the ROLE(s) played in CONSPIRACIES and the IRREPARABLE injury/harm done to Newsome. 67. The Record Evidence will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has been TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY placed on NOTICE of the role that the KLAN’S Law Firm Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker Donelson”) is playing in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Creditor Newsome. Moreover, HOW such Law Firms as Baker Donelson use FRONTING Firms to CONCEAL their IDENTITY as well as efforts to CIRCUMVENT laws as the KU KLUX KLAN Act! The Klan’s Law Firm of Baker Donelson is ALIVE and is in BAD SHAPE while it DESPERATELY SEEKS MEMBERS in 2016, and Creditor Newsome is HERE TO EXPOSE! - - NO PATTY CAKE PLAYING! The Klan’s TERRORIST Law Firm Baker Donelson and its COHORTS are on their way DOWN! Creditor Newsome is MORE THAN HAPPY to LEAD THE CHARGE!
  • 35. Page 33 of 63 G) IMMUNITY ISSUE: Please see U.S. District Court – Southern District of Mississippi (Hattiesburg), Hudson v. Jones County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12237 at EXHIBIT “D” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein which states in part: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY The Fifth Circuit has held that "government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity if their conduct violates no 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1998)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). Under the two step analysis employed by the Fifth Circuit in reviewing claims wherein qualified immunity has been asserted, the Court must first determine "whether the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If so, the court decides whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable." Sorenson, 134 F.3d at 327 quoting Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997)(applying the two-prong test of Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1792-93, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991)). The first step "is subdivided into three questions: (1) whether a constitutional violation is alleged; (2) whether the law regarding the alleged violation was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether the record shows that a violation occurred." Dudley v. Angel, 209 F.3d 460, 462 quoting Kerr v.Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) citing Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988)). In this case, the court finds that Hudson cannot demonstrate he has suffered a constitutional deprivation and, as such, his claims against Gavin must be dismissed. I. DUE PROCESS To state a claim for a due process violation, Hudson must establish a "recognized ,,liberty or property. interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he was intentionally or recklessly deprived of that interest, even temporarily, under color of state law.'" Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990). The procedural [*10] component of the Due Process Clause makes certain that citizens receive fair process i.e. notice and an opportunity to respond, when deprived of a protected liberty interest. Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 2003). The substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ,,regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Marco Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Reg'l Transit Auth., 489 F.3d 669, 673 (5th Cir.. 2007) (quoting, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)). Substantive due process is violated by state conduct that "shocks the conscience." McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, in order to prove a due process violation, Hudson must first show that he has a "recognized liberty or property interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment." Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 1995).
  • 36. Page 34 of 63 68. The Record EVIDENCE will support that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington will NOT qualify for IMMUNITY because he is KNOWINGLY and WILLINGLY engaging in criminal acts that VIOLATE clearly established STATUTORY and/or CONSTITUTIONAL Rights of which a REASONABLE person would have known; moreover, VIOLATIONS that have been BEAUTIFULLY set further pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CONSTITUTIONAL violations ARE alleged! 69. Pursuant to Rule 8 (General Rules of Pleading) of the FRCP, Creditor Newsome’s pleadings in this instant Bankruptcy action specifically sets forth “short and plain statement(s)” of the grounds for relief/claims; however, due to this Court’s/Judge Edward Ellington’s INABILITY to respond in accordance to said Rule to legally/lawfully REBUT the claims, allegations and/or arguments set forth in Creditor Newsome’s pleadings, this Court/Judge Ellington merely CONTINUALLY proceeds on what appears to be a MENTALLY DISTURBED and RABID Judge/Law Clerk THROWING TOGETHER a FRIVOLOUS and BASELESS 8-PAGE rambling of UNSUBSTANTIATED GARBAGE! Further supporting and challenging Judge Edward Ellington’s FITNESS as well as MENTAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL state to preside in this matter; moreover, his INABILITY to understand and interpret the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided in Creditor Newsome’s pleadings providing in this Bankruptcy action. 70. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome has CLEARLY ASSERTED VIOLATION(s) of CLEARLY ESTABLISHED Constitutional Right(s) and that this Court’s Judge Ellington’s CONDUCT is UNREASONABLE and done with MALICE, PREJUDICE and INCORPORATES a Racially Discriminatory Animus! 71. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that in this instant Bankruptcy action, the LAWS SUPPORTING Creditor Newsome’s claims have been REPEATEDLY set forth at the time of VIOLATIONS for purposes of TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY putting this Court, Judge Edward Ellington, his Law Clerk, OPPOSING Party (Debtor Townsend and her Counsel) and their CO- CONSPIRATORS on NOTICE of the CONSTITUTIONAL violations as well as Criminal/Civil violations being committed. To NO AVAIL! 72. The Record EVIDENCE in this Bankruptcy action WILL SUSTAIN the SHOWING of VIOLATION(s) of and AGAINST Creditor Newsome from Judge Edward Ellington and those with whom he CONSPIRES! 73. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAN that in this instant Bankruptcy action, that this Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington has REPEATEDLY VIOLATED and DEPRIVED Creditor Newsome of DUE PROCESS and the DEPRIVATION of LIBERTIES set forth in this instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” as well as PREVIOUS filings from Creditor Newsome. Moreover, that the VIOLATIONS of this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Ellington are DONE INTENTIONALLY and with RECKLESS DISREGARD for Creditor Newsome’s Rights secured/guaranteed under the Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters.
  • 37. Page 35 of 63 74. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington ERRED and is attempting to BULLY Creditor Newsome to forego PROTECTED Rights by noting for instance, “Vogel Newsome is PROHIBITED from FILING ANOTHER pleading in this case OTHER than a NOTICE OF APPEAL which is ACCOMPANIED by the RELATED FILING FEE” – i.e. SUSTAINING the UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL practices of this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Ellington to DEPRIVE Creditor Newsome DUE PROCESS and an OPPORTUNITY to RESPOND to his FRIVOLOUS 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case. . . (DOCKET No. 78). 75. Due Process BARS the ARBITRARY and WRONGFUL Government actions of this Bankruptcy Court and Judge Edward Ellington. Moreover, the UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL procedures that are being used to DEPRIVE Creditor Newsome DUE PROCESS! 76. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court and Judge Edward Ellington Due Process VIOLATION(s) INDEED “SHOCKS the CONSCIENCE!” H) DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW/DENIAL OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW: Please see U.S. Southern District of Mississippi, Wickton v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 45 F.2d 615; 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1528 which states in part: "That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not, under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed. "If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself, prescribing a rule of evidence, in either criminal or civil cases, does not shut out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied him. 77. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN a NEXUS as well as a RATIONAL CONNECTION BETWEEN the Fact(s) PROVED and the Ultimate Fact(s) PRESUMED through this instant Bankruptcy filing as well as PREVIOUS filings in this action that Creditor Vogel Newsome has been DEPRIVED/DENIED Due Process of Law as well as DEPRIVED/DENIED the Equal Protection of the Laws! 78. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome has TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY NOTIFIED this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington of her DEMAND for a JURY TRIAL! To NO AVAIL! This Bankruptcy Court and Judge Ellington are DETERMINED to DEPRIVE Creditor Newsome of DUE PROCESS of Law and EQUAL PROTECTION of the
  • 38. Page 36 of 63 Laws in FULFILLING ROLE(s) in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Creditor Newsome! I) CORE PROCEEDINGS: Please see the FIFTH Circuits decision in, In The Matter of Timothy Michael Frazin, 732 F.3d 313; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20032 at EXHIBIT “E” attached hereto and incorporated by reference which states in part: [HN6] Hudson's holding, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, that bankruptcy courts can enter final judgments in all core proceedings is clearly inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's Stern's holding that bankruptcy courts cannot enter final judgments in one type of core proceeding, namely, state-law counterclaims that are not necessarily resolved in the claims-allowance process. Therefore, Stern has unequivocally sub silentio overruled Hudson as to that type of core proceeding. . . [HN7] When separation of powers is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty. When such U.S. Const. art. III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect. [HN8] The practice of bankruptcy courts entering final judgments in certain state-law counterclaims compromises the integrity of the system of separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system. Thus, structural concerns cannot be ameliorated by a party's consent or waiver to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. [HN14] In order to preserve an argument for appeal, the litigant must press and not merely intimate the argument during the proceedings before the district court. If an argument is not raised to such a degree that the district court has an opportunity to rule on it, the appellate court will not address it on appeal. 79. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this instant Bankruptcy action is NOT a Core proceeding! 80. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome does NOT CONSENT to this Bankruptcy Court presiding over Debtor Lady M. Townsend Bankruptcy action which has named Newsome as a CREDITOR! 81. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that Creditor Newsome has TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY CONTESTED the FRIVOLOUS/VOID Discharge of Debt granted to Debtor Townsend! Furthermore, this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington ERRED in the ENTRY of Discharge of Debt because it FALSELY and INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTS that Debtor Townsend is DISCHARGED from LIABILITY and DAMAGES in the Civil Lawsuit brought by Creditor Newsome in Newsome v. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, et al., in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT – Southern District Of Mississippi (Jackson), Case No. 10-704 – when Debtor Townsend is NOT Discharged as a matter of statutes/laws governing said matters.
  • 39. Page 37 of 63 J) NON-CORE PROCEEDING: Please see the FIFTH Circuit Court decision in, In the Matter of BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, LLC, 735 F.3d 279; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22791 at EXHIBIT “F” attached hereto and incorporated by reference with states in part: OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Where a debtor filed an adversary complaint alleging various state law tort and contract claims against creditors, the bankruptcy court lacked U.S. Const. art. III authority to enter final judgment denying relief on the debtor's claims because the proceedings were non-core proceedings that were not necessary to the resolution of the bankruptcy estate; [2]-Although the debtor initially consented to the bankruptcy court's entry of final judgment, but later withdrew its consent such that the bankruptcy court was statutorily authorized under 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(2) to issue a final judgment, the debtor's consent did not cure the constitutional deficiency because parties could not consent to such circumvention of art. III that impinged on the structural interests of the Judicial Branch. OUTCOME: Judgment vacated and case remanded. [HN2] . . . For non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy court submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, which then reviews the submissions de novo. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(1). With consent of the parties, however, the bankruptcy court may enter final, appealable judgments in non-core proceedings. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(2). [HN5] In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to enter final judgment on a debtor's state-law counterclaim even though the statute conferred such authority. [HN6] Courts emphasize the importance of our tripartite system and separation of powers, stressing that the system of checks and balances exists to serve two related purposes: to protect the independence of each branch and to protect the individual citizen. . . [HN7] When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789, and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with U.S. Const. art. III judges in art. III courts. The Constitution assigns that job--resolution of the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of law--to the Judiciary. [HN9] Non-core proceedings usually require a bankruptcy court to enter findings and conclusions for the district court to review. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(1). But, with the consent of the parties, a district court may refer a case to the bankruptcy court to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments. 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(c)(2). [HN11] The consequences of a litigant sandbagging the court--remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor--can be particularly severe.
  • 40. Page 38 of 63 [HN12] Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), held that, regardless of statutory authority, a bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on claims that are so deeply at the heart of the federal judiciary's U.S. Const. art. III powers and are not necessary to the resolution of the bankruptcy estate. [HN15] . . . However, by failing to object until a case reaches a U.S. Court of Appeals, an appellant consents to the adjudication of the claim by a bankruptcy judge. [HN16] Parties cannot consent to circumvention of U.S. Const. art. III that impinges on the structural interests of the Judicial Branch. [HN21] Where a structural interest is triggered, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. When the art. III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect. [HN22] Under Stern, a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter final judgment on certain state-law counterclaims by a debtor, despite that the debtor has impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. [HN23] Although a district court does have the authority to retain jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter a final judgment if the district court does not retain and the reference is not withdrawn. And once entered, a purported judgment of the bankruptcy court -- the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court with broad substantive jurisdiction -- would be entitled to the usual deference, for example, the clearly-erroneous standard for factual findings, owed to such an act that is final, subject to review only if a party chooses to appeal, to a higher, U.S. Const. art. III tribunal. Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987) - If proceeding involves right created by federal bankruptcy law, or is one which would only arise in bankruptcy, it is core proceeding, but if proceeding does not invoke substantive right created by federal bankruptcy law and is one that could exist outside of bankruptcy, it is noncore proceeding, though it may be related to bankruptcy because of its potential effect on debtor's estate. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157. In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2008) - Bankruptcy court's adjudicative authority is constrained if the adversary proceeding is non- core. 82. This instant Bankruptcy action brought by Debtor Ladye M. Townsend is a NON-Core proceeding! 83. This Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington ERRED in the ENTRY of a FRIVOLOUS Final Judgment on or about 09/30/15, in which said Court LACKED Jurisdiction to enter!
  • 41. Page 39 of 63 84. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge Edward Ellington’s KNOWLEDGE that this instant Bankruptcy action is NON-Core and, thus, the TRUE reason that Judge Ellington this time ONLY submitted the 06/07/15 Findings Of Fact (which is hereby TIMELY CONTESTED) because of the NON-Core status! 85. Bankruptcy courts have NO power to ENTER judgments in NON-Core matters. - In re Cathedral of Incarnation in Diocese of Long Island, 99 F.3d 66 (1996) (a) IF this Bankruptcy Court had Jurisdiction (which it does NOT) it would have ONLY required a “PROPOSED Findings of Fact” or “REPORT and RECOMMENDATION” for submittal to DISTRICT COURT! However, instead, this Court MISTAKENLY submitted “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Creditor’s (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From Order/Judgement (sic); Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions Of And Against Robert Rex McRaney Jr./McRaney & McRaney; and Request To be Advised Of Conflict-Of-Interests (DKT. #34)” – See DOCKET No. 60 - which clearly is neither “PROPOSED” or a “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” in Bankruptcy matters (as in this instant action) which is a NON-CORE proceeding – i.e. as evidenced in this instant filing as well as Creditor Newsome’s previous filings in this Bankruptcy matter.
  • 42. Page 40 of 63 28 USC § 157(c) as of 10/08/15: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/157 (b) This Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington MISTAKENLY moved and QUICKLY entered “FINAL JUDGMENT ON CREDITOR’S (VOGEL NEWSOME) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER/JUDGEMENT (sic); MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST ROBERT REX McRANEY JR./McRANEY & McRANEY; AND REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS (DOCKET No. 61)” in a NON- CORE proceeding WITHOUT the Consent of Creditor Newsome! Action which is CLEARLY in VIOLATION of the statutes/laws governing said matters and DEPRIVES Creditor Newsome of RIGHTS GUARANTEED under the Constitution and other governing statutes/laws. Phrase “final judgments and orders,” as used in statute that AUTHORIZES bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments and orders in NON-core proceedings ONLY WITH consent of parties, is not limited in scope merely to ultimate rulings entered following evidentiary hearing but also includes rulings upon dispositive motions that present only questions of law; UNLESS parties CONSENT to some different procedure, whenever bankruptcy court reaches conclusion with respect to dispositive motion in NON-core proceeding, it MUST prepare REPORT and RECOMMENDATION for SUBMISSION to district court, REQUESTING entry of final order thereon. – In re Blakwell ex rel. Estate of I.G. Services Ltd., 279 B.R. 818 (2002)
  • 43. Page 41 of 63 (c) Having KNOWLEDGE that this instant Bankruptcy matter is a NON-CORE proceeding. Therefore, this Bankruptcy Court LACKED jurisdiction to render the “Findings of Fact. . .” – DOCKET NO. 60 and then SWIFTLY moved ILLEGALLY and UNLAWFULLY to enter its FINAL JUDGMENT – DOCKET NO. 61. To decide whether particular matter falls within its bankruptcy jurisdiction, it is NOT necessary for DISTRICT court to distinguish between “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related to” proceedings; DISTRICT court NEED ONLY determine whether the matter is at least “related to” bankruptcy. – Beasley v. Personal Finance Corporation, 279 B.R. 523 (S.D. Miss. 2002) – Dixon v. First Family Financial Services, 276 B.R. 173 (S.D. Miss. 2002) For purpose of determining whether particular matter falls within DISTRICT court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction, it is NOT necessary to distinguish between proceedings “arising under,” “arising in a case under,” or “related to a case under” Title 11; these REFERENCES operate CONJUNCTIVELY to define scope of court’s jurisdiction. 28 USCA § 1334 – Thomas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 259 B.R. 571 (S.D. Miss. 2001) The 1984 Bankruptcy Act did NOT change scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction set forth in 1978 Act, but rather altered PLACEMENT of bankruptcy jurisdiction by creating statutory distinction between core and NON-core proceedings and RESTRICTING power of BANKRUPTCY court to adjudicate the latter. . . . 28 USCA § 1334 – Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90, on remand 84 B.R. 432 (5th Cir. (Miss) 1987) – If proceeding involves right created by federal bankruptcy law, or is one which would only arise in bankruptcy, it IS core proceeding, but IF proceeding does NOT invoke substantive right created by federal bankruptcy law and is one that could EXIST OUTSIDE of bankruptcy, it is NONcore proceeding, though it may BE RELATED to bankruptcy because of its potential effect on debtor’s estate. (Id.) 86. As a matter of law, the United States District Court – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson Division), Case No. 10-704 - on December 3, 2010, FIRST retained jurisdiction over this matter. Jurisdiction is the power to decide; it must be conferred, not assumed. Matter of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1986). All bankruptcy jurisdiction is given in the first instance to the United States district courts. Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1986), ordered aff’d, 1987 1987 WL 47763 (E.D. N.Y. 1987); In re Double TRL, Inc., 65 B.R. 993 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1986). The district courts are granted jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, that is cases under the Bankruptcy Code and over three categories of bankruptcy proceedings: (1) civil proceedings arising under Title 11; (2) civil proceedings arising in a case under Title 11; and (3) civil proceedings related to cases under Title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). As used in this statute, the phrase “arising under Title 11” is meant, not to distinguish between different matters, but to identify collectively a broad range of matters subject to the bankruptcy
  • 44. Page 42 of 63 jurisdiction of federal courts. Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987). On or about December 16, 2010, Newsome served Debtor (Ladye M. Townsend [“Townsend”]) with the required: (a) “Notice of Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of Summons;” and (b) “Waiver of the Service of Summons” which was accompanied by Notification Accompanying Waiver of Service of Summons. According to United States Postal Service information, Townsend received these documents on or about December 27, 2010. K) INTERLOCUTORY ORDER NOT APPEALABLE: Please see the FIFTH CIRCUIT Court of Appeals’ decision in, In Re Bobby Ray Foust, 96 Fed. Appx. 940; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1217 at EXHIBIT “G” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein which states in part: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reversed the bankruptcy court's decision holding appellees liable for failing to turn over property of the appellant debtors' bankruptcy estate. The district court also reversed on the issue of damages, remanded for further development of expert testimony regarding valuation, and remanded for consideration of the debtors' advice of counsel defense. The debtors appealed. OVERVIEW: The parties did not contest the appellate court's jurisdiction. The appellate court raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte and found that the district court's decision was not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C.S. § 158(d). The district court reversed and remanded to the bankruptcy court for further consideration of adequate protection, expert testimony regarding valuation, and the appellees' advice of counsel defense. These issues constituted significant further proceedings because the bankruptcy court was required to do more than simply enter judgment. An alternative avenue for jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291, which governed appeals from final judgments of district courts. The district court's decision was not final under § 1291 for the same reasons the district court's decision was not final under § 158(d). Finally, the case did not meet the standards for an interlocutory appeal, and the district court did not certify its decision for interlocutory appeal. OUTCOME: The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. [HN1] . . . Remands requiring judicial functions by the bankruptcy court, for example additional fact-finding, are not final orders and, as such, are not appealable to the appellate court. An alternative avenue for jurisdiction in this case is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which [HN2] governs appeals from final judgments of district courts. The district court's decision is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for the same reasons the district court's decision is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). See In re Nichols, 21 F.3d at 692. Finally, this case does not meet the standards for an interlocutory appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and the district court did not certify its decision for interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
  • 45. Page 43 of 63 87. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court LACKS JURISDICTION to preside over Debtor Ladye M. Townsend’s Bankruptcy claims under the FIRST-TO-FILE Rule! 88. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that from the ONSET of Debtor Townsend’s Bankruptcy action, Creditor Newsome has REPEATEDLY CONTESTED this Bankruptcy Court’s Jurisdiction. 89. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge Edward Ellington’s 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen Case . . .(DOCKET No. 78) is MERELY a FRIVOLOUS Order and that NO “FINAL Judgment” has been entered! Thus, this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington have ERRED in advising Newsome to bring an APPEAL action. 90. The Record EVIDENCE will support that this Bankruptcy Court and/or Judge Edward Ellington DID KNOWINGLY advise Creditor Newsome to file an Appeal for purposes of UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY EXTORTING and/or EMBEZZLING monies (MASKED as Filing Fees) from Creditor Newsome. 91. The Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN that this Bankruptcy Court’s and/or Judge Edward Ellington’s 06/07/16 Order Denying Motion To Reopen. . .(DOCKET No. 78) is NOT a FINAL Judgment and any APPEAL on said Order and INSTRUCTIONS by this Court would be FRIVOLOUS and REJECTED due to the 06/07/16 INTERLOCUTORY Order! II. TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: Through this instant Bankruptcy action that Creditor Vogel Newsome does hereby TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY put this Court and Opposing Parties on NOTICE of the Constitutional Violations set forth above in this instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” as well as in Creditor Newsome’s PREVIOUS filings with this Bankruptcy Court! III. TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT UPON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: Through this instant Bankruptcy action that Creditor Vogel Newsome does hereby TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY put this Court and Opposing
  • 46. Page 44 of 63 Parties on NOTICE of the INFRINGEMENT UPON the Constitutional Rights of Creditor Newsome as set forth above in this instant “CVNOT06/07/16ORDER” as well as in Creditor Newsome’s PREVIOUS filings with this Bankruptcy Court! IV. REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF- INTERESTS Creditor Vogel Newsome request through this instant Bankruptcy action as well as INCORPORATES request(s) submitted in PREVIOUS filings with this Court to be advised of the CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS that appears to be present in this Court’s and/or Judge Edward Ellington’s handling of this case. V. REITERATION OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON Creditor Vogel Newsome REITERATES her DEMAND that this Bankruptcy Court’s Judge Edward Ellington IMMEDIATELY RECUSE himself from this Bankruptcy action. In support thereof, Creditor herein INCORPORATES the claims and defenses set forth in PREVIOUS Filings (as set forth in Docket Nos. 41, 52, 64, 67, 70, 73, and 77) as if set forth in full herein! PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Creditor Vogel Newsome IS CONFIDENT that INVESTIGATIONS in to Judge Edward Ellington’s handling of this Bankruptcy matter WILL SUSTAIN that CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS exist, thus, making him UNFIT/UNJUST and UNQUALIFIED to proceed as the Judge in this Bankruptcy Action. Furthermore, SUPPORTING WILLFUL, MALICIOUS and WANTON behavior by Judge Edward Ellington in his ZEALOUS efforts to fulfill his roles in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Vogel Denise Newsome on behalf of his LEGAL COUNSEL Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and, said Law Firm’s other PARTIES/CLIENTS with an interest in the outcome of this Bankruptcy Action.
  • 47. Page 45 of 63 The record evidence will support that this Court as well as Judge Edward Ellington has been TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY notified and requested to address the CONFLICT-OF- INTEREST PRESENT; however, has BLATANTLY refused in his QUEST and ZEAL to fulfill his ROLES in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome by him, his Legal Counsel and opposing counsel and their CLIENTS having in INTEREST in the outcome of this Bankruptcy Action. VI. NOTIFICATION TO THE PUBLIC and WORLD/FOREIGN LEADERS Creditor Newsome believes that the Record EVIDENCE will SUSTAIN the PUBLIC’s and/or the WORLD/FOREIGN Leaders’ INTEREST in the information that she shares through her Bankruptcy and/or Court pleadings and that said INTEREST(s) is sparked by EVIDENCE and the EXPOSURE of the CORRUPTION of the United States of America’s CORRUPT Judicial System and HOW it appears it is being CONTROLLED and MANIPULATED by the KLAN’S Law Firm of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz for purposes of PROMOTING its RACIALLY and DISCRIMINATORY practices against People-Of-Color as Creditor Newsome and/or NATIONS-OF- COLOR! WHETHER FILED or NOT (due to the CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES leveled against Creditor Newsome), this pleading WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE for PUBLIC viewing to the WORLD/FOREIGN Leaders due to the OVERWHELMING Domestic and International Interests in Creditor Vogel Newsome’s COMMUNITY Activist and/or CIVIL RIGHTS Activist work!
  • 48. Page 46 of 63 Creditor Vogel Newsome made it clear in the pleadings filed in this instant Bankruptcy action the GOAL of “TAKING DOWN” of the WHITE SUPREMACIST’s and JEW’s/ZIONIST’s WALL STREET! As this Court can see, OTHER Governments are PAYING attention as well as are WAKING UP and TAKING the NECESSARY PRECAUTIONARY steps to DUMP U.S. TREASURIES and RID THEMSELVES of TIES to the United States’ DESPOTISM Government Regime that is presently being CONTROLLED by WHITE SUPREMACIST Groups as the KU KLUX KLAN and JEWS/ZIONISTS!
  • 49. Page 47 of 63 LOOK at the United States’ MASSIVE DEBT and WHO they OWE!
  • 50. Page 48 of 63 LOOK at all of the MONEY GIVEN to the United States’ DESPOTISM Government Regime! MONEY Being USED To FINANCE The UNITED STATES’ TERRORIST Government Regime! NOT MUCH HAS CHANGED SINCE 2011 and it is GETTING WORSE! http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/debt-usa3norwayindiafrance
  • 51. Page 49 of 63 A QUESTION BEING PRESENTED TO THE PUBLIC/WORLD: HOW WERE SMALL WHITE SUPREMACISTS and JEWS/ZIONISTS GROUPS ALLOWED TO HIJACKTHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S GOVERNMENT And CREATE A CORPORATION UNDER WHICH IT IS ALLEGED TO BE OPERATING? While this appears to sound a little FAR FETCHED, Creditor Vogel Newsome looks forward to looking into the AUTHENTICITY of such allegations because, IF TRUE, the LEGAL and LAWFUL “OVERTHROW” of a DESPOTISM Government Regime will be INEVITABLE! For instance there are those who may not know: (1) That WASHINGTON, D.C. is NOT a part of the United States of America’s STATES! (2) Has NO Representtion in the United States Senate! Washington, D.C, which is MERELY a DISTRICT and on a SMALL Parcel of Land out of which it is alleged this FRAUDULENT and DECEPTIVE CORPORATION and its TERRORIST Counterparts are conducting BUSINESS!
  • 52. Page 50 of 63 HOW WERE SUCH SMALL TERRORIST GROUPS AS THIS DECEPTIVE CORPORATION WHOSE ALLEGED HEADQUARTERS IS THE UNITED STATES WHITE HOUSE AND ITS WHITE SUPREMACISTS and JEWISH/ZIONIST COUNTERPARTS WITH ALLEGED HEADQUARTERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM and ISRAEL ALLOWED TO GET CONTROL OF GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF PUSHING THEIR WHITE SUPREMACIST AND ZIONIST PERVERTED RELIGIOUS AGENDAS?
  • 54. Page 52 of 63 DID YOU KNOW THAT TO SERVE ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT YOU HAVE TO BE EITHER JEWISH OR CATHOLIC? HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL EXPLAIN THE “PERVERTED” DECISIONS HANDED DOWN FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT THAT CATER TO THEIR BELIEFS
  • 55. Page 53 of 63 AND THEN THE USE OF THE ZIONIST-CONTROLLED MEDIA NETWORKS TO FORCE THEIR LIFESTYLE AND BELIEFS DOWN THE THROATS OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE!
  • 57. Page 55 of 63 U.S. v. Jimenez Recio, 123 S.Ct. 819 (2003) - Essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act. Agreement to commit an unlawful act, which constitutes the essence of a conspiracy, is a distinct evil that may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. Id. Conspiracy poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crime, both because the combination in crime makes more likely the commission of other crimes and because it decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Id. DID YOU KNOW THAT WHEN SUCH PERVERSIONS AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES ARE ALLOWED TO GO UNPUNISH, THESE WHITE SUPREMACISTS AND ZIONISTS WILL CONTINUE ON THEIR “PATH OF CRIMINALITY” AND FRAME OTHERS FOR THEIR CRIMES WHILE USING THEIR MEDIA NETWORKS TO EXPLOIT AND MAGNIFY THEIR TERRORIST ACTS?
  • 58. Page 56 of 63 FOR INSTANCE, DID YOU KNOW THAT THE KLAN’S LAW FIRM BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ IS ALSO LEGAL COUNSEL TO THE UNITED STATES AND HAS AN OFFICE IN ORLANDO, FLORIDA?