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Myanmar:UNReportsEvidenceof
“GenocidalIntent”againstMinorities
Washington
August 27, 2018
In response to a United Nations fact finding mission report on Myanmar, which
recommends that the country’s army commander and other senior officers face trial in
an international court on possible charges of genocide against Rohingya Muslims and
crimes against humanity committed in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan States, Freedom
House released the following statement:
“The United Nations investigation of Myanmar confirms what has long been reported
about the gross human rights abuses by Myanmar’s military, which is conducting a
campaign of systematic violence against minority ethnic and religious groups, largely
with impunity,” said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House. “The
perpetrators of these crimes must be held accountable. It is past time for the United
Nations Security Council to ask the International Criminal Court to determine
responsibility and bring the wrong-doers to justice.”
Myanmar is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2018, Not Free in Freedom of the
Press 2017, and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2017.
Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization that supports democratic
change, monitors the status of freedom around the world, and advocates for democracy

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© 2018 Freedom House

FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
Highlights from Freedom House’s annual report on political rights and civil liberties

This report was made possible by the generous support of the Smith Richardson
Foundation and the Lilly Endowment. Freedom House also gratefully acknowledges the
contributions of the Reed Foundation, the Achelis & Bodman Foundation, David L. Fogel,
and additional private contributors who wish to remain anonymous.
Democracy in Crisis 1
Methodology 2
The United States in decline 3
Mugabe’s fall from power in Zimbabwe 4
Ethnic cleansing in Myanmar 5
Worst of the Worst 6
Turkey moves to ‘Not Free’ 7
International pressure helps end
decades of oppression in The Gambia 7
An Arab success story founders in Tunisia 8
Countries to Watch in 2018 9
Regional Trends 11
Freedom in the World 2018 Map 12
Freedom in the World 2018 Status Changes 18
Freedom in the World 2018 Trend Arrows 19
The following people were instrumental in the writing of this booklet: Elen Aghekyan, Rukmani Bhatia, Jen-
nifer Dunham, Shannon O’Toole, Arch Puddington, Sarah Repucci, Tyler Roylance, and Vanessa Tucker.
Freedom in the World 2018
Table of Contents
ON THE COVER
Cover image by KAL.
This booklet is a summary of findings for the 2018 edition of Freedom in the World. The complete
analysis including narrative reports on all countries and territories can be found on our website at
www.freedomhouse.org.

Democracy in Crisis
Democracy is in crisis. The values it embodies—par-
ticularly the right to choose leaders in free and fair
elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law—
are under assault and in retreat globally.
A quarter-century ago, at the end of the Cold War,
it appeared that totalitarianism had at last been
vanquished and liberal democracy had won the great
ideological battle of the 20th century.
Today, it is democracy that finds itself battered and
weakened. For the 12th consecutive year, according
to Freedom in the World, countries that suffered dem-
ocratic setbacks outnumbered those that registered
gains. States that a decade ago seemed like promising
success stories—Turkey and Hungary, for exam-
ple—are sliding into authoritarian rule. The military in
Myanmar, which began a limited democratic opening
in 2010, executed a shocking campaign of ethnic
cleansing in 2017 and rebuffed international criticism
of its actions. Meanwhile, the world’s most power-
ful democracies are mired in seemingly intractable
problems at home, including social and economic
disparities, partisan fragmentation, terrorist attacks,
and an influx of refugees that has strained alliances
and increased fears of the “other.”
The challenges within democratic states have fueled
the rise of populist leaders who appeal to anti-immi-
grant sentiment and give short shrift to fundamental
civil and political liberties. Right-wing populists gained
votes and parliamentary seats in France, the Nether-
lands, Germany, and Austria during 2017. While they
were kept out of government in all but Austria, their
success at the polls helped to weaken established
parties on both the right and left. Centrist newcomer
Emmanuel Macron handily won the French presiden-
cy, but in Germany and the Netherlands, mainstream
parties struggled to create stable governing coalitions.
Perhaps worst of all, and most worrisome for the future,
young people, who have little memory of the long strug-
gles against fascism and communism, may be losing
faith and interest in the democratic project. The very
idea of democracy and its promotion has been tarnished
among many, contributing to a dangerous apathy.
The retreat of democracies is troubling enough. Yet
at the same time, the world’s leading autocracies,
China and Russia, have seized the opportunity not
only to step up internal repression but also to export
their malign influence to other countries, which are
increasingly copying their behavior and adopting their
disdain for democracy. A confident Chinese president
Xi Jinping recently proclaimed that China is “blazing
a new trail” for developing countries to follow. It is a
path that includes politicized courts, intolerance for
dissent, and predetermined elections.
The spread of antidemocratic practices around the
by Michael J. Abramowitz
Political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to
their lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period
characterized by emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies,
and the United States’ withdrawal from its leadership role in the global
struggle for human freedom.
1www.freedomhouse.org
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018

world is not merely a setback for fundamental free-
doms. It poses economic and security risks. When
more countries are free, all countries—including the
United States—are safer and more prosperous. When
more countries are autocratic and repressive, treaties
and alliances crumble, nations and entire regions
become unstable, and violent extremists have greater
room to operate.
Democratic governments allow people to help set the
rules to which all must adhere, and have a say in the
direction of their lives and work. This fosters a broader
respect for peace, fair play, and compromise. Auto-
crats impose arbitrary rules on their citizens while
ignoring all constraints themselves, spurring a vicious
circle of abuse and radicalization.
The United States accelerates its
withdrawal from the democracy struggle
A long list of troubling developments around the world
contributed to the global decline in 2017, but perhaps
most striking was the accelerating withdrawal of the
United States from its historical commitment to promot-
ing and supporting democracy. The potent challenge
from authoritarian regimes made the United States’
abdication of its traditional role all the more important.
Despite the U.S. government’s mistakes—and there
Freedom in the World 2018 evaluates the state of
freedom in 195 countries and 14 territories during
calendar year 2017. Each country and territory is
assigned between 0 and 4 points on a series of
25 indicators, for an aggregate score of up to 100.
These scores are used to determine two numerical
ratings, for political rights and civil liberties, with a
rating of 1 representing the most free conditions
and 7 the least free. A country or territory’s politi-
cal rights and civil liberties ratings then determine
whether it has an overall status of Free, Partly Free,
or Not Free.
Freedom in the World methodology
The methodology, which is derived from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is applied
to all countries and territories, irrespective of geo-
graphic location, ethnic or religious composition,
or level of economic development.
Freedom in the World assesses the real-world
rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather
than governments or government performance
per se. Political rights and civil liberties can be
affected by both state and nonstate actors, includ-
ing insurgents and other armed groups.
For complete information on the methodology, visit https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018/methodology.
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
2
PULATION
6%
66%
ASIA-PACIFIC: STATUS BY POPULATION
21%
33%
46%
EUROPE: STATUS BY POPULATION
12%
86%
CA:
ION
WORLD: STATUS BY POPULATION
UNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STATUS BY COUNTRY EUROPE: STATUS BY COUNTRY
CA:
Y
WORLD: STATUS BY COUNTRY
Total population
7.4billion
opulation
billion
ation
on
Total population
4.1billion
Total population
618.1million
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
40%
22%
38%
2%
85%
13%
2%
es
Total
countries
39
Total
countries
42
GLOBAL: STATUS BY POPULATION
42%
6%
28%
66%
21%
33%
46% 12%
ATION
22%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
STATUS BY POPULATION
39%
43%
18%
25%
30%
45%
AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STATUS BY COUNTRY EUROPE:
RY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
STATUS BY COUNTRY
Total population
7.4billion
Total population
1.02billion
n
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
Total
countries
35
Total
countries
39
Total
countries
49
Total
countries
195
GLOBAL: STATUS BY COUNTRYFREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE

Freedom House has tracked a slow decline in po-
litical rights and civil liberties in the United States
for the past seven years. Prominent concerns
have included the influence of money in politics,
legislative dysfunction, and severe inequalities in
the criminal justice system.
In 2017, however, the deterioration accelerated. The
United States lost three points on the 100-point
scale used by Freedom in the World due to:
• growing evidence of Russian interference in the
2016 election campaign and a lack of action by
the Trump administration to prevent a reoccur-
rence of such meddling;
• violations of basic ethical standards by the new
administration, including the president’s failure
to divest himself of his business empire, his
hiring of family members as senior advisers, and
his appointment of cabinet members and other
senior officials despite apparent conflicts of
interest; and
• a reduction in government transparency, includ-
ing an unusual pattern of false statements by the
administration, the president’s failure to disclose
basic information such as his personal tax data,
policy and other decisions made without mean-
ingful input from relevant agencies and officials,
and the removal of information on issues of
public interest from government websites for
political or ideological reasons.
The United States now receives a score of 86 out
of 100 points. While this places it below other
major democracies such as France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom, it is still firmly in the Free
category. Nevertheless, a three-point decline in a
single year is rare for an established democracy.
In particular, Freedom House is closely watching
President Trump’s verbal attacks on the press and
their potential impact on the public’s access to
free and independent news media.
The United States in decline
have been many—the American people and their
leaders have generally understood that standing up
for the rights of others is both a moral imperative and
beneficial to themselves. But two long wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq and a global recession soured the
public on extensive international engagement, and
the perceived link between democracy promotion on
the one hand and military interventions and financial
costs on the other has had a lasting impact.
The Obama administration continued to defend
democratic ideals in its foreign policy statements,
but its actions often fell short, reflecting a reduced
estimation of the United States’ ability to influence
world events and of the American public’s willingness
to back such efforts.
In 2017, however, the Trump administration made
explicit—in both words and actions—its intention to
cast off principles that have guided U.S. policy and
formed the basis for American leadership over the
past seven decades.
President Trump’s “America First” slogan, originally
coined by isolationists seeking to block U.S. involve-
ment in the war against fascism, targeted traditional
notions of collective global security and mutually
beneficial trade. The administration’s hostility and
skepticism toward binding international agreements
on the environment, arms control, and other topics
confirmed that a reorientation was taking shape.
Even when he chose to acknowledge America’s treaty
alliances with fellow democracies, the president
spoke of cultural or civilizational ties rather than
shared recognition of universal rights; his trips abroad
rarely featured any mention of the word “democracy.”
Indeed, the American leader expressed feelings of
admiration and even personal friendship for some of
the world’s most loathsome strongmen and dictators.
This marks a sharp break from other U.S. presidents
in the postwar period, who cooperated with certain
authoritarian regimes for strategic reasons but never
wavered from a commitment to democracy as the
best form of government and the animating force
behind American foreign policy. It also reflects an
inability—or unwillingness—by the United States to
lead democracies in effectively confronting the grow-
ing threat from Russia and China, and from the other
states that have come to emulate their authoritarian
approach.
www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom House
3

Democratic norms erode within
the United States
The past year brought further, faster erosion of Ameri-
ca’s own democratic standards than at any other time
in memory, damaging its international credibility as a
champion of good governance and human rights.
The United States has experienced a series of set-
backs in the conduct of elections and criminal justice
over the past decade—under leadership from both
major political parties—but in 2017 its core institu-
tions were attacked by an administration that rejects
established norms of ethical conduct across many
fields of activity. President Trump himself has mingled
the concerns of his business empire with his role as
president, appointed family members to his senior
staff, filled other high positions with lobbyists and rep-
resentatives of special interests, and refused to abide
by disclosure and transparency practices observed by
his predecessors.
The president has also lambasted and threatened
the media—including sharp jabs at individual jour-
nalists—for challenging his routinely false state-
ments, spoken disdainfully of judges who blocked his
decisions, and attacked the professional staff of law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. He signals
contempt for Muslims and Latin American immigrants
and singles out some African Americans for vitriolic
criticism. He pardoned a sheriff convicted of ignoring
federal court orders to halt racially discriminatory pol-
icies and issued an executive order restricting travel
to the United States from a group of Muslim-majority
countries after making a campaign promise to ban all
foreign Muslims from the United States. And at a time
when millions around the world have been forced to
FREEDOM IN THE BALANCE
After years of major gains, the share of Free countries has declined over the past decade, while the share of Not Free countries has risen.
PercentageofCountries
0
10
20
30
40
50
1987 1997 2007 2017
34.5% 34.5%
31.0%
42.4%
30.4%
27.2%
46.6%
31.1%
22.3%
45.1%
29.8%
25.1%
The process by which elected president Robert
Mugabe was compelled to resign in November un-
der pressure from the military pushed Zimbabwe
over the threshold from Partly Free to Not Free in
Freedom in the World 2018. This downgrade may
seem counterintuitive given Mugabe’s long and
often harsh rule, the sudden termination of which
prompted celebration in the streets. But it was
the regime’s years of repression of the opposition,
the media, and civil society, and its high levels of
corruption and disregard for the rule of law, that
placed Zimbabwe at the tipping point between
Not Free and Partly Free prior to 2017.
The next year will be crucial for Zimbabwe, as
general elections are expected. It remains to be
seen whether newly installed president Emmerson
Mnangagwa—a stalwart of the ruling party—is
prepared make much-needed reforms that would
enable free elections, or will simply retain the
uneven playing field that had allowed Mugabe to
remain in power since 1980.
Mugabe’s fall from power in Zimbabwe
FREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
4

flee war, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing, President
Trump moved to implement major reductions in the
number of legal immigrants and refugees that the
United States would accept.
The president’s behavior stems in part from a frus-
tration with the country’s democratic checks and
balances, including the independent courts, a coequal
legislative branch, the free press, and an active civil
society. These institutions remained fairly resilient in
2017, but the administration’s statements and actions
could ultimately leave them weakened, with serious
consequences for the health of U.S. democracy and
America’s role in the world.
China and Russia expand their
antidemocratic influence
While the United States and other democratic pow-
ers grappled with domestic problems and argued
about foreign policy priorities, the world’s leading
autocracies—Russia and China—continued to make
headway. Moscow and Beijing are single-minded in
their identification of democracy as a threat to their
oppressive regimes, and they work relentlessly, with
increasing sophistication, to undermine its institu-
tions and cripple its principal advocates.
The eventual outcome of these trends, if unchecked,
is obvious. The replacement of global democratic
norms with authoritarian practices will mean more
elections in which the incumbent’s victory is a foregone
conclusion. It will mean a media landscape dominat-
ed by propaganda mouthpieces that marginalize the
opposition while presenting the leader as omniscient,
strong, and devoted to national aggrandizement. It will
mean state control over the internet and social media
through both censorship and active manipulation that
promotes the regime’s message while confusing users
with lies and fakery. And it will mean more corruption,
injustice, and impunity for state abuses.
Already, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has carried out disin-
formation campaigns before elections in countries
including the United States, France, and Germany,
cultivated ties to xenophobic political parties across
Europe, threatened or invaded its closest neighbors,
and served as an alternative source of military aid for
Middle Eastern dictatorships. Its chief goal is to disrupt
democratic states and fracture the institutions—such
as the European Union—that bind them together.
Beijing has even greater ambitions—and the resourc-
es to achieve them. It has built up a propaganda and
censorship apparatus with global reach, used eco-
nomic and other ties to influence democracies like
Australia and New Zealand, compelled various coun-
tries to repatriate Chinese citizens seeking refuge
abroad, and provided diplomatic and material support
to repressive governments from Southeast Asia to
Africa. Moscow often plays the role of spoiler, bolster-
ing its position by undercutting its adversaries, but the
scope and depth of Beijing’s activities show that the
Chinese regime aspires to truly global leadership.
Corrupt and repressive states threaten
global stability
The past year provided ample evidence that undemo-
cratic rule itself can be catastrophic for regional and
global stability, with or without active interference
from major powers like Russia and China.
Myanmar has a long history of persecuting the Ro-
hingya, a mostly Muslim community of more than
a million people living in western Rakhine State. In
August 2017, the military reacted to attacks from
a small armed faction of the Rohingya by launch-
ing a violent campaign against civilians that many
in the international community have described
as ethnic cleansing. Over 600,000 Rohingya have
sought refuge in neighboring Bangladesh, report-
ing widespread arson, rape, and mass murder by
military personnel.
These horrific events underscored how far Myan-
mar still is from becoming a democracy. In 2015,
voters elected a civilian leadership after decades
of military rule. However, under a hybrid politi-
cal system created by the outgoing regime, the
military retains immense power and autonomy. It
continues to use brutal tactics to fight multiple
ethnic insurgencies, and its campaign in Rakhine
State is supported by radical Buddhist leaders
who portray the Rohingya as a menace to national
unity and security.
Ethnic cleansing in Myanmar
Freedom House
5

FREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE
LARGEST ONE-YEAR GAINS AND DECLINES IN 2017
Note: This chart
shows aggregate
score changes
of 3 or more points.
Worst of the Worst
Country Aggregate score
Syria -1
South Sudan 2
Eritrea 3
North Korea 3
Of the 49 countries designated as Not Free, the
following 12 have the worst aggregate scores for
political rights and civil liberties.
Country Aggregate score
Turkmenistan 4
Equatorial Guinea 7
Saudi Arabia 7
Somalia 7
Uzbekistan 7
Sudan 8
Central African Republic 9
Libya 9
Ecuador
Nepal
Iraq
Timor-Leste
Uzbekistan
The Gambia
-8
-6
-6
-6
-4
-4
-4
-4
-4
-3
-10 -5 0 +5 +10 +15 +20 +25
-9
-3
Gains in aggregate score reflect improvements in conditions for political rights and civil liberties.
Gain or Decline in Aggregate Score
+3
+4
+4
+3
+4
+21
Gabon
Tunisia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Tanzania
Turkey
Maldives
Hungary
Libya
Malta
Poland
Venezuela
Burkina Faso
Kenya
Mexico
Nicaragua
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
United Arab Emirates
United States
-3
-3
-5
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
6

Turkey’s passage over the threshold from Partly
Free to Not Free is the culmination of a long and
accelerating slide in Freedom in the World. The
country’s score has been in free fall since 2014
due to an escalating series of assaults on the
press, social media users, protesters, political
parties, the judiciary, and the electoral system, as
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan fights to impose
personalized control over the state and society
in a deteriorating domestic and regional security
environment.
Erdoğan has pushed out his rivals and former
allies within the ruling party, reshaped media
ownership to fit his needs, and rammed through
an unpopular constitutional referendum to create
a “super-presidential” system without meaningful
checks and balances. His response to the July
2016 coup attempt has become a sprawling witch
hunt, resulting in the arrest of some 60,000 peo-
ple, the closure of over 160 media outlets, and the
imprisonment of over 150 journalists. The leaders
of the third-largest party in the parliament are in
prison, and nearly 100 mayors across the country
have been replaced through emergency measures
or political pressure from the president. The gov-
ernment has even pressed its crackdown beyond
Turkey’s borders, triggering a flood of Interpol “red
notice” requests to detain critics abroad, among
other effects.
Turkey moves to ‘Not Free’
The Gambia secured one of the largest-ever
improvements in Freedom in the World for 2017,
registering a 21-point score increase and mov-
ing from Not Free to Partly Free. For more than
two decades, the country had suffered under
the oppressive rule of President Yahya Jammeh,
who first took power in a military coup. Under
his regime, government opponents, independent
journalists, and rights activists faced intimidation,
arbitrary arrest, torture, and forced disappearance.
Although the country’s past elections had been
marred by violence and rigging, the December
2016 presidential vote resulted in a surprise
victory for opposition candidate Adama Barrow.
For weeks, Jammeh refused to concede, but he
relented after the regional body ECOWAS sent
in troops in January 2017. While much-needed
institutional reforms still lie ahead, fundamental
freedoms have improved under Barrow’s govern-
ment, and successful legislative elections were
held in April. Among other positive developments,
exiled journalists and activists returned, political
prisoners were released, ministers declared their
assets to an ombudsman, the press union began
work on media-sector reform, and arrest warrants
were issued for suspects in the 2004 murder of
journalist Deyda Hydara.
The year’s developments illustrated the decisive
value of robust and well-timed international sup-
port for democratic transitions, though long-term
advice and incentives will be necessary to ensure
that good governance takes root.
International pressure helps end decades of oppression in The Gambia
In Myanmar, the politically dominant military conduct-
ed a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the
Muslim Rohingya minority, enabled by diplomatic cover
from China and an impotent response from the rest
of the international community. Some 600,000 people
have been pushed out, while thousands of others are
thought to have been killed. The refugees have strained
the resources of an already fragile Bangladesh, and
Islamist militants have sought to adopt the Rohingya
cause as a new rallying point for violent struggle.
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan broadened
and intensified the crackdown on his perceived
opponents that began after a failed 2016 coup
attempt. In addition to its dire consequences for
detained Turkish citizens, shuttered media out-
lets, and seized businesses, the chaotic purge has
become intertwined with an offensive against the
Kurdish minority, which in turn has fueled Turkey’s
diplomatic and military interventions in neighboring
Syria and Iraq.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, authoritarian rulers in
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt
Freedom House
7

asserted their interests in reckless ways that per-
petuated long-running conflicts in Libya and Yemen
and initiated a sudden attempt to blockade Qatar, a
hub of international trade and transportation. Their
similarly repressive archrival, Iran, played its own part
in the region’s conflicts, overseeing militia networks
that stretched from Lebanon to Afghanistan. Prom-
ises of reform from a powerful new crown prince in
Saudi Arabia added an unexpected variable in a region
that has long resisted greater openness, though his
nascent social and economic changes were accom-
panied by hundreds of arbitrary arrests and aggressive
moves against potential rivals, and he showed no
inclination to open the political system.
30
40
50
60
70
NumberofCountries
59 59
60
67
49
54
63
54
62
72
56
43
38
34 34
37
43
40
33
43
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
80
2016
67
36
71
35
2017
12 YEARS OF DECLINE
Countries with net declines in aggregate score have outnumbered those with gains for each of the past 12 years.
DECLINEDIMPROVED
Sharp democratic declines in Tunisia in 2017
threatened to downgrade the only country in the
Arab world with a status of Free. Following the oust-
er of its longtime dictator in 2011, which launched
the Arab Spring, Tunisian political factions and civil
society worked together to draft a democratic con-
stitution and hold free elections, moving the coun-
try from Not Free to Free in just four years. However,
the events of the past year indicate that while the
international community was quick to praise the
country’s achievements, it did not provide enough
sustained support and attention. Without careful
development and consolidation, the new democra-
cy may not withstand pressure from a resurgent old
guard that was never fully dismantled.
Looming problems in 2017 included the continued
postponement of subnational elections, the ability
of power brokers from the old regime to protect
their interests through new legislation, failure to
create and fully fund independent bodies called for
in the constitution, executive domination of the
legislature, and intimidation of the media. If Tunisia
continues on its current path, the hard-won gains
of 2011 could disappear, and democracy will lose
its foothold in a repressive and unstable region.
An Arab success story founders in Tunisia
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
8

The humanitarian crisis produced in Venezuela by
President Nicolás Maduro’s determination to stay in
power continued to drive residents to seek refuge
in neighboring countries. But other Latin American
states also proved problematic: Brazil’s sprawling
corruption investigations implicated leaders across
the region. Mexico’s embattled administration resisted
reforms that would help address rampant graft, orga-
nized crime, and a crumbling justice system.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, incum-
bent rulers’ ongoing use of violence to flout term limits
helped to generate internal displacement and refugees. A
deeply flawed electoral process in Kenya contributed to
political violence there, while South Sudan’s leaders chose
to press on with a bloody civil war rather than make peace
and face a long-overdue reckoning with voters.
North Korea presented one of the most glaring threats
to world peace, aggressively building up its nuclear
arsenal in an attempt to fortify an exceptionally op-
pressive and criminal regime.
Freedom in one country
depends on freedom for all
Democracies generally remain the world’s wealthiest so-
The following countries are among those that may be approaching important turning points in their demo-
cratic trajectory, and deserve special scrutiny during the coming year.
Countries to Watch in 2018
• Afghanistan: Opposition alliances are crys-
tallizing ahead of long-overdue parliamentary
elections, but preparations for the polls have
been lacking, and it is uncertain whether they
will be held as planned in 2018.
• Angola: Newly elected president João Lou-
renço moved to weaken the control of his pre-
decessor’s family in 2017, but it remains to be
seen whether he will make a serious effort to
stem endemic corruption or ease restrictions
on politics, the media, and civil society.
• Georgia: The ruling Georgian Dream party re-
cently pushed through constitutional amend-
ments that—combined with the financial
backing of its reclusive billionaire patron—will
make an effective challenge by the fractured
opposition in future elections even more un-
likely, potentially cementing the party’s control
for years to come.
• Iraq: Improved security has helped create
space for competition among newly registered
parties and candidates ahead of the 2018
elections, which will test the resilience of the
country’s political system.
• Macedonia: A democratically elected, ethni-
cally inclusive government is seeking to root
out corruption and other systemic abuses that
grew worse under its scandal-plagued prede-
cessor, and it could even resolve the lingering
“name dispute” with Greece that has impeded
the country’s path toward EU membership.
• Mexico: The July 2018 general elections will
serve as a referendum on an administration
that has failed to curb rampant violence and
corruption, and has become increasingly
hostile toward independent media and civil
society activists.
• Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman’s controversial reform program is likely
to cause even more upheaval in Saudi govern-
ment and society, as small gains in social free-
doms and attempts to attract foreign investors
go hand in hand with attempts to quash
dissent and fight off perceived opponents.
• South Africa: Under a new leadership elected in
December, the ruling African National Congress
will be under pressure to clean up its image—
which has been sullied by corrupt former party
leader and current national president Jacob
Zuma—ahead of general elections in 2019.
• United States: The media and the judiciary—
both of which have a long history of indepen-
dence—face acute pressure from the Trump
administration, whose smears threaten to
undermine their legitimacy.
• Uzbekistan: The new government has taken
tentative steps toward greater openness and
international engagement, but lasting change
in one of the world’s most repressive political
systems will require sustained international
attention as well as support for independent
voices in the country’s media and civil society.
Freedom House
9

cieties, the most open to new ideas and opportunities,
the least corrupt, and the most protective of individual
liberties. When people around the globe are asked
about their preferred political conditions, they embrace
democracy’s ideals: honest elections, free speech,
accountable government, and effective legal constraints
on the police, military, and other institutions of authority.
In the 21st century, however, it is increasingly difficult
to create and sustain these conditions in one country
while ignoring them in another. The autocratic regimes
in Russia and China clearly recognize that to maintain
power at home, they must squelch open debate, pursue
dissidents, and compromise rules-based institutions be-
LARGEST 10-YEAR DECLINES
-35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
yond their borders. The citizens and leaders of democ-
racies must now recognize that the reverse is also true:
To maintain their own freedoms, they must defend the
rights of their counterparts in all countries. The reality of
globalization is that our fates are interlinked.
In August 1968, when Soviet tanks entered Czecho-
slovakia to put down the Prague Spring, a small group
of dissidents gathered in Red Square in Moscow and
unfurled a banner that read, “For your freedom and
ours.” Almost 50 years later, it is this spirit of transna-
tional democratic solidarity and defiance in the face of
autocracy that we must summon and revive.
Dramatic declines in freedom have been observed in every region of the world.
Decline in Aggregate Score
Turkey
Central African Rep.
Mali
Burundi
Bahrain
Mauritania
Ethiopia
Venezuela
Yemen
Hungary
Nicaragua
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan
Honduras
Gabon
Dominican Republic
Nauru
Russia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Mexico
Niger
Rwanda
Ukraine
Eritrea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Kuwait
Liechtenstein
Syria
-31
-28
-27
-25
-22
-21
-21
-21
-20
-19
-17
-12
-12
-11
-34
-20
-15
-14
-13
-11
-11
-10
-10
-10
-11
-11
-10
-10
-10
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
10

Regional Trends
Americas
Gains and declines show value of electoral turnover
FREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE
Despite the decline in democracy worldwide in
2017—and Venezuela’s continued descent into dicta-
torship and humanitarian crisis—the Americas region
displayed some signs of resilience.
Under new president Lenín Moreno, Ecuador turned
away from the personalized and often repressive rule
of his predecessor, Rafael Correa. Moreno has eased
pressure on the media, promoted greater engagement
with civil society, proposed the restoration of term lim-
its, and supported anticorruption efforts, including a
case against his own vice president. Moreno had been
Correa’s chosen successor, but his unexpectedly re-
formist stance once again demonstrated the potential
for regular elections and transfers of power to disrupt
authoritarian entrenchment.
Meanwhile, under a new administration that took
office in late 2015, Argentines benefited from a freer
press as part of the country’s recovery from the
authoritarian tendencies of former president Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner. In Colombia, more citizens
could enjoy basic due process rights as the govern-
ment implemented reforms to limit pretrial detention
and continued to expand its territorial control under a
2016 peace agreement with left-wing rebels.
Nevertheless, declines outpaced gains in the re-
gion as a whole in 2017. In Honduras, after an
early presidential vote count favored the opposition
candidate, a belatedly updated total handed victory
to the incumbent, prompting protests, curfews, and
calls for a new election. In Bolivia, the constitutional
court—which had been elected through a highly
politicized process—struck down term limits that
would have prevented incumbent leader Evo Morales
from seeking reelection. Voters had rejected the lifting
of term limits in a 2016 referendum, and international
observers called the court’s reasoning a distortion of
human rights law.
Nicaragua carried out deeply flawed municipal
elections that favored the party of President Daniel
EURASIA: STATUS BY POPULATION
58%
42%
AMERICAS: STATUS BY POPULATION
6%
28%
66%
ASIA-PACIFIC: STAT
21%
33%
MIDDLE EAST: STATUS BY POPULATION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
WORLD: ST
EURASIA: STATUS BY COUNTRY AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STAT
ToTotal population
1.02billion
Total population
424.8million
Total population
286.7million
Total population
992.3million
Total po
4.1b
11%
5%
79%
21%
4%
27%
69%
40%
22%
38%
Total
countries
12
Total
countries
35
T
cou
AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY
58%
42%
6%
28%
66%
ASIA-PACIFIC: STATU
21%
33%
WORLD: STA
EURASIA: STATUS BY COUNTRY AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STATU
TotTotal population
1.02billion
Total population
424.8million
Total population
286.7million
Total population
992.3million
Total pop
4.1bi
11%
5%
79%
21%
4%
27%
69%
40%
22%
38%
Total
countries
12
Total
countries
35
To
cou
3
Freedom House
11

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018
FREE PARTLY FREE NOT FREE
12

Status Countries
FREE 88
PARTLY FREE 58
NOT FREE 49
Total 195
Freedom in the World 2018 assessed 195 countries
around the globe.
www.freedomhouse.org 13

OPULATION
42%
6%
28%
66%
21%
33%
46%
S BY POPULATION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
COUNTRY AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STATUS BY COUNTRY
Total population
7.4billion
Total population
1.02billion
opulation
million
pulation
million
Total population
992.3million
Total population
4.1billion
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
4%
27%
69%
40%
22%
38%
tal
tries
2
Total
countries
35
Total
countries
39
PULATION
42%
6%
28%
66%
21%
33%
46%
BY POPULATION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
UNTRY AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STATUS BY COUNTRY
Total population
7.4billion
Total population
1.02billion
pulation
million
ulation
illion
Total population
992.3million
Total population
4.1billion
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
4%
27%
69%
40%
22%
38%
al
ries
Total
countries
35
Total
countries
39
ASIA-PACIFIC: STATUS BY COUNTRY
Ortega, and the government enacted judicial reforms
that further centralized state authority and shifted
power from juries to judges. Separately, Mexico was
shaken by new revelations of extensive state surveil-
lance aimed at journalists and civil society activists
who threatened to expose government corruption and
other wrongdoing.
Asia-Pacific
Antidemocratic forces
on the march
Repressive regimes in Asia continued to consolidate
their power in 2017, while marginalized communities
faced dire new threats.
Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen oversaw a deci-
sive crackdown on the country’s beleaguered opposi-
tion and press corps as his Cambodian People’s Party
prepared for national elections in 2018. The politicized
Supreme Court dissolved the opposition Cambodia
National Rescue Party, and party leader Kem Sokha
was charged with treason. In a series of blows to free
expression, the authorities shuttered the independent
Cambodia Daily, pushed several radio stations off
the air, and announced that sharing criticism of the
government on social media was a crime.
The Communist Party leadership in Beijing exercised
ever-greater influence in Hong Kong as it attempted
to stamp out growing public support for local self-de-
termination. Four prodemocracy lawmakers were
expelled from the legislature on the grounds that their
oaths of office were “insincere,” making it easier for
progovernment forces to pass major legislation and
rules changes. In addition, the government obtained
harsher sentences against three prominent protest
leaders, and the Chinese legislature annexed a law
criminalizing disrespect of the national anthem—
which is often booed by Hong Kong soccer fans—to
the territory’s Basic Law, effectively compelling the
local legislature to draft a matching measure.
In Myanmar, the military’s brutal campaign of rape,
mutilation, and slaughter aimed at the Rohingya
minority forced over 600,000 Rohingya to flee the
country. The crisis, and the civilian leadership’s failure
to stop it, underscored severe flaws in the country’s
hybrid political system, which grants the military enor-
mous autonomy and political power.
The Maldives suffered from acute pressure on
freedom of speech and dissent in 2017. The murder
of prominent liberal blogger Yameen Rasheed had
a chilling effect, encouraging people to self-censor
rather than speak out against religious extremism.
Moreover, the military was used to block opposition
efforts to remove the speaker of parliament, and a
number of lawmakers were ousted for defecting from
the ruling party.
In a bright spot for the region, Timor-Leste, one of the
poorest nations in Southeast Asia, conducted fair
elections that led to a smooth transfer of power. The
process helped to consolidate democratic develop-
ment in the country and allowed new parties and
younger politicians to gain seats in the parliament.
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
14

FREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE
Eurasia
Some doors open
as others close
Observers have long speculated about the problems
and opportunities posed by presidential succession
in Central Asia, where a number of entrenched rulers
have held office for decades. In Uzbekistan, specu-
lation turned into cautious optimism in 2017, as the
country’s new administration—formed following the
2016 death of longtime president Islam Karimov—
took steps toward reform. Among other moves, the
government ended forced labor in the annual cotton
harvest for some segments of the population, and
announced plans to lift the draconian exit-visa regime
and make the national currency fully convertible. The
new administration has also granted more breathing
room to civil society; some local groups reported a
decrease in state harassment, and a Human Rights
Watch delegation was allowed to enter Uzbekistan for
the first time since 2010.
In other parts of the region, however, governments
sought to stave off change. In Armenia and Kyrgyz-
stan, heavily flawed voting highlighted the continuing
erosion of democratic norms surrounding elections.
The dominant parties in both countries relied on
harassment of the opposition, voter intimidation,
and misuse of administrative resources to maintain a
grip on power. In Armenia’s case, the blatant electoral
misconduct stands at odds with the country’s pursuit
of a closer relationship with the European Union,
with which it signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced
Partnership Agreement in November.
Perhaps the most alarming threats to democracy
in the region involved authoritarian forces reaching
across borders to punish their critics. Exiled Azer-
baijani journalist Afgan Mukhtarli was kidnapped in
Tbilisi by men who allegedly spoke Georgian, then
transported across the border to Azerbaijan, raising
concerns that Georgian authorities were complicit
in the abduction. In Ukraine, a prominent Chechen
couple who were fierce opponents of Vladimir Putin
and supported Ukraine in the Donbas conflict fell
victim to an assassination attempt that killed one and
injured the other. Numerous plots against politicians
were also reported during the year, with Ukrainian au-
thorities mostly pointing the finger at Russian security
services.
Europe
Right-wing populists win seats
and reject democratic values
Reverberations from the 2015–16 refugee crisis con-
tinued to fuel the rise of xenophobic, far-right parties,
which gained ground in elections in France, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Austria.
Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s far-right National
Front, defeated mainstream presidential candidates
with her pledges to suspend immigration and hold
a referendum on France’s EU membership, though
she lost in the second round to centrist newcomer
Emmanuel Macron. The Euroskeptic, anti-immigrant
Alternative for Germany became the first far-right
58%
42%
6%
28%
66%
ASIA-PACIFIC: STATU
21%
33%
WORLD: STA
EURASIA: STATUS BY COUNTRY AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STATU
TotTotal population
1.02billion
Total population
424.8million
Total population
286.7million
Total population
992.3million
Total pop
4.1bi
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
79%
21%
4%
27%
69%
40%
22%
38%
Total
countries
12
Total
countries
35
To
coun
3
EURASIA: STATUS BY COUNTRY
58%
42%
6%
28%
66%
ASIA-PACIFIC: STA
21%
33%
WORLD: S
EURASIA: STATUS BY COUNTRY AMERICAS: STATUS BY COUNTRY ASIA-PACIFIC: STA
TTotal population
1.02billion
Total population
424.8million
Total population
286.7million
Total population
992.3million
Total p
4.1
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
79%
21%
4%
27%
69%
40%
22%
38%
Total
countries
12
Total
countries
35
co
Freedom House
15

FREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE
BY POPULATION
46%
12%
86%
US BY POPULATION
BY COUNTRY EUROPE: STATUS BY COUNTRY
l population
7.4billion
ulation
ion
Total population
618.1million
2%
85%
13%
2%
tal
tries
9
Total
countries
42
Y POPULATION
46%
12%
86%
S BY POPULATION
Y COUNTRY EUROPE: STATUS BY COUNTRY
population
.4billion
ulation
on
Total population
618.1million
2%
85%
13%
2%
al
ries
9
Total
countries
42
EUROPE: STATUS BY COUNTRY
party to enter Germany’s legislature since 1945,
following a campaign in which its leaders demanded
the deportation of “large numbers of refugees” and
characterized Islam as incompatible with German
identity. In Austria, the similarly Islamophobic Free-
dom Party finished third in parliamentary elections
and entered a governing coalition headed by the
conservative People’s Party. In the Netherlands, the
notoriously xenophobic Party for Freedom chipped
away enough support from mainstream parties to
finish second, becoming the parliament’s primary
opposition group.
In Hungary and Poland, populist leaders continued to
consolidate power by uprooting democratic institu-
tions and intimidating critics in civil society. Smears
of the opposition appeared in public media in both
countries, and both passed laws designed to curb the
activities of nongovernmental organizations. Poland’s
ruling party also pressed ahead with an effort to assert
political control over the judiciary, adopting laws that
will affect the Supreme Court, the local courts, and a
council responsible for judicial appointments.
Events in the Western Balkans demonstrated a need
for continued engagement in the region by major
democracies. In Macedonia, mediation by Washington
and Brussels helped resolve a years-long political cri-
sis, paving the way for a new, democratically elected
government. But in Serbia, EU leaders’ tolerance of
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s authoritarian ten-
dencies allowed him to further sideline the opposition
and undermine what remains of the independent
media after winning the country’s presidency in April.
Middle East and North Africa
Authoritarian rule and
instability reinforce one another
In a region ravaged by war and dictatorship, Tunisia
has stood out for its successful transition to demo-
cratic rule after hosting the first Arab Spring uprising
in 2011. In 2017, however, earlier signs of backsliding
became far clearer: municipal elections were once
again postponed, leaving unelected councils in place
seven years after the revolution, and figures associ-
ated with the old regime increased their influence
over the vulnerable political system, for example
by securing passage of a new amnesty law despite
strong public opposition. The extension of a two-year-
old state of emergency also signaled the erosion of
democratic order in Tunisia.
Tunisia’s security situation has been undermined by
lawlessness in neighboring Libya, where disputes
between rival authorities in the east and west have
led to political paralysis. Reports of modern-day slave
markets were added to other abuses against refugees
and migrants stranded in militia-run detention camps.
Their captivity in Libya stems in part from an EU-led
crackdown on human trafficking across the Mediter-
ranean.
Libya’s problems also pose a threat to Egypt. The
authoritarian government of President Abdel Fat-
tah al-Sisi has allegedly supported the anti-Islamist
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
16

campaign of the de facto government in eastern Libya
in order to buttress its own floundering efforts to
combat extremist violence, which has extended from
the Sinai to touch all corners of Egypt. Rather than
reforming its abusive security services and enlisting
support from all segments of Egyptian society, how-
ever, the regime continued its repression of dissent in
2017 and adopted a restrictive new law designed to
choke off international funding for nongovernmental
organizations and provide legal cover for their arbi-
trary closure.
Elsewhere in the region, Iraqi forces declared victory
over the Islamic State (IS) militant group in December,
and improved security has helped to create space
for competition among newly registered parties and
candidates ahead of the 2018 elections. IS also lost
territory in Syria, but the repressive Assad regime
gained ground, and civilians in areas captured from IS
by U.S.-backed fighters faced widespread devastation
and concealed explosives.
Yemen’s civil war churned on despite a late-year rift
in the rebel alliance, leaving some three-quarters of
the population in need of humanitarian aid. Small
groups of war-weary protesters in Sanaa repeatedly
turned out to demand the release of political prison-
ers and an international response aimed at ending
the violence. The Saudi-led coalition supporting
Yemen’s ousted government continued its indiscrim-
inate bombing campaign, while in Saudi Arabia itself,
Mohammed bin Salman worked to consolidate power
after replacing the previous crown prince in June.
Among other rapid and opaque decisions during
the year, he arbitrarily detained hundreds of princes,
officials, and businessmen under the pretense of an
anticorruption campaign.
Sub-Saharan Africa
New leaders from old parties
may fail to bring reform
New leaders replaced longtime incumbents in Angola
and Zimbabwe in 2017, but their background in the
ruling elite raised doubts about their promises of
change.
The dramatic exit of President Robert Mugabe in late
2017 left the future of democracy in Zimbabwe un-
certain. While his departure after nearly four decades
in office was widely welcomed, he resigned under
pressure from the military, and his successor, former
vice president and ruling party stalwart Emmerson
Mnangagwa, was a key member of Mugabe’s repres-
sive regime.
In Angola, newly elected president João Lourenço
began to dismantle the family-based power structure
set up by his predecessor, José Eduardo dos Santos,
who served as president for 38 years and was still
head of the ruling party. In one of his first moves as
head of state, Lourenço, a ruling party member who
had served as dos Santos’s defense minister, fired the
former leader’s daughter as chairwoman of the nation-
al oil company. It remained unclear, however, whether
Lourenço would tackle corruption comprehensively or
58% 66% 33%
MIDDLE EAST: STATUS BY POPULATION
22%
11%
67%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
39%
43%
18%
WORLD: STATUS
25%
30%
MIDDLE EAST: STATUS BY COUNTRY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
STATUS BY COUNTRY
WORLD: STATUS
Total p
7.4
Total population
1.02billion
Total population
424.8million
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
Total
countries
18
Total
countries
49
co
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA:
58% 66% 33%
MIDDLE EAST: STATUS BY POPULATION
22%
11%
67%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
39%
43%
18%
WORLD: ST
25%
30%
MIDDLE EAST: STATUS BY COUNTRY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
STATUS BY COUNTRY
WORLD: STA
TotTotal population
1.02billion
Total population
424.8million
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
83%
12%
5%
Total
countries
18
Total
countries
49
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA:
STATUS BY COUNTRY
Freedom House
17

simply consolidate his own control over the levers of
power and public wealth.
Leaders in several other countries clung to power,
often at the expense of their citizens’ basic rights.
Kenya’s Supreme Court initially won broad praise for
annulling the results of what it deemed to be a flawed
presidential election. However, the period before
the court-mandated rerun was marred by a lack of
substantive reforms, incidents of political violence,
and a boycott by the main opposition candidate, Raila
Odinga. These factors undermined the credibility
of President Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory, in which he
claimed 98 percent of the vote amid low turnout.
In neighboring Tanzania, the government of Presi-
dent John Magufuli—who took office in 2015 as a
member of the only ruling party the country has ever
known—stepped up repression of dissent, detaining
opposition politicians, shuttering media outlets, and
arresting citizens for posting critical views on social
media. And in Uganda, 73-year-old president Yoweri
Museveni, in power since 1986, sought to remove the
presidential age limit of 75, which would permit him to
run again in 2021. Museveni had just won reelection
the previous year in a process that featured police
violence, internet shutdowns, and treason charges
against his main challenger.
Even in South Africa, a relatively strong democratic
performer, the corrosive effect of perpetual incumben-
cy on leaders and parties was apparent. A major cor-
ruption scandal continued to plague President Jacob
Zuma, with additional revelations about the wealthy
Gupta family’s vast influence over his government.
The story played a role in the ruling African National
Congress’s December leadership election, in which
Zuma’s ex-wife and ally, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was
defeated by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.
The Gambia’s status improved from
Not Free to Partly Free due to the
installation of newly elected president
Adama Barrow into office in January and the
holding of competitive legislative elections in
April. Among other openings associated with
the departure of former president Yahya
Jammeh, exiled journalists and activists
returned, political prisoners were released,
ministers declared their assets to an ombuds-
man, and the press union began work on
media-sector reform.
Timor-Leste’s status improved from
Partly Free to Free due to fair elections
that led to a smooth transfer of power
and enabled new parties and candidates to
enter the political system.
Turkey’s status declined from Partly
Free to Not Free due to a deeply flawed
constitutional referendum that centralized
power in the presidency, the mass replacement
of elected mayors with government appointees,
arbitrary prosecutions of rights activists and
other perceived enemies of the state, and
continued purges of state employees, all of
which have left citizens hesitant to express
their views on sensitive topics.
Uganda’s status improved from Not
Free to Partly Free due to the resilience
of the media sector and the willingness
of journalists, bloggers, and citizens to voice
their opinions, though the political environ-
ment remained tightly restricted under the
regime of long-ruling president Yoweri Museve-
ni.
Zimbabwe’s status declined from Partly
Free to Not Free due to the process by
which elected president Robert Mugabe was
compelled to resign in November under
pressure from the military.
Status Changes
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
18

FREE
PARTLY FREE
NOT FREE
Trend Arrows
Ecuador received an upward trend arrow due to reduced
pressure on the media and civil society, as well as progress on
anticorruption efforts, under newly elected president Lenín More-
no.
Nepal received an upward trend arrow due to the first
national, regional, and local elections held under a new
constitution, with high voter turnout despite some reports of
violence.
Bolivia received a downward trend arrow due to a constitu-
tional court ruling that abolished term limits and paved the
way for President Evo Morales to run for a fourth term in 2019.
Cambodia received a downward trend arrow due to a crack-
down on the political opposition, including the dissolution of
the main opposition party and treason charges against its leader.
Hong Kong received a downward trend arrow due to the
expulsion of four prodemocracy lawmakers from the legisla-
ture, jail sentences against protest leaders, and other apparent
efforts by pro-Beijing authorities to stamp out a movement calling
for local self-determination.
Hungary received a downward trend arrow due to increasing
intimidation of civil society groups and the opposition, which
has left citizens more reluctant to speak out on political topics.
Morocco received a downward trend arrow due to harsh
state responses to major demonstrations throughout the
year.
Serbia received a downward trend arrow due to President
Aleksandar Vučić’s continued consolidation of power, includ-
ing through opaque party financing methods, politicization of law
enforcement, and attempts to undermine critical journalists with
financial investigations and smears in government-friendly media.
Tanzania received a downward trend arrow due to mounting
repression of the opposition, media outlets, and social media
users who are critical of the increasingly authoritarian president,
John Magufuli.
Tunisia received a downward trend arrow due to further
postponement of municipal elections and growing pressure
on the political system from powerful elements of the former
regime.
66% 33%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
39%
43%
18%
25%
30%
45%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
STATUS BY COUNTRY
Total population
7.4billion
Total population
1.02billion
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
Total
countries
49
Total
countries
195
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: STATUS BY POPULATION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
39%
43%
18%
25%
30%
45%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
STATUS BY COUNTRY
Total population
7.4billion
Total population
1.02billion
37%
24%
39%
37%
52%
11%
Total
countries
49
Total
countries
195
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: STATUS BY COUNTRY
Freedom House
19

Notes
FREEDOM
IN THE WORLD
2018
Democracy in Crisis
20

Freedom in one
country depends on
freedom for all.

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8/29/2018 Myanmar | Freedom House
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/myanmar 1/17
FREEDOM STATUS: PARTLY FREE
Freedom in the World Scores
Aggregate Score: 31/100 (0=Least Free,
100=Most Free)
Population:
Capital:
GDP/capita:
Press Freedom Status:
Net Freedom Status:
Quick Facts
52,400,000
Nay Pyi Taw
$1,139
Not Free
Not Free
Myanmar Pro le
5/75/7
Freedom Rating
5/75/7
Political Rights
5/75/7
Civil Liberties
(1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)

Overview:
Myanmar’s democratic transition now appears uncertain under the
leadership of the National League for Democracy (NLD), which
came to power in relatively free elections in 2015, but has since failed
to uphold fundamental human rights or bring security to areas
affected by militant insurgencies and the army’s offensives against
them. In 2017, a military clearance operation in response to an armed
insurgency forced more than 650,000 members of the country’s
Muslim Rohingya minority to flee to Bangladesh, in what the Office
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called “a textbook
example of ethnic cleansing.” The military retains significant
influence over politics.
Key Developments in 2017:
Military forces launched security clearance operations against
Rohingya communities in Rakhine State, which reportedly
included torture, rape, indiscriminate killing, and the burning of
villages, worsening already dire humanitarian conditions and
causing an outflow of more than 650,000 Rohingya refugees to
Bangladesh. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi drew withering
criticism from international observers for her reluctance to
explicitly condemn violence by the military against the
Rohingya.
In January, U Ko Ni, a prominent Muslim lawyer, democracy
advocate, and advisor to the NLD, was assassinated at the
Yangon airport, in what was interpreted as a warning to
democracy and rights activists in the country.
Prosecutions for defamation under the 2013
Telecommunications Act continued under the NLD

government. Though the parliament amended the law to reduce
the maximum prison sentence for defamation to two years from
three, lawmakers chose to retain the key restrictive elements.
Political Rights and Civil
Liberties:
POLITICAL RIGHTS: 13 / 40 (–1)
A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 5 / 12
A1. Was the current head of government or other chief
national authority elected through free and fair elections? 2 / 4
The legislature elects the president, who is chief of state and head of
government. Military members have the right to nominate one of the
three presidential candidates, and the elected members of each
chamber nominate the other two. The candidate with the largest
number of votes in a combined parliamentary vote wins the
presidency; the other two candidates become vice presidents. Htin
Kyaw, the NLD candidate, won the presidency in the 2016 election.
NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi holds the powerful position of state
counselor, a post akin to that of a prime minister. The NLD created
the oﬃce and named Aung San Suu Kyi to it in 2016, through
legislation designed to circumvent constitutional provisions that
prevented her from running for president.
The commander in chief of the armed forces holds broad powers and
is selected through opaque processes by the military-dominated
National Defense and Security Council (NDSC).

A2. Were the current national legislative representatives
elected through free and fair elections? 2 / 4
Under the 2008 military-drafted constitution, the bicameral
Assembly of the Union consists of the 440-seat lower House of
Representatives and the 224-seat upper House of Nationalities.
Representatives serve five-year terms. A quarter of the seats in both
houses are reserved for the military and filled through appointment
by the commander in chief of the armed forces.
International electoral observers concluded that the 2015 legislative
polls were generally credible and that the outcome reflected the will
of the people, despite a campaign period marked by anti-Muslim
rhetoric, the exclusion of Muslim candidates, and the
disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims.
The NLD won 135 of the 168 elected seats in the upper house, 255 of
330 elected seats in the lower house, and 496 of 659 seats across 14
state and regional legislatures. The military-backed Union Solidarity
and Development Party (USDP) placed second with 12 seats in the
upper house, 30 in the lower house, and 76 in the states and regions.
(Myanmar’s first-past-the-post system allowed the NLD to translate
its popular vote margin into a much larger majority in terms of seats;
it took 57 percent of the popular vote, compared with the USDP’s 28
percent.) The remaining seats were captured by ethnic minority and
other parties and independents.
A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they
implemented impartially by the relevant election management
bodies? 1 / 4
Numerous legal provisions unduly influence electoral results. A
quarter of all legislative seats are unelected, and instead appointed
by the military leadership. Rigid citizenship laws have resulted in the
disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the population.

Citizenship laws and excessive residency requirements prohibit
many people from standing for office.
The Union Election Commission (UEC), which is responsible for
election administration, operates opaquely, and regulations allow it
to adjudicate complaints against itself. Election monitors have
expressed concern about the potential for early voting procedures to
facilitate fraudulent voting.
Constitutional provisions barred Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming
president due to the foreign nationality of her immediate family
members, thus prompting the NLD to pass legislation establishing
her role as “state counselor.”
B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND
PARTICIPATION: 8 / 16
B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different
political parties or other competitive political groupings of their
choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and
fall of these competing parties or groupings? 2 / 4
New political parties were generally allowed to register and compete
in the 2015 elections, which featured fewer restrictions on party
organization and voter mobilization than the 2010 vote. Only
sporadic interference from government officials was reported.
Ninety-one parties competed in the elections, and many of them,
including the NLD, convened meetings and large rallies throughout
the country.
However, some legal provisions can be invoked to restrict parties’
operations. The constitution contains a requirement that political
parties be loyal to the state, which has the potential for abuse. Laws
allow for penalties, including deregistration, against political parties
that accept support from foreign governments or religious bodies, or

which are deemed to have abused religion for political purposes or
disrespected the constitution.
B2.      Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to
increase its support or gain power through elections? 3 / 4
As evidenced by the NLD’s overwhelming parliamentary victory in
2015, there is a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its
support and gain power through elections. However, the military still
retains substantial influence over politics under a nondemocratic
constitution.
B3.      Are the people’s political choices free from domination by
the military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic
oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not
democratically accountable? 2 / 4
The results of the 2015 election and subsequent transition talks
suggest a waning ability or determination by the military to influence
electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, the military retains considerable
power over political affairs, and many former military officers hold
positions in the country’s bureaucracy. The 2008 constitution allows
the military to dissolve the civilian government and parliament and
rule directly if the president declares a state of emergency. It has the
right to administer its own affairs.
B4.      Do various segments of the population (including ethnic,
religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full
political rights and electoral opportunities? 1 / 4
Minority groups face restrictions on their political rights and
electoral opportunities. In particular, citizenship, residency, and
party registration laws disadvantage the mainly Muslim Rohingya,
who were rendered stateless by a 1982 law. In 2015, under pressure
from Buddhist nationalists, the president issued a decree revoking

the temporary identification cards, or “white cards,” that had
allowed Rohingya to vote in previous elections. A Constitutional
Tribunal ruling later in 2015 then found that voting by white-card
holders was unconstitutional. Nearly all Rohingya were consequently
left off the voter rolls for the 2015 elections. Additionally, a sitting
Rohingya lawmaker from the USDP was barred from running in the
polls.
Other Muslims with citizenship documents were able to vote, but of
more than 6,000 candidates on the final list, only about 28 were
Muslim. No Muslim sits in the current parliament.
While ethnic parties generally fared poorly in the 2015 legislative
elections, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and
the Arakan National Party (ANP) performed well in their respective
states.
Women remain underrepresented in the government and civil
service, due largely to social pressures that discourage their political
participation. Notwithstanding the prominence of Aung San Suu Kyi,
whose father led Myanmar’s independence struggle, few women have
achieved ministerial-level appointments.
C. FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT: 4 / 12
C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national
legislative representatives determine the policies of the
government? 2 / 4
Though the NLD began in 2016 to lay out plans for policy changes
among its various ministry portfolios, the military remains a
dominant force in policymaking, particularly through its
constitutional control over the Defense, Home Affairs, and Border
Affairs Ministries. The military effectively controls at least six seats

on the powerful 11-member NDSC. Over one-fifth of the total budget
is devoted to the military.
C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and
effective? 1 / 4
Corruption is rampant at both the national and local levels and
recent government initiatives aimed at curbing it have generally not
produced meaningful results. For example, an Anti-Corruption
Commission established in 2014 has only penalized a handful of
people.
Privatization of state-owned companies and other economic reforms
in recent years have allegedly benefited family members and
associates of senior officials. The government has ignored tax
evasion by the country’s wealthiest companies and individuals.
C3. Does the government operate with openness and
transparency? 1 / 4
The government does not operate with openness and transparency.
A draft Right to Information Law developed in 2016 remains stalled
in the parliament. Some information about the budget has been
released in recent years, and saw limited parliamentary scrutiny.
ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY POLITICAL
RIGHTS QUESTION
ADD Q: Is the government or occupying power deliberately
changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as
to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of
another group? –4 / 0 (–1)
The government has long used violence, displacement, and other
tactics to alter the demographics of states with ethnic unrest or

insurgencies. The Rohingya in Rakhine State have faced particularly
harsh restrictions for decades, including limits on family size and the
ability and right to marry, the denial of legal status and social
services, and disenfranchisement and loss of citizenship. Human
rights experts and the United Nations have labeled the abuses
against the Rohingya as crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing, while some analysts have argued that they constitute
either genocide or a precursor to genocide.
Repression of the Rohingya escalated in August 2017, after armed
men from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), formerly
known as Harakah al-Yaqin, attacked multiple police posts with
rudimentary weapons. Burmese military forces launched a severe
counteroperation on Rohingya communities across the northern part
of the state, leading to reports of torture, rape, indiscriminate
killings, and the burning of villages, worsening already-dire
humanitarian conditions, and causing an outﬂow of more than
650,000 Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh. In September, the head of
the Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights deemed
the situation “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” NLD leader
Aung San Suu Kyi has drawn withering criticism from international
observers for her reluctance to explicitly condemn violence against
the Rohingya.
Score Change: The score declined from –3 to –4 because of renewed
violence against Rohingya communities in Rakhine state, which
resulted in the forced displacement of over 650,000 people to
Bangladesh amid reports of torture, rape, and indiscriminate killing
by military forces.
CIVIL LIBERTIES: 18 / 60

D. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BELIEF: 6 /
16 (–1)
D1. Are there free and independent media? 2 / 4
Media freedoms have improved since the official end of government
censorship and prepublication approval in 2012. However, existing
laws allow authorities to deny licenses to outlets whose reporting is
considered insulting to religion or a national security danger, and the
threat of prosecution under criminal defamation laws encourages
self-censorship. Journalists and social media users continued to face
defamation cases in 2017. Surveillance of journalists by the military-
controlled Home Affairs Ministry remains a common practice.
Reporters covering sensitive topics risk harassment, physical
violence, and imprisonment. In June 2017, three journalists covering
an antidrug rally conducted by an ethnic armed organization were
arrested and imprisoned on junta-era charges of unlawful
association, despite a provision in the 2014 News Media Law that
exempts journalists from detention while covering conflicts. Two
Reuters journalists were imprisoned and charged in December under
the State Secrets Act while covering the conflict in Rakhine State.
Previous constraints on internet access have largely unraveled, and
the proliferation of smartphones has rapidly increased usage.
However, internet activity is still subject to criminal punishment
under several broadly worded legal provisions, particularly those in
the Electronic Transactions Law.
D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious
faith or nonbelief in public and private? 1 / 4
The constitution provides for freedom of religion. It distinguishes
Buddhism as the majority religion, but also recognizes Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, and animism. The government occasionally

interferes with religious assemblies and attempts to control the
Buddhist clergy. Authorities have also discriminated against minority
religious groups, refusing to grant them permission to hold
gatherings and restricting educational activities, proselytizing, and
construction of houses of worship.
Anti-Muslim hate speech and discrimination has been amplified by
social media, and some state institutions and mainstream news
websites. Ma Ba Tha, or the Committee for the Protection of
Nationality and Religion, agitates for the protection of Buddhist
privileges, urges boycotts against Muslim-run businesses, and
disseminates anti-Muslim propaganda. Reports have shown
systematic discrimination against Muslims in obtaining identity
cards, as well as the spread of “Muslim-free” villages with the
complicity of officials.
D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system
free from extensive political indoctrination? 1 / 4
Political activity on university campuses is generally restricted.
Student unions are discouraged, have no formal registration
mechanisms, and are viewed with suspicion by authorities.
D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on
political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or
retribution? 2 / 4 (–1)
Free private discussion is constrained by state surveillance and laws
that inhibit online speech. Numerous defamation cases involving
online commentary have been filed under Article 66(d) of the 2013
Telecommunications Law, which includes broadly worded bans on
online activity deemed to be threatening or defamatory. The rights
organization Free Expression Myanmar found 106 cases of
complaints made under Article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act
between November 2015 and November 2017, most of which were

ﬁled under the NLD government. The law was amended in August
2017 to reduce the maximum penalty for violations to two years,
from three previously.
Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 due to continued
arrests under Article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law, and
the parliament’s move to preserve its repressive nature during an
amendment process.
E. ASSOCIATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
RIGHTS: 6 / 12 (+1)
E1. Is there freedom of assembly? 2 / 4
Under the 2014 revised Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession
Law, unauthorized demonstrations are punishable with up to six
months in prison; a variety of other vaguely worded violations can
draw lesser penalties. An antigovernment protest by farmers in April
2017 was permitted, while in February a medical student was
arrested for protesting against violence in Rakhine State.
E2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations,
particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and
governance-related work? 2 / 4
The 2014 Association Registration Law features simple, voluntary
registration procedures for local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and no restrictions or criminal punishments
for noncompliance. Although the law was seen a positive
development, in 2015 the Home Aﬀairs Ministry issued
implementing regulations that required NGOs to obtain government
approval prior to registration, drawing sharp criticism from civil
society leaders.

Surveillance of activists by the military-controlled Home Affairs
Ministry continued in 2017.
E3.      Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional
or labor organizations? 2 / 4 (+1)
Independent trade unions were banned until 2011, and while union
organizers continue to face retaliation for their work, union activity
has nevertheless taken root in Myanmar. In recent years, factory
workers have held strikes in Yangon with fewer repercussions and
arrests than in the past. And in late 2017, in response to activism by
workers, a government committee approved a 33 percent increase in
the national daily minimum wage to approximately $3.56, which was
expected to take effect in 2018.
Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because labor
activity has increased gradually over recent years, and labor
activists have faced fewer arrests and other repercussions.
F. RULE OF LAW: 1 / 16
F1.       Is there an independent judiciary? 0 / 4
The judiciary is not independent. Judges are appointed or approved
by the government and adjudicate cases according to its decrees.
F2.       Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters? 1 /
4
Administrative detention laws allow individuals to be held without
charge, trial, or access to legal counsel for up to five years if deemed
a threat to state security or sovereignty. A 2017 assessment by the
British-based NGO Justice Base, which promotes the rule of law,
found that the country performed poorly in nearly every measure of
international fair trial standards. According to a report by the

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), at the end of
November, 228 individuals were being repressed due to political
activities, of whom 46 were currently serving sentences, 49 were in
pretrial detention, and 133 were awaiting trial outside of prison.
In 2016, the parliament repealed the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act,
which the previous military government had invoked frequently to
silence and imprison dissidents.
F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical
force and freedom from war and insurgencies? 0 / 4
In January, U Ko Ni, a prominent Muslim lawyer, democracy
advocate, and advisor to the NLD, was assassinated at the Yangon
airport, in what was interpreted as a warning to democracy and
rights activists in the country. He had reportedly received death
threats from nationalists prior to his murder. While several people
were arrested in connection with his killing, at year’s end no one had
been convicted of it.
The NLD government’s push for the creation of a more
comprehensive peace mechanism continued to be hampered by
military offensives against various ethnic rebel groups, particularly in
Shan and Kachin States, attacks by such groups against security
forces, and continued divisions among signatories and non-
signatories to a 2015 national cease-fire agreement. Reports of
indiscriminate shelling, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances,
and other abuses by the military continued, as militant groups
engaged in forced disappearances and forced recruitment. Areas in
the north remain riddled with land mines planted by both militants
and the army. Authorities at times prevented aid groups from
reaching populations affected by violence.
Prison conditions are frequently life-threatening.

F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal
treatment of various segments of the population? 0 / 4
Some of the country’s worst human rights abuses, commonly
committed by government troops, are against ethnic and religious
minorities. The government’s failure to protect victims, conduct
investigations, and punish perpetrators is well documented.
In August 2017, military forces launched a supposed antiterrorist
clearance operation against Rohingya communities in northern
Rakhine State, which reportedly included torture, rape,
indiscriminate killing, and the burning of villages, worsening already
dire humanitarian conditions and causing an outflow of more than
650,000 Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh. The NLD government in
June refused entry to a UN–mandated fact-finding mission
commissioned in the wake of similar attacks and refugee
displacement that took place in 2016.
The anti-Muslim Ma Ba Tha and the similar 969 movement have
been accused of stoking outbreaks of violence with inflammatory
sermons, leaflets, and other materials, and local government officials
have actively sought out administrative loopholes to destroy Muslim
schools and houses of worship.
A number of laws create a hostile environment for LGBT (lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender) people. Same-sex sexual conduct is
criminalized under the penal code, and police subject LGBT people
to harassment, extortion, and physical and sexual abuse.
G. PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS: 5 / 16
G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the
ability to change their place of residence, employment, or
education? 2 / 4

Freedom of internal travel is generally respected outside of conflict
zones. Numerous exiled activists who returned to the country have
experienced substantial delays and evasion from government
authorities when attempting to renew visas and residency permits.
Illegal toll collection by state and nonstate actors has been a problem
in some areas. The parliament voted in 2016 to repeal a long-
standing rule requiring overnight houseguests to be registered with
local authorities. Guests staying for more than a month must still be
registered.
G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property
and establish private businesses without undue interference
from state or nonstate actors? 1 / 4
Contentious disputes over land grabbing and business projects that
violate human rights continued in 2017. Instances of forced eviction
and displacement, lack of sufficient compensation, and direct
violence by state security officials abound. The NLD government’s
Central Committee on Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands,
formed in 2016 has been accused of releasing data that omits land
grabs initiated by the military, other government bodies, and
corporations.
In December 2017, President Htin Kyaw approved a law that would
simplify processes for establishing private businesses, though it had
not been implemented by year’s end.
G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including
choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from
domestic violence, and control over appearance? 1 / 4
Laws protecting women from violence and exploitation are
inadequate, and violence against women is a persistent problem. The
army has a record of using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic

minority women, and security personnel typically enjoy impunity for
sexual violence.
G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom
from economic exploitation? 1 / 4
While the government has made increased efforts to identify and
prosecute human trafficking, it remains a serious problem. Child
labor is widespread. Various commercial and other interests
continue to use forced labor despite a formal ban on the practice
since 2000. Trafficking victims include women and girls subjected to
forced sex work and domestic servitude.
Scoring Key: X / Y (Z)
X = Score Received
Y = Best Possible Score
Z = Change from Previous Year
Full Methodology
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© 2018 Freedom House

8/29/2018 Myanmar
https://freedomhouse.org/print/50082 1/22
Published on Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org)
Home Myanmar
Myanmar
Country:
Myanmar
Year:
2018
Freedom Status:
Partly Free
Political Rights:
5
Civil Liberties:
5
Aggregate Score:
31
Freedom Rating:
5.0
Overview:

8/29/2018 Myanmar
Myanmar’s democratic transition now appears uncertain under
the leadership of the National League for Democracy (NLD),
which came to power in relatively free elections in 2015, but has
since failed to uphold fundamental human rights or bring security
to areas affected by militant insurgencies and the army’s
offensives against them. In 2017, a military clearance operation
in response to an armed insurgency forced more than 650,000
members of the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority to flee to
Bangladesh, in what the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights called “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”
The military retains significant influence over politics.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties:
POLITICAL RIGHTS: 13 / 40 (–1)
A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 5 / 12
A1. Was the current head of government or other chief
national authority elected through free and fair elections? 2 / 4
The legislature elects the president, who is chief of state and
head of government. Military members have the right to
nominate one of the three presidential candidates, and the
elected members of each chamber nominate the other two. The

8/29/2018 Myanmar
candidate with the largest number of votes in a combined
parliamentary vote wins the presidency; the other two candidates
become vice presidents. Htin Kyaw, the NLD candidate, won the
presidency in the 2016 election.
NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi holds the powerful position of
state counselor, a post akin to that of a prime minister. The NLD
created the office and named Aung San Suu Kyi to it in 2016,
through legislation designed to circumvent constitutional
provisions that prevented her from running for president.
The commander in chief of the armed forces holds broad powers
and is selected through opaque processes by the military-
dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC).
A2. Were the current national legislative representatives
elected through free and fair elections? 2 / 4
Under the 2008 military-drafted constitution, the bicameral
Assembly of the Union consists of the 440-seat lower House of
Representatives and the 224-seat upper House of Nationalities.
Representatives serve five-year terms. A quarter of the seats in
both houses are reserved for the military and filled through
appointment by the commander in chief of the armed forces.

8/29/2018 Myanmar
International electoral observers concluded that the 2015
legislative polls were generally credible and that the outcome
reflected the will of the people, despite a campaign period
marked by anti-Muslim rhetoric, the exclusion of Muslim
candidates, and the disenfranchisement of hundreds of
thousands of Rohingya Muslims. The NLD won 135 of the 168
elected seats in the upper house, 255 of 330 elected seats in the
lower house, and 496 of 659 seats across 14 state and regional
legislatures. The military-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP) placed second with 12 seats in the
upper house, 30 in the lower house, and 76 in the states and
regions. (Myanmar’s first-past-the-post system allowed the NLD
to translate its popular vote margin into a much larger majority in
terms of seats; it took 57 percent of the popular vote, compared
with the USDP’s 28 percent.) The remaining seats were
captured by ethnic minority and other parties and independents.
A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they
implemented impartially by the relevant election management
bodies? 1 / 4
Numerous legal provisions unduly influence electoral results. A
quarter of all legislative seats are unelected, and instead
appointed by the military leadership. Rigid citizenship laws have
resulted in the disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the

8/29/2018 Myanmar
population. Citizenship laws and excessive residency
requirements prohibit many people from standing for office.
The Union Election Commission (UEC), which is responsible for
election administration, operates opaquely, and regulations allow
it to adjudicate complaints against itself. Election monitors have
expressed concern about the potential for early voting
procedures to facilitate fraudulent voting.
Constitutional provisions barred Aung San Suu Kyi from
becoming president due to the foreign nationality of her
immediate family members, thus prompting the NLD to pass
legislation establishing her role as “state counselor.”
B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION: 8
/ 16
B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different
political parties or other competitive political groupings of their
choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise
and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 2 / 4
New political parties were generally allowed to register and
compete in the 2015 elections, which featured fewer restrictions
on party organization and voter mobilization than the 2010 vote.

8/29/2018 Myanmar
Only sporadic interference from government officials was
reported. Ninety-one parties competed in the elections, and
many of them, including the NLD, convened meetings and large
rallies throughout the country.
However, some legal provisions can be invoked to restrict
parties’ operations. The constitution contains a requirement that
political parties be loyal to the state, which has the potential for
abuse. Laws allow for penalties, including deregistration, against
political parties that accept support from foreign governments or
religious bodies, or which are deemed to have abused religion
for political purposes or disrespected the constitution.
B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to
increase its support or gain power through elections? 3 / 4
As evidenced by the NLD’s overwhelming parliamentary victory
in 2015, there is a realistic opportunity for the opposition to
increase its support and gain power through elections. However,
the military still retains substantial influence over politics under a
nondemocratic constitution.
B3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination
by the military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic
oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not
democratically accountable? 2 / 4

8/29/2018 Myanmar
The results of the 2015 election and subsequent transition talks
suggest a waning ability or determination by the military to
influence electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, the military retains
considerable power over political affairs, and many former
military officers hold positions in the country’s bureaucracy. The
2008 constitution allows the military to dissolve the civilian
government and parliament and rule directly if the president
declares a state of emergency. It has the right to administer its
own affairs.
B4. Do various segments of the population (including
ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups)
have full political rights and electoral opportunities? 1 / 4
Minority groups face restrictions on their political rights and
electoral opportunities. In particular, citizenship, residency, and
party registration laws disadvantage the mainly Muslim
Rohingya, who were rendered stateless by a 1982 law. In 2015,
under pressure from Buddhist nationalists, the president issued a
decree revoking the temporary identification cards, or “white
cards,” that had allowed Rohingya to vote in previous elections.
A Constitutional Tribunal ruling later in 2015 then found that
voting by white-card holders was unconstitutional. Nearly all
Rohingya were consequently left off the voter rolls for the 2015

8/29/2018 Myanmar
elections. Additionally, a sitting Rohingya lawmaker from the
USDP was barred from running in the polls.
Other Muslims with citizenship documents were able to vote, but
of more than 6,000 candidates on the final list, only about 28
were Muslim. No Muslim sits in the current parliament.
While ethnic parties generally fared poorly in the 2015 legislative
elections, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD)
and the Arakan National Party (ANP) performed well in their
respective states.
Women remain underrepresented in the government and civil
service, due largely to social pressures that discourage their
political participation. Notwithstanding the prominence of Aung
San Suu Kyi, whose father led Myanmar’s independence
struggle, few women have achieved ministerial-level
appointments.
C. FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT: 4 / 12
C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national
legislative representatives determine the policies of the
government? 2 / 4

8/29/2018 Myanmar
Though the NLD began in 2016 to lay out plans for policy
changes among its various ministry portfolios, the military
remains a dominant force in policymaking, particularly through its
constitutional control over the Defense, Home Affairs, and
Border Affairs Ministries. The military effectively controls at least
six seats on the powerful 11-member NDSC. Over one-fifth of
the total budget is devoted to the military.
C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and
effective? 1 / 4
Corruption is rampant at both the national and local levels and
recent government initiatives aimed at curbing it have generally
not produced meaningful results. For example, an Anti-
Corruption Commission established in 2014 has only penalized a
handful of people.
Privatization of state-owned companies and other economic
reforms in recent years have allegedly benefited family members
and associates of senior officials. The government has ignored
tax evasion by the country’s wealthiest companies and
individuals.
C3. Does the government operate with openness and
transparency? 1 / 4

8/29/2018 Myanmar
The government does not operate with openness and
transparency. A draft Right to Information Law developed in
2016 remains stalled in the parliament. Some information about
the budget has been released in recent years, and saw limited
parliamentary scrutiny.
ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY POLITICAL
RIGHTS QUESTION
ADD Q: Is the government or occupying power deliberately
changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as
to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of
another group? –4 / 0 (–1)
The government has long used violence, displacement, and
other tactics to alter the demographics of states with ethnic
unrest or insurgencies. The Rohingya in Rakhine State have
faced particularly harsh restrictions for decades, including limits
on family size and the ability and right to marry, the denial of
legal status and social services, and disenfranchisement and
loss of citizenship. Human rights experts and the United Nations
have labeled the abuses against the Rohingya as crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing, while some analysts have argued
that they constitute either genocide or a precursor to genocide.

FREEDOM HOUSE ORGANIZATION AND MYANMAR

FREEDOM HOUSE ORGANIZATION AND MYANMAR

FREEDOM HOUSE ORGANIZATION AND MYANMAR

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